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Abstract 
 
The mere exposure effect (MEE) was first identified by Zajonc (1968:1) who observed 
that, “the mere repeated exposure of the individual to a stimulus is a sufficient condition 
for the enhancement of his attitude towards it. By ‘mere exposure’ is meant a condition 
which just makes the given stimulus accessible to the individual's perception.” Since 
then, this robust experimental phenomenon has been demonstrated in over 300 studies in 
the psychology literature; most often in relation to changes in affective response to 
abstract, novel stimuli (for reviews see Harrison, 1977; Bornstein, 1989; Bornstein and 
Craver-Lemley, 2004). Given that it provides a theoretical and empirical framework 
within which to explore and explain the attitudinal effects of repeated, fleeting 
communication that receives minimal attention and elaboration, it has been deemed to 
be most important to the fields of marketing and consumer behaviour (Bornstein and 
Craver-Lemley, 2004). Indeed, it may be considered to be particularly relevant in the 
context of a contemporary consumption environment that is largely characterised by a 
proliferation of brands, media and messages, the fragmentation of traditional channels 
and audiences, and thus low levels of consumer attention, engagement and involvement. 
Under such conditions, it may be argued that the MEE constitutes a potentially 
important means by which to study, understand and shape the effects of simple, repeated 
brand communication.  
 
However, it is important to acknowledge that the nature of marketing stimuli, 
consumption-based evaluation and decision-making, and the context in which this 
occurs is often quite different from the laboratory conditions in which the MEE has been 
demonstrated in psychological research. As such, there is a need to robustly test the 
assumptions that may be drawn from four decades of experimental research in 
psychology before they can be confidently applied in the specific domain of marketing. 
At the same time, however, it is important to stress that the MEE represents just one of 
an array of potential influences on real-world consumer processing and decision-
making. Furthermore, and within the constraints of current methodological alternatives, 
it is arguably impossible to isolate, identify and examine this phenomenon alone in such 
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a complex natural environment. As such, it is necessary to take an incremental approach 
to the extension of abstract psychological research in the marketing domain; to carefully 
bridge the gap between pure psychological understanding and that which relates 
specifically to consumer behaviour. A relatively small body of experimental marketing 
research has endeavoured to begin this process; although (it will be argued) current 
findings regarding the occurrence and nature of the marketing-based MEE are somewhat 
limited, often equivocal and subject to some important limitations.  
 
The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to underpin and extend the incremental 
development of first-principles mere exposure research in the marketing domain. To this 
end, it provides a comprehensive review of both the state of current psychological 
understanding and the degree to which it has been applied in the marketing literature, 
prior to a robust examination of the existence, size and nature of this phenomenon in a 
marketing context. This is achieved by marrying the highly controlled experimental 
methods of psychological mere exposure research with the use of typical marketing 
stimuli, brand-related evaluation and a relatively large sample (as is common in the 
broader field of marketing research but not, as yet, with regard to the MEE in 
particular).  
 
The results of this empirical work are somewhat surprising and challenge previous 
assumptions regarding the influence of recognition memory and the direction of the 
exposure-induced affect-bias. Taken together, they support a ‘dual-processing’ model of 
mere exposure, incorporating two forms of the MEE that are underpinned by the 
processes of implicit and explicit memory respectively. This model has potentially 
significant implications for theory, practice and further research in the fields of both 
psychology and marketing; all of which are discussed in the final part of the thesis. 
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“With the sophisticated mental apparatus we have used to build world 
eminence as a species, we have created an environment so complex, 
fast-paced, and information-laden that we must increasingly deal with it 
in the fashion of the animals we long ago transcended” 
 
Robert B Cialdini (2007) 
 
  1 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction and Overview 
 
  2 
1.1. Introduction 
 
In the concluding chapter of his acclaimed work on the psychology of persuasion, 
Robert Cialdini (2007: 275) observes that, as human beings; 
“we are unchallenged in the ability to take into account a multitude of 
relevant facts and, consequently, to make good decisions. Indeed, it is this 
information-processing advantage over other species that has helped make 
us the dominant form of life on the planet. Still, we have our capacity 
limitations too; and, for the sake of efficiency, we must sometimes retreat 
from the time-consuming, sophisticated, fully informed brand of decision-
making to a more automatic, primitive, single-feature type of responding.” 
 
This thesis is concerned with a phenomenon that reflects just such a retreat. The mere 
exposure effect (Zajonc, 1968) refers to the enhancement of attitudes and preferences 
simply on the basis of brief, repeated exposure to a given stimulus in isolation. 
Specifically, its purpose is to examine the occurrence, size, direction and nature of this 
phenomenon in a marketing context, and the consequences of mere exposure for 
consumer decision-making and the effectiveness of marketing communication. The 
primary aims of this introductory chapter, therefore, are to highlight the relevance and 
importance of the mere exposure effect (MEE) in the marketing domain and provide an 
overview of the purpose and structure of the thesis. As a basis for this, however, the 
chapter begins with a brief definition and explanation of the phenomenon itself. 
  3 
1.2. The Mere Exposure Effect: A concise explanation 
 
As early as 1968 Zajonc observed that, “the mere repeated exposure of the individual to 
a stimulus is a sufficient condition for the enhancement of his attitude towards it” 
(Zajonc, 1968: 1). Since that time, the mere exposure effect (MEE) has proven to be a 
robust phenomenon in the psychology literature, having been researched in over 300 
empirical studies and in relation to nine different types of stimuli (for reviews see 
Bornstein, 1989; Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004). In this body of research, the 
enhancement of affective and cognitive response towards a stimulus has consistently 
been observed following repeated mere exposure; even (and perhaps, especially) in the 
absence of recognition memory (for reviews see Harrison, 1977; Bornstein, 1989; 
Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004). On this basis, it is widely regarded to be a product 
of the non-conscious processes of implicit memory that persists over time and is not 
mediated by socio-demographic factors (see Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004).  
 
In a real-world environment that is characterised by rapid, fleeting exposure to a 
multitude of stimuli, the mere exposure effect may thus be seen as a common and 
naturally occurring phenomenon. As Bornstein and Craver-Lemley (2004: 215) observe: 
“there are numerous everyday instances of increased liking following 
repeated exposure to a stimulus . . . not only does repeated exposure affect 
our attitude regarding a stimulus, but the process is so subtle that in most 
cases we are unaware that mere exposure played a role in altering our 
judgments and feelings.” 
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Furthermore, in a recent review of the MEE, Bornstein and Craver-Lemley (2004) stress 
that it is particularly relevant to the fields of marketing communication and consumer 
behaviour; a proposition that appears well-grounded, as will be explained below. 
 
1.3. The relevance and importance of the MEE in marketing 
 
In the context of marketing, the primary relevance and importance of the MEE lies in 
the fact that it provides a framework within which to understand and explain marketing 
communication effects under conditions of low attention and involvement (see Grimes 
2008). Such conditions have become increasingly common in a contemporary  
consumption environment that is characterized by the rapid proliferation of brands, 
messages and media, and increases in the speed and volume of communication and 
consumer decision-making (Ha and Litman, 1997; Skinner and Stephens, 2003). 
Furthermore, and on the basis of a perceived parity between the functional performance 
of brands, Heath (2004: 60) claims that consumers “no longer feel the need to seek out 
information about brands, which in turn inhibits any desire to pay active attention to 
advertising.” In doing so, he extends earlier observations that the propagation of 
communications ‘clutter’, and the fact that consumers are often involved in tasks that 
occupy attention and limit communication processing (MacInnis et al., 1991), gives rise 
to the likelihood that most marketing communication does not receive any active 
processing at all (Shapiro et al., 1997). 
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Faced with this environment, Heath (2004) observes two distinct responses from 
marketing and advertising practitioners. The ‘traditional’ response views attention as an 
essential and controllable effect of marketing communication, and sees the solution as 
making executions more ‘attention-grabbing’. However, Heath (2004: 61) argues that 
this is “a pointless exercise, because the advertising usually focuses so much on waking 
the audience up that it fails to communicate anything about the brand.” The alternative 
response is to view attention as “an incurable ailment”, that is not due to any deficiency 
in advertising but rather the effectiveness of branding, resulting in the perception 
amongst consumers that most advertising can be ignored.  The solution to a lack of 
attention is therefore to create communication with strong affective associations that can 
be processed incidentally and does not require significant levels of attention to be 
effective: 
“Certain types of advertising can operate at very low levels of attention, 
creating brand associations and emotive values which endure long after the 
advertising itself has been forgotten. These associations and values can exert 
powerful influence on brand choice. Hence we find consumers choosing 
advertised products yet unable to recall the advertising and strenuously 
denying that it has influenced their choice.” (Heath, 2004: 60). 
 
It is against this background, therefore, that the MEE might be considered to be of 
significant theoretical relevance to an understanding of affective response to marketing 
communication; and in particular the formation of attitudes, preferences and decisions at 
low levels of attention and involvement. Given that these conditions largely characterise 
the current marketing and media environment, this phenomenon might therefore be 
considered to be extremely pertinent to contemporary marketing practice. In this respect, 
the most obvious commercial application of the MEE is in improving the effectiveness 
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of brief, repeated exposures to simple marketing stimuli, and in particular those relating 
to the brand (e.g. names, logos and other imagery). Specifically, research into the MEE 
may have implications for the selection, design, organisation and placement of 
marketing stimuli, and the integration of these in multiple channels, across multiple 
media and between external and point-of-purchase environments (as will be discussed in 
chapter 8). In addition to its potential application by marketing practitioners, however, it 
is important to recognise that the MEE is a naturally occurring phenomenon; i.e. it 
happens in cluttered, dynamic environments even when there is no proactive attempt to 
manipulate exposure to a particular stimulus. From a public policy perspective, 
therefore, a deeper understanding of the nature and extent of the MEE in marketing 
communication may be required to assess, and if necessary minimise, the potential for 
negative and undesirable impacts on consumer behaviour. For example, regulation 
might be deemed to be necessary with regard to the placement and style of marketing 
communications in certain contexts, whilst consumer education may be considered 
appropriate in facilitating greater awareness, understanding and conscious control over 
the formation of preference-based decisions. 
 
Given the relevance of the MEE to both marketers and consumers alike, therefore, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that an emerging body of research has sought to explore and 
explain this phenomenon in the specific context of marketing communication. In this 
respect, the importance (and indeed necessity) of this domain-specific work should be 
acknowledged; particularly in light of the fact that purely scientific, laboratory-based 
investigations have traditionally used abstract stimuli (e.g. irregular polygons) and 
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context-free evaluations that are untypical of those encountered in the marketing 
environment. What is somewhat surprising, however, is that this stream of the marketing 
literature has remained limited in both scope and volume since Obermiller’s (1985) 
initial extension of psychological mere exposure research in this domain. Furthermore, 
the relatively small collection of marketing research that might be considered to provide 
evidence for the MEE is subject to significant theoretical and methodological constraints 
(as will be discussed in chapter 4). In light of this, the work in this thesis is designed to 
strengthen both the theoretical and empirical basis on which the principles of mere 
exposure may be understood, explained and applied in the context of marketing 
communication. In this respect, the intended contributions - and the means by which 
they will be achieved - are outlined more specifically in the following section. 
 
1.4. Thesis overview: Purpose, aims, structure and content 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to extend the relatively small body of marketing-specific 
mere exposure research, and to provide a detailed and robust examination of the MEE in 
this domain. As such, the overall aims of the thesis are to: 
1. provide a detailed review of current knowledge and understanding of the MEE in 
the discipline of psychology 
2. clarify how the MEE should be conceptualised in marketing theory 
3. critically review current evidence for the MEE in the marketing literature 
4. provide a robust empirical examination of the existence, size and nature of the 
MEE in a marketing context 
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5. extend theoretical understanding of the MEE in a marketing context 
6. identify the potential implications of the MEE for marketing practitioners and 
consumers  
 
To this end, the thesis is divided into three parts (as illustrated in figure 1.1). The first of 
these is intended to provide a comprehensive theoretical basis for empirical 
investigations of the MEE in a marketing context. It therefore begins with a detailed 
review of current knowledge and understanding of the MEE in the psychology literature 
(chapter 2). The purpose of this is to develop a broad foundation on which to critique 
previous conceptualisations of the MEE in marketing theory (in chapter 3) and current 
empirical evidence in the extant marketing literature (in chapter 4). 
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Figure 1.1: Thesis structure 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Part I: Theoretical foundation 
Chapter 2. The MEE: A critical review of the psychology literature 
Chapter 3. The MEE in marketing theory 
Chapter 4. Empirical evidence for the marketing-based MEE: A critical review 
 
Part II: Research objectives & methodology 
Chapter 5. Research objectives, methodology & experimental design 
Chapter 6. Critical issues in the research design 
 
Part III: Results, conclusions and discussion 
Chapter 7. Data analysis & results 
Chapter 8. Conclusions, discussion and implications 
Chapter 9. Contributions, limitations and further research 
 
The critical review undertaken in chapter 2 also provides a detailed theoretical basis for 
the research design in this thesis. Specifically, three fundamental propositions are 
distilled from the extant psychology literature that, it is argued, are central to 
understanding the nature of the MEE. These essentially reflect the notion that the MEE 
relates primarily to the unreinforced, enhancement of affect and is moderated by explicit 
memory of the stimulus exposure. On this basis, an empirical study is developed with a 
view to providing a detailed examination of the occurrence, size and direction of the 
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MEE in a marketing context; and specifically to test the fundamental propositions 
distilled from the psychology literature in a marketing context. As will be explained in 
part II, this is achieved by marrying the highly controlled experimental methods of 
psychological mere exposure research with the use of typical marketing stimuli and a 
relatively large sample (as is common in the broader field of marketing research but not, 
as yet, with regard to the MEE in particular). Furthermore, the empirical work in this 
thesis addresses theoretical and methodological issues that appear to be overlooked in 
previous mere exposure research; most notably the potential confounding influence of 
the false familiarity effect (Whittlesea, 1993) and affective modulation bias (Phaf and 
Rotteveel, 2005).  
 
In part III, the results of the study are presented and interpreted (chapter 7), prior to the 
development and discussion of conclusions and implications (chapter 8) and a summary 
of the main contributions, limitations and directions for further research (chapter 9). The 
results are somewhat surprising in that, whilst validating the proposition that mere 
exposure influences affective response to marketing stimuli, they challenge previous 
assumptions regarding the influence of recognition memory and the direction of the 
affect-bias. In contrast to the expectation that stimulus recognition would consistently 
result in a smaller (but nonetheless identical) MEE, the positive influence of mere 
exposure in the presence of this factor is actually found to be reversed in its absence; i.e. 
the results indicate that mere exposure without subsequent recognition may, in fact, 
negatively bias affective response to the stimulus when it is subsequently encountered. 
Furthermore, the two effects appear to be mediated differently by factors such as 
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perception, subjective recollection and stimulus-type; indicating that they are 
qualitatively different.  
 
In conclusion, therefore, it will be argued (in chapter 8) that the findings support a dual-
processing model of mere exposure, incorporating two forms of the MEE that are 
underpinned by the processes of implicit and explicit memory respectively. Specifically, 
the explicit MEE occurs when audiences exhibit objective recognition memory for 
having been previously exposed to marketing stimuli, and can lead to positive affect-
bias when these stimuli are subsequently encountered. The implicit MEE occurs when 
consumers do not exhibit conscious, accurate memory for the marketing stimuli to 
which they have been repeatedly and fleetingly exposed (e.g. brand names), and can 
lead to negative affect-bias when these stimuli are subsequently encountered. From a 
theoretical perspective, it will be proposed that this model facilitates a more detailed 
conceptualisation of the MEE for marketers; incorporating the potential for both positive 
and negative effects of mere exposure, and defining the conditions under which each 
might be expected to occur. Moreover, it may be considered to have far-reaching 
implications for the explanation of this phenomenon in a broader psychological context; 
potentially accommodating a number of seemingly conflicting theories. 
 
With regard to marketing practice in particular, the thesis serves to restate the potential 
importance of the MEE to identifying, understanding, measuring and influencing 
marketing communication effects under conditions of low attention and involvement. 
Furthermore, it highlights the fact that the positive effects of mere exposure may be 
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dependent on the establishment of recognition memory during extremely brief 
encounters with marketing stimuli. In this respect, the conclusions of this thesis clearly 
distinguish the MEE from the somewhat discredited notion of subliminal advertising. 
Moreover, they gives rise to specific implications for the selection, design, presentation 
and integration of marketing stimuli, as a means of ensuring attention, ease of 
processing and recognition memory for extremely fleeting exposures. All of these will 
be discussed in detail during chapter 8, at which point it will also be argued that, given 
the inherent fluency (and thus recognition) advantages that are associated with familiar 
and salient stimuli (see Moray, 1959; Nielson and Sarason, 1981; Kurilla and 
Westerman, 2008), the positive effects of mere exposure might be most relevant to the 
maintenance of favourable attitudes towards well-known brands in large consumer 
markets. This proposition challenges the previous supposition that a lack of knowledge, 
experience and established brand attitudes are consistently conducive to the MEE in a 
marketing context (e.g. Chung and Szymanski, 1997; Baker, 1999; Fang et al., 2007).  
 
Finally it will be acknowledged that, whilst this thesis may serve to allay concerns that 
the application of mere exposure principles in marketing communication constitutes a 
revival of subliminal persuasion tactics, it highlights the potential for other negative 
consequences from a consumer perspective. Specifically, the conclusion that attention 
and recognition may underpin the positive effects of the MEE implies that the 
commercial application of mere exposure principles could result in an increasingly 
intrusive and inexorable barrage of marketing communication. Should this be the case, it 
is argued that the primary challenge for public policy-makers may be to protect 
consumer privacy rather than prevent subliminal manipulation. 
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1.5. Summary and conclusion 
 
In summary, therefore, this thesis aims to strengthen the foundations of the slowly 
emerging bridge between the realms of psychology and marketing with regard to the 
MEE. To this end, it endeavours to provide a thorough, critical and interdisciplinary 
review of the extant literature, and a robust experimental study of the MEE in a 
marketing context. On this basis, a novel theoretical model will be proposed; the 
implications of which will be discussed in detail prior to a thorough consideration of 
directions for further research. With this in mind, it should be noted that the empirical 
work in this thesis is not necessarily intended to constitute an applied study of the MEE 
in the natural marketing environment. Indeed, it will be argued that until such time as a 
robust methodological means of distinguishing between the MEE and other, similar 
priming effects (such as classical conditioning) is established, the validity of such 
research will be significantly compromised. Rather, it follows the tradition of an 
emerging stream of marketing research in this field; aiming to provide a particularly 
detailed and robust ‘first principles’ experimental study of the existence, size and nature 
of the MEE in relation to typical marketing stimuli. As a foundation for this, the thesis 
begins with a comprehensive review of current knowledge and understanding of the 
MEE in the realms of psychology. 
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Part I 
Theoretical Foundation 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Mere Exposure Effect: 
A critical review of the psychology literature 
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2.1. Introduction 
 
Whilst the mere exposure effect (MEE) is the subject of over 300 experimental studies 
in psychology, it is important to recognise that it is a common and naturally occurring 
phenomenon (Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004). Furthermore, the field of marketing 
was identified in the most recent scientific review as a context for “the most obvious 
applications of MEE principles” (Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004: 218). With this in 
mind, detailed reviews of how the MEE has been conceptualized and empirically 
studied in the marketing literature will be provided in chapters 3 and 4 respectively. In 
the process it will be argued that, whilst this phenomenon has long been considered to 
be relevant by marketing theorists, accurate conceptualizations have until recently been 
hampered by the emerging nature of psychological theory. More importantly, however, 
empirical studies in the marketing domain are relatively limited in volume and scope, 
and subject to a number of theoretical and methodological limitations. However, in 
order to critique the basis on which this phenomenon has been comprehended, explored 
and interpreted by marketing researchers it is first necessary to develop a thorough 
appreciation of the current state of knowledge and understanding of the MEE within the 
discipline of psychology. 
 
As illustrated in figure 2.1., the initial aim of this chapter is thus to review the extant 
psychology literature regarding the existence, extent and nature of the mere exposure 
effect. This is followed by an overview of the various theoretical explanations that have 
been proposed in relation to this phenomenon, and a discussion of current challenges 
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and controversies regarding the existence, explanation and efficacy of the MEE. Finally, 
the chapter is drawn to a close with a discussion of the implications of this critical 
review for the extension and application of mere exposure research in a marketing 
context. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Structure of Chapter 2 
 
 
 
 
2. Defining & describing the MEE 
• The nature of the MEE 
• The size of the MEE 
• Influences on the MEE 
• The durability of the MEE 
3. Explaining the MEE 
• Affect-based theories 
• Cognition-based theories 
5. Implications of the MEE for marketing 
6. Conclusion 
4. Theoretical challenges to the MEE 
• Conceptual implicit memory 
• Alternative sources of fluency and 
the false familiarity effect 
1. Introduction 
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2.2. Defining and describing the MEE 
 
The mere exposure effect (MEE) was first defined by Zajonc (1968: 1) who observed 
that: 
“the mere repeated exposure of the individual to a stimulus is a sufficient 
condition for the enhancement of his attitude towards it. By ‘mere exposure’ 
is meant a condition which just makes the given stimulus accessible to the 
individual's perception.”  
 
Subsequently, the MEE has come to be recognized as a robust phenomenon in the 
psychology literature and the size, nature and durability of this phenomenon has been 
subject to a great deal of research (for reviews see Harrison, 1977; Bornstein, 1989; 
Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004). The key aspects of this literature are summarized 
in the following subsections, prior to a review of the various competing explanations of 
the MEE in section 2.3 (page 36). 
 
2.2.1. The nature of the MEE 
 
In terms of the qualitative characteristics of the MEE, three important themes are 
evident in the psychology literature. The first of these relates to the affective versus 
cognitive nature of the outcome, and has important implications for theoretical 
explanations of the phenomenon (as will be discussed in section 2.3). The second is 
concerned with the direction of the outcome, whilst the third relates to the non-
conscious nature of the processes that underpin the MEE. These themes are discussed in 
more detail below. 
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2.2.1.1. Affective versus cognitive response 
 
Since Zajonc’s (1968) seminal monograph, the vast majority of empirical research has 
focused on the relationship between exposure and affect. Indeed, Bornstein’s (1989) 
meta-analysis includes more than 200 studies of this particular manifestation of the 
MEE, prompting the author to conclude that; “the first 20 years of research on Zajonc's 
(1968) mere exposure effect leaves little doubt that the exposure–affect relationship is a 
robust, reliable phenomenon” (Bornstein, 1989: 278). Given this, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that most theories of the MEE have specifically sought to explain the 
influence of exposure on affective response (e.g. Berlyne, 1970; Stang, 1975; Zajonc, 
1980; Winkielman and Cacciopo, 2001). As will be discussed in section 2.3, however, 
these theories have largely been eclipsed by those that accommodate the notion that 
mere exposure can also influence cognitive response (e.g. Mandler et al., 1987; 
Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994). Empirical evidence for this is provided by 
Mandler et al. (1987), who found that mere exposure to a stimulus not only enhanced 
subsequent affective response but also (cognitive) judgments of brightness and darkness. 
This is in line with implicit (i.e. subconscious) memory research, in which prior 
exposure has been found to influence perceptions of truthfulness (Begg and Armour, 
1991), sound volume (Jacoby et al., 1988) and fame (Jacoby et al., 1989). As such, it 
would appear that the impact of mere exposure is not limited to the affective component 
of attitude, but may also be observed in relation to cognitive evaluations. 
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2.2.1.2. Positive versus negative influence 
 
Within the psychology literature, mere exposure has almost universally been found to 
positively influence adult response. However, findings to the contrary (i.e. an exposure-
induced novelty bias) have been proffered in relation to food preferences (Stang, 1975) 
and high (versus) low-density matrices (Lee, 1994). Interestingly, although neither the 
stimulus nor the nature of evaluation is specifically related to marketing communication, 
the second of these studies is published in the marketing literature. As such, it will be 
critically reviewed in more detail during chapter 4. 
 
By contrast, mixed findings are evident with regard to the direction of the MEE in 
children. Whilst some studies have revealed a classic, positive MEE amongst this group 
(e.g. Jenrenaud and Linford, 1969; Sluckin et al., 1973; Heingartner and Hall, 1974), the 
majority have found a reverse MEE (Cantor, 1968; Leckart et al., 1968; Rabinowitz and 
Robe, 1968; Cantor and Kubose, 1969; Freeman, 1972; Siebold, 1972; Lemond and 
Nunnally, 1974; Hutt, 1975; Eson et al., 1977;  Linford and Linford, 1977; Busse and 
Seraydarian, 1978). This exposure-induced novelty bias in children has proven to be 
robust across a number of measurement techniques, including forced-choice (e.g. 
Freeman, 1972; Cantor and Kubose, 1969), categorical choice (e.g. like versus dislike; 
Siebold, 1972) and interval scale ratings (e.g. Cantor, 1968). Furthermore, the 
directional difference of the MEE in adults and children is supported by meta-analysis, 
“which shows an overall negative relationship between exposure and affect in children 
and a positive relationship between exposure and affect in adults” (Bornstein, 1989: 
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278). The reason for this difference is not yet understood but, importantly, it challenges 
the almost universal assumption amongst marketing theorists (see chapter 3) and 
researchers (see chapter 4) that the MEE systematically enhances positive attitudes to a 
given stimulus, and highlights the need for context-specific studies of this phenomenon 
in the marketing domain. 
 
2.2.1.3. The MEE: A non-conscious phenomenon 
 
One of the most striking characteristics of the MEE is that it remains apparent even in 
the absence of stimulus recognition. The first notable demonstration of this was 
provided by Wilson (1979) who, by way of a dichotic-listening task, demonstrated 
enhanced affective response for unattended melodies at low and chance levels of 
recognition. These findings were quickly supported by those of Kunst-Wilson and 
Zajonc (1980), who observed enhanced liking for irregular polygons following repeated 
visual exposures of just one millisecond. Specifically, the results of 2-factor forced-
choice tests revealed that participants preferred the exposed stimuli over novel 
alternatives 60% of the time, whilst recognition did not differ significantly from chance 
(i.e. 50%). Using similar techniques, these findings have subsequently been replicated 
on numerous occasions (e.g. Seamon et al. 1983a; Bonanno and Stillings, 1986; Barchas 
and Perlaki, 1986; Mandler et al., 1987; Murphy and Zajonc, 1993). Furthermore, 
Bornstein (1989) presents meta-analytic evidence of a significantly larger MEE in those 
studies that have employed a subliminal exposure phase to eliminate the possibility of 
subsequent stimulus recognition. On this basis, the MEE has been characterised as a 
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non-conscious phenomenon that is hindered by the influence of explicit memory for 
prior exposure (Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994). Whilst the grounds for this 
assumption are somewhat questionable – as will be discussed in section 2.2.3.3.1 (page 
29) – it nonetheless remains a central element of the influential ‘misattribution’ theories 
of mere exposure (Mandler et al. 1987; Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994); as will 
be explained in section 2.3.2.2 (page 45). 
 
However, it should be noted that, whilst the fleeting nature of mere exposure is such that 
it does not facilitate a great deal of attention, elaboration and encoding, nor does it 
necessarily eliminate the possibility of stimulus perception and recognition. Indeed, the 
vast majority of research in the psychology literature has demonstrated exposure-
induced changes in affective response under just such conditions (see Bornstein, 1989; 
Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004). Nevertheless, Bornstein and Craver-Lemley 
(2004: 230) stress that the MEE should still be considered to be a non-conscious 
phenomenon on the basis that: 
“even in situations where participants are aware of having been exposed to 
stimuli, they rarely attribute their liking for a stimulus to repeated exposure, 
instead believing that some property of the stimulus is particularly attractive 
or interesting.” 
 
Although the precise processes by which the MEE occurs remain subject to debate, 
therefore, it is perhaps fair to conclude that the phenomenon is broadly assumed to be 
non-conscious in nature. This assumption, however, will be revisited subsequently in 
this chapter in the light of new and emerging evidence of the influence that recognition 
memory might be expected to exert on the size of the MEE (see page 32). As a context 
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for this, however, it is first necessary to consider the literature regarding the magnitude 
of the MEE, and the factors that have been found to moderate this, from a broader 
perspective. 
 
2.2.2. The size of the MEE 
 
In his seminal meta-analysis Bornstein (1989) observed that the overall magnitude of the 
MEE (as measured by the correlation coefficient r) was a moderate 0.26. In a more 
recent review, Bornstein and Craver-Lemley (2004: 217) note that this has subsequently 
been confirmed by further empirical studies, but stress that even small statistical effects 
may be substantively significant in a real-world context: 
“[For example]. . . studies suggest that frequency of exposure is a significant 
determinant of the number of votes garnered by a candidate for elected 
office, even when other factors (e.g. popularity of the candidate's policy 
positions are controlled for statistically (Bornstein, 1989). The impact of 
repeated exposure on election outcome is not just statistically significant, 
but ecologically significant aswell: The 5-10% shift attributable to candidate 
familiarity is enough to alter the outcome of many real world elections." 
 
With this in mind, and in a marketing context, one might contend that a 5-10% shift in 
product sales due to the MEE might appear to be relatively small but could constitute 
significant increases in revenue for global fmcg brands. Indeed, this very argument is 
made by Shapiro and Krishnan (2001) with regard to the influence of implicit memory 
on brand choice (a key factor in explanations of the non-conscious MEE, as will be 
explained in section 2.3): 
“Although it may appear that implicit memory results are relatively small 
(in our study, an overall increase in brand choice of 11% relative to the 
baseline), small changes in market share can equate to billions of dollars in 
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sales. For example, 11.2% of the soft drink market is equal to $6.5 billion in 
sales.” 
 
 
In essence, therefore, whilst marketing researchers should not necessarily expect to find 
large MEEs in an experimental setting, small but significant effects may nonetheless 
reflect substantial influences in a real-world context. However, whilst the average size 
of the experimental MEE provides an important benchmark for further research, it is 
important to note that this has been found to be influenced by a number of factors. 
Perhaps the most important of these is stimulus recognition (as will be explained in 
detail on page 29), although a number of other factors are worthy of note in this respect. 
These are categorized by Bornstein and Craver-Lemley (2004) as stimulus, exposure and 
individual variables; each of which are briefly outlined in the following section. 
 
2.2.3. Influences on the MEE 
 
Detailed reviews of the factors that have been found to moderate the size of the 
experimental MEE are provided by Bornstein (1989) and Bornstein and Craver-Lemley 
(2004). For the purposes of this thesis, however, it is important to  provide a brief 
overview of these and, in particular, a critical discussion of the influence that 
recognition memory might be expected to exert on the MEE; an issue that is at the heart 
of the theoretical debate as to how this phenomenon occurs (as will be discussed in 
section 2.3, page 36). 
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2.2.3.1. Stimulus variables 
 
The two main moderating variables in this first category concern the type and 
complexity of the target stimulus. Although the vast majority of research has utilised 
visual and auditory cues, the MEE has been found to be robust across a range of 
different stimulus types, as Bornstein and Craver-Lemley (2004: 219) observe: 
“Nine different types of stimuli have been used in MEE research: nonsense 
words, meaningful words, ideographs, photographs, drawings, auditory 
stimuli, gustatory (i.e. food) stimuli, actual people, and objects (e.g. toys). 
Studies contrasting the magnitude of the MEE as a function of stimulus type 
have generally found no consistent differences across stimulus classes.” 
 
During his meta-analysis, however, Bornstein (1989: 269-270) observes that 
“photograph, meaningful-word, and polygon stimuli produce moderate to strong 
exposure effects, whereas ideograph, nonsense-word, and real person/object stimuli 
produce somewhat smaller effects.” Furthermore, the author notes that drawings, 
abstract paintings and matrices have been found to produce an extremely weak MEE. 
However, it should perhaps be acknowledged that, within the marketing literature, Lee 
(1994) found directional differences in the MEE on the basis of matrix density. In this 
respect, a positive effect was observed in relation to low-density matrices, while a 
reverse (i.e. negative) MEE was apparent for high-density matrices. This study is 
critically reviewed in the context of other consumer research into the MEE in chapter 4. 
 
Further to the moderating influence of stimulus-type, stronger MEEs have been found in 
relation to complex as opposed to simple stimuli, but only in studies that utilize a 
within-subjects design (e.g. Berlyne, 1970; Saegert and Jellison, 1972; Heyduk, 1975). 
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In the only comparative study to use a between-group design, Zajonc et al. (1972) found 
no such differences, prompting Bornstein (1989: 271) to suggest that: 
“It may be that subjects' differential ratings of simple and complex stimuli 
depend on their being able to compare reactions to both types of stimuli 
over the course of repeated exposures . . . That is, complex stimuli may 
produce stronger exposure effects in part because they are compared to 
simple stimuli and deemed more interesting or pleasing.”  
 
In the context of marketing-based research and application of the MEE, therefore, it 
should be noted that the size of the effect may vary according to the specific 
characteristics of the stimulus in question. For example, brand names commonly take 
the form of either real-word (e.g. Mars) or pseudo-word stimuli (e.g. Twix), and may 
thus be subject to the meta-analytic differences in effect size observed in relation to 
‘meaningful’ and ‘nonsense’ words by Bornstein (1989; see previous page). However, 
moderating variables in relation to the MEE are not confined to the properties of the 
stimulus in question. The nature of exposure has also been found to be influential in this 
respect; as discussed in the following section.  
 
 
2.2.3.2. Exposure variables 
 
The key moderating factors in this second category are related to the frequency, 
sequence and duration of exposure. Firstly, with regard to the number of exposures, 
Bornstein and Craver-Lemley (2004: 220) observe that, “in most MEE studies 
researchers observe an increase in liking ratings through 10 stimulus exposures, after 
which ratings plateau and gradually decline to baseline.” That is not to say that the MEE 
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will necessarily be restricted to 10 exposures in the natural environment, but rather that 
in a closed experimental setting this is the point at which the effect begins to decline; 
most likely as a result of boredom and fatigue (Bornstein et al., 1990). Secondly, 
Bornstein (1989) observed that random (heterogeneous) exposure sequences produced 
an effect size of r = 0.3, whilst ‘massed’ (homogenous) exposure did not result in any 
substantive effect (r = -0.02).  Finally, Bornstein and Craver-Lemley (2004: 220) 
observe that: 
“There is an inverse relationship between stimulus exposure duration and 
magnitude of the exposure effect (Bornstein, 1989). Studies that use 
stimulus exposures of less than 1 second produce an overall MEE (r) of 
0.41, whereas studies that use stimulus exposures between 1 and 5 seconds 
produce a [small] MEE of 0.16, and those that use longer exposures produce 
a [very small] MEE of 0.09. Individual studies comparing MEEs for 
identical stimuli presented at different exposure durations support this meta-
analytic result.” (Parentheses added) 
 
As an overview, therefore, it may be concluded that the size of the experimental MEE is 
likely to be enhanced by a small number of extremely fleeting exposures in a 
randomized sequence. This is in line with Zajonc’s (1968) original conceptualization of 
mere exposure as that which is just perceptible (see page 18). Moreover, the fact that 
these conditions obviate the influence of attention, elaboration and explicit memory 
provide support for the argument that the MEE is essentially a non-conscious 
phenomenon that is hindered by conscious processing (see page 22). 
 
2.2.3.3. Participant variables 
 
Whilst Bornstein and Craver-Lemley (2004) observe that the MEE has generally proven 
to be robust across a range of participant variables (e.g. need for approval, anxiety, 
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tolerance of ambiguity and sensation seeking), boredom and fatigue have been found to 
limit and even eliminate the experimental MEE (Bornstein et al., 1990). However, the 
lack of evidence for socio-demographic and cultural factors appears to reflect a dearth of 
comparative research in this respect; symptomatic perhaps of the fact that the processes 
of implicit memory on which the dominant theories of mere exposure are founded (e.g. 
Mandler et al., 1987; Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994) have been consistently 
demonstrated to be equivalent across such variables (see page 48).  
 
Whilst not acknowledged in the literature, however, it may be argued that the 
assumption of a universally standard MEE (underpinned by the generic processes of 
implicit memory) is undermined by consistent findings of a difference in both the size 
and direction of this effect between adults and children (see page 20). In this respect, a 
relatively small novelty bias (i.e. reverse MEE) is evident in child participants, whereas 
a larger preference bias for previously exposed stimuli is usually found in adults (see 
Bornstein, 1989). In this respect, the fact that developmental factors appear to mediate 
the direction of the MEE poses significant problems for an assumption that is generally 
apparent in the extant marketing literature (see chapters 3 and 4); namely, should this 
phenomenon influence consumer attitudes it will do so in a way that is invariably 
positive. Not only do the findings in developmental psychology indicate that this is 
unlikely to be the case amongst children but, in a broader sense, they draw attention to 
the fact that this phenomenon is not necessarily context-free; highlighting the need for 
domain-specific research into the specific impact of mere exposure on consumer 
attitudes to marketing stimuli. 
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Finally, perhaps the most important influence on the size of the MEE is that of stimulus 
recognition; a factor that arguably constitutes a central point of departure for the various 
competing explanations of the MEE that have emerged in recent decades (see section 
2.3; page 36). In this respect, the ‘misattribution’ theories of mere exposure (Mandler et 
al., 1987; Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994) have come to prominence largely as a 
result of their ability to accommodate meta-analytic evidence that recognition moderates 
the MEE (Bornstein, 1989); as will be explained in section 2.3.2.2 (page 45). However, 
while this assumption remains prevalent in the psychology literature (see Bornstein and 
Craver-Lemley, 2004), it may be challenged on a number of grounds. These are 
elucidated in the following section, as part of a critical discussion of the influence that 
recognition memory might be expected to exert on the MEE. 
 
2.2.3.3.1. The influence of stimulus recognition on the MEE 
 
The vast majority of experimental research into the MEE has not sought to isolate 
affective response from recognition. Indeed, of the 208 experiments included in 
Bornstein’s (1989) seminal meta-analysis, just nine explore the influence of mere 
exposure in the absence of stimulus recognition; all of which employ subliminal mere 
exposure as a means by which to eliminate the possibility of subsequent explicit 
memory. Nonetheless, it is this body of work that has provided the basis for the 
assumption that recognition memory moderates the size of the MEE in the contemporary 
psychology literature (see Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004). Specifically, this is 
  30 
founded on Bornstein’s (1989) meta-analytic finding that the size of the MEE is almost 
twice as large in studies that have employed a subliminal exposure phase; prompting the 
following conclusion: 
“Not only is stimulus recognition unnecessary for the production of 
typical exposure effects, but comparison of recognized versus 
unrecognized briefly presented stimuli suggests that stimulus recognition 
may actually inhibit the exposure effect.” (Bornstein, 1989: 275) 
 
Given the methodological approach by which this enhanced form of the effect has been 
demonstrated, it may be tempting to refer to it as the subliminal MEE. However, it is 
important to stress that, within the dominant misattribution theories of mere exposure 
(Mandler et al., 1987; Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994), subliminal perception is 
not regarded as a necessary condition for the enhancement of affective response in the 
absence of recognition at test. These theories will be discussed in more detail during 
section 2.3. (page 36), although at this point it is perhaps useful to note that they are 
founded on the assumption that preference is an illusion – the product of misattributed 
processing fluency in the absence of explicit memory for the source of this (i.e. stimulus 
exposure). Under experimental conditions, subliminal presentation is simply deemed to 
be an effective means by which to stimulate this process, as Lee (2001a:32) explains: 
“The key . . . is not in the subliminality of the stimuli, but rather the lack of 
awareness of the relationship between the exposure phase and the affective 
judgment phase, and subliminal exposure is merely one way of achieving 
it.” 
 
As such, subliminal perception is considered to enhance the MEE in the same way as 
other factors that serve to limit the influence of explicit memory (e.g. extending the 
period of delay between exposure and test, Stang, 1975; Seamon et al., 1983b). In 
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support of this, Bornstein and Craver-Lemley (2004) observe that the non-conscious 
nature of the MEE is also evidenced by neuroscientific findings of exposure-induced 
affect in patients with deficits that preclude explicit memory (Halpern and O’Connor, 
2000). With this in mind, it is perhaps more appropriate to consider exposure-induced 
affect in the absence of recognition as a non-conscious, rather than subliminal, 
phenomenon.  
 
However, it should be noted that this subsequent interpretation of Bornstein’s (1989) 
results differs from that which was initially proposed. Indeed, Bornstein (1989) 
originally speculated that the reason for the observed differences in effect size may 
reside in the fact that subliminal presentation greatly reduces the likelihood of boredom 
and fatigue during exposure; two factors that have since been found to limit the size of 
the MEE (Bornstein et al., 1990). Indeed, the distinction between the subliminal and 
non-conscious nature of this form of the MEE has yet to be empirically demonstrated. 
As such, it is not currently possible to rule out the notion that it is the nature of 
perception during exposure, rather than memory at test, that is responsible for 
previously observed increases in the size of the MEE. This is a particularly pertinent 
issue in the marketing domain where a clear and important distinction between 
subliminal and non-conscious advertising effects has emerged (see Chartrand, 2005). It 
will therefore be discussed in detail during the next chapter, and addressed in the 
empirical phase of this thesis.  
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Furthermore, it should be noted that, whilst the meta-analytic findings of Bornstein 
(1989) have been afforded great importance in the psychology literature (see Bornstein 
and Craver-Lemley, 2004), direct empirical comparisons of the MEE in the presence 
and absence of recognition memory are relatively scarce, and somewhat equivocal. For 
example, Seamon et al. (1983b) observed that, during two-factor forced-choice tests, 
rising rates of target preference (between 60-65%) were accompanied by falling rates of 
recognition (between 55-50%), when the delay between exposure and measurement was 
extended from a few minutes to one day and one week. These results are in line with the 
more recent findings of Bornstein and D’Agostino (1992) and may be taken as further 
evidence of a stronger MEE in the absence of explicit memory for stimulus exposure. 
On a cautionary note, however, it should be acknowledged that Seamon et al. (1984) 
found similar increases in the rate of positive affective response (to approximately 60%) 
under conditions of both enhanced and chance recognition. Furthermore, evidence has 
begun to accumulate that, following supraliminal mere exposure, recognition memory 
may in fact enhance the size of the MEE (Newell and Shanks, 2007); particularly when 
it is accompanied by the subjective experience of clear, confident, contextualised 
recollection (Lee, 2001b; Wang and Chang, 2004).  
 
In summary, therefore, whilst the results of Bornstein’s (1989) meta-analysis continue to 
provide a foundation for the assumption that recognition memory moderates the size of 
the MEE (see Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004), this may be subject to challenge in 
two respects. Firstly, the results of direct empirical research are somewhat equivocal; 
with initial supporting evidence (Seamon et al., 1984; Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992) 
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contradicted by more recent findings (Lee, 2001b; Wang and Chang, 2004; Newell and 
Shanks, 2007). Secondly, the body of research that serves to underpin this assumption is 
almost universally characterised by the use of subliminal exposure to eliminate the 
possibility of subsequent recognition memory. By contrast, recent contradictory 
evidence is founded on the examination of affect-bias in the presence and absence of 
stimulus recognition, following supraliminal mere exposure (Lee, 2001b; Wang and 
Chang, 2004; Newell and Shanks, 2007). As such, it is not yet clear whether it is 
stimulus perception or recognition memory that is responsible for the differences in 
effect size in Bornstein’s (1989) seminal meta-analysis. Whilst it is acknowledged that 
the moderating influence of recognition memory remains a central assumption in 
contemporary theories of mere exposure (see Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004), 
therefore, it may be concluded that an unequivocal acceptance of this is no longer 
appropriate. As a result, future research into the nature and size of the MEE should seek 
to empirically test the proposition that memory will moderate the magnitude of this 
phenomenon. The implications of this for the empirical work in this thesis will be 
revisited later in section 2.5 (page 61). Before this, however, consideration will be given 
to the durability of the MEE (in the following section); prior to a detailed critique of 
current theoretical explanations of this phenomenon (in section 2.3., page 36). 
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2.2.4. The durability of the MEE 
 
The length of time for which mere exposure effects endure is subject to some debate, 
although it has been found that this may be much longer than those created by 
elaborative processing. As Nordhielm (2002: 380) observes: 
“One key issue is how time influences the relationship between feature 
repetition and affective response. Research that has investigated perceptual 
and conceptual priming suggests that the effects of prior exposure on 
affective response can actually last as long as one year when the stimuli are 
processed in a shallower manner, whereas when these stimuli are elaborated 
upon, these positive effects can diminish within as little as a few minutes.” 
 
Empirically, and as a by product of their exploration of the moderating effects of delay 
between exposure and test, the MEE in particular has been found to persist for at least 
one week (Seamon et al., 1983b) and two weeks (Stang, 1975). Further to this, and in 
light of the automatic processes that are theorized to underpin the non-conscious MEE 
(as will be discussed later in this chapter), a more detailed perspective is perhaps 
provided by evidence that implicit memory is relatively stable and persistent over time 
(see Roediger and McDermott, 1993). However, it should be noted that there is some 
disagreement regarding the durability of implicit memory, with findings ranging from 
less than two hours (Graf and Mandler, 1984), to one day (Kolers, 1976), to one week 
(Landrum, 1997), two weeks (Tulving et al. 1982), one year (Kolers, 1976), and even up 
to sixteen months (Sloman et al., 1988). 
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2.2.5. A summary description of the MEE 
 
In summary, therefore, mere exposure has been consistently found to produce moderate 
but robust experimental effects throughout four decades of psychological research. 
During this time, the focus has largely been on the relationship between exposure and 
affect (for reviews see Bornstein, 1989; Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004), although 
there is evidence to suggest that cognitive response may also be influenced by mere 
exposure (e.g. Mandler et al., 1987). Although somewhat isolated in the literature, these 
findings are worthy of note as they may have important implications for theoretical 
explanations of the MEE (as will be discussed in the following section). Whatever the 
nature of participant response, the direction of this is almost universally positive in 
adults. However, whilst a number of studies have made similar findings with children, 
the majority present evidence of a reverse MEE in this group (i.e. a tendency to prefer 
novel over previously exposed stimuli). 
 
Whilst the average size of the experimental MEE is relatively small (Bornstein, 1989), it 
appears to be to be moderated to some extent by a number of factors. These include the 
type and complexity of the stimulus, the frequency, sequencing and duration of 
exposure, and the degree to which participants experience boredom or fatigue. Perhaps 
the most influential findings in this respect, however, have been those of Bornstein’s 
(1989) meta-analysis, which appear to demonstrate that the size of the MEE is 
significantly reduced by stimulus recognition. Although originally attributed to an 
absence of boredom and fatigue under conditions of subliminal exposure, this has 
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subsequently been interpreted as evidence that the MEE is underpinned by the non-
conscious processes of implicit memory; the influence of which is hindered by 
conscious encoding and retrieval of prior exposure (Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 
1994). In the absence of direct, unequivocal empirical support, however, it may be 
argued that the moderating influence of recognition memory remains a proposition; the 
validation of which is central to the question of how mere exposure alone might 
influence attitudes and choice behaviour. As will be explained in the following section, 
the debate in this respect is characterised by a number of competing theoretical 
explanations; each of which incorporate assumptions as to the role of memory. 
 
2.3. Explaining the MEE 
 
Whilst the existence of the MEE is not disputed, the mechanism by which it occurs is 
subject to extensive, and as yet unresolved, debate. In the continued absence of a generic 
theory of mere exposure a number of competing explanations have been proposed. As 
Bornstein and Craver-Lemley (2004: 225) observe: 
“Since the publication of Zajonc’s seminal (1968) paper, more than a dozen 
theoretical frameworks have been developed to explain the processes that 
underlie the MEE (see Bornstein, 1989, 1992; Seamon et al., 1998; 
Whittlesea and Price, 2001; Zajonc, 2001). Five of these models have been 
particularly influential.” 
 
The five theories referred to in this quote are those of arousal (Berlyne, 1970), the 
primacy of affect (Zajonc, 1980, 2000), non-specific activation (Mandler et al., 1987), 
two-factor theory (Stang, 1975) and perceptual fluency/attribution (Bornstein and 
D’Agostino, 1994). However, two other theories are also worthy of note in this 
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discussion; uncertainty reduction (Sawyer, 1981) and hedonic fluency (Winkielman and 
Cacioppo, 2001). All of these explanations may be categorized on the basis that they 
assume the MEE to be the product of either affective or cognitive processing (see 
Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004). A summary of this categorization is provided in 
table 2.1, prior to a discussion of the theories contained within. 
 
Table 2.1: Summary of current theoretical accounts of the MEE 
 
 
Affect-Based 
 
Cognition-Based 
 
 
Arousal (Berlyne, 1970) 
 
Primacy of Affect (Zajonc, 1980) 
 
Hedonic Fluency  
(Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001) 
 
 
Two-Factor Theory (Stang, 1975) 
 
Uncertainty reduction (Sawyer, 1981) 
 
Non-specific Activation (Mandler et al., 1987) 
 
Perceptual Fluency/Attribution  
(Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1994) 
 
 
As Winkielman and Cacioppo (2001: 990) observe, cognition-based explanations of the 
MEE (to be discussed in section 2.3.2, page 42), “assume that the effects of processing 
facilitation on evaluations can be explained by the same mechanism as the effects of 
processing facilitation on other ‘nonaffective’ judgments (e.g., fame, truth, clarity).” 
Whilst the authors acknowledge that this is a reasonable assumption, particularly in the 
light of the range of judgment effects discussed in section 2.2.1.1. (page 19), it is 
important to note that a number of theories are based on the premise that the MEE arises 
on the basis of affective response occurring prior to, or in the absence of, cognition (e.g. 
Berlyne, 1970; Zajonc, 1980). Whilst this proposition remains contentious, it may be 
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supported to some extent by initial neuroscientific findings of separable neural 
substrates for affect and cognition (e.g. Elliott and Dolan, 1998; LeDoux, 1995). The 
purpose of this section, therefore, is to discuss the main affect-based explanations of the 
MEE, prior to a review of the more widely accepted cognition-based theories (see 
Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004; Butler and Berry, 2004). 
 
2.3.1. Affect-based theories 
 
Firstly in this respect, Berlyne’s (1970) arousal theory is founded on the premise that 
exposure to a novel stimulus produces high levels of unpleasant physiological arousal. 
As the stimulus is rendered increasingly familiar (via the process of repeated mere 
exposure), this arousal is experienced to a lesser degree. In response to this, a “rebound 
effect” occurs whereby the participant experiences positive affective response for a 
stimulus that was once unknown but is now familiar. To some extent, this theory is 
empirically supported by findings that unfamiliar, and therefore unpredictable, stimuli 
lead to enhanced arousal (Kruglanski and Webster, 1996). However, Bornstein and 
Craver-Lemley (2004) contend that it cannot account for the moderating effects of 
stimulus complexity and randomized exposure sequences, and is thus incomplete.  
 
At this point, it is perhaps helpful to note that Berlyne’s (1970) theory of the MEE is 
very similar to that of uncertainty reduction (Sawyer, 1981). This cognition-based 
explanation posits that uncertainty about unfamiliar stimuli results in a feeling of 
tension. In this context, exposure is seen to reduce uncertainty, ease tension and thus 
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enhance positive affective response to the stimulus. However, the emergence of 
Bornstein’s (1989) meta-analytic evidence that stimulus recognition hinders (rather than 
facilitates) the MEE is potentially problematic for the theories of Berlyne (1970) and 
Sawyer (1981). Indeed, whilst it was previously acknowledged that this assumption may 
be challenged on the grounds that direct empirical evidence for this remains relatively 
scarce and somewhat equivocal (see page 32), the persistence of it in the contemporary 
psychology literature (see Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004) may also undermine the 
most recent affect-based explanation of mere exposure; the theory of hedonic fluency 
(Winkielman and Cacioppo, 2001). This is founded on the premise that the processing 
fluency created by mere exposure always gives rise to a genuine, positive affective 
reaction towards a stimulus. It is in line with earlier claims that processing fluency 
inherently constitutes a pleasant experience as it may, for example, relate to a feeling of 
confidence in having appropriate knowledge to deal with the stimulus (Bless and 
Fiedler, 1995; Schwarz, 1990), or a sense of achievement at having successfully 
recognized and interpreted it (Carver and Scheier, 1990; Vallacher and Nowak, 1999). 
In support of their hedonic fluency theory, Winkielman and Cacioppo (2001) present 
empirical evidence that processing fluency gives rise to a brief, unmediated positive (but 
not negative) affective response; pointing to the fact that  this in line with the 
conclusions of Reber et al. (1998) and Seamon et al. (1998). Once again, however, and 
whilst acknowledging the potential fragility of this claim, a potential limitation of this 
explanation is that it does not account for the fact that the size of the MEE may be 
limited, rather than enhanced, by a conscious sense of recognition for prior stimulus 
exposure (see Bornstein, 1989; Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992). Furthermore, the 
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consistent and robust evidence of a reverse MEE in children (i.e. a novelty preference 
bias) indicates that processing fluency is not always associated with positive affective 
response. In light of these criticisms, and the limited scope and impact of previous 
empirical work into the concept of hedonic fluency, it would seem that there is a need 
for far greater evidence for this theory before one can dispute the authors’ own 
observation that, “in sum, the available research is inconclusive regarding the positive 
marking of processing fluency” (Winkielman and Cacioppo, 2001: 997). 
 
As such, and in light of the non-conscious nature of the MEE (see page 21), the most 
influential affect-based explanation may be considered to be the primacy of affect 
(Zajonc, 1980). The basis of Zajonc’s (1980) theory is that affective response to a 
stimulus can occur prior to, or even in the absence of, cognition and thus drive the 
decision-making process. Furthermore, affect may occur instantaneously, automatically 
and without high levels of conscious attention and elaboration (Zajonc, 1980, 2000).  
Zajonc (1980) proposes that the reason affect and recognition (used in this context as an 
indicator of cognition) can occur separately is that they are reactions to different 
elements of the stimulus. In short, he argues that affect occurs as an holistic, gestalt 
response to global features of the stimulus (termed ‘preferenda’), whilst recognition 
occurs in relation to specific sub-features of the stimulus (termed ‘discriminada’). 
 
Although emerging indications that the size of the MEE may in fact be enhanced by 
explicit memory (e.g. Lee, 2001b; Wang and Chang, 2004) are potentially problematic 
for the primacy of affect theory, it nonetheless serves to provide a potential explanation 
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for previous evidence of a larger MEE under conditions of subliminal perception (see 
Bornstein, 1989; Bornstein and D’Agostino). Furthermore, it may be supported by 
neuroscientific findings of a physiological basis for the independence of cognition and 
emotion (e.g. Elliott and Dolan, 1998; LeDoux, 1995). However, Vanhuele (1994) 
observes that the primacy of affect theory is yet to be validated in direct empirical 
research. Moreover, he draws attention to a particular limitation with regard to Zajonc’s 
(1980) explanation of the MEE. Essentially this relates to the fact that recognition was 
widely used as an indicator of cognition in the empirical work that gave rise to the 
primacy of affect theory (e.g. Wilson, 1979; Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc, 1980; Zajonc, 
1980). However, more recent research in the field of implicit memory has demonstrated 
that, in the absence of recognition, mere exposure can lead to enhanced performance in 
purely cognitive tasks, such as perceptual identification of degraded stimuli, accurate 
word completion and lexical decision tasks (for a review see Bornstein, 1989). This 
leads Vanhuele (1994: 265) to conclude that: 
“the identification of cognition with recognition, one of the bases of 
Zajonc's argument, no longer seems justified in light of this recent research. 
Thus, it is possible that cognitive processing is responsible for the mere 
exposure effect.” 
 
In support of this, a similar conclusion is subsequently drawn by Lee (2001a: 30) who, 
with reference to the independence of affect and cognition, observes: 
“That mere exposure effects can be found not just with affective judgments 
lessens the viability of Zajonc's (1980, 1984) independence hypothesis . . . If 
mere exposure effects can be found with other types of judgments, then 
certainly, it would not be reasonable to postulate that a separate system is 
responsible for each type of response.” 
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Such criticism, and the absence of compelling empirical evidence for Zajonc’s (1980) 
theory, prompts Butler and Berry (2004: 475) to conclude that, “the largely descriptive 
primacy of affect framework seems ill-equipped to account for the wide variety of 
findings in the mere exposure literature.” In light of this, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
cognition-based explanations of the MEE have come to dominate the psychology 
literature during the last two decades; as will be discussed in the next section. 
 
 
2.3.2. Cognition-based theories 
 
Contrary to affect-based theories of mere exposure, most of the contemporary 
psychology literature in this field has sought to explain the MEE as the result of a two-
step cognitive process, one consequence of which is an ‘illusory’ affective response 
(Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004). In general terms, Winkielman and Cacioppo 
(2001: 990) explain this as follows: 
“As a first step, processing manipulations lead to a change in a cognitive 
experience of the stimulus. As a second step, participants explain the change 
in the experience by relating it to evaluative or other features of the 
stimulus.” 
 
However, the specific nature of these steps is subject to debate, as illustrated in the 
following review of the main cognition-based theories of the mere exposure effect. 
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2.3.2.1. Two-factor theory 
 
In his two-factor theory, Stang (1975) posits that the MEE occurs as a result of enhanced 
cognitive arousal during the learning of novel stimuli at low levels of exposure 
frequency. In this way, he also seeks to explain the reversal of this effect at high 
exposure frequencies on the basis that cognitive arousal is vastly reduced once boredom 
occurs. The first of these stages may be seen to be similar to Berlyne’s (1970) arousal 
theory (see previous section), but Stang (1975) stresses that positive affective response 
is the result of heightened cognitive arousal rather than a reduction in physiological 
arousal. Bornstein and Craver-Lemley (2004) note that this proposition is supported by 
empirical evidence that the MEE is enhanced by relatively complex stimuli (Bornstein, 
1989) and reduced by boredom and fatigue (Bornstein et al., 1990).  
 
Importantly, therefore, Stang (1975) contends that enhanced affective response is based 
on a conscious, subjective feeling of familiarity for stimuli that were ‘new’ but are now 
perceived as ‘old.’ Whilst this may be supported by emerging indications that the MEE 
is enhanced by the subjective experience of memory for prior exposure (Lee, 2001b; 
Wang and Chang, 2004), it would appear to be at odds with the influential results of 
Bornstein (1989), and the subsequent interpretation that the MEE is, in fact, constrained 
by stimulus recognition (see Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992). Given the persistence of 
this assumption in the extant psychology literature (see Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 
2004), it may therefore be subject to the same criticism as the theories of Berlyne 
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(1970), Sawyer (1981) and Winkielman and Cacioppo (2001); as outlined in the 
previous section (page 38-39).  
 
In defence of Stang (1975), however, and indeed all those who propose that the 
instigation of exposure-induced familiarity is a necessary process factor in the creation 
of the MEE (e.g. Berlyne, 1970; Sawyer, 1981; Winkielman and Cacioppo, 2001), prior 
evidence of the moderating influence of recognition may be accommodated by a more 
detailed consideration of this factor. In this respect, Mandler (1980) proposed that 
recognition can occur on the basis of either familiarity or a combination of this and 
precise retrieval that, taken together, might be termed recollection (see figure 2.2). On 
this basis, it might be contended that, whilst a sense of familiarity is conducive to the 
MEE (e.g. Stang, 1975), the clear, conscious experience of recollection is not (e.g. 
Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994). 
 
Figure 2.2: The two bases of recognition memory (Mandler, 1980) 
 
 
 
 
 
Familiarity 
Recollection 
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As a caveat to this, however, it should be noted that recent empirical challenges to the 
assumption that memory moderates the MEE, also incorporate evidence of a positive 
correlation between the size of this effect and the degree to which participants 
experience a subjective sense of confident, contextualised recollection; regardless of 
recognition accuracy (Lee, 2001b; Wang and Chang, 2004). In line with the earlier 
recommendation (on page 33) that future research should endeavour to test (rather than 
accept) the assumption that the MEE is hindered by recognition, therefore, the same 
might be proposed with regard to the moderating influence of recollection in particular. 
Nevertheless, the provision of empirical evidence for the proposition that the MEE is 
facilitated by familiarity in the absence of recollection, but moderated by clear, 
contextualised memory for prior exposure, would potentially resolve the apparent 
disparity between Stang’s two-factor theory (1975) and the subsequent ‘misattribution’ 
theories that have risen to prominence in the contemporary literature; details of which 
are outlined in the following section. 
 
2.3.2.2. Misattribution theories of the MEE: Non-specific activation and Perceptual 
fluency/attribution 
 
The theories of non-specific activation (Mandler et al., 1987) and perceptual 
fluency/attribution (Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994) share a great deal of 
common ground. Both posit that the non-conscious MEE is akin to repetition priming; 
“the facilitation or bias in the processing of a stimulus as a function of a recent 
encounter with that stimulus” (Butler and Berry, 2004: 468). Furthermore, this is 
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purported to occur subconsciously on the basis of implicit memory of the prior 
exposures. Specifically, both theories are based on the premise that mere exposure 
reinforces a mental image of the stimulus features that facilitates easier processing 
(termed fluency) when it is subsequently encountered (Mandler et al., 1987; Bornstein 
and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994). In the absence of conscious recollection, the source of 
this processing fluency is mistakenly attributed to the inherent characteristics of the 
stimulus. In research into repetition priming this has been found to include perceptions 
of truthfulness (Begg and Armour, 1991) and sound volume (Jacoby et al., 1988).  
Moreover, in the context of the MEE, enhanced processing fluency has been widely 
misattributed to affective and, to a lesser degree, cognitive judgments (see section 
2.2.1.1). This process is illustrated in figure 2.3. below: 
 
Figure 2.3: An implicit perceptual priming model of the MEE 
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At this point, it is perhaps important to briefly define and discuss the nature of implicit 
memory to the extent that it contributes to an understanding of the MEE. A full review 
of the implicit memory literature is beyond the scope of this thesis (for detailed 
discussion of this see Bowers and Marsolek, 2003). However, a number of basic 
theoretical principles from this literature are central to the ‘misattribution’ theories of 
the non-conscious MEE, and are thus worthy of note here. As a starting point for this 
discussion, the difference in explicit and implicit memory processes is neatly 
summarized by Krishnan and Chakravarti (1999: 9) as follows: 
“Explicit memory processes involve conscious recollection and are seen as 
stemming from a declarative or episodic system. Implicit memory 
processes are ascribed to procedural or semantic systems (Squire & Cohen, 
1984; Tulving, 1983) and can show learning facilitation or preference 
change without conscious awareness.” 
 
The distinction between explicit and implicit memory is supported by a large body of 
empirical research that has found functional dissociations in performance on different 
kinds of tests. Much of this work was undertaken with amnesic patients who have been 
found to exhibit impairment in relation to explicit memory, whilst showing no such 
impairment in tests of implicit memory (e.g. Moscovitch et al., 1986; Squire et al., 
1993). Similarly, clinical research in other areas has found that, whilst explicit memory 
is impaired, implicit memory remains unaffected by factors such as normal ageing 
(Light and Singh, 1987; Parkin, 1993), mental retardation (Lorsbach and Worman, 1989, 
1990), schizophrenia (Schwartz et al., 1993), learning disabilities (Lorsbach et al., 
1992), and depression (Hertel and Hardin, 1990). In addition, and within the broader 
field of memory research, factors such as depth of processing (Jacoby and Dallas, 1981; 
Roediger et al., 1992), length of retention intervals (Kolers, 1976; Tulving et al., 1982) 
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and division of attention (Eich, 1984; Parkin and Russo, 1990) have all been found to 
influence explicit, but not implicit, memory. Furthermore, implicit memory is widely 
cited in the literature to differ from explicit memory in that it is immune to interference 
from additional learning, either before or following the stimulus exposure (see reviews 
by Roediger and McDermott, 1993; Rovee-Collier, 1997; Schacter et al., 1993). In a 
similar vein, implicit memory has been found to be unaffected by instructions for 
directed forgetting, whilst explicit memory is impaired by this factor (Basden et al., 
1993; Paller, 1990; Russo and Andrade, 1995). Given the large body of work in this 
area, implicit memory is widely accepted as a robust phenomenon that is equivalent 
across diverse populations, including children (e.g. Landrum, 1997), university students 
(e.g. Graf and Mandler, 1984), amnesics (e.g. Shimamura, 1986; Squire et al., 1987) and 
the elderly (Light and Singh, 1987). Furthermore, unlike explicit memory, it has been 
found to be relatively stable and persistent over time; although, as noted previously, it 
should be acknowledged that there is ongoing debate as to exactly how long implicit 
memory effects might endure (see page 34). 
 
Whilst the existence and influence of implicit memory is not in dispute, however, the 
nature of the mental processes by which it occurs is subject to a great deal of debate. In 
this respect, the earlier definition of Krishnan and Chakravarti (1999; see page 47) is 
somewhat controversial as it presupposes that this phenomenon is “ascribed to 
procedural or semantic systems.” On the one hand, this may be seen to incorporate the 
emerging contention that implicit memory has a conceptual dimension (see Rueckl, 
2003). However, the traditional (and arguably dominant) perspective in the psychology 
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literature is that implicit memory does not incorporate semantic or associative 
processing and is, in fact, no more than a perceptual representation system (Schacter, 
1990; Tulving and Schacter, 1990). For this reason the process illustrated in figure 2.3. 
(and that which may be seen to underpin the misattribution theories of mere exposure) is 
limited to the creation and influence of perceptual representations of the stimulus form. 
The possibility of conceptual implicit memory, however, may have important 
implications for the nature and scope of the MEE, particularly in a marketing context, 
and will thus be discussed in more detail subsequently (see section 2.4.1, page 53). 
 
At this point, however, it is useful to maintain a focus on the two theoretical 
explanations of the MEE that are the subject of this section; non-specific activation 
(Mandler et al., 1987) and perceptual fluency/attribution (Bornstein and D’Agostino, 
1992, 1994). Thus far, these theories have been discussed in terms of their great 
similarity. Indeed, perhaps the only significant difference between them is the degree to 
which they explain the impact of processing fluency on subsequent affective and 
cognitive response. As Lee (2001a: 32) observes: 
“Comparing the nonspecific activation account and the perceptual 
fluency/attributional model, it is apparent that the two are very similar and 
may be two sides of the same coin. The consequence of activation in 
memory is greater accessibility and hence quicker processing (Collins & 
Loftus, 1975; Anderson, 1983). Greater processing speed is also implied by 
greater ease of processing and perceptual fluency, in fact, is often indexed 
by reaction time (e.g. Whittlesea. 1993). [However] the perceptual 
fluency/attributional model, unlike the nonspecific activation account, is 
more explicit about the process that leads from stimulus encounter to 
affective judgment.” 
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In this respect, both Mandler et al. (1987) and Bornstein and D’Agostino (1992, 1994) 
elucidate a process whereby the fluency that is created by mere exposure is then 
attributed to “the most parsimonious and reasonable explanation of the experience” 
(Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1994: 106-107). Importantly, however, Bornstein and 
D’Agostino (1992, 1994) also identify a correction mechanism whereby the degree to 
which misattribution occurs is reduced by explicit memory of the stimulus exposure. 
This enables their theory to account for evidence that the MEE is hindered by the 
presence of stimulus recognition (Seamon et al., 1983; Bornstein, 1989; Bornstein and 
D’Agostino 1992). Whilst, the validity of this assumption may be challenged on the 
basis of emerging empirical evidence (e.g. Lee, 2001b; Wang and Chang, 2004; as 
discussed in section 2.2.3.3.1, page 29), its persistence in the contemporary literature 
leads Butler and Berry (2004: 479) to claim that the theory of perceptual 
fluency/attribution currently, “offers the best hope of a comprehensive explanation for 
the mere exposure effect.” 
 
It may be interesting to note, however, that whilst the theory of perceptual 
fluency/attribution was coined by Bornstein and D’Agostino (1992, 1994), it is also 
apparent in the work of Jacoby et al. (1992: 803): 
“memory for prior experience automatically influences the processing and 
interpretation of later events. One ubiquitous effect of past experience is to 
make current processing more efficient, rapid, or fluent. Such fluent 
processing is then unconsciously attributed to a source, thereby giving rise 
to a particular subjective experience. Errors in this attribution process can 
result in a variety of memory-based illusions.” 
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In support of this claim, the authors provide illustrations of such illusions in relation to 
noise judgments and the false fame effect (Jacoby et al. 1989); a phenomenon whereby 
prior exposure to non-famous names gives rise to a feeling of familiarity that, in turn, 
enhances the frequency with which they are mistakenly judged to be famous.  In the 
same vein, the MEE is explained as an illusory affective response that occurs on the 
basis of misattributed processing fluency, in the absence of recollection for prior 
exposure. Importantly, however, Jacoby et al., (1992) also draw attention to the 
possibility that processing fluency could enhance subjective judgments of familiarity in 
the absence of objective recognition for prior stimulus exposure; as Whittlesea (1993: 
1248) explains:  
“Jacoby and his associates (e.g., Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989) argued 
that feelings of familiarity are attributions of current processing fluency to 
some source that seems likely. That is, when the past appears to be a likely 
source of current ease of processing, a feeling of familiarity will emerge. 
When the present is regarded as a more likely source of the same fluency, a 
feeling of some present quality will emerge.”  
 
This has important implications for the concept and measurement of recognition in mere 
exposure research, and indeed for whether mere exposure is necessary at all for the 
creation of fluency-based effects. It is therefore discussed in more detail during the 
following section, alongside another potential challenge to current conceptualizations of 
the MEE arising from the debate over the nature of implicit memory.  
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2.4. Theoretical issues and challenges to the MEE 
 
In the previous section it was acknowledged that, in the absence of a generic theory of 
mere exposure, two competing schools of thought have given rise to affect-based and 
cognition-based theories respectively. Of these, the latter – and particularly those 
founded on the notion of implicit memory and misattribution – have come to represent 
the most influential explanations of the MEE (see Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004; 
Butler and Berry, 2004). The assumptions on which these are founded, however, are 
subject to challenge in three areas that, respectively, may have important implications 
for how the MEE is explained, the degree to which it may occur in the natural 
environment and, indeed, the efficacy of this phenomenon as a route to attitude change. 
The first relates to the impact of the conscious experience of memory for prior exposure; 
an issue that was discussed at length in section 2.2.3.3.1 (page 29) and referred to 
throughout section 2.3. The second is concerned with the question of whether implicit 
memory has a conceptual dimension or is entirely perceptual in nature, and the third 
emerges from the relatively recent conceptualisation of the false familiarity effect 
(Whittlesea, 1993); a phenomenon whereby fluency that is entirely unrelated to previous 
exposure exerts an influence on subsequent cognition and affect in a similar way to that 
proposed in theories of the MEE. Building on previous discussion with regard to the 
first of these three issues (see page 29), therefore, this section is designed to elucidate 
the potential implications of the other two for the exploration and explanation of mere 
exposure effects. 
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2.4.1. Conceptual implicit memory 
 
The dominant misattribution theories of mere exposure (Mandler et al., 1987; Bornstein 
and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994) are based on the assumption that implicit memory is 
entirely perceptual in nature, with semantic processing occurring only on the basis of 
conscious, elaborative encoding and retrieval. This is well-supported in the psychology 
literature (Jacoby, 1983; Graf and Mandler, 1984; Schacter, 1990; Tulving and Schacter, 
1990) and implies that replication of perceptual stimulus features is a necessary 
condition for the MEE. Whilst it remains contentious, however, there is some support 
for the theory that implicit memory also has a conceptual dimension (see Rueckl, 2003). 
This is based on the notion that the ‘spreading activation’ underpinning semantic 
memory for the meaning of a stimulus may occur automatically and implicitly (Neeley, 
1977; Posner and Snyder, 1975; Swinney, 1979, 1982); a proposition that is supported 
by the finding that amnesic patients  are capable of learning semantic information whilst 
exhibiting impaired explicit memory (e.g. Graf and Schacter, 1985). Further to this, 
Ferraro et al. (2003) argue that semantic memory is to some extent implicit in that 
certain relationships already exist in long-term memory as implicit knowledge.  
 
In the context of the MEE, a key implication of conceptual implicit memory is that 
automatic semantic analysis might occur during exposure; embedding the stimulus in a 
pre-existing semantic network. On this basis, it may be argued that the MEE could occur 
on the basis of misattributed conceptual fluency for the stimulus meaning, even when 
the perceptual features of the stimulus are not replicated at test. This fluency could, for 
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example, be triggered by the activation (i.e. presentation) of associated cues in the 
semantic network or the use of an analogous cue in a different modality (e.g. the 
auditory presentation of a word that was previously presented visually).  
 
The notion of conceptual implicit memory could thus have significant implications for 
both theories and applications of the MEE. Firstly, it would require that the influential 
theory of perceptual fluency/attribution (Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994) be 
extended to include the possibility of an MEE that is based on automatic semantic 
analysis, implicit memory for the stimulus meaning and conceptual fluency at test (as 
illustrated in figure 2.4). Secondly, by removing the need for perceptual matching 
between exposure and test, implicit conceptual memory would provide a foundation for 
the MEE to occur across modalities in the natural environment. In the context of 
marketing communication, for example, visual exposure to the brand name via above-
the-line advertising may not only result in perceptual fluency effects when the same 
stimulus is seen on, say, product packaging, but also when it is verbalised in other 
elements of the promotions mix (e.g. TV, radio, word-of-mouth, personal selling). 
Theoretically, therefore, the notion of an MEE that is not dependent on implicit 
perceptual processing significantly broadens the frequency with which it might be 
expected to influence attitudes and decision-making in the natural environment. 
 
  55 
Figure 2.4: An implicit conceptual priming model of the MEE 
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specifically to the influence of unreinforced repeated exposure to the target stimulus 
alone. Contrary to this, she argues that the predictive nature of the preceding sentence in 
Whittlesea’s (1993) experiment could lead to a feeling of expectation that is then 
reinforced by congruent words, giving rise to positive affect. 
 
Indeed, Whittlesea’s (1993) study, and the subsequent criticism of Lee (2001a), 
highlights an important distinction between the MEE and classical conditioning 
(Pavlov, 1927); a similar phenomenon whereby affective response to a given stimulus is 
influenced by repeated association with other stimuli. As will be discussed in chapter 4, 
Baker (1999: 32) specifically compares the influence of mere exposure and classical 
conditioning on consumer attitudes; finding similar effects via different mechanisms, 
and concluding that the advantage of the MEE in marketing communication is that it is 
“less difficult to implement . . . but may produce an identical effect.” In the context of 
this discussion, however, the critical distinction to note is that the MEE relates to 
repeated, unreinforced exposure to a given stimulus in isolation. By contrast, classical 
conditioning relates to the reinforcement of stimulus meaning by the context in which it 
is repeatedly presented. In relation to semantic memory, classical conditioning might 
therefore be considered to be based on the creation of associations between two or more 
external stimuli. Conversely, a conceptually-based MEE would relate to the embedding 
of the newly encountered stimulus into an existing semantic memory network. It should 
be stressed, however, that the concept of an MEE that is based on semantic analysis and 
conceptual fluency remains highly contentious. Indeed, the received wisdom in 
psychology continues to be underpinned by Schacter’s (1996) assertion that semantic 
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memory is dependent on conscious elaboration and deep level processing. As such, it is 
perhaps prudent for marketing research (and particularly that which constitutes the 
empirical phase of this thesis) to be developed on the assumption that the MEE is 
underpinned by implicit perceptual representations of the exposed stimuli; in line with 
the theories of Mandler et al. (1987) and Bornstein and D’Agostino (1992, 1994).  
 
2.4.2. Alternative sources of perceptual fluency and the ‘false familiarity’ effect 
 
As discussed in section 2.3.2.2 (page 45), the dominant misattribution theories of mere 
exposure (Mandler et al., 1987; Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994) posit that the 
MEE essentially constitutes an illusory affective or cognitive response, arising on the 
basis of misattributed processing fluency in the absence of recollection for the source. 
Inherent in this explanation is the premise that the source of this fluency is prior 
exposure.  This assumption, however, may be undermined by research indicating that 
enhanced processing fluency can occur as a result of both past exposure and the inherent 
characteristics of the stimulus (in the present). Furthermore, in the absence of 
recollection for prior exposure, this fluency might be misattributed in the same way 
regardless of the basis on which it occurs (Whittlesea, 1993). Empirical evidence for this 
is provided by Reber et al. (1998: 48), who manipulated processing fluency via three 
mechanisms; visual priming, figure-ground contrast and exposure duration. On the basis 
that a subsequent affect-bias was observed in each case, the authors concluded that: 
“preference for neutral stimuli can be enhanced by manipulations of fluency 
in the perceptual domain, independently of stimulus repetition . . . We assume 
that this facilitation leads to a subjective experience of processing fluency, 
which is then attributed to the quality of the stimulus, as proposed by the two-
step account of mere-exposure effects.” 
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Whilst the interpretation of visual priming results in this study might be questioned on 
the grounds that this effectively constitutes prior exposure, those relating to the other 
manipulations would certainly appear to provide evidence in support of the authors’ 
conclusion (above). Furthermore, the weight of these findings is enhanced by a growing 
body of empirical work that specifically supports the proposition that stimulus 
characteristics in the present may give rise to a mistaken sense of familiarity (i.e. a 
misattribution to factors in the past). The false familiarity effect (Whittlesea, 1993) is 
empirically supported by research in which the ease with which stimuli are perceptually 
processed is manipulated to produce a false sense of familiarity in the absence of prior 
exposure. In this respect, successful manipulations have included the level of stimulus-
masking (Whittlesea et al., 1990; Lindsay and Kelley, 1996) and exposure duration at 
test (Whittlesea, 1993). In addition, a number of studies have demonstrated that the 
enhancement of conceptual fluency also results in a sense of false familiarity in the 
absence of prior exposure (e.g. Jacoby, 1983; Roediger et al., 1989). For example, such 
evidence has been obtained by test manipulations of semantic context (Roediger and 
McDermott, 1995; Whittlesea, 1993) and by the presentation of words associated with a 
(non-presented) category ‘prototype’ (Stadler et al., 1999). In this respect, prior 
exposure to the words ‘bounce’, ‘rubber’ and ‘round’, for instance, may result in a false 
feeling that the word ‘ball’ had also been presented in this list. This is referred to as the 
prototype-familiarity effect, it has a long history in the scientific literature (since Deese, 
1959) and has been replicated on numerous occasions (see McDermott, 1996; 
McDermott and Roediger, 1998; McEvoy et al., 1999; Whittlesea, 2002). 
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The false familiarity effect (Whittlesea, 1993) may be seen to pose an important 
challenge to the MEE; particularly, in relation to the fact that the influential 
misattribution theories of mere exposure incorporate the possibility that (in the absence 
of recollection) it is the suggestion, rather than the occurrence of prior exposure that 
leads to an illusion of familiarity (Mandler et al., 1987; Bornstein and D’Agostino, 
1992, 1994). As such, even under conditions of mere exposure without recollection 
there is no guarantee that familiarity is caused by this, rather than some inherent 
characteristic of the stimulus. As Whittlesea (1993: 1236) explains: 
“The relationship between perceptual fluency and familiarity is complicated 
by the fact that fluency of performance can result from, and can sensibly be 
attributed to, sources in either the past or the present. Just as prior 
experience of an object facilitates current processing, so do many factors in 
the present, including visual clarity, absence of distraction, and coherent 
organization of the stimuli . . . In consequence, use of the “fluency 
heuristic” can result in erroneous attributions of an influence of present 
factors to an influence of the past, or of past influence to present factors.” 
 
In the same way that exposure-induced processing fluency may be expected to give rise 
to affective and cognitive response, therefore, fluency that arises by another means 
might also be expected to result in the same outcome. Indeed, in addition to false 
familiarity, illusory affective response has been found in the absence of mere exposure. 
For example, both Reber et al. (1998) and Winkielman and Cacioppo (2001) 
demonstrate enhanced affective response to stimuli that were presented for longer 
durations at test, and thus became easier to process. 
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Taken together, therefore, the studies reviewed in this section indicate that both false 
familiarity and positive affect may be experienced as a result of processing fluency that 
arises from stimulus characteristics in the present, rather than exposure in the past. 
These are synonymous with the effects of mere exposure, and in line with the attribution 
elements of the theories of non-specific activation (Mandler et al., 1987) and perceptual 
fluency/attribution (Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994). For this reason, it might be 
argued that future research into the MEE should incorporate a means by which to 
specifically link the observed effects to the exposure phase of the study. In addition, 
direct comparison of the MEE and other fluency effects (e.g. the FFE; Whittlesea, 1993) 
may constitute an important direction for further research in this field. Indeed, this issue 
does not seem to have been addressed since Whittlesea’s (1993) call for research to 
examine the relative the size and nature of the MEE and FFE. Such an undertaking may 
be particularly important in a marketing context to address the question of whether it is 
desirable, or even necessary, to use mere exposure techniques to enhance fluency 
effects. Should the MEE and FFE prove to be entirely equivalent, it may be more cost 
effective to enhance processing fluency by simply selecting brand stimuli that are 
inherently easier to process, either perceptually, conceptually or both.  
 
Although a detailed exploration of the differences between the MEE and FFE is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, therefore, it must be acknowledged that evidence for the former 
may only be apparent if it can be effectively distinguished from the latter. To this end, 
the empirical phase of this thesis incorporates an important methodological 
advancement in the sense that it explicitly links observed preference bias to the exposure 
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phase. One of the means by which this is achieved (i.e. stimulus pretesting) was 
planned, whilst a second approach emerged as a result of exploratory comparison of 
preference rates under conditions of subliminal and supraliminal exposure. These 
elements of the research design will be discussed in detail during part II of the thesis, 
with the results of comparative analysis then presented in chapter 7 (section 7.5.1, page 
338). During the final section of this chapter, however, it is perhaps useful to consider 
the implications of all the issues discussed above and, more broadly, the current state of 
psychological understanding for the exploration and application of the MEE in a 
marketing context.  
 
2.5. Implications for marketing research and application 
 
To this point, the chapter has sought to provide a critical review of the extant 
psychology literature. In the context of this thesis, however, it is important to bring the 
chapter to a close with a discussion of the specific implications of this for the 
exploration and application of the MEE in a marketing context. This is complicated to 
some extent by the emerging nature of scientific understanding with regard to the MEE; 
as illustrated by ongoing debates in the literature reviewed in this chapter (e.g. the 
influence of recognition and recollection, the durability of the effect and, in particular, 
the absence of a generic theory or mere exposure). However, on the basis of those 
aspects that would appear to be central to the exploration and explanation of the MEE in 
the psychology literature, it is possible to distil three fundamental propositions; the 
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testing of which might be expected to facilitate a robust examination of the existence, 
size, direction and nature of the MEE in a marketing context: 
P1: Mere exposure to a marketing stimulus will influence affective response 
to that stimulus when it is subsequently encountered (Zajonc, 1968; see pg 18) 
P2: The size of the marketing-based mere exposure effect will be hindered by 
the presence of accurate recognition memory for marketing stimulus exposure 
(Bornstein, 1989; Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992; see pg. 30) 
P3: The size of the marketing-based mere exposure effect will be hindered by 
a subjective sense of confident, contextualized recollection for prior exposure 
to the marketing stimulus; regardless of recognition accuracy (see pg. 45) 
 
Additionally, however, it should be noted that the marketing stimuli to which 
participants are exposed, and required to make judgments upon, in the empirical phase 
of this thesis are novel brand names (as will be explained in chapter 5, page 189). As 
noted previously (on page 26), such stimuli commonly take the form of either real or 
pseudo-words in the natural marketing environment and may thus be subject to the 
meta-analytic effect size differences observed by Bornstein (1989); although it should 
be noted that this has yet to be empirically tested in a marketing context. As such, an 
additional proposition may be deemed to be both relevant and necessary to the empirical 
work in this thesis: 
 
P4: The marketing-based mere exposure effect will be significantly larger for 
real-word brand names than it will for pseudo-word brand names 
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Importantly, in each of the above propositions ‘mere exposure’ is defined as brief, 
repeated exposure to a stimulus in isolation; reflecting the original definition of Zajonc 
(1968; see page 18) and highlighting the unreinforced nature of direct priming that 
distinguishes the MEE from similar phenomena (e.g. classical conditioning). 
Furthermore, however, it is perhaps useful to qualify the basis on which these 
propositions might be expected to provide a foundation for the extension of mere 
exposure research in the marketing domain; and in particular that which is the focus of 
this thesis.  
 
Firstly, in this respect, whilst proposition 1 is supported by a great deal of evidence from 
abstract psychological experimentation (as discussed throughout this chapter), it is 
important to specifically investigate the extent to which these findings may be replicated 
in a marketing context. Secondly, in light of occasional evidence for a reverse MEE in 
adults (e.g. Crandall et al., 1973; Heyduk, 1975), and in particular the fact that one such 
study is published in the marketing literature (Lee, 1994), it may be argued that robust 
testing of the direction of the mere exposure effect remains an important task for 
marketing researchers at this juncture. For this reason, proposition 1 is carefully worded 
to accommodate the possibility of both positive and negative affect-bias as a result of 
mere exposure. Thirdly, whilst the premise that the MEE is hindered by recognition 
memory - and in particular that which is based on confident, contextualised recollection 
of prior exposure - underpins the influential misattribution theories of mere exposure 
(Mandler et al., 1987; Bornstein and D’Agistino, 1992, 1994), direct empirical findings 
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in this respect are relatively scarce and somewhat equivocal (see page 32). As such, it 
was previously noted that future mere exposure research should endeavour to test the 
proposition that memory moderates the MEE, rather than make assumptions in this 
respect. To this end, propositions 2 and 3 are designed to provide a comprehensive 
examination of what is arguably one of the most important, interesting and increasingly 
controversial aspects of the MEE.  
 
Finally, it has been stressed that previous supporting evidence for the moderating 
influence of recognition memory is primarily based on the use of subliminal exposure as 
a means by which to eliminate subsequent conscious memory in the experimental setting 
(Bornstein, 1989; Seamon et al., 1983; Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992; see page 29). 
As such, it is as yet unclear as to whether the enhancement of the MEE in these studies 
is a consequence of subliminal perception or the intermediate non-conscious processes 
of implicit memory. Whilst this may represent an important direction for future MEE 
research in the psychology literature, it is of particular relevance in the context of 
marketing. In this domain, subliminal advertising has come to be regarded as 
inconsequential following the debunking of initial ‘evidence’ of its substantive 
influence (see Broyles 2006). At the same time, however, empirical support for the 
effects of non-conscious intermediate processing following supraliminal perception has 
become increasingly common in the consumer literature (see Chartrand, 2005). For 
example, non-conscious goal activation (Chartrand et al., 2005), behavioural mimicry 
(Dijksterhuis et al., 2005) and the marketing placebo effect (Shiv et al., 2005) have all 
been found to influence consumer behaviour in the absence of conscious awareness (and 
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following supraliminal perception); as will be discussed in detail during chapter 3. In 
light of this, it may be argued that resolution of this issue might have significant 
implications for the conceptualization, application and impact of the MEE in the 
marketing domain. For example, evidence to support the original speculation of 
Bornstein (1989) that increases in the size of the MEE are due to the experience of 
subliminal perception (and an accompanying absence of boredom and fatigue) may be 
seen to provide the first, robust evidence of how subliminal advertising may have a 
substantive effect on audience attitudes and preferences. Given the serious ethical 
challenges to this form of persuasive communication, widespread public concern and 
opposition, and thus the reluctance of advertisers and marketers to adopt subliminal 
techniques, however, the most likely implication of this finding would be to marginalize 
the concept of mere exposure in marketing theory. By contrast, a non-conscious MEE 
would contribute to the growing literature on consumer behaviour in the absence of 
awareness, regardless of the nature of perception (as will be discussed in chapter 3).  
 
As such, it may be argued that, if the MEE is to assume an influential role in marketing 
theory and practice, an important challenge for marketing-based mere exposure research 
(and thus one of the primary aims of this thesis) is to provide a demonstration – or, more 
accurately perhaps, an examination - of the non-conscious MEE in particular; i.e. that 
which occurs in the absence of recognition (and perhaps, more specifically, recollection) 
following supraliminal perception. Not only might this be expected to make a significant 
contribution to the broad theoretical understanding of the MEE (in the realms of 
psychology), it addresses what is arguably one of the most important factors in the 
extent to which this phenomenon may be deemed to be relevant, acceptable and 
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applicable by marketing academics and practitioners alike. Furthermore, it is directly in 
line with Zajonc’s (1968: 1) original definition of the MEE; i.e. that which is “just 
accessible to the individual’s perception.” With this in mind, the operational definition 
of ‘mere exposure’ in the propositions above (see page 62) should perhaps be further 
refined as the brief, repeated exposure of a stimulus in isolation, at a level that is just 
perceptible to the audience.  
 
2.6. Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a detailed review of the extant 
psychology literature, incorporating the large body of research that has so far sought to 
examine and explain the existence, size and nature of the MEE. In this respect, it is 
important to recognize that, whilst the existence of this phenomenon is not in dispute, a 
generic theory of mere exposure remains elusive. In its absence, a number of competing 
explanations have emerged that may be categorized on the basis that they emphasise the 
role of affect or cognition. Whilst the latter have come to be acknowledged as the most 
likely source of a unified theory of mere exposure (see Butler and Berry, 2004), the 
assumptions on which these accounts are founded are nonetheless subject to a number of 
emerging theoretical (and occasionally empirical) challenges that may have important 
implications for the explanation, exploration and efficacy of the MEE.  
 
Firstly, the fact that stimulus recognition may occur on the basis of familiarity and/or 
recollection has potentially important implications for both theories of mere exposure 
and the empirical measurement of this phenomenon. Furthermore, recent indications that 
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recognition – and, in particular, the subjective experience of this – might be expected to 
enhance, rather than  moderate, the MEE (Lee, 2001b, Wang and Chang, 2004; Newell 
and Shanks, 2007) highlight the importance of addressing, rather than accepting, the 
influence of memory in future mere exposure research. Secondly, the possibility that 
implicit memory has a semantic dimension that facilitates non-conscious conceptual 
fluency may not only require revision of the dominant misattribution theories of mere 
exposure (see page 45), but may also increase the scope by which the MEE might be 
expected to occur across modalities in the natural environment. However, it should be 
noted that, in the continued absence of widespread theoretical acceptance of conceptual 
implicit memory (and robust empirical evidence), it cannot yet be regarded as a strong 
foundation on which to explore the effects of mere exposure in an applied context (such 
as marketing). Finally, the emergence of the false familiarity effect (Whittlesea, 1993) 
challenges the notion that exposure is required to produce both perceptual and 
conceptual fluency effects; indicating instead that this may simply be the product of 
inherent stimulus characteristics. This work is potentially important as it suggests that, 
whilst mere exposure may be sufficient for creating processing fluency (and thus 
subsequent affective and cognitive response), it may not be necessary and, indeed, might 
not be the most influential factor in previous demonstrations of the MEE. In light of this, 
it may be argued that future empirical studies - including that which is the focus of this 
thesis - must seek to distinguish this phenomenon from the FFE (Whittlesea, 1993) by 
specifically linking the observed effects to the exposure phase of the study.  
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In conclusion, therefore, this chapter has sought to provide a comprehensive review of 
the vast and complex psychology literature that has emerged over four decades of 
research into the mere exposure effect (Zajonc, 1968); with the intention of establishing 
a detailed theoretical foundation on which to extend mere exposure research in the 
marketing domain. In this respect, it is argued that the essential characteristics of the 
MEE - or at least those factors that are at the heart of the various theoretical 
explanations of this phenomenon - may be encapsulated in three fundamental 
propositions. Alongside these, one additional proposition is formulated in 
acknowledgment of the potential for stimulus-specific differences when real-word and 
pseudo-word brand names are the subject of empirical research into the MEE (as they 
will be in this thesis). The central question for marketers is whether each of these 
propositions can be robustly supported in the context of marketing communication. In 
order to assess the extent to which this has so far been achieved, a critical review of the 
extant empirical research in the marketing domain will be undertaken in chapter 4. Prior 
to this, however, and on the basis of the discussion so far, the following chapter provides 
a critical review of how the MEE has been, could be, and perhaps should be 
conceptualised in the context of marketing theory. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Conceptualising the MEE in Marketing Theory 
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3.1. Introduction 
 
At the heart of this thesis is an exploration of how marketing communication influences 
attitudes at extremely low levels of attention and engagement; conditions that 
characterize a large proportion of the current media and consumption environment (Ha 
and Litman, 1997; MacInnis et al., 1991; Skinner and Stephens, 2003). Traditionally, 
models of decision-making and advertising effects have been rooted in the notion that 
consumers pay attention to, and consciously process, product, brand and company 
information prior to making informed decisions. However, these models are likely to be 
of limited use in the contemporary context of minimal conscious attention, processing 
and mindful analysis/evaluation. By contrast, it is argued that the mere exposure effect 
(MEE) provides a relevant paradigm within which to understand the influence of 
marketing communications under such conditions (Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004). 
 
A critical review of empirical research into the marketing-based MEE will be 
undertaken in the following chapter. Prior to that, however, it is perhaps important to 
provide a detailed discussion as to the relevance and role of this phenomenon in 
marketing theory. In this respect, the MEE is arguably most germane to the specific field 
of consumer information processing; a boundary-spanning tradition of research at the 
interface between consumer behaviour and marketing communication (as illustrated in 
figure 3.1 below).  
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Figure 3.1.: Contextualising the MEE in the marketing domain 
 
 
  
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to contextualise the MEE in relation to 
marketing theory, and specifically that pertaining to consumer information processing 
(CIP). The field of CIP has been of great interest to researchers seeking to understand 
the influence of marketing communication on consumer attitudes and behaviour; 
resulting  in a very large, complex and multi-disciplinary body of work (for a review see 
Kitchen and Spickett-Jones, 2003). The discussion in this chapter is not intended to 
provide an exhaustive review but rather to facilitate a critical discussion of how the 
MEE is currently understood in this domain. In this respect, previous attempts to 
contextualise this phenomenon are evident in three streams of the CIP literature:  
a) Involvement theory and the ‘integrative models’ of information processing to 
which this has given rise; 
b) Non-cognitive consumer processing (i.e. the generation and influence of affect 
and emotion in consumer decision-making); and 
c) Non-conscious consumer processing 
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In order to facilitate a critical review of the relevance of mere exposure research in CIP 
theory the chapter is divided into three main sections; addressing each of the above areas 
in turn (as illustrated in figure 3.2.). On this basis, it aims to develop a clear 
understanding of how the MEE has been, could be and perhaps should be conceptualised 
in marketing theory. In conjunction with chapter 2, this chapter is designed to provide a 
comprehensive theoretical foundation on which to develop a critical review of 
marketing-specific studies of the mere exposure effect (chapter 4), and indeed the 
forthcoming empirical work in this thesis. The chapter begins, therefore, with a review 
of the MEE in the context of involvement theory, prior to a discussion of this 
phenomenon with regard to affective and non-conscious consumer processing 
respectively. 
 
Figure 3.2: Structure of chapter 3 
 
2. Involvement theory & the MEE 
• Integrative models of consumer processing 
3. Non-cognitive consumer processing & the MEE 
• The cognitive perspective 
• Affect-based theories 
5. Relevance of the MEE in marketing theory 
6. Conclusion 
4. Non-conscious consumer processing & the MEE 
• Perception 
• Intermediate processing 
• Outcomes 
1. Introduction 
  73 
3.2. Involvement theory and the MEE 
 
Simply stated, consumer involvement can be seen as the willingness and ability to 
identify and process detailed, issue-relevant information in relation to a consumption 
decision. It is mediated by the degree of perceived risk and personal relevance inherent 
in the decision (Bloch, 1981; Celsi and Olsen, 1988; Germunden, 1985; Laurent and 
Kapferer, 1985; Zaichowsky, 1985). However, this ‘entry’ into the concept masks some 
of the different perspectives given to it in the literature. For example, in behavioural 
terms it has been considered in terms of information search activities (Richins et al., 
1992; Roselius, 1971; Stone, 1984), motivation to provide information and opinions to 
others (Bloch and Richins, 1983; Feich and Price, 1987; Richins and Root-Schaffer, 
1988), cognition (e.g. enhanced processing of detailed information via engagement of 
the left cerebral hemisphere; Stone, 1984; Vaughn, 1980; 1986), and affect (Park and 
Young, 1983). The question as to what consumers are ‘involved’ with has also been 
approached from a number of different perspectives.  For example, involvement has 
been defined with regard to advertisements, products and purchase decisions 
(Zaichowsky, 1986), and as both enduring and situational (Bloch and Richins, 1983; 
Houston and Rothschild, 1978; Laurent and Kapferer, 1985; Richins and Bloch, 1986).  
 
However, perhaps the most pertinent conceptualisation in the context of this thesis is 
that of audience versus actor involvement, whereby “the audience is engaged in 
acquiring knowledge, [whilst] the actor executes performance based on already acquired 
knowledge” (Greenwald and Leavitt, 1984: 583). In this respect, actor involvement 
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relates to the extent to which consumers seek, pay attention to, and cognitively process 
detailed, issue-relevant information throughout the decision-making process. By 
contrast, audience involvement is specifically concerned with processing responses to 
marketing communications; closely reflecting the original observations of Krugman 
(1965: 352) that the largely passive processing of increasingly repetitive advertising had 
resulted in a situation whereby, “much of the impact of television is in the form of 
learning without involvement.” Audience involvement is thus specifically defined as: 
“the allocation of attentional capacity to a message source, as needed to 
analyze the message at one of a series of increasingly abstract 
representational levels” (Greenwald and Leavitt, 1984:591).  
 
Taken together therefore, the concepts of audience and actor involvement span the 
boundaries of consumer behaviour and marketing communications, encompassing the 
full range of information processing that occurs between advertising exposure and brand 
choice. In this respect, audience involvement may be seen to directly mediate 
advertising effects in which “the practical concern is more with the consumer’s 
acquiring (rather than using) knowledge” (Greenwald and Leavitt, 1984: 583). By 
contrast, actor involvement is a critical mediator of the extent to which advertising 
effects subsequently influence consumer decision-making and product/brand choice.  
 
It is in these terms, therefore, that the relevance of the MEE to the field of consumer 
information processing might be most clearly understood. Specifically, it may be argued 
that the MEE provides a paradigm for exploring, understanding and influencing the 
processing of marketing communications under conditions of extremely low audience 
involvement. As a result, it has implications for the design, planning and execution of 
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marketing communication (as will be discussed in chapter 8). However, it should be 
acknowledged that subsequent effects on brand choice may be magnified by situations 
in which consumers are unable or unwilling to consciously retrieve and utilize detailed 
information from explicit memory in the decision-making process, i.e. in the context of 
low actor involvement. With echoes of Stang’s (1975) two-factor theory of mere 
exposure (see chapter 2, page 43), Janiszewski (1993: 390) explains this as follows: 
“In the event a consumer has subjective advertising information and 
discounts it, familiarity becomes one of the few remaining cues for 
decision-making. Hence, whenever consumers do not actively use 
recognition or frequency information to discount the influence of 
familiarity, familiarity is likely to exert a bias.” 
 
In summary, therefore, involvement theory may provide an important and mutually 
dependent context in which to understand the relevance of the MEE to consumer 
information processing. In the following section it will be argued that the lowest points 
of the involvement spectrum (as defined by Petty and Cacioppo, 1981; Greenwald and 
Leavitt, 1984; MacInnis and Jaworski, 1989) effectively describe the conditions under 
which the marketing-based MEE might be expected to occur. At the same time, mere 
exposure provides a paradigm within which to explore, understand and influence 
communication effects at the very lowest levels of involvement. This is perhaps best 
illustrated by a series of ‘integrative models’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1983; Greeewald and 
Leavitt, 1984; MacInnis and Jaworski, 1989) that have sought to explain the mediating 
role of involvement in consumer processing and decision-making. A critical discussion 
of how each of these accommodates the MEE is provided in the subsection below. 
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3.2.1. The MEE and integrative models of consumer involvement and processing 
 
The earliest and, arguably, most influential theory of how involvement mediates 
communication effects is the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty and Cacioppo, 1983; 
see figure 3.3 below). As MacInnis and Jaworski (1989: 15) observe: 
“Petty and Cacioppo's Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) added 
considerable parsimony to attitude research by suggesting that various 
attitude formation processes could be classified into two general types; 
those that take considerable effort/cognitive resources and those that 
require little thinking.”  
 
Significantly, the ELM incorporates the notion that perceived risk moderates the degree 
of involvement and in turn the likelihood of ‘elaboration’; elaboration being the degree 
to which consumers engage in detailed information search, purposeful processing and 
proactive dissemination in relation to the decision context. 
 
Figure 3.3: Routes to attitude formation and consumer decision-making: The ELM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Shimp, 1997) 
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On the basis that risk/relevance moderates involvement, and that this subsequently 
moderates elaboration, Petty and Cacioppo (1981) identify the message forms that are 
likely to be effective at different levels of involvement.  They argue that the 
effectiveness of the message form rests on two general routes to attitude change. The 
central route includes informational cues, the strength of arguments and the quality of 
evidence, and is proposed to be the route by which highly involved consumers actively 
move towards consumption decisions. By contrast, the peripheral route is characterized 
by the use of simple decision-rules, triggered by cues such as imagery, brand names and 
music, to move passively [and rapidly] towards a consumption decision. 
 
The ELM has clear implications for the message forms that are likely to be effective for 
consumers at different levels of involvement. In this respect, highly involved consumers 
are seen to be receptive to rich, relevant informational cues that enable them to assess 
the quality and strength of the message content, develop and resolve counter-arguments, 
and thus reduce their level of perceived risk (Bloch et al., 1986; Chaiken, 1980, 1987; 
Fishbein and Ajzen, 1981; Houston, 1979). In addition to habits and routines, low 
involvement consumers will, it is claimed, seek to utilise peripheral cues, such as music, 
imagery, endorser characteristics and source credibility, likability or attractiveness 
(Petty and Cacioppo 1979, 1981, Petty et al., 1983; Yalch and Elmore-Yalch 1984; see 
Petty and Cacioppo 1986). The relatively low level of perceived risk that low 
involvement consumers experience enables them to form attitudes more quickly and 
effortlessly using simple heuristics (Petty et al., 1983). Importantly, however, the nature 
of the cue itself does not necessarily determine its role in a central or peripheral route to 
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attitude formation (Petty et al., 1983). Rather, the essential factor is the extent to which 
the cue facilitates mindful information processing [via the central route] or simple 
decision shortcuts [via the peripheral route]:  
“The critical feature of the central route to persuasion is that an attitude 
change is based on a diligent consideration of information that a person 
feels is central to the true merits of an issue or product. This information 
may be conveyed visually, verbally, or in source or message 
characteristics.” (Petty et al., 1983: 144) 
 
On this foundation a clear distinction has emerged between high and low involvement  
processing in consumer behaviour. Furse et al. (1984), for example, asserted that 
consumers only engage in systematic cognitive processing when they are highly 
involved; a situation that is anything but the norm according to Chaiken (1987). In 
situations of low involvement consumers may not elaborate on information, their needs 
or their purchase intentions (Belk, 1985). Nor will they engage in extensive information 
search and evaluation, or receive information in anything more than a passive way 
(Krishnan and Shapiro, 1999). Nonetheless, advertising may still influence affective 
response (Petty and Cacioppo, 1985) and brand attitudes (Batra and Ray, 1986; Droge, 
1989) under these conditions. 
 
However, the ELM does not explicitly recognise the potential influence of non-
conscious processes in consumer information processing. Rather the concepts of low 
involvement and peripheral processing inherently assume a degree of conscious, 
attentive processing and thus a likelihood of explicit memory for the stimulus exposure. 
Indeed, explicit recall constitutes a dependent variable in some empirical studies of the 
ELM (e.g. Rao and Burnkrant, 1991). In response to this, Greenwald and Leavitt (1984; 
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see figure 3.4) extend the dichotomous ELM by sub-dividing the basic levels of low and 
high involvement to create four levels of involvement: 
1. Preattention - processing limited to sensory buffering and feature analysis 
2. Focal attention – during which perceptual and semantic processing may occur 
3. Comprehension – incorporating syntactic analysis; and  
4. Elaboration - at which point complex conceptual analysis may occur 
 
Figure 3.4: Immediate and enduring effects associated with 4 levels of involvement 
 
 
Source: Greenwald and Leavitt (1984) 
 
As illustrated above, Greenwald and Leavitt (1984) provide a model of communication 
effects that draws specifically on the underlying bases of audience involvement; 
attention and level of processing. As the authors explain: 
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“The four levels differ in the abstractness of symbolic activity used in the 
analysis of an incoming message. The progression from preattention (the 
lowest level) through elaboration (the highest) is assumed to be 
accompanied by the allocation of increasing [attentional] capacity, which 
is required for increasingly abstract analyses of incoming information.” 
(Greenwald and Leavitt, 1984: 584) 
 
In this respect, the focus on attention and level of processing as the defining 
characteristics of involvement, and in particular the acknowledgement that cognitive and 
attitudinal effects may occur with little or no attentive processing and elaboration, 
facilitates, for the first time, an explicit acknowledgement of the potential for the mere 
exposure effect (Zajonc, 1968) in advertising. In the light of the review in the previous 
chapter, however, Greenwald and Leavitt’s (1984) categorization of the MEE as 
essentially the result of focal attentive processing would appear to be out of line with the 
influential misattribution theories of mere exposure (Mandler et al., 1987; Bornstein and 
D’Agostino, 1992, 1994; see page 45); both of which indicate that this phenomenon is 
underpinned by the non-conscious processes of implicit memory. Specifically, these 
theories are founded on the assumption that the MEE is hindered by explicit memory for 
previous exposure; as evidenced by findings of a larger effect under conditions of 
subliminal perception (Bornstein, 1989; Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992). Whilst it was 
previously acknowledged that this assumption may be subject to challenge in the light of 
emerging evidence to the contrary (e.g. Lee, 2001b; Wang and Chang, 2004; see page 
32), it remains apparent in the contemporary mere exposure literature (see Bornstein and 
Craver-Lemley, 2004). From this perspective, therefore, and as the likelihood of 
conscious recall increases with attentional capacity (see Brown and Craik, 2000), so the 
size and frequency of the MEE might be expected to diminish. On this basis, the MEE 
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might be more accurately characterized as a function of the first (preattentive) level of 
processing in figure 3.4 (page 79). Indeed, it should be noted that Greenwald and Leavitt 
(1984: 587) originally acknowledged the possibility of this, but cited a lack of empirical 
evidence at the time of publication: 
“The question marks in the rows for enduring cognitive and attitudinal 
effects of preattention reflect a currently very active controversy as to 
whether any such effects exist. There continues to be no confidently 
established support for claims of various types of lasting effects of 
‘subliminal’ communications.” 
 
As discussed in chapter 2 (page 21), however, a significant body of empirical research 
has since shed light on the non-conscious nature of the MEE. Whilst it remains unclear 
as to whether explicit recollection limits or magnifies the size of the effect (see chapter 
2, page 29), it is not disputed that the effect is significantly larger under conditions of 
subliminal perception (see Bornstein, 1989; Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004). As 
such, it is perhaps fair to assume that the concerns of Greenwald and Leavitt (1984) 
have now been allayed, and the MEE may also be categorized as a function of 
preattentive processes in the context of their model. 
 
Since the work of Greenwald and Leavitt (1984), however, theories of involvement-
based advertising effects have largely ignored the mere exposure phenomenon, taking a 
similar view of low involvement processing to that evident in the ELM (e.g. MacKenzie 
and Lutz, 1989; Heath, 2004). To a degree, however, an exception may be observed in 
the work of MacInnis and Jaworski (1989), in which the authors seek to further refine 
the models of Petty and Cacioppo (1983) and Greenwald and Leavitt (1984) into an 
integrative framework of information processing (see figure 3.5). 
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Figure 3.5: An Integrated Model of Information Processing from Advertisements 
 
 
(Source: MacInnis and Jaworski, 1989) 
 
One of the key aspects of the above model is that it incorporates six levels of processing, 
reflecting increasing degrees of attention, motivation and feature/semantic analysis. The 
first of these is particularly relevant in the context of the MEE as it relates to affective 
response at minimal levels of attention, and in the absence of evaluative processing and 
semantic analysis. As the authors explain: 
“At low levels of brand processing, the consumer may be aware only of 
features associated with salient ad cues. Because processing of brand 
information is negligible, cognitive responses should be unrelated to the 
message. Though little attention is focused on the ad, emotional responses 
to attended features are possible even with this processing operation.” 
(MacInnis & Jaworski, 1989: 8) 
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Figure 3.6: The six levels of consumer processing (MacInnis and Jaworski, 1989) 
 
Antecedents Processing 
Motivation to 
process 
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processing 
Representative 
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Low Divided Low 2 Basic categorization 
Low -moderate Ad only Low -moderate 3 Meaning analysis 
Moderate Ad only Moderate 4 Information integration 
High Ad only High 5 Role-taking 
Highest Ad only Highest 6 Constructive processes 
 
(Source: Extracted from MacInnis & Jaworski, 1989; Table 1) 
 
With regard to figure 3.6, therefore, it would appear that both the first and second levels 
of processing could potentially provide a context for the MEE; although MacInnis and 
Jaworski (1989) make no explicit reference to this in their discussion. Indeed, their 
explanation of the proposed effects at these levels of processing is to some degree at 
odds with that of the MEE. In what is perhaps the most influential theory of mere 
exposure, for example, Bornstein and D’Agostino (1992, 1994) argue that feature 
analysis (be it preattentive or otherwise) results in perceptual fluency that, in the absence 
of recollection for the exposure, is then misattributed to affective response (see chapter 
2, page 45). By contrast, MacInnis and Jaworski (1989: 8-9) propose that the valenced 
nature of the exposure context will determine the nature of subsequent attitudes to the 
stimulus; an explanation that is couched in terms synonymous, not with the MEE, but 
with the similar phenomenon of classical conditioning (an important distinction that was 
discussed in chapter 2, page 56): 
“Brand and ad attitudes are likely to reflect only the halo effect or mood 
created by emotional and evaluative reactions to the attended features and 
exposure context (Isen et al. 1982). Hence, consumers asked to indicate 
ad and brand attitudes when the exposure context is negatively 
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(positively) valenced are likely to generate negative (positive) brand and 
ad attitudes.” 
 
Similarly, whilst the second level of processing may appear to provide a context for the 
MEE on the basis of conceptual implicit memory (a controversial construct discussed in 
chapter 2, page 53), the authors’ commentary does not necessarily imply this. Although 
MacInnis and Jaworski (1989) briefly list the MEE as one of the ways in which affective 
response to the stimulus may have become positively valenced, second-level processing 
in this model is explained only in terms of activating, not creating, these associations. 
The MEE, it would appear, is not explicitly considered within the parameters of this 
model. 
 
Finally, it is perhaps worthy of note that preattentive audience involvement (Greenwald 
and Leavitt, 1984; MacInnis and Jaworski, 1989) would appear to provide a foundation 
for the recently proposed ‘low involvement processing theory’ of Heath (2001: 31): 
“Unlike high involvement processing which is activated by volition, low 
involvement processing happens automatically, whether we like it or not. 
This is important because, in a situation where consumers regard brand 
information as being superfluous to their needs, the tendency is going to 
be for them to pay very little attention: the value of low involvement 
processing is that even in a low attention model, brand learning is still 
processed.”  
 
Given this, Heath (2004) suggests that the solution to a lack of attention to marketing 
communication is to create executions with strong emotive associations that can be 
processed incidentally and do not require significant levels of attention to be effective. 
In this respect, he observes that certain types of advertising can create emotional brand 
associations at very low levels of attention, which are enduring, influential in decision-
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making and not available to subsequent explicit recall. Although not overtly 
acknowledged, the notion that implicit memory underpins advertising effects following 
low attention exposure, would appear to reflect a domain-specific conceptualisation of 
the non-conscious MEE. 
 
In summary, therefore, and with regard to the literature reviewed in this section, it may 
be argued that the role and influence of the MEE in advertising effects should be 
conceptualised with regard to the very lowest (preattentive) levels of audience 
involvement (Greewald and Leavitt, 1984; MacInnis and Jaworski 1989; Heath, 2004). 
In this respect, the MEE provides a conceptual framework within which to explore, 
understand and influence consumer response to marketing communication in the 
absence of significant attention, involvement and elaboration; conditions that 
characterize a large swathe of the contemporary marketing and media environment (Ha 
and Litman, 1997; MacInnis, et al., 1991; Skinner and Stephens, 2003). In this context, 
the idea that consumers receive and process information passively has become an 
important stream of research at what might be considered the ‘hyper-low-involvement’ 
end of the spectrum. For example, research into the passive processing of advertising 
has led to claims that consumers are influenced by information even though they pay no 
focal attention to it, and may have no conscious recollection of the exposure (e.g. 
Olshavsky and Granbois, 1979, Heath, 2004, Janiszewski, 1993). Indeed, it is within this 
context that the broad concepts of non-cognitive and non-conscious consumer decision-
making have been most extensively developed; both of which provide a further 
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dimension to the conceptualisation of the MEE in marketing theory, and are thus 
discussed in detail during the remainder of this chapter. 
 
3.3. Non-cognitive consumer processing and the MEE 
 
MacInnis and Jaworski (1989: 1) observe that, “since the 1950s researchers have been 
developing theories to describe, understand and predict consumers’ responses to 
advertising.” These responses may be broadly characterised as cognitive, affective, and 
behavioural (see Vakratsas and Ambler, 1999; Kitchen and Spickett-Jones, 2003), and 
together they contribute to the formation of attitudes. The nature and interdependence of 
these concepts is neatly summarised by Petty et al. (1988: 357): 
“We use affect as a superordinate construct to encompass emotions and 
relatively transient moods and feelings. Attitudes, on the other hand, refer 
to global and enduring evaluations of attitude objects. A person's general 
evaluations or attitudes can be based on a variety of behavioral, affective, 
and cognitive experiences, and are capable of guiding behavioral, 
affective, and cognitive responses.” 
 
However, the relative influence of cognition (C), affect (A) and behaviour (B) on 
consumer attitudes and decision-making, and in particular the order in which they occur, 
has been the subject of some debate in the contemporary consumer processing literature. 
As a basis on which to explore this issue, it is perhaps useful to acknowledge that 
traditional theories of consumer decision-making are characterised by two overarching 
perspectives; cognitivism and behaviourism. A full review of the literature in this 
respect is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is important to note that within both 
paradigms affective response has historically been either ignored or considered to be a 
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function of cognition and behaviour respectively. This is explained in the following 
subsection, prior to a discussion of affect-based theories of consumer processing and 
their relevance to the marketing-based MEE (in section 3.3.2, page 93). 
 
 
3.3.1. Cognitivism, behaviourism and the subjugation of affective consumer 
processing 
 
Within the realms of consumer behaviour, the cognitivist perspective places great 
emphasis on the primary role of attention and cognition, stressing that learning and 
decision-making involves complex mental processing to arrive consciously and logically 
at an optimum decision. It is reflected in ‘stepwise’ models that suggest consumers 
move sequentially through a series of rational processes, en route to making a reasoned 
choice (e.g. Howard and Sheth, 1969; Bettman, 1979). Such theories have traditionally 
dominated the consumer behaviour literature; the most influential perhaps being that of 
Engel, Blackwell and Miniard (1986), as illustrated in figure 3.7. In line with all of the 
stepwise models of consumer decision-making, this effectively assumes a cognition-
behaviour (C-B) hierarchy, with hardly any role at all for affective response. 
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Figure 3.7: Simplified version of Consumer Decision-Making Model (Engel, 
Blackwell and Miniard, 1986) 
 
 
 
Schiffman and Kanuk (1991) note that a highly rational, stepwise progression towards 
utility-maximising decisions has historically pervaded not only the consumer decision-
making literature but also that of innovation decisions (knowledge-persuasion-decision-
confirmation), innovation adoption (awareness-interest-evaluation-trial-adoption) and 
promotion (attention-interest-desire-action); the last of which is particularly pertinent to 
this thesis. In this respect, and in keeping with the literature on consumer decision-
making, traditional theories are based on the assumption that advertising works 
rationally by changing the way in which consumers think about the product, brand or 
company (cognition). In this respect, it is broadly seen to induce a ‘hierarchy of effects’; 
as Vaktratsas and Ambler (1999: 32) explain: 
“Persuasive models introduced the concept of a hierarchy of effects, that 
is, an order in which things happen, with the implication that the earlier 
effects, being necessary preconditions, are more important.” 
 
The hierarchy of stages that consumers supposedly move through in their response to 
advertising was originally classified as attention, interest, desire and action (Strong, 
1925); a movement from cognition to affect to behaviour (C-A-B). The inclusion in this 
of what might be considered an emotional response (i.e. ‘desire’) is interesting, given 
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the almost total domination of cognition in ensuing models of consumer processing (e.g 
Engel, Blackwell and Miniard, 1986; illustrated in figure 3.7). Indeed, in a subsequent 
explanation of Strong’s (1925) hierarchy, Frey (1947) largely ignores this element. In 
his description, once attention and interest have been secured the next step is to present 
the appeal “in such a way that, once read, it will lead to consumer acceptance, and better 
still, consumer-preference or consumer-demand for the merchandise”; a wholly 
cognitive perspective on desire. Furthermore, affective response is either ignored (e.g. 
Colley, 1961) or afforded a secondary role to that of cognition (e.g. Lavidge and Steiner, 
1961) in subsequent hierarchies of effect; as illustrated in figure 3.8, below. 
 
Figure 3.8: Hierarchical models of advertising effects 
 
 
 
Source: East (2003) 
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Indeed, the role of advertising has traditionally been conceptualized as providing 
information and logical reasons to buy for consumers whose rationality dominates the 
decision-making process. As Kitchen (2001: 268) observes: 
“The working definition of advertising takes it as read that the purpose of 
communicating to target audiences is to persuade them to revise negative 
opinions, renew positive beliefs and ultimately act accordingly.”  
 
This observation is couched in terms relating to cognitive aspects of consumer decision-
making and their direct influence on behaviour (C-B); a perspective that has been 
common in the advertising literature since Colley (1961: 21) described the role of 
advertising as, “purely and simply to communicate to a defined audience, information 
and a frame-of-mind that stimulates action.” In this respect, therefore, the role of 
advertising is to inform, remind, and persuade consumers by way of considered thought.  
 
However, the primacy of cognition has traditionally been challenged by behaviourist 
theories of consumer decision-making and advertising effects. At its radical extreme, 
behaviourism rejects the notion of ‘autonomous’ man that is central to the cognitive 
perspective. The idea that behaviour is the result of complex and conscious thought 
processes, perceptions, attitudes, feelings and states of mind is regarded as a fiction, 
replaced by the notion that man is an elaborate machine that merely responds to 
environmental stimuli (Skinner, 1948). The exact nature of this machine has been the 
subject of much debate, with definitions ranging from the suitably dry ‘device for 
converting incoming messages into outgoing messages’ (Weiner, 1964) to the 
wonderfully termed ‘Environmentally Modifiable Physico-Chemical Regulatory 
Device’ (Reiner, 1968). However, Markin and Narayana (1976: 223) suggest that the 
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term machine is somewhat misleading, implying that man “rusts, clanks, whirs and goes 
chug-chug . . . [or] he is a large, warm, soft computer.” What it does mean, they clarify, 
is that human behaviour is lawful, limited, and predictable within general principles that 
apply to all individuals. The key assertion, therefore, is that behaviour is not determined 
from within but from without, and is primarily shaped by repeated association (Pavlov, 
1927) or the positive reinforcement of previous behaviour (Skinner, 1953). With this in 
mind, Ehrenberg (1974) argues that advertising essentially works by influencing each 
phase of the awareness-trial-reinforcement process that characterizes the behaviourist 
perspective of consumer behaviour (see figure 3.9). Importantly, however, he claims 
that the strongest effects will be observed when advertising works to confirm existing 
purchase patterns (see the heavy arrows in figure 3.9). Thus, whilst this philosophy 
incorporates the possibility of a behaviour-affect-cognition (B-A-C) hierarchy, 
(alongside those of B-C-A, B-C and B-A), affective response is once again considered 
to play a secondary role (at best) in the formation of attitudes. 
 
Figure 3.9: Awareness-Trial-Reinforcement model of ad effects (Ehrenberg, 1974) 
 
Source: East (2003) 
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It should be stressed, however, that the behaviourist perspective has been subject to 
significant criticism from its inception, inspired perhaps by the somewhat disturbing 
notion of man as nothing more than a reactive and predictable machine. Indeed, Hood 
(2009: 99) observes that the tone was set for the rejection of behaviourism in an early 
review of Skinner’s work by Noam Chomsky: 
“Using language development as his test case, Chomsky launched an attack on 
behaviorism. He pointed out that no association theory of learning could explain 
how every human child acquires language for the simple reason that the rules 
that generate and control language are invisible to every natural speaker. . . [so] 
how can we possible teach our children by way of reinforcement and 
punishment?” 
 
Since the work of Pavlov (1927) and Skinner (1948, 1953), however, the behaviourist 
paradigm has nonetheless played host to significant theoretical and empirical 
developments in the fields of consumer behavior, non-conscious consumer processing 
and behavioural economics. Furthermore, and particularly in relation to advertising, the 
validity of the cognitivist perspective has also endured continuing criticism from a range 
of perspectives; primarily as a result of the continued absence of unequivocal empirical 
evidence for a hierarchy of effects (Vakratsas and Ambler, 1999). As Weilbacher (2001: 
20) observes: 
 
“The most that can be said about the hierarchy-of-advertising-effects model 
. . . is that it has been in the marketing/advertising atmosphere for over 100 
years, expressed in one context or another, as an intuitive, non-validated 
explanation of how advertising works” 
 
Similarly, the twin pillars of rational and reasoned choice on which traditional 
hierarchical models of consumer decision-making rest have been strongly challenged on 
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the basis that they do not account for the myriad cognitive limitations of individual 
consumers. This is illustrated in a detailed and comprehensive critique by Zey (1992: 
19), in which the author concludes: 
 
“Humans cannot maximise because they are not totally rational and 
because they cannot fully implement the rational process. They cannot 
obtain complete information even before making important decisions, all 
possible alternatives are not known [and] outcomes attached to each 
alternative are not obvious.” 
 
However, perhaps the strongest challenge to the cognitivist perspective has come from 
theories that assert the primacy, and even independence, of affective consumer 
processing in the formation of attitudes and behaviour. Not only do these theories 
accommodate the notion of advertising effects by way of mere exposure, they have their 
very roots in one the main theoretical explanations of this phenomenon; the primacy of 
affect theory (Zajonc, 1980; see chapter 2, page 40). The emergence of affect-based 
theories of consumer processing thus provides an important context for the 
conceptualisation of the MEE in marketing theory; as will be discussed below. 
 
3.3.2. Affect-based theories of consumer processing and the MEE 
 
As noted in the previous section, traditional stepwise models of consumer decision-
making imply a highly cognitive approach to information search, evaluation, attitude 
formation, choice and post-purchase evaluation; assuming a cognition-affect–behaviour 
(C-A-B) hierarchy. However, it is claimed that these frameworks have rarely managed 
to explain more than 20% of variance in consumer attitudes and behaviour (Obermiller 
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and Atwood, 1990). One of the earliest papers to explicitly acknowledge the need to 
address this, and to do so by introducing an emphasis on affect, was that of Markin and 
Narayana (1976: 227): 
“It is rather well known but only begrudgingly acknowledged in the formal 
literature on consumer behaviour that most decisions are made on the basis 
of limited cognitive activity involving selective cues, and that these cues 
are more in the psychological realms of the affective-emotional amygdala 
than in the cognitive realm of the cerebral cortex. Thus a more relevant 
model of the consumer would be one possessed of more realistic attributes; 
attributes which acknowledge the frailty of the human condition. This 
model would admit to the affective-emotional nature of the consumer.”  
 
In support of this, Zajonc (1980) contends that affect is not a product of cognition and 
that this can occur in the absence of cognitive processing. Although robust empirical 
evidence for this hypothesis is relatively scarce (Vanhuele, 1994), it may be supported 
by more recent neuroscientific indications that cognition and affect are the product of 
separable neural substrates (Elliott and Dolan, 1998; LeDoux, 1995). Further to the 
independence of cognition and affect, however, Zajonc also contends that if cognition 
has any role to play in decision-making it is secondary to that of affect (Zajonc and 
Markus, 1982). The primacy of affect theory (Zajonc, 1980, 2000) thus incorporates the 
notion of both an A-C-B and A-B hierarchy of consumer processing. Furthermore, 
Zajonc and Markus (1982) argue that the role of cognition in consumer decision-making 
has been greatly exaggerated because people believe that they should act rationally, and 
therefore report rational judgments that in fact they do not use; a proposition that is 
strongly supported in the subsequent literature (e.g. Hirschmann and Holbrook, 1982; 
Klayman and Ha, 1987; Kunda, 1990) and effectively constitutes an A-B-C hierarchy of 
consumer response. Zajonc (1980) claims that the primacy of affect is particularly 
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evident under conditions of holistic choice, whereby consumers are unable or unwilling 
to separate out individual attributes but instead form an overall impression. Furthermore, 
he argues that emotional judgments are instantaneous, “inescapable” and linked to deep-
seated subjective feelings. As such, decision-processes that are driven by affect are 
unlikely to incorporate high levels of conscious engagement and cognition in relation to 
marketing communications. On this basis, the primacy of affect theory (Zajonc, 1980) 
has been proposed as a specific explanation of the MEE (as discussed in chapter 2, page 
40-41). 
 
In line with Zajonc’s theory, Mittal (1988) proposes an ‘affective choice mode’ in 
relation to symbolic and expressive consumption in particular, whereby choice is affect-
driven, holistic and based on subjective feelings that cannot be verbalised. Indeed, the 
specific field of symbolic consumption has long been linked with emotion in the 
construction of self-image, on the basis that symbolic interpretation is essentially non-
rational, unconscious, and thus beyond cognition and verbalisation (Sperber, 1990). 
More recently, however, the over-riding power of emotion has been elucidated in a 
much broader sense. For example, Rook (1987) presents evidence for the ‘hedonic 
experiential’ perspective of consumer behaviour (Holbrook and Hirschman, 1982), 
finding that consumption is often referred to in a purely emotional way with phrases 
such as ‘thrilling’ and ‘wild’. This notion is extended by Arnould et al. (1999) into the 
concept of ‘extraordinary experience’, which they claim describes consumption that is 
intensely enjoyable, hedonistic and emotional. However, the work of Campbell (1987) 
suggests that there is nothing extraordinary about the concept of ‘extraordinary 
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experience’, and in fact most consumption is undertaken in a self-constructed reality of 
self-illusory hedonism. On the basis of this growing body of evidence, therefore, Elliot 
(1998) proposes an all encompassing ‘Model of Emotion-Driven Choice’ (figure 3.10), 
in which non-rational preferences are formed holistically and much faster than 
cognition-based judgments. Whilst he observes that this may be followed by post-hoc 
rationalisation he stresses that: 
“Once the non-rational preference is formed it tends to drive out further 
rational evaluation as the emotional responses overwhelm objective 
evidence and dominate consumer behaviour.” (Elliot, 1998: 104) 
 
Moreover, Elliot (1998) suggests that affective decision-making is actually far more 
efficient and effective than cognition-based hierarchical modes. In support of this, he 
cites the evidence of Taylor and Brown (1988) that thinking about the reasons for 
preferences may lead to less satisfactory choices. Indeed, Franzen and Bouwman (2001: 
33) observe that emotional response appears to be the dominant factor in all human 
decision-making, concluding that “where emotion and reason conflict, emotion wins.” 
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Figure 3.10: A Model of Emotion-Driven Choice (Elliot, 1998) 
Source: Elliott (1998: 101) 
 
The increasing importance of affect in theories of consumer decision-making is mirrored 
in those relating to advertising effects. As previously noted, the literature in this field 
has also been traditionally dominated by cognition-based hierarchies. As Vakratsas and 
Ambler (1999: 28) observe: 
“The main stream of advertising research began with AIDA. Originally a 
model of personal selling, it was adapted only later for advertising (Strong 
1925, p. 76). From this emerged the class of persuasive hierarchy models 
summarized by Kotler (1997, p. 611) as Response Hierarchy Models: 
AIDA, hierarchy-of-effects (Lavidge and Steiner 1961), and innovation-
adoption (Rogers 1962). All these models follow the cognitive stage - 
affective stage - behavior sequence”  
 
Indeed, even explanations for the effects of advertising at low levels of attention and 
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section 3.2.1) have traditionally been sought within the cognitivist paradigm. For 
example, Davis et al. (1991) suggest that consumers utilise cues such as production 
values and the implied advertising expenditure as signals of quality. In line with 
consumer decision-making theory, however, the contemporary advertising literature has 
also begun to incorporate the notion that behavioural response may be driven primarily 
(and perhaps entirely) by affect and emotion. As Ambler et al. (2000: 18) observe: 
“Many practitioners . . . have long believed that advertising effects were 
driven by how well ads triggered emotional (affective) responses. They 
doubt the relevance of neat academic step-by-step models.” 
 
Indeed, Broadbent (2000) suggests that all of the logical, rational, cognitive scales for 
measuring advertising effects are in fact irrelevant and that perhaps “it’s the halo that 
counts.” In particular, the author suggests that affective response may be all-important in 
brand communication and consumer decision-making, and that, “perhaps this is where 
the elusive brand equity is hiding – not so much in a bundle of reportable memories, 
associations and experience, as in a warm glow in the pit of the stomach, or wherever 
the amygdala shows its presence and its power” (Broadbent, 2000: 27). In line with this, 
Kitchen (2001) proposes that, when the goal is related to long-term brand building rather 
than stimulating direct action, affective response should be the key objective. 
Furthermore, Heath (2004) observes that even when advertisements do not provide any 
detailed information, they still appear to make a significant impact on affect and 
behaviour. Indeed, the author claims that nearly all of the most successful advertising 
campaigns are underpinned by a strong emotional element. 
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It is within this context, therefore, that the MEE may be conceptualized as a means by 
which to study, influence and explain the influence of advertising on affective response 
under conditions of low attention, engagement and involvement. Specifically, it may be 
argued that the rise to prominence of affect-driven theories of consumer processing is 
closely linked to the emergence of the MEE. Indeed, the impetus for Zajonc’s (1980) 
primacy of affect hypothesis was to develop a theoretical explanation for the MEE that 
he himself had defined in 1968. To this day, the extent to which the MEE represents a 
cognitive or affective phenomenon constitutes a major point of difference between 
competing theoretical explanations (as discussed in section 2.3, page 36). It is perhaps 
unsurprising, therefore, that the MEE has been categorised as a non-cognitive (i.e. 
affect-based) theory of advertising effects (Vaktratsas and Ambler, 1999).  
 
As discussed in chapter 2 (section 2.3.2), however, Zajonc’s (1980) proposition that the 
MEE effectively constitutes an A-B hierarchy of response has been strongly challenged 
by a series of influential theories that are based on the premise that, whilst mere 
exposure may give rise to the subjective experience of affect (e.g. liking, preference), 
the implicit processes by which this occurs are entirely cognitive. Specifically, it is 
argued that feature analysis during exposure enhances implicit memory and perceptual 
fluency for the stimulus when it is subsequently encountered. In the absence of explicit 
memory for the source, this fluency is then misattributed to affect (Bornstein and 
D’Agostino, 1992, 1994) or indeed other plausible cognitive evaluations (e.g. 
brightness, Mandler et al., 1987). As such, whilst the MEE may be subjectively 
experienced as affect (A) followed by behaviour (B), it actually reflects a C-A-B 
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hierarchy of response, in which the initial cognition (C) is entirely subconscious. The 
distinction between cognition and consciousness is therefore critical to an accurate 
conceptualisation of the MEE in marketing theory. In particular, it is important to 
recognise that cognition can involve implicit processing, and that this may subsequently 
give rise to an ‘illusion’ of affect (see Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004). Indeed, 
given the dominance of cognition-based theories of mere exposure in recent years 
(Butler and Berry, 2004), it is perhaps prudent for marketing researchers to 
conceptualise the MEE as a non-conscious rather than non-cognitive theory of 
marketing communication; a perspective that is discussed in more detail below. 
 
3.4. Non-conscious consumer processing and the MEE 
 
As illustrated by the discussion in previous sections, consumer decisions and advertising 
effects have traditionally been assumed to be the product of conscious consumer 
processing; albeit often under conditions of low involvement and largely affective in 
nature. Following evidence that consumer processing and decision-making can occur in 
the absence of cognition, however, contemporary research also indicates that 
consciousness may not be a necessary condition for this either (Dijksterhuis et al., 2005; 
Whittlesea and Wright, 1997). Indeed, Dijksterhuis et al. (2005: 200) argue that 
conscious information processing can only account for a minority of the choices people 
make: 
“In our view, [non-conscious consumer processing effects] may well be 
very common in real life. Only a limited number of choices are based on 
conscious information processing strategies. The rest of the variance left to 
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explain is caused by unconscious effects of all kinds of subtle cues in the 
environment.” 
 
However, the recency with which this has been acknowledged in the marketing domain 
is stressed by Bargh (2002: 280), who argues that, “consumer research has largely 
missed out on [scientific findings that suggest] much of social judgment and behaviour 
occur without conscious awareness or intent.” Importantly, Bargh (2002) observes that 
non-conscious motivations and behaviours go beyond mere hedonic impulses and 
physiological addictions, and that when traditional cognitive models of behaviour are 
taken out of laboratory settings, the role of deliberate conscious choice is minimal. This 
leads the author to recommend two key areas for the “next wave of consumer research”: 
1. The assessment of how much of a role non-conscious influences play in real life 
decisions and behaviour that are of consequence to the individual; and 
2. Assessment of the extent to which people are aware of, and in control of, the 
influences and reasons for their purchasing and consumption behaviour. 
 
In line with this, Fitzsimons et al. (2002: 276) draw heavily on the scientific literature 
referred to by Bargh (2002) to conclude that:  
“Evidence continues to accumulate regarding stimulus (sic) that are not 
consciously perceived by the consumer, non-conscious downstream effects 
of a consciously perceived stimuli (sic) or thought process, and decision 
processes that occur entirely outside of awareness. Each of these non-
conscious components of consumer choice has important implications for 
researchers studying consumer decision making, particularly because 
consumer choice contexts exhibit many of the conditions that lead to 
automatic processing.” 
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Given the various types of non-conscious processing highlighted by Fitzsimons et al. 
(2002), however, Chartrand (2005) argues that it is first necessary to define exactly 
which aspects of the decision-making process consumers are unaware of. To this end, 
Chartrand (2005: 203) extends the simple conscious versus unconscious dichotomy to 
specify three aspects of the decision in which consumers may lack awareness (see figure 
3.11): 
“In general, environmental features activate an automatic process, which in 
turn leads to an outcome. Environmental features (A) can include social 
situations, the presence of other people, events, objects, places, and so on. 
Automatic processes (B) can include attitude activation, automatic 
evaluation and emotion, non-conscious behavioral mimicry, automatic trait 
and stereotype activation, and non-conscious goal pursuit, just to name a 
few . . . Outcomes (C) can include behavior, motivation, judgments, 
decisions, and emotions.” 
 
Figure 3.11: The three elements of non-conscious consumer processing 
 
 
Source: Chartrand (2005) 
 
With reference to the model above, Chartrand (2005) proposes that non-conscious 
decision-making occurs when consumers lack awareness during one or more of these 
three stages, and stresses the implications of this for both marketing theory and 
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recognition of exactly which elements of decision-making occur outside of conscious 
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conscious processes in consumer behavior.” Secondly, and in line with Bargh (2002), 
the author argues that consumers must understand the specific nature of non-conscious 
influence on their behaviour if they wish to counteract this. For example, consumers 
may need to identify and avoid certain environmental triggers (A), alter implicit 
semantic associations (B) and/or recognize behaviours that give rise to negative 
consequences (C). 
 
Whilst Chartrand’s (2005) model extends beyond the influence of marketing 
communication on consumer processing and behaviour (the focus of this thesis), it 
nonetheless provides a useful and important framework for understanding the variety of 
non-conscious processing effects in this specific context. It is within this structure, 
therefore, that the various strands of the extant marketing literature will be drawn 
together. To this end, the following subsection is concerned with the influence of 
subconsciously perceived marketing stimuli in the environment (A); a phenomenon that 
is encapsulated in the somewhat controversial concept of subliminal advertising. Two 
further subsections are then dedicated to a discussion of non-conscious intermediate 
processing effects (B) and non-conscious outcomes (C) in a marketing context. The 
section then concludes with a synthesis of the implications of this literature stream for 
conceptualisation of the MEE in marketing theory. 
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3.4.1. Non-conscious perception of marketing communications: Subliminal 
advertising 
 
Subliminal advertising refers to marketing communication that is presented below the 
threshold of conscious perception. It is often related to words, symbols and pictures that 
are embedded in another medium (e.g. a picture, tv programme or advertisement), and is 
hypothesized to exert a subconscious influence on consumer attitudes and behaviour. 
Although widely accepted in the domain of psychology for some time previously, the 
‘commercialization’ of subliminal perception (Broyles, 2006) occurred with the 
publication of a study by James M Vicary in The Hidden Persuaders (Packard, 1957). 
Vicary claimed to have increased the sales of popcorn and cola in a New Jersey cinema 
by projecting subliminal instructions to consume these products onto the screen. Despite 
the fact that he subsequently admitted the ‘experiment’ was a hoax and that the results 
were invented, the notion of subliminal advertising continues to prick the public 
consciousness and remains a source of fear and fascination (see Nelson, 2008).  
 
Empirical evidence for subliminal advertising effects is, however, equivocal at best (see 
Trappey, 2006). In support of this phenomenon, subliminal embeds have been shown to 
enhance hunger (e.g. the word “beef”), thirst (e.g. the word “Coke”) and sexual arousal 
(for a review, see Broyles, 2006). More recently, enhanced physiological states (e.g. 
thirst) have been found to provide the necessary conditions for the subliminal manipulation 
of product consumption and evaluation (Strahan et al., 2002; Berridge and Winkielman, 
2003). Such findings support the claim that subliminal advertising may have some merit in 
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producing specific effects in the early phases of consumer decision-making (Cuperfain and 
Clarke, 1985; Theus,1994; Dijksterhuis et al. 2005). 
 
The somewhat limited supporting evidence, however, should be considered alongside 
continuous and consistent failures to demonstrate subliminal advertising effects (e.g. 
Champion and Turner, 1959, Kelly, 1979, Gable et al., 1987, Rosen and Singh, 1992). 
Furthermore, both experimental and applied replication of these effects has proven to be 
almost impossible (see Broyles, 2006). However, skepticism surrounding the use of 
subliminal advertising is primarily fuelled, not by doubts over the existence of its 
influence, but by the notion that this is simply a weak analogue of that created via 
supraliminal perception (Theus, 1994; Trappey, 1996). The effects are so small, it is 
argued, that they are far outweighed by others in the consumption environment (see 
Broyles, 2006). Such claims lend contemporary support to the conclusion of Moore 
(1982) that subliminal advertising is, “an epiphenomenon, not worthy of any 
marketing application.” 
 
In light of such criticism, and despite continuing popular misconception, the influence of 
subliminal advertising has been largely discounted by academics, advertisers and 
regulators alike (see Broyles 2006; Nelson, 2008). That is not to say, however, that the 
potential for this has been entirely rejected; particularly in relation to the early 
(attitudinal) phases of consumer decision-making and certain persuasive contexts. For 
example, Theus (1994) suggests that subliminal priming of positive self-image could 
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enhance the effectiveness of public service advertising, e.g. to reduce tobacco, alcohol 
or drug abuse. 
 
Whilst it remains difficult to make the case for a direct link between subliminal 
perception and consumer behaviour, however, a much stronger argument has been made 
for other forms of non-conscious advertising effects; phenomena that do not relate to 
subliminal perception but a lack of conscious awareness of the processing that occurs 
between exposure and outcome (see Chartrand, 2005; Dijksterhuis et al., 2005). Indeed, 
it should be stressed that, whilst the fleeting reference to Vicary’s hoax stole the 
headlines, the concept of subliminal advertising is little more than a footnote in The 
Hidden Persuaders (Packard, 1957). Rather, the focus of Packard’s text is the effect of 
non-conscious processing that occurs following supraliminal exposure to advertising 
stimuli. In this respect, he argued that advertising could influence perceptions, attitudes, 
emotions and impulses without consumers’ conscious awareness of the extent or nature 
of this influence. Such effects have since been the subject of a rich vein of motivation 
research in both psychology and marketing over the last 40 years, during which time 
they have been demonstrated to be robust, replicable and of potentially great 
significance to marketers, advertisers and consumers. The application and implications 
of this research in a marketing context are thus reviewed in the following section. 
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3.4.2. Non-Conscious Intermediate Processing 
 
The degree of public concern regarding subliminal advertising would appear to be 
inconsistent with the scarce and highly questionable evidence for its effects on attitudes 
and behaviour. However, the realm of non-conscious consumer processing effects goes 
far beyond the mere perception of marketing stimuli. Indeed, with reference to figure 
3.11 (page 102), Chartrand (2005: 204) argues that non-conscious processing studies, 
“are almost always ones in which the mediator between the environment and the 
outcome—the automatic process (B)—occurs outside of the individual’s conscious 
awareness.” Such a scenario is particularly pertinent in the domain of consumer 
behaviour, as Chartrand (2005: 204) explains: 
“One of the most frequent scenarios in consumer settings is one in which the 
consumer is aware of the environmental trigger and the outcome, but not the 
automatic process. For instance, the consumer is aware of shopping with her 
friend (A), and aware of purchasing the $100 blouse (C), but not aware of the 
automatic intervening process that led to that decision (B).” 
 
Indeed, Dijksterhuis et al. (2005: 194), argue that consumers “often react rather 
‘mindlessly’ to stimuli that trigger certain automated responses”; regardless of the 
subliminal versus supraliminal nature of perception. The authors refer to such decisions 
as ‘introspectively blank’, arguing that the “the amount of [conscious] information 
processing going on [is] minimal or virtually nonexistent” (Dijksterhuis et al., 2005: 
194). However, in the same way that Chartrand (2005) highlights three potential 
elements of non-conscious consumer behaviour (see figure 3.11, page 102), and as 
alluded to by Bornstein and Craver-Lemley (2004; see chapter 2, page 22), it may be 
argued that intermediate processing (B) is itself characterized by two dimensions: 
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1. Activation and experience of the mental construct; and 
2. Influence of the activated mental construct on attitudinal and behavioural 
outcomes 
 
Consumers may lack conscious awareness in both of these elements, or simply the latter; 
giving rise to the possibility of two different types of non-conscious intermediate 
processing effect (see figure 3.12). 
 
Figure 3.12: Adaptation of Chartrand’s (2005) model to illustrate two types of non-
conscious intermediate processing effect 
 
 
 
Within the marketing literature, an example of a fully non-conscious intermediate 
processing effect (1) is evident in the work of Chartrand et al. (2008). In this study, the 
authors demonstrate the non-conscious activation and influence of consumer goals 
(image versus value-based) on brand choice. Chartrand (2005: 207) draws attention to 
the wider implications of these findings in a marketing context, as follows:  
“Consumers are primed in naturalistic settings by any number of things; a 
brand-image goal could be made more accessible by the presence of a 
wealthy friend, or a value goal could be activated by a sale sign in a store.” 
Environmental 
Features (A) 
Automatic 
(Intermediate) 
Process (B) 
 
Outcome (C) 
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However, it is important to recognise that psychological evidence for fully non-
conscious intermediate processing is not restricted to the priming of a motivational state 
(i.e. a goal) For example, Dijksterhuis et al. (2005: 194) elucidate the entirely non-
conscious process of behavioural mimicry; a phenomenon they refer to as the low road 
to imitation, and explain as follows: 
“. . . mere perception of the social environment leads people to engage in 
corresponding behaviour (see Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001; Wheeler & 
Petty, 2001). This research implies that our behavior is often highly 
imitative and thus that behavior is contagious . . . we often simply do what 
we see.”  
 
In social psychology, this type of non-conscious mirroring has been causally linked to 
enhanced liking and rapport between people (see Chartrand and Bargh, 1999); a 
phenomenon that has been successfully demonstrated in the consumer environment by 
positively (and negatively) manipulating the average tip received by waitresses who 
imitated (and did not imitate) the verbal orders of their customers (van Baaren et al., 
2003). Furthermore, Tanner et al. (2008) have subsequently demonstrated that mimicry 
of consumer behaviour not only enhances liking for people, but also for the products 
with which they are associated. Moreover, this latter effect is magnified when 
consumers are mimicked by people who actively endorse the product (e.g. sales people), 
rather than those who appear to be neutral and unaffected by its success. Importantly, 
however, participants did not report any enhanced liking for the ‘sales person’ in this 
second scenario; leading the authors to conclude that the liking previously generated 
towards the (neutral) mimicker was unconsciously transferred to the product when that 
person was perceived to be actively engaged in selling. This misattribution explanation 
  110 
of non-conscious processing to affect is particularly interesting in the context of this 
thesis as it exhibits parallels with theoretical accounts of the MEE (see section 2.3.2.2, 
page 45). Furthermore, it is also proffered by Chartrand (2005) as a means to account 
for the influence of behavioural mimicry on consumption patterns and behaviour 
(Johnston, 2002), and subsequent preferences for the products consumed (Ferraro et al., 
2005). In the first of these studies, participants were found to mirror the volume of ice 
cream consumed by the researcher. In the second, mimicry was found to extend to the 
pattern of consumption (between two types of cracker) and also to enhance preference 
for whichever product was consumed the most. Importantly, Chartrand (2005: 205) 
highlights the fact participants in this second study did not demonstrate an awareness of 
their behavioural mimicry and instead “attributed their preferences to preexisting 
evaluations or attributes or both of the [product].”  
 
In addition to physical mirroring, however, Dijksterhuis et al. (2005: 195) observe that 
non-conscious mimicry can also occur in relation to the stereotypes and traits that are 
automatically activated during exposure to others; a phenomenon they term the high 
road to imitation. An interesting implication of this for consumer behavior is that, whilst 
non-conscious priming may occur via exposure to a broad range of stimuli, the attitudes, 
traits, goals and behaviours of other people may serve as a particularly powerful 
influence in this respect. For example, with reference to the results of Bargh et al. 
(1996), Dijksterhuis et al. (2005) suggest that social stimuli (i.e. young people) might 
have a similar influence to music (Milliman, 1982) and colour (Bellizi and Hite, 1992) 
on the time that consumers spend in a shopping or service environment.  
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As illustrated in figure 3.12 (page 108), however, a total lack of subjective awareness is 
not necessary for the occurrence of non-conscious intermediate processing effects. 
Indeed, these may arise solely on the basis that consumers are unaware of the influence 
that a subjectively experienced construct has on their subsequent behavior; a 
phenomenon that is referred to in figure 3.12 as a non-conscious influence effect (2). 
This is evident, for example, in the marketing placebo effect (Shiv et al., 2005) whereby 
the perceived quality, and even physiological efficacy, of a product can be influenced by 
the ‘framing’ effects of non-product factors (e.g. price). However, Chartrand (2005) 
draws attention to the fact that, even when consumers are consciously aware of having 
perceived an environmental stimulus, and of the mental processing that takes place as a 
result, the outcomes of this may yet remain outside the realms of consciousness. This 
third and final strand of the non-conscious consumer processing literature is explained 
briefly in the next section. 
 
3.4.3. Non-conscious outcomes: attitudes, decisions and behaviour 
 
In the context of consumer behaviour, and particularly that relating to choice, non-
conscious experience of the outcome of information processing is rare; as Chartrand 
(2005: 204) acknowledges: 
“In the consumer domain, where the outcome is often a choice between 
product options, the decision maker is most often aware of the outcome - 
that is, of what he or she chose.” 
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Nonetheless, it is possible to conceive of various outcomes of which consumers may be 
unaware. In this respect, whilst consumers may be conscious of the behaviour they are 
engaging in as a result of non-conscious processing, they may not be entirely aware of 
the nature, frequency or extent of this. For example, Chartrand (2005) points to the fact 
that diners in a restaurant may be unaware that they eat more food, more quickly when 
listening to fast, as opposed to slow, music. Additionally, post-hoc rationalization of 
previous decisions may be a non-conscious outcome of an activated motivational state 
(e.g. ego-protection) and could give rise to other non-conscious outcomes, such as 
overestimation of prior knowledge (Hawkins and Hastie 1990). However, perhaps the 
most established non-conscious outcomes of previous consumer processing relate to the 
nature and extent of conscious processing that is afforded to new information. For 
example, selective attention occurs when consumers seek out and pay more attention to 
information that closely reflects their current beliefs, stereotypes and interests, or fulfils 
an activated goal (e.g. reassurance during periods of post-purchase cognitive 
dissonance). Similarly, selective distortion refers to the tendency to interpret new 
information in ways that assimilate it with currently held norms, beliefs and stereotypes. 
Crucially, however, consumers are not consciously aware that they are engaging in these 
behaviours (see Fitzsimons et al., 2002). 
 
In the context of the MEE, however, the conscious (albeit illusory) experience of 
affective, cognitive and behavioural outcomes is not in dispute. Rather, the key question 
in the context of figure 3.12 (page 108) is the extent to which the non-conscious nature 
of the MEE is related to subliminal perception (A) or automatic intermediate processing 
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(B). The key aspects of this debate and its implications for marketing theory and 
practice are therefore discussed in the following section.  
 
3.4.4. The MEE in the context of non-conscious consumer processing theory 
 
As noted in chapter 2 (page 21), the MEE is currently conceptualized as a non-conscious 
phenomenon; largely on the basis that it is presumed to be hindered by the presence of 
conscious memory for prior exposure (e.g. Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994), but 
also in the sense that (even when they remember it) participants are unaware of the 
extent to which exposure alone influences their attitudes and behavior (see Bornstein 
and Craver-Lemley, 2004). By way of explanation, the most influential theories of mere 
exposure posit that this occurs as a result of the non-conscious misattribution of implicit 
processing fluency to affective and cognitive response (see chapter 2, page 45). In the 
context of Chartrand’s (2005) model, therefore, it may be argued that the marketing-
based MEE is most accurately conceptualized as a product of non-conscious 
intermediate processing; alongside phenomena such as behavioural mimicry 
(Dijksterhuis et al., 2005) and the marketing placebo effect (Shiv et al., 2005). More 
specifically, whilst the fact that it remains apparent in the presence of stimulus 
recognition (albeit to a lesser degree perhaps) might limit the extent to which it can be 
regarded as a fully non-conscious processing effect, it should at least be considered to be 
a non-conscious influence effect (see figure 3.12, page 108). In support of this, 
Fitzsimons et al. (2002: 274) make clear reference to the MEE in their observation that 
it, “seems safe to argue that people are not consciously aware of the influence that mere 
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perceptual fluency and the misattribution of familiarity can have on their attitudes, 
confidence, perceptions of truth, and forecasts.” 
 
However, whilst subliminal perception is not considered to be a necessary condition for 
the non-conscious creation of the MEE in the dominant misattribution theories (see 
chapter 2, page 45) it has traditionally been employed as a means of demonstrating the 
non-conscious nature of the MEE in the psychology literature (see chapter 2, page 21). 
As such, it is not yet possible to discount the proposition that the marketing-based MEE 
is primarily enhanced by subliminal perception (Bornstein, 1989); and is therefore most 
closely associated with the controversial concept of subliminal advertising. Given that 
the former is considered to be a valuable and important stream of research in the 
contemporary consumer processing literature (see Fitzsimons et al., 2002; Chartrand, 
2005; Dijksterhuis et al., 2005), whilst the latter remains subject to a somewhat 
paradoxical mixture of skepticism (over its efficacy) and ethical concerns (over its 
manipulative power), this represents an important distinction in marketing theory. On 
the one hand, a subliminal MEE may be seen to provide the first, robust evidence of 
how subliminal exposure to advertising may have a substantive effect on the attitudes of 
consumers. By contrast, a non-conscious MEE would contribute to the growing 
literature on consumer behaviour in the absence of awareness, regardless of the nature of 
perception. As such, an important challenge for marketing-based MEE research at this 
point (and thus one of the main objectives of this thesis) is to test the proposition that, 
under conditions of supraliminal perception, the MEE is enhanced by the absence of 
memory for prior stimulus exposure. 
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Whichever non-conscious mechanism is responsible for the MEE, however, the 
importance of this, and indeed all of the non-conscious phenomena reviewed in this 
chapter, has become increasingly recognised in the marketing literature (see Fitzsimons 
et al., 2002; Chartrand, 2005; Dijksterhuis et al., 2005). These phenomena have 
significant implications for the exploration, explanation, application and control of 
marketing communication and its impact on consumer attitudes and behaviour. The 
current thesis, therefore, may be seen to contribute directly to a body of consumer 
research that appears to be fulfilling the prediction of Duplessis (1997, in Broadbent, 
2000: 27) that in future, “we will not be delving for the sub-conscious after establishing 
the rational, but we will recognise the sub-conscious before we delve into the rational.” 
 
3.5. Summarising the theoretical basis for the MEE in a marketing context 
 
During the course of this chapter, the relevance of the MEE has been discussed in 
relation to three streams of the information processing literature; involvement theory, 
non-cognitive and non-conscious consumer processing. At this point, therefore, it is 
perhaps useful to draw together the key themes of the discussion in this chapter, and to 
summarise the basis on which the MEE might be expected to occur in a marketing 
context. To this end, a simple model is proposed in figure 3.13 and discussed in more 
detail below. 
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Figure 3.13: The creation and influence of the MEE in a marketing context 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the heart of the above model is the notion that an extremely low level of audience 
involvement provides the primary context in which the marketing-based MEE might be 
expected to occur (Greenwald and Leavitt, 1984). This is apparent whenever consumers 
lack the motivation, ability and/or opportunity to elaborate on marketing communication 
(MacInnis and Jaworski, 1989), and is reflected in little or no conscious attention to 
marketing stimuli (Greenwald and Leavitt, 1984; MacInnish and Jaworski, 1989; Heath, 
2004). Such conditions are common in a contemporary media and consumption 
environment that is characterised by the proliferation of brands, messages and media. In 
this context, increasingly time-poor consumers are bombarded by thousands of 
marketing messages in a cluttered media environment (Skinner and Stephens, 2003). 
The volume and diversity of brands, media and messages means consumers are unable 
and unwilling to identify, obtain, and evaluate all of the information necessary to take 
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reasoned action (Shapiro et al.; 1997). Furthermore, as brands are largely expected to 
match each other’s functional performance the details of advertising are often avoided, 
ignored or preconsciously ‘screened-out’ as unimportant (Heath, 2004). In this sense, 
therefore, it might be argued that the non-conscious MEE is a naturally occurring 
phenomenon in the contemporary consumption environment.  
 
However, it should be noted that the design and execution of advertising may also 
constrain consumers’ ability and opportunity to elaborate, and thus the level of audience 
involvement. For example, Edell and Staelin (1983) found that, in the absence of verbal 
explanation, the ambiguous nature of isolated pictures may restrict processing ability. 
Similarly, and in same way that advertising clutter might divide attention between  
messages, the amount and congruency of information within an advertisement might 
result in divided attention between each aspect of this, (e.g. attractive endorsers may 
restrict message processing; Chaiken and Eagly, 1983). Also, restricting the duration for 
which the message is available for processing may also be expected to reduce the 
opportunity for elaboration and thus the level of audience involvement (Moore et al., 
1986). As such, the MEE should also be regarded as a phenomenon that might be 
manipulated by marketers to enhance affective response to products, brands and 
advertisements.  
 
Whilst the MEE should not necessarily be considered to be a non-cognitive 
phenomenon, the most pertinent outcome of this in a marketing context is the 
misattribution of processing fluency to positive affective response. As such, it is likely 
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to be most relevant to advertising effects in situations where the goal is simply to 
generate positive affect towards the brand rather then convey detailed information and 
understanding (Vakratsas and Ambler, 1999). Thus, it is perhaps fair to conclude that 
the MEE is most relevant to marketing when the goal of advertising is to elicit generally 
positive affective response at extremely low levels of audience involvement, and in the 
absence of significant focal attention (see figure 3.14). 
 
Figure 3.14: Basic conditions for maximising the influence of consumer-based 
MEE 
 
 
 
However, it is important to acknowledge three potentially important mediators of the 
extent to which the mere exposure effect of advertising (i.e. the enhancement of positive 
affective response) might subsequently be expected to influence consumer choice: 
• Low versus high levels of actor involvement  
• Propensity for brand-switching  
• Absence of experience with the target brand and/or the product category. 
 
With regard to the first of these, and as discussed in section 3.2 (page 73), the influence 
of enhanced affective response on subsequent brand choice has been widely presumed to 
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be facilitated by a low level of actor involvement at the point of decision-making (e.g. 
Chung and Szymanski, 1997; Baker, 1999; Fang et al., 2007). Given that consumer 
choices in fmcg categories are often made under such conditions (Hawkins and Hoch, 
1992), therefore, the MEE may be particularly, and indeed increasingly, relevant in the 
contemporary consumption environment. Moreover, it may be argued that a correlation 
between low actor involvement and the influence of exposure-induced affect implies 
that the MEE may be particularly influential in the early stages of decision-making. In 
this respect, Cai et al. (2004) contend that involvement increases as consumers move 
from developing awareness sets of the alternatives, to consideration sets and, finally, 
purchase decisions. In line with this, however, it may be hypothesised that the influence 
of the MEE on decision-making will decrease as the consumer moves closer to the 
actual purchase decision. Indeed, whilst it is beyond the scope of the empirical work in 
this thesis, this may constitute an interesting and useful direction for future mere 
exposure research in this domain (as will be discussed in chapter 9). 
 
Secondly, and in the continued absence of empirical research into this issue, it is perhaps 
prudent to assume that the marketing-based MEE will only influence consumer 
behaviour in the absence of well-established routines, habits or strongly held beliefs 
with regard to target and competitor brands. In this sense, it may be fair to presume that 
the relatively moderate size of the experimental effect (see chapter 2, page 23) indicates 
that its impact on behaviour may be nullified by the forces of brand inertia. A propensity 
for brand-switching within groups of consumers or product categories may therefore 
constitute a second mediating factor in the degree to which exposure-induced affect 
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influences behaviour. However, it should be noted that the degree to which the 
marketing-based MEE may alter previously ingrained attitudes towards well-known 
brands is yet to be adequately tested in the marketing literature. 
 
Finally, Vakratsas and Ambler (1999) contend that, alongside cognition and affect, 
experience constitutes a third mediating factor between advertising exposure and choice 
behaviour. The main implication of this for the MEE is that experience with target or 
competitor brands may create strongly held beliefs and attitudes that reduce, or even 
eliminate, the impact of mere exposure on choice behaviour. In contrast, however, it 
may be argued that negative experiences with a product may enhance the motivation for 
brand-switching in that category, and thus the degree to which the MEE influences 
choice behaviour. However, in the current absence of empirical evidence for either of 
these hypotheses, it is perhaps prudent to assume that exposure-induced affect is more 
likely to lead to behavioural effects in the absence of extensive experience with the 
target brand, and ideally the product category in general. 
 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, therefore, the development of research into advertising effects has, to a 
large extent, mirrored that of consumer decision-making. In particular, the drive to 
develop a more detailed understanding of consumer response to advertising has led 
researchers in both traditions to question the relationships between cognition, affect and 
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behaviour in the creation of communication effects. Most notably in this respect, the 
emphasis placed on cognitive response by traditional hierarchical models has been 
challenged by the emergence of affect-driven theories of consumer response and 
decision-making. In line with these, an emerging body of contemporary research argues 
that affective response to advertising is the key to influencing subsequent behaviour, and 
should thus be the main objective of advertisers. This is particularly important when the 
ultimate goal of advertising is related to long-term brand building and ensuring the 
brand is included in a consumer’s consideration set. 
 
Given the preoccupation for demonstrating the link between mere exposure and affect in 
the psychology literature (see chapter 2, page 19), and the close relationship between 
early explanations of the MEE and affect-driven theories of advertising (Zajonc, 1980, 
2000), it may seem appropriate to categorise the MEE in the context of non-cognitive 
consumer processing theory. In light of the recent emergence of cognition-based 
theories of this phenomenon, however, this would not be entirely appropriate. Rather, 
the marketing-based MEE should be conceptualised as a non-conscious (cognitive) 
theory of marketing communications. Whilst the most robust (and perhaps relevant) 
outcome of this is likely to be the enhancement of affective response, it may also impact 
upon cognitive judgments (e.g. quality) of merely exposed marketing stimuli when they 
are subsequently encountered. Within the realms of non-conscious consumer processing, 
however, it is as yet unclear as to whether the MEE is a function of subliminal 
perception and/or non-conscious intermediate processing. This is a key distinction in the 
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context of marketing theory and constitutes an important direction for further research in 
this domain; and in particular that which is included in this thesis. 
 
What is not subject to dispute, however, is that the MEE is most relevant to the 
exploration, explanation and manipulation of marketing communication effects under 
conditions of low attention and involvement (during exposure and throughout the 
decision-making process). Furthermore, it is likely to be most influential when the goal 
of marketing communication is to generate affective response to the brand. As such, the 
MEE may be assumed to be of greater importance in the early stages of decision-making 
(i.e. the formation of awareness and consideration sets) than in the actual purchase 
decision (as this tends to be associated with a relatively higher degree of actor 
involvement; Cai et al., 2004). Further to this, however, the influence of exposure-
induced affect on ultimate choice behaviour is likely to be maximised by the absence of 
strong routines, habits, attitudes and experience in relation to the brand and, ideally, the 
product category.  
 
In conclusion, however, it is important to stress that the integration of the MEE into 
marketing theory, and indeed the proposed conceptualisation of the marketing-based 
MEE in figure 3.13 (page 116), is based on the assumption that the occurrence, nature, 
size and direction of this domain-specific phenomenon will be identical to that 
demonstrated in abstract psychological research (see chapter 2). In essence, therefore, 
the validity of a mere exposure-based theory of advertising effects and consumer 
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decision-making is dependent on the robustness of the three fundamental propositions 
distilled from the psychology literature in chapter 2: 
P1: Mere exposure to a marketing stimulus will influence affective response to 
that stimulus when it is subsequently encountered 
P2: The size of the marketing-based mere exposure effect will be hindered by the 
presence of accurate recognition memory for marketing stimulus exposure 
P3: The size of the marketing-based mere exposure effect will be hindered by a 
subjective sense of confident, contextualized recollection for prior exposure to 
the marketing stimulus; regardless of recognition accuracy 
 
Whilst a great deal of evidence for the first of these propositions is apparent in the 
psychology literature (see Bornstein, 1989) the prospect that this may, to some extent, 
be context specific (e.g. with regard to stimuli or participants; see chapter 2) highlights 
the need for robust replication in the marketing domain. Furthermore, the current 
controversy regarding the impact of recognition memory (and therefore the nature of the 
MEE; as discussed in chapter 2, page 29) may have important implications for 
marketing theory, research and practice, and thus warrants examination in this context. 
With this in mind, the purpose of the following chapter is to critically review the extent 
to which specific evidence for the MEE is apparent in the extant marketing literature, 
and in particular the degree to which the above propositions have been tested and 
supported. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Empirical evidence for the marketing-based MEE: 
A critical review 
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4.1. Introduction 
 
The mere exposure research paradigm is derived directly from Zajonc’s (1968: 1) 
original observation that: 
“the mere repeated exposure of the individual to a stimulus is a sufficient 
condition for the enhancement of his attitude towards it. By ‘mere 
exposure’ is meant a condition which just makes the given stimulus 
accessible to the individual's perception.”  
 
Research that is conducted within the strict confines of this paradigm is characterized by 
an exposure phase, a period of delay and a subsequent test phase. Exposure in this 
respect takes the form of repeated presentation of the target (and more often than not 
distractor) stimuli in isolation, and at a level that is just perceptible. The absence of 
contextual, associated or accompanying stimuli is important to distinguish the MEE 
from similar effects that may occur as a result of classical conditioning; a phenomenon 
that is characterized by associative priming or, as Foxall (2002: 186) explains, “the 
direct or non-cognitively mediated transfer of pleasant or unpleasant feelings from the 
[unconditioned stimulus] (e.g. the advertisement] to the conditioned stimulus (e.g. the 
brand].” With this in mind, it will be argued in this chapter that few marketing studies to 
date have been conducted within the strict confines of the mere exposure paradigm. 
Rather, evidence of the marketing-based MEE is provided via the loose application of 
this framework and the use of an alternative, incidental exposure paradigm. The 
findings, conclusions and limitations of this body of work are critically discussed in 
detail during this chapter.  
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Figure 4.1: Structure of Chapter 4 
 
 
 
To this end, the extant marketing literature is categorised into three streams (see figure 
4.1.); incorporating those studies that seek to demonstrate the MEE in the presence of 
recognition, to compare it in the presence and absence of recognition and to explain this 
phenomenon, respectively. The latter category is then further divided into those studies 
that have sought to test the theoretical explanations discussed in chapter 2 (section 2.3, 
page 36) and those that have investigated some of the specific non-conscious processes 
to which these theories refer. Whilst study-specific limitations are raised during this 
review, it will be argued that the extant marketing literature in this field is characterised 
by a number of common methodological limitations. These are discussed in section 4.3 
(page 159), prior to a review of the extent to which this body of work may be considered 
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to provide empirical support for the fundamental propositions distilled from the 
psychology literature in chapter 2 (page 62). 
 
As an overview, however, it is perhaps useful to first acknowledge that, in line with the 
majority of psychological research, all of the marketing studies in this field have 
examined the link between exposure and affect, and all bar one have reported an entirely 
positive relationship. Contrary to the psychology literature, however, effect size is not 
widely reported in the extant marketing literature to date. Further to this, it is important 
to note that, whilst effects are often reported in the presence and absence of recognition, 
marketing research into the MEE is almost entirely characterised by the supraliminal 
presentation of stimuli during the exposure phase. This is perhaps unsurprising given the 
scepticism and hostility with which research into subliminal advertising has been met in 
recent decades (Broyles, 2006; see page 104). As will be discussed in the following 
section, however, marketing-based evidence of the MEE in either the presence or 
absence of recognition is largely equivocal and subject to significant theoretical and 
methodological constraints. 
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4.2. The existence and nature of the MEE in a marketing context: A critical review 
of the evidence 
 
Although Obermiller (1985) is often cited as the first notable study to provide evidence 
of the MEE in the marketing literature (e.g. Vanhuele, 1994; Baker, 1999), this is not 
entirely accurate. Specifically, this study develops and tests the proposition that 
processing style mediates the impact of stimulus exposure on subsequent affective 
response. However, with regard to table 4.1 (page 129), it may be argued that only one 
of the five processing conditions across which Obermiller (1985) compares the effect of 
repeated exposure to novel melodies is in line with the MEE paradigm. This, the author 
refers to as ‘minimal processing’ and takes the form of divided attention; in line with 
Wilson (1979), one of the very first empirical studies of the MEE in the psychology 
literature. Whilst Obermiller (1985) concedes that this condition is “the closest analogue 
to Wilson (1979),” it should be stressed that it is in fact the only condition in which 
participants are not required to engage in a high degree of conscious, attentive, 
elaborative processing of the target stimuli during exposure, and thus the only condition 
in which mere exposure occurs (according to Zajonc’s original definition; see page 18). 
At this level of minimal processing, exposure was not found to have any influence on 
affective response; i.e. the MEE was not in fact observed in this study. This led 
Obermiller (1985: 27) to conclude that, “the failure to replicate findings of affective 
change under conditions of limited cognitive processing (during repeated mere 
exposure) calls into question the robustness of [the MEE].” In conclusion, Obermiller 
(1985: 28) called for more consumer research within the strict confines of the mere 
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exposure paradigm, to “demonstrate or refute affective responding under conditions that 
limit cognitive processing [during repeated exposure].”  
 
Table 4.1: Summary of the five processing conditions in Obermiller (1985) 
Condition Description 
Minimal processing 
 
Attention was focused away from the melodies. Subjects were 
given a worksheet of math and language exercises. While they 
worked on this distraction task, the melodies played in the 
background. 
Structural processing 
 
Attention was focused on the melodies. The task required 
subjects to count and record the number of notes in each melody. 
Cognitive processing 
 
Attention was focused on the melodies. Subjects were instructed 
to listen to the melodies and write down an appropriate title for 
each one. 
Affective processing 
 
Attention was focused on the melodies. Subjects were instructed 
to listen to the melodies and rate each on a five-point 
pleasant/unpleasant scale. 
Associative processing 
 
Attention was focused on the melodies. Subjects were instructed 
to listen to the melodies and attempt to form as many images or 
associations as they could and to indicate how many images or 
associations they formed for each melody on a six-point scale. 
Source: Obermiller (1985) 
 
In response to the call of Obermiller (1985), a small but potentially important body of 
marketing research has emerged that appears to provide evidence for the MEE in this 
context, although these studies are largely subject to significant theoretical and 
methodological limitations (as will be discussed subsequently). Whilst not overtly 
acknowledged, the moderating influence of stimulus recognition has been an intrinsic 
aspect of this stream of the marketing literature; a consequence perhaps of the increasing 
interest of psychologists in this issue during the last three decades (see chapter 2, page 
29). More recently, the emphasis in both domains has shifted from demonstration to 
explanation, and in particular the nature of the non-conscious processes that underpin 
the MEE. As such, marketing studies of the MEE may be divided into three categories; 
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those that examine the MEE in the presence of recognition only, those that seek to 
compare the MEE in the presence and absence of recognition, and those that endeavour 
to explain this phenomenon. A critical review of each of these streams of literature is 
provided in the subsections below. 
 
4.2.1. Demonstrating the marketing-based MEE in the presence of recognition 
 
Reflecting an acknowledgement of the MEE (and the greater interest in this) as 
essentially a non-conscious phenomenon (see chapter 2, page 21), perhaps, this stream 
of the extant marketing literature is limited to just two studies; both of which, it would 
seem, were undertaken with the original aim of exploring the MEE in the absence of 
recognition. Firstly, and albeit inadvertently, Baker (1999) provides evidence of the 
MEE solely in the presence of recognition, in a study that is ostensibly designed to 
compare the conditions under which the MEE and classical (affective) conditioning 
might influence consumer behaviour. In essence, this involves testing three potential 
mediators of both phenomena; existing brand familiarity, perceived functional 
performance and level of involvement. The fact that identical conditions are found to 
enhance both the MEE and classical (affective) conditioning could simply be a function 
of their similarity; alternatively, it could indicate a failure to distinguish between them in 
the research design. However, if the validity of Baker’s (1999) results is accepted, the 
important aspect of this study is the nature of the MEE in question. In this respect, 
whilst the literature review refers to preattitudinal and non-conscious processing, the 
empirical work does not distinguish between affective response in the presence and 
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absence of conscious memory for prior exposure. Indeed, the measurement of 
recognition is replaced by one of ‘exposure frequency awareness’; whereby participants 
are required to determine the number of times each stimulus was presented. Given the 
relatively large number of prolonged, attentive exposures (discussed further in section 
4.3, page 159) and the nature of the memory task, it would appear that there is no 
suggestion that participants did not recognise the stimuli as having been presented 
previously (merely, that they could not remember how many times this occurred). As 
such, Baker (1999) essentially presents evidence of a marketing-based MEE in the 
presence of recognition, but only when there is parity in brand familiarity and perceived 
functional performance. Additionally, the MEE in this study does not appear to be 
restricted to low involvement consumer decision-making, operating also as a ‘tie-
breaker’ in highly involved deliberation; a finding that potentially extends the conditions 
under which the MEE might be expected to influence consumer behaviour (see chapter 
3, page 118). 
 
Further to this study, it should perhaps be acknowledged that Olson and Thjomoe (2003) 
claim to ‘reconfirm’ the MEE for brand names in the presence of recognition. In line 
with Baker (1999), they also contend that the effect is not mediated by accompanying 
brand information that is not fully processed (i.e. that it is distinct from the process of 
implicit associative priming). This study, however, is beset with methodological 
problems; not least of which is an almost total lack of control over the direction and 
extent of attention during exposure, and the absence of recognition measures for the 
target brand names. The former relates to an exposure phase in which marketing 
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students were repeatedly exposed to 82 adverts (48 targets and 44 distractors) that were 
embedded in the slides of a real lecture and positioned as “examples of advertising.” 
Each advert was presented ‘several times’ and for a duration of 5-seconds on each 
occasion. The degree to which each brand name is just perceptible (Zajonc, 1968) and 
not subject to elaborative processing is therefore highly questionable. The main problem 
with this approach, however, is that it facilitates significant differences in attentive 
processing between participants and stimuli during the course of the lecture; from 
situations in which students lose interest and look away from the lecture slides, to those 
where students study some of these ‘examples of advertising’ in great detail as part of 
their learning experience. The absence of subsequent recognition measures for each 
advertisement further compounds the difficulty in identifying whether or not each 
stimulus has received a high degree of attentive, elaborative processing. At best, 
therefore, the findings of this study should be taken as indicative evidence of a 
marketing-based MEE in the presence of recognition but, given that the authors concede 
that their results require “replication and extension”, it is important to stress that they 
should (for now at least) be treated with a degree of caution.  
 
As previously mentioned, however, the conclusions of Olson and Thjomoe (2003) are 
not the only ones that must be considered in the context of significant limitations. 
Indeed, most marketing-specific studies of the MEE are subject to a number of common 
methodological considerations that could undermine the validity of their findings and 
conclusions; as will be discussed in section 4.3 (page 159). Prior to this, however, the 
two most prominent streams of marketing-based MEE research are critically reviewed; 
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beginning with that which seeks to directly compare this phenomenon in the presence 
and absence of recognition. 
 
4.2.2. Comparing the marketing-based MEE in the presence and absence of 
recognition 
 
In addition to the literature reviewed above, a slightly larger (though still small) body of 
marketing research has sought to compare the MEE in the presence and absence of 
recognition memory. However, it should be noted this is largely restricted to comparing 
the occurrence, rather than the size, of the MEE in each case. This constitutes a 
potentially important limitation as psychological results consistently indicate that 
stimulus recognition is likely to attenuate the size of the effect, rather than eliminate it 
completely (see chapter 2, page 29). Perhaps a more serious problem for this somewhat 
limited stream of marketing research, however, is the equivocal nature of the findings; 
as illustrated in the discussion below. 
 
The first notable response to Obermiller’s (1985) call for more marketing research into 
the MEE, is that of Anand, Holbrook and Stephens (1988). These authors replicated 
Wilson’s (1979) exposure technique of dividing attention between two auditory stimuli, 
ostensibly to test cognition versus affect-based theories of the MEE. In this study, 
however, cognition appears to be confused with recognition; a fundamental criticism of 
the empirical evidence for Zajonc’s (1980) primacy of affect theory (see Vanhuele, 
1994), and one that potentially invalidates Anand et al.’s conclusions as to the necessity 
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of cognition in the MEE. However, although not explicitly acknowledged, this study 
more accurately constitutes an attempt to measure the marketing-based MEE in the 
presence and absence of recognition. In this respect, Anand et al. (1988: 390) find 
support for the former but not the latter, observing that, “our results suggest that the 
[MEE] increases with the accuracy of recognition.” These findings may be considered 
surprising, and at the time ran contrary to psychological research indicating that the size 
of the MEE is significantly reduced under such conditions (for reviews see Bornstein 
1989; Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004). 
 
In defence of Anand et al. (1988), however, it might be noted that psychological 
evidence for the non-conscious nature of the MEE is largely derived from studies that 
use subliminal exposure (see Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004). By contrast, this is 
one of the first studies to measure the effects of supraliminal exposure in the absence of 
subsequent recognition. Furthermore, their conclusion is supported by more recent 
psychological research of this nature (Lee, 2001b; Wang and Chang, 2004; Newell and 
Shanks, 2007; see page 33). In this respect, therefore, it may be argued that the results of 
Anand et al. (1988) constitute an early indication that subliminal perception is a 
necessary condition for the non-conscious enhancement of the MEE; and that this might 
be more accurately termed the subliminal MEE. However, given the combination of 
small sample size (n=30) and a lack of control over the nature and duration of exposure 
(as will be discussed in section 4.3, page 159), it is perhaps unwise to draw such a 
conclusion from this study alone. Furthermore, the failure to demonstrate the MEE in 
the absence of recognition is contradicted by Janiszewski (1993), and two subsequent 
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comparative studies that are relevant to the MEE (Shapiro and Krishnan, 2001; Tom et 
al., 2007). In this respect, Janiszewski (1993) proffers evidence for the MEE in both the 
absence and presence of recognition in a study that is primarily designed to test a theory 
of preattentive hemispheric processing. In this respect, participants were peripherally 
(and it is therefore presumed incidentally) exposed to invented advertisements in a 
mocked-up newspaper. In the absence of recognition memory for the novel brand names 
contained within, liking for these elements of the stimuli was found to be enhanced; a 
result the author explains with reference to the non-conscious MEE, and in particular the 
misattribution theories of Mandler et al. (1987) and Bornstein and D’Agostino (1992). 
However, the same result is also evident in the presence of recognition; a finding that is 
not discussed in the context of MEE theory, nor in relation to comparative effect size. 
 
Further to this, it may be argued that evidence for the MEE in the absence and presence 
of recognition is also apparent in Shapiro and Krishnan’s (2001) comparison of 
advertising effects on explicit and implicit memory. Although not acknowledged, the 
MEE, and in particular the perceptual fluency/attribution theory of mere exposure 
(Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994; see page 45), is adopted as a proxy by which to 
infer the presence of implicit memory in this study. As the authors explain: 
“Implicit memories have been shown to lead to a response bias in which 
there is a greater likelihood of using the previously seen information to 
complete a task without the awareness of doing so. One type of response bias 
that has been found is an increased preference for previously seen 
information (Schacter 1987). One explanation for this effect is perceptual 
fluency, in which a previously seen stimulus appears familiar, and absent a 
successful search of memory to attribute this familiarity to the prior exposure 
episode, the familiarity is attributed to a preference for the stimulus.” 
(Shapiro and Krishnan, 2001: 2) 
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On this basis, the authors used a 2x2 between-group experiment to examine the impact 
of delay and divided attention on explicit (recognition) and implicit memory (i.e. 
preference) for 12 novel brand names. These stimuli replaced the real brand names 
contained in 12 real-life advertisements. Each ad was then exposed once for a period of 
10 seconds. Divided attention was created by instructing participants to simultaneously 
listen to a radio broadcast during the exposure phase, while delay was facilitated by 
asking respondents to complete the test phase the following day. In this way, the authors 
found that both divided attention and a period of delay significantly reduced recognition 
rates for the target brands, whilst the brand preference effect (by which implicit memory 
was inferred) remained robust across all conditions. Although not specifically noted or 
discussed, therefore, these results would appear to reflect a marketing-based MEE in the 
both the presence and absence of recognition (to an equal extent). As a caveat to this 
conclusion, however, and in the specific context of the MEE, a number of limitations 
should be acknowledged with regard to this study. 
 
Firstly, it may be argued that the clearly visible nature of the target brand names and the 
extended length of exposure (10 seconds) does not necessarily meet the criteria of ‘mere 
exposure’ (i.e. that which is just perceptible; Zajonc, 1968), even in the divided 
attention condition. Furthermore, the fact that the target brand names were presented in 
the context of elaborate, real-world advertising gives rise to two additional limitations. 
Firstly, it is possible that the observed preference effects are the result of associative 
priming during each 10s exposure; i.e. that they reflect the results of classical 
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conditioning rather than mere exposure (see Baker, 1999). It might be argued that, in 
order to clearly distinguish the influence of the MEE experimentally, either the brand 
names should be presented in isolation or the complete advertisements should be 
considered to be the target stimuli and replicated in their entirety at test. In this case, 
however, the latter option may be problematic on the grounds that real-life adverts may 
be subject to pre-existing attitudes that are transferred to the newly-embedded brand 
names during exposure. In addition to this, however, the use of such stimuli gives rise to 
a second methodological limitation. Specifically, varying degrees of pre-experiment 
familiarity with each real-life advertisement could contribute to differences in 
processing fluency (over and above the influence of experimental manipulation). In this 
respect, a relatively high degree of fluency might be expected to enhance both encoding 
of the target brand names during exposure and/or perceived recognition of these at test 
(see Moray, 1959; Nielson and Sarason, 1981; Kurilla and Westerman, 2008). 
 
In the context of this thesis, however, perhaps the most significant limitation of Shapiro 
and Krishnan’s (2001) study is that it is not specifically designed to examine the MEE; 
rather, support for this particular phenomenon must be inferred.  To explain; evidence 
for the MEE in this study is drawn from between-group findings of explicit 
(recognition) and implicit memory for previously exposed stimuli (inferred by the 
enhancement of affect). In the first group, recognition was found to occur only in the 
absence of delay and under conditions of full attention. In the second group, enhanced 
brand preference is found with or without delay, and under conditions of full and 
divided attention. From this, it may be inferred that exposure-induced affect is evident 
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under conditions that both facilitate and hinder stimulus recognition. However, in the 
absence of within-subject analysis of the relationship between recognition and affect it is 
impossible to determine whether those participants that recognised (or indeed failed to 
recognise the target stimulus) in the first group also preferred it. Similarly, recognition 
data is not available in relation to those participants who preferred the stimulus in the 
second group. In other words, the fact that one group preferred the target brand names 
following a period of delay, whilst another failed to recognise them under the same 
conditions does not necessarily demonstrate the occurrence of a non-conscious MEE. It 
is possible that all those who preferred the target brand names would have also reported 
recognition of these stimuli had they been asked. Similarly, all those who reported 
recognition of the brand names may not necessarily have preferred them. Whilst this is 
perhaps unlikely, the fact that it is possible undermines an interpretation of this study as 
evidence for two qualitatively different forms of the MEE, arising on the basis of two 
separate memory systems (i.e. explicit and implicit). Whilst such a conclusion should 
not necessarily be ruled out, and would be of both interest and importance in the field of 
marketing communication, it is argued that the results of Shapiro and Krishnan (2001) 
would benefit from validation using a within-subject experimental design. 
 
On the one hand, therefore, and in light of the limitations above, it may be argued that 
the results of Shapiro and Krishnan (2001) do not necessarily reflect the MEE, and 
should be treated with caution in this particular context. Alternatively, however, and in 
the continued absence of empirical evidence for the non-conscious MEE following 
supraliminal exposure, it may be reasonably proposed that this robust, marketing-based 
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study indicates the possibility of a qualitative distinction between two forms of the 
MEE. In this respect, the fact that an equivalent preference-bias is apparent in both the 
presence and absence of recognition may suggest that, rather than the former being a 
weaker analogue of the latter (i.e. a fully non-conscious effect; see figure 3.12, page 
108), the two effects occur via two different processing routes; namely those associated 
with explicit and implicit memory respectively. Whilst this possibility is not raised by 
the authors, it may be seen to provide a theoretical basis on which to reconcile the 
seemingly paradoxical findings of an increase in the size of the MEE under conditions 
of both subliminal perception and stimulus recognition (see chapter 2, pages 29-33). It 
may therefore constitute an interesting avenue for further research, and will be 
considered in more detail during the latter part of this thesis. 
 
To complete the literature review in this section, however, it is perhaps important to 
consider one particular study that, although not published within the marketing 
literature, sought to explore the effects of supraliminal and subliminal mere exposure in 
this context. In this respect, Tom et al. (2007) found that the ‘perceived effectiveness’ of 
a promotional tool (a corporate novelty gift) was enhanced by repeated supraliminal 
(250ms) and, to a greater extent, subliminal (100ms) embeds of the item in a 
promotional video. With regard to the psychology literature (within which this study is 
published), this marketing-based demonstration of the MEE would appear to be in line 
with the findings of Bornstein and D’Agostino (1992) and Bornstein’s (1989) meta-
analysis. From both a purely scientific and applied marketing perspective, however, a 
number of limitations should perhaps be acknowledged. Firstly, in the absence of 
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subjective measures of perception, the degree to which the two conditions are 
effectively distinguished from each other must be inferred. Given that the original 
empirical study of the (visual) non-conscious MEE utilised subliminal exposures of just 
1ms (Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc, 1980), and that Seamon et al. (1983) found above 
chance recognition following exposures of 3ms (but not 2ms), the assumption that a 
100ms embed will be subliminally perceived by all participants is questionable. 
Secondly, and in light of the fact that Tom et al. (2007) develop a theoretical foundation 
for the MEE that is based entirely on the primacy of affect theory (Zajonc, 1980), the 
largely cognitive nature of the dependent variable (i.e. a mindful evaluation of its 
potential effectiveness) appears to be somewhat illogical. Furthermore, it does not 
necessarily reflect a typical affective consumer response to promotion. Finally, the use 
of subliminal (or at least heavily disguised) embeds in a promotional video may be 
questioned on the grounds that it provides neither a high degree of ecological validity 
nor robust internal validity; the complex nature of contextual stimuli providing scope for 
implicit associative priming (i.e. classical conditioning) that may confound the effects of 
mere repeated exposure to the target stimulus alone (see chapter 2, page 56). 
Nonetheless, the work of Tom et al. (2007) represents a potentially important part of the 
bridge between psychology and marketing; the development and completion of which 
will facilitate a greater understanding of the MEE in both domains. 
 
From the literature reviewed in this section, therefore, it may be concluded that 
comparative evidence and explanation for the marketing-based MEE in the presence and 
absence of recognition remains subject to some confusion. Whilst Anand et al. (1988) 
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find support for the MEE in only the first of these conditions, Janiszewski (1993), 
Shapiro and Krishnan (2001) and Tom et al. (2007) support the existence of this 
phenomenon in both scenarios. However, whilst Tom et al. (2007) find that recognition 
(or more specifically, perception) merely attenuates the size of the MEE, the conclusions 
of Shapiro and Krishnan (2001) imply two qualitatively different forms of this effect, 
based on the conscious and non-conscious processes of memory respectively. As a 
caveat to all of these findings, however, and in line with those studies reviewed in the 
previous section, this literature stream is subject to a number of significant limitations. 
These are not restricted to the study-specific issues raised in this section but also include 
a number of common methodological limitations that will be discussed in section 4.3 
(page 159). Prior to this, however, a final stream of the marketing literature is reviewed; 
namely, that which endeavours to explain the MEE. 
 
4.2.3. Explaining the MEE in a marketing context 
 
Given the discussion to this point in the chapter, it might be argued that a robust 
domain-specific demonstration of the MEE, and in particular the degree to which it is 
moderated by stimulus recognition, remains absent from the extant marketing literature. 
Nevertheless, the trend in recent years has been to explain, rather than to validate, this 
phenomenon in a marketing context. In this respect, a small body of literature has 
emerged that may be subdivided into two categories; that which endeavours to test the 
numerous theories of mere exposure discussed in chapter 2 (section 2.3, page 36), and 
that which explores the nature and influence of the specific non-conscious processes to 
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which these theories refer. The relevant studies in both these respects are critically 
discussed in the subsections below. 
 
4.2.3.1. Testing psychological theories of mere exposure in a marketing context 
 
As previously mentioned, the intention of Anand et al. (1988) to compare affect versus 
cognition-based theories of the MEE is largely undermined by theoretical assumptions 
that have subsequently proven to be inaccurate (i.e. that recognition is equivalent to 
cognition; see Vanhuele, 1994). Unfortunately, a similar limitation is apparent in Lee’s 
(1994) attempt to test the misattribution theories of mere exposure (see chapter 2, page 
45). To this end, a 2x2 experimental design is employed in which stimuli are either 
exposed (‘old’) or not (‘new’). Half of the stimuli in each condition are then explicitly 
labelled as having been exposed (‘seen’) or not (‘not seen’), giving rise to four 
conditions; old/seen, old/not seen, new/seen, new/not seen. On this basis, Lee (1994) 
hypothesises that misattribution theories of mere exposure would be supported by 
enhanced positive affective response in: 
a) the old/not seen but not the old/seen condition; and 
b) the new/not seen but not the new/seen condition 
 
The first assumption appears to be relatively robust, and is seemingly in line with 
Bornstein’s (1989) conclusion that the size of the MEE is greater in the absence of 
stimulus recognition. The second is developed on the basis that the new/seen condition 
will give rise to negative affect in the absence of expected perceptual fluency for new 
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stimuli that are believed to have been previously exposed; a somewhat novel 
interpretation of the implications of the perceptual fluency/attribution theory of mere 
exposure  (Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994). However, this proposition is not 
necessarily supported by the misattribution theories discussed in chapter 2 (page 45) - in 
which the experience of processing fluency is neither expected nor necessarily 
conscious – and  is particularly questionable in the light of Whittlesea’s (1993) 
conceptualisation of the false familiarity effect (FFE). As discussed in chapter 2 (page 
57), this phenomenon implies that a false, subjective experience of memory can occur 
on the basis of the relative ease of stimulus processing and is linked to enhanced 
affective response. On this basis, the instigation of false familiarity (via the suggestion 
that new stimuli had in fact been presented previously) should be expected to result in a 
preference-bias in the new/seen (and not the new/unseen) condition; a proposition that is 
diametrically opposed to that of Lee (1994). Given this, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
Lee (1994) fails to support the second part of the above hypothesis, instead finding 
positive affective response for new stimuli when participants were told that they had 
been presented previously (and inadvertently demonstrating the FFE). More surprising, 
perhaps, is the fact that Lee (1994) also fails to support the first part of the hypothesis; 
finding enhanced affective response to old stimuli regardless of what participants were 
told about their exposure status.  
 
On the face of it, therefore, this study appears to provide evidence of an equivalent MEE 
in the presence and absence of recognition, leading Lee (1994: 274) to conclude that the 
MEE, “cannot be undone by knowledge of prior exposure.” In a similar vein to Anand et 
  144 
al. (1988), this conclusion is contradicted by those of two subsequent psychological 
reviews (Bornstein, 1989; Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004) but finds some empirical 
support in the contemporary psychology literature (Lee, 2001b; Wang and Chang, 2004; 
Newell and Shanks, 2007). As the author concedes, however, it is somewhat 
undermined by a basic theoretical limitation; namely, that the construct of ‘seen’ in this 
study is not necessarily equivalent to that of recognition. In fact, Lee (1994) reports that 
none of the stimuli were recognised by participants during the test phase. With this in 
mind, it would appear that the enhancement of affect for ‘old’ stimuli (regardless of 
whether they were positioned as ‘seen’ or ‘unseen’) essentially provides evidence of a 
non-conscious MEE. In addition, the same finding for new stimuli positioned as ‘seen’ 
(but not ‘unseen’) inadvertently supports the false familiarity effect (Whittlesea, 1993). 
The MEE is not actually tested in the presence of recognition during this study.  
 
With this in mind, perhaps the most important finding of Lee (1994) is that the direction 
of the non-conscious MEE (i.e. that which occurs in the absence of recognition) for low-
density patterns is diametrically opposed to that of high-density patterns. Specifically, 
she finds enhanced positive evaluation of the former accompanied by increased negative 
evaluation of the latter. As such, whilst this study does not necessarily constitute a 
robust test of the misattribution theories of mere exposure, it is one of the very few 
studies to demonstrate a reverse non-conscious MEE in adults (alongside Crandall et al., 
1973; Heyduk, 1975), and to provide evidence that the direction of the MEE may be 
stimulus-specific. 
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The only other study that has specifically sought to test generic theories of mere 
exposure in a marketing context is that of Fang et al. (2007). With specific regard to 
online banner advertising, the authors adopt a peripheral (and thus, it is assumed, 
incidental) exposure paradigm to compare two competing explanations of the MEE; the 
cognition-based theory of  perceptual fluency/attribution (Bornstein and D’Agostino, 
1992, 1994) and the affect-based theory of hedonic fluency (Winkielman and Cacciopo, 
2001). Despite doubts over whether the latter constitutes a valid theoretical explanation 
of the MEE (see chapter 2, page 40), Fang et al. (2007) argue that it is supported by the 
findings of this study whilst perceptual fluency/attribution is not. This is somewhat 
surprising in light of the credence that has been given to Bornstein and D’Agostino’s 
(1992, 1994) theory in the extant psychology literature (e.g. Butler and Berry, 2004); 
although it may be seen to be supported by a small number of recent studies that 
challenge the assumptions of this theory (e.g. Lee, 2001b; Wang and Chang; see page 
33). 
 
However, there are a number of potential criticisms and limitations that might be raised 
with regard to the findings of Fang et al. (2007). Firstly, the theory of perceptual 
fluency/attribution (Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994) appears to be ruled out on 
the basis that findings of enhanced affect for the target brand names was eliminated by 
the prior instruction that a peripheral stimulus (accompanying music) may give rise to a 
sense of processing fluency or affect; a result that Fang et al. (2007: 102) claim, “clearly 
supports the more complex model in which affect influences the interpretation of 
fluency.” In the absence of further explanation, however, the justification for this claim 
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is unclear. Indeed, an alternative (and arguably more robust) interpretation might lead to 
the opposite conclusion; i.e. that the study in fact provides support for the misattribution 
theories of mere exposure. In this respect, the findings appear to support a central 
proposition of both non-specific activation theory (Mandler et al., 1987) and perceptual 
fluency/attribution (Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994); namely, that perceptual 
fluency will be misattributed to whatever reason appears most plausible in the context of 
the experiment (see page 50). In this case, the fact that accompanying music was 
specifically suggested as the source of fluency makes it the most plausible explanation, 
and eliminates the need for misattribution to qualities of the target stimulus. 
 
In addition to this issue, the findings of Fang et al. (2007) are assumed to reflect non-
conscious processes on the basis that mean recognition in a two-factor forced choice test 
was at chance, and the peripheral placement of banner ads ensured that exposure 
occurred “just under the level of perception” (Fang et al., 2007: 102). However, the first 
of these assumptions is undermined by the absence of within-subject analysis of the link 
between recognition and affect. As such, it is not possible to rule out the possibility that 
enhanced preference for the latter is underpinned mainly by judgments that occurred in 
the presence of accurate recognition. Furthermore, were this to be the case it gives rise 
to the possibility of an inverse relationship as a result of task ordering effects, i.e. that 
accurate recognition of the stimulus was associated with prior judgments of affect rather 
than the exposure phase (see Phaf and Rotteveel, 2005). Moreover, the assumption of 
subliminal perception is undermined by an absence of direct attention-control during 
exposure and any subsequent measurement of this variable. 
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Finally, the peripheral exposure technique that is used by Fang et al. (2007) gives rise to 
the possibility that the observed effects are not in fact the outcome of mere exposure to 
the stimulus alone, but an interaction between the target stimuli and other focal and 
peripheral stimuli during the exposure phase. The potential for implicit associative 
priming of this nature is common to all research conducted within the incidental 
exposure paradigm, and will thus be discussed further in section 4.3 (page 159). Given 
these limitations, however, and the somewhat surprising nature of the findings in Fang 
et al. (2007), it is perhaps prudent to draw this section to a close with the conclusion that 
(in line with the psychology literature) robust evidence for one theory of mere exposure 
over all others is not yet apparent in the marketing domain. However, marketing-specific 
research that seeks to explain the effects of mere exposure is not confined to testing the 
specific theories discussed in chapter 2 (section 2.3, page 36). By investigating the non-
conscious processes of implicit memory and processing fluency on which cognition-
based theories of mere exposure are founded, a small body of additional work might 
also be considered to make an important contribution in this respect; as will be discussed 
in the next section. 
 
4.2.3.2. Exploring the non-conscious processes of the MEE 
 
Given the emergence in psychology of cognition-based explanations of the MEE, 
coupled with the continued absence of a universally accepted theory of mere exposure, it 
is perhaps not surprising that marketing researchers have instead sought to test the 
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specific underlying processes on which these accounts are built. In this respect, the main 
focus of marketing research has been the basic premise that exposure-induced fluency 
implicitly primes affective response to marketing stimuli. In particular, the key question 
that has been addressed is the perceptual versus conceptual nature of this process. Whilst 
it has been acknowledged that there is still widespread disagreement as to the whether 
implicit memory has a conceptual dimension at all (see chapter 2, page 53), this may 
nevertheless be considered to be an important and interesting stream of literature in the 
context of this thesis. 
 
Perhaps the first marketing study to examine this issue directly is that of Chung and 
Szymanski (1997), who claim to take an ‘implicit memory perspective’ of exposure-
induced brand choice. To this end, the authors measure the effect of brand name 
exposure on preference in relation to a given consideration set (consisting of the target 
brand and four alternatives). This effect is then compared under the following 
conditions: 
a) Visual v auditory exposure  
b) Low v high involvement at test (operationalised by decision-time restrictions of 
3s and 10s respectively) 
c) Perceptual v conceptual processing during exposure (operationalised as 
letter/syllable counting and judging when in the day the brand would be used 
respectively) 
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Whilst it is not overtly referred to, this study presents evidence in support of the MEE; 
but only under conditions of visual exposure and low involvement decision-making. No 
significant differences in brand preference are apparent as a result of the perceptual 
versus conceptual nature of processing; a finding that, on the face of it, might suggest 
the MEE can occur via both routes. However, the validity of the experimental 
manipulation in this respect is somewhat questionable. Firstly, given that the brand 
names were real, familiar and therefore part of existing semantic memory, the 
proposition that letter/syllable counting results only in perceptual processing appears to 
rest on the unlikely assumption that the stimulus is not processed holistically at any 
point. If it is perceived to be a real brand name, or even a real word for that matter, 
semantic activation might reasonably be expected to occur. Secondly, judgements as to 
when in the day a brand is used are assumed in this study to involve only conceptual 
processing. However, exposure to the perceptual features of the stimulus in this activity 
inevitably entails perceptual processing. As the authors acknowledge, however, the 
influence of perceptual versus conceptual processing may ultimately be more adequately 
assessed via another manipulation in this study; the visual versus auditory nature of 
exposure. Given that the test phase was entirely visual, the first of these conditions 
provides the opportunity for perceptual matching of the physical features encountered 
during exposure and test, whilst the second does not. Effects observed in the auditory 
exposure condition cannot therefore be explained on the basis of simple perceptual 
matching and thus the influence of conceptual processing can be confidently assumed. 
However, no such effects were found, with the MEE apparent only when visual 
perceptual processing was possible in both phases of the experiment. Thus the authors 
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conclude, quite reasonably, that under conditions of low involvement, perceptual 
processing (and in particular perceptual matching of the visual stimulus features 
between exposure and test) underpins the effect in this study. This is in line with the 
theory that implicit memory is essentially a perceptual representation system (Schacter, 
1990; Tulving and Schacter, 1990; see page 49). 
 
However, in the context of implicit memory research in general, and the MEE in 
particular, this study is subject to a number of additional limitations. Firstly, the authors 
claim to consider the effects of exposure within the theoretical framework of implicit 
priming. To this end, the paper provides a good review of the implicit memory literature 
and accurately defines implicit priming as “exposure-induced change in performance 
unaccompanied by awareness” (Chung and Szymanski, 1997: 288). Awareness, 
however, is not specifically defined, controlled or measured in this study; although 
given the long, supraliminal exposures, the requirement for active, attentive, elaborative 
processing during these, and the relatively short delay before testing, it must be 
considered to be extremely likely that many of the 15 target brand names were 
recognised as having been seen during the exposure phase (amongst the 30 that were 
presented in total). As such, it is perhaps fair to conclude that, contrary to the claimed 
implicit nature of this study, the results essentially demonstrate priming in the presence 
of explicit recognition memory. In the specific context of the MEE, however, even this 
conclusion is perhaps undermined by the fact that neither type of exposure (visual or 
auditory) could be considered to occur at a level that is just perceptible (Zajonc, 1968). 
Indeed, the difficulties of presenting auditory stimuli at this level might suggest that, 
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whilst the use of modality matching/mismatching is a robust way to assess the nature of 
the processes that underpin the MEE, future studies might consider the manipulation of 
modality at test rather than exposure. In this respect, the standard visual presentation of 
the exposure phase would be replicated or altered in the test phase to create the 
necessary modality match/mismatch. Finally, the extent to which the effects observed in 
this study are analogous to those of the MEE may be questioned on the basis that the 
experimental effect of just one further exposure is unlikely to lead to a sizeable 
preference-bias for the real-word stimuli (e.g. Dentyne) used in this study. This 
possibility is elucidated by Shapiro (1999) in perhaps the most robust marketing-based 
study of implicit priming effects; a critical review of which is provided below. 
 
Building on the work of Shapiro et al. (1997; to be discussed subsequently), Shapiro 
(1999) compares the degree to which incidental exposure to product-category 
advertising facilitates implicit perceptual and conceptual priming and thus enhances the 
likelihood of inclusion in a consideration set. To this end, the two processing conditions 
are manipulated by the presentation of target products in isolation (to facilitate 
perceptual processing of the stimulus form) and in the context of a scene (to encourage 
semantic, associative processing). This second condition is then divided into meaningful 
and non-meaningful scenes, and target products are depicted that are either familiar or 
unfamiliar in shape. On this basis, Shapiro (1999) finds that incidental exposure to 
advertising influences consideration set formation when products are: 
a) unfamiliar and presented in isolation; or  
b) familiar and presented in the context of a meaningful scene. 
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The author concludes that these results highlight the importance of meaningful 
contextual information to the formation of conceptual fluency, and to the facilitation of 
perceptual fluency by its absence. Both forms of fluency, he argues, subsequently give 
rise to greater approach behaviour. However, whilst semantic analysis (and thus 
conceptual fluency) is further enhanced by the embedding of familiar stimuli, perceptual 
fluency for these is unlikely to be significantly influenced by one more experimental 
exposure.  
 
Whilst this study is not explicitly positioned as an investigation of the MEE, its findings 
are nonetheless relevant and important in the context of this phenomenon. In this 
respect, the observed effects of implicit perceptual and conceptual fluency on 
consideration set formation may be considered to be analogous to those of mere 
exposure (i.e. direct stimulus priming) and classical (affective) conditioning respectively 
(see Baker 1999). However, whilst it was previously acknowledged that Baker (1999) 
finds no difference in the effects of these two phenomena (beyond the fact that one is 
easier to execute in the context of marketing communications), Shapiro (1999) indicates 
an important qualitative distinction. Specifically, the semantic analysis that underpins 
classical conditioning is facilitated by prior familiarity with the stimulus and a 
presentation context that encourages elaborative processing. By contrast, feature 
analysis and direct perceptual priming is enhanced by isolated exposure and unfamiliar 
stimuli. As such, this study not only provides evidence for perceptual fluency 
explanations of the MEE (Mandler et al., 1987; Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994), 
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but also identifies two boundary conditions that clearly distinguish this phenomenon 
from that of classical (affective) conditioning.  
 
However, it is perhaps important to acknowledge that the specific focus of Shapiro 
(1999) is the extent to which generic products (e.g. computer, briefcase) are included in 
a consideration set. As such, further research may be necessary to examine the degree to 
which these findings hold with respect to brand discrimination and choice. Furthermore, 
it should be acknowledged that, whilst the study of Shapiro (1999) is particularly robust 
in the context of the incidental exposure paradigm within which it is developed, this 
approach may pose problems for the interpretation of these findings in the specific 
context of the MEE. Indeed, Shapiro (1999) does not necessarily seek to interpret his 
findings in the context of the mere exposure literature. For example, his conclusion that 
prior familiarity with the stimulus may moderate the implicit priming effects of a small 
number of additional experimental exposures would seem to be at odds with the finding 
that (familiar) meaningful words generate larger MEEs than (unfamiliar) nonsense 
words in Bornstein’s (1989) seminal meta-analysis (see page 25). In this respect, 
however, it should be acknowledged that these previous results relate specifically to 
abstract lexical stimuli, whereas those of Shapiro (1999) refer to product images. 
Nonetheless,  a degree of ambiguity as to whether the observed effects reflect the MEE 
or classical (affective) conditioning is a limitation that is common to all studies in which 
peripheral (incidental) exposure techniques are employed; and is therefore discussed in 
more detail in section 4.3 (page 159).  
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Prior to this, however, it is important to acknowledge the work of Lee (2002), who 
extends Shapiro’s (1999) attempt to identify boundary conditions for implicit perceptual 
and conceptual priming by studying their influence in stimulus-based and memory-
based brand choice. To this end, the author measures target brand selection in paired-
choice (stimulus-based) and category generation (memory-based) tests following both 
isolated and contextualised exposure to the brand name. These two exposure conditions 
are based on the assumption that the former facilitates perceptual priming whilst the 
latter encourages conceptual priming (Shapiro, 1999). In the isolated exposure 
condition, brand choice is found to be enhanced when the task is stimulus-based but not 
when it is memory-based, whilst the opposite is apparent following contextualised 
exposure. This leads Lee (2002) to conclude that isolated exposure to the brand name 
facilitates perceptual fluency that, in turn, influences brand choice in stimulus-based 
(but not memory-based) decisions. By contrast, contextualised exposure facilitates 
conceptual fluency that impacts brand choice in memory-based decisions only. 
 
Whilst contextualised exposure is not necessarily in line with the mere exposure 
paradigm (designed, as it is, to encourage elaborative, associative processing), Lee’s 
(2002) findings in relation to isolated exposure would appear to be directly relevant to 
the MEE in a marketing context. In particular, the apparently implicit and perceptual 
nature of the priming effects in this study supports the notion that the MEE is 
underpinned by non-conscious processes, and that these may take the form of feature 
analysis and the subsequent misattribution of perceptual fluency (Mandler et al., 1987; 
Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994). However, one potential caveat to the implicit 
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nature of the effects observed in this study is that, in the absence of a direct measure of 
recollection for the stimulus exposure, “the possibility that [brand choice] decisions 
reflect the potential influence of explicit memory cannot be ruled out” (Lee, 2002: 448). 
Indeed, the use of extended (8-second) exposures to the 12 target items (during which 
participants are required to actively evaluate their prior awareness of each brand), and a 
relatively short (10 minute) delay between the study and test phase, gives rise to a strong 
likelihood of stimulus recognition at the point of brand choice. As such, it is perhaps 
prudent to consider the results of Lee (2002) as an indication of the MEE in the presence 
of recognition. Within these parameters, however, it may be argued that this study not 
only demonstrates the MEE in a marketing context, but also presents evidence that it 
occurs on the basis of perceptual fluency (Mandler et al., 1987; Bornstein and 
D’Agostino, 1992, 1994), and therefore only in relation to stimulus-based consumer 
decisions (where the physical features of the exposed stimulus can be exactly 
reproduced). By contrast, it may be argued that the necessity of contextualised exposure 
for memory-based brand choice effects provides further evidence that these are the 
product of classical (affective) conditioning. Indeed, the findings of a difference in the 
degree to which stimulus-based and memory-based brand choice is mediated by isolated 
and contextualised exposure respectively might be seen to strengthen the conclusion that 
mere exposure and classical (affective) conditioning are qualitatively different 
phenomena (Shapiro, 1999). 
 
However, the study of Lee (2002), like the majority of those reviewed in this chapter, is 
subject to a number of methodological limitations. For example, the reliability of the 
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results may be hampered by the relatively small sample size per condition (n=28). 
Furthermore, the fact that such a significant effect was observed on the basis of a single 
exposure, and in relation to real, familiar and popular brands, may cast doubt on the 
degree to which the results are the product of experimental manipulations alone 
(Shapiro, 1999). Additionally, the author acknowledges that intermediate tests of 
perceptual and conceptual priming (between exposure and judgments of brand 
preference) raises the possibility of task order effects; an issue that will be discussed in 
more detail during chapter 6 (page 285). 
 
Finally, and in addition to those studies that address the issue of perceptual versus 
conceptual priming, one further marketing study is worthy of note in that it seeks to 
qualify the attenuating influence of stimulus recognition (Bornstein, 1989); a 
contribution that may explain the seemingly equivocal findings of this in the marketing 
literature (see section 4.2.2, page 133). In Vanhuele (1995), participants were exposed to 
81 unknown brand logos and then required to make affective evaluations after a delay of 
either 30 minutes or one-day. The results indicated that the MEE was evident only in the 
one-day delay condition and in the presence of accurate recognition. Although in line 
with those of Anand et al., (1988), therefore, these findings would appear to be at odds 
with those of Bornstein (1989; see page 29) and the theory of a non-conscious MEE that 
is hindered by recognition memory (Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994; see  page 
45).  
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Figure 4.2: The two bases of recognition memory (Mandler, 1980) 
 
 
However, the author seeks to reconcile this apparent disparity with reference to 
Mandler’s (1980) observation that recognition memory can occur on the basis of either 
familiarity or a combination of both this and precise retrieval that, taken together, might 
be termed recollection (see figure 4.2). The implications of this are explained by 
Vanhuele (1994, 266): 
“A stimulus can be recognized because it merely looks (or sounds, tastes, 
smells, or feels) familiar, but this impression can also be confirmed by 
recollecting details about the context in which it was presented, the 
thoughts that came to mind during its presentation, the attitudes that were 
formed etc.” 
 
With this in mind, he argues that the observed MEE is in fact a function of familiarity 
rather than recollection, and that it is the latter form of recognition that attenuates the 
effect. In this respect, the findings of Vanhuele (1995) may be considered to support 
cognition-based theories that consider familiarity to be a necessary condition for the 
enhancement of affect (e.g. Stang, 1975; Sawyer, 1981). As discussed in chapter 2 (page 
45), however, these theories have been largely subsumed by the proposition that 
Familiarity Recollection 
Familiarity + Retrieval 
Recognition 
  158 
exposure-induced response is the product of misattributed processing fluency (e.g. 
Mandler et al., 1987; Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994). In this context, familiarity 
in the absence of recollection, like affect, is deemed to be simply another cognitive 
illusion; an outcome of the MEE, rather than an underlying process factor. With this in 
mind, it may be argued that the subjective experience of familiarity that is presumed to 
underpin affective response by Vanhuele (1995) may be an illusion in itself; that in fact, 
both outcomes are the product of perceptual fluency in the absence of recollection. This 
interpretation, however, merely adds further credence to the author’s claim that it is not 
recognition per se that moderates the MEE (Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992), but 
explicit recollection for the stimulus exposure.  
 
Indeed, although it is not overtly acknowledged, empirical evidence for Vanhuele’s 
(1995) proposal may be found in the most recent marketing-based study of the MEE. In 
the specific context of product placement, Matthes et al. (2007) ostensibly find an 
inverse relationship between brand recall and liking; a result that would appear to 
support the notion that recognition memory moderates the MEE (Bornstein and 
D’Agostino, 1992). Importantly, however, it should be noted that the precise nature of 
the moderating variable in this study is brand ‘recall’, as measured on a 5-point scale 
(from ‘do not remember’ to ‘do remember’). As such, it might be argued that what the 
authors have in fact measured is not only recognition per se, but also confidence in this 
judgment or, more broadly, the subjective experience of memory. In this respect, 
therefore, and as a caveat to the conclusion that this study provides robust support for 
the claims of Vanhuele (1995) in an applied marketing context, it should be noted that 
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the findings directly contradict those of contemporary psychological research in which 
the MEE has been found to be enhanced by recognition (e.g. Newell and Shanks, 2007); 
particularly when it is accompanied by a subjective sense of recollection (Lee, 2001b; 
Wang and Chang, 2004); as discussed in chapter 2 (page 33). 
 
Whilst it may be premature to draw definitive conclusions as to the influence of memory 
on the marketing-based MEE at this stage, therefore, the propositions of Vanhuele 
(1995) continue to provide a relevant and important basis for further research into the 
MEE; and in particular that which is the focus of this thesis. However, it should be noted 
that Vanhuele’s (1995) “pilot study” is subject to some significant methodological 
limitations with regard to sample size, exposure control and the propensity for boredom 
and fatigue effects; all of which raise the question of validity in the context of MEE 
research. More broadly, however, it has been consistently noted that such limitations are 
common to a number of marketing-based studies in the field of mere exposure. They are 
thus discussed in more detail in the following section. 
 
4.3. Common methodological limitations 
 
In addition to the study-specific limitations discussed to this point in the chapter, a 
number of common methodological limitations are also evident in relation to this 
relatively small body of literature. These relate to three key elements of experimental 
design; sampling, stimuli, and procedure. The specific nature of these limitations is 
discussed in the subsections below. 
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4.3.1. Sampling 
 
At the end of the section 4.2 (above), brief reference was made to the size of Vanhuele’s 
(1995) pilot study, which included a total of 42 participants. Only 13 of these, however, 
were allocated to the crucial one-day delay condition in which evidence of the MEE was 
found. This, of course, is an extremely small sample on which to base statistical 
analysis, but it is not uncommon in the extant marketing literature. For example, the 
crucial ‘minimal processing’ condition in Obermiller (1985) contained just 31 
participants; a sample size that is approximately replicated in Anand et al. (1988; n=30), 
Janiszewski (1993; n=25-30) and Fang et al. (2007; n=35-40). Indeed, while Lee (1994) 
sampled 60 participants in total, they were divided into four separate conditions; 
resulting in an average sample size per condition of just 15. Whilst such sample sizes do 
not necessarily negate the validity of the findings, they may cast some doubt over the 
reliability of statistical results; particularly when the expected size of the experimental 
MEE is relatively small (see Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004), and indirect tests are 
used to infer the effects of implicit memory and thus the non-conscious effects of 
exposure (Meier and Perrig, 2000; Buchner and Brandt, 2003). 
 
At this point, it is also perhaps noteworthy that the use of student samples is ubiquitous 
in this literature stream. This is an extremely common (indeed almost universal) 
approach to sampling in the psychology literature and does not necessarily constitute a 
major limitation; particularly as the MEE is not considered to be sensitive to individual 
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or group differences (see chapter 2, page 27). Furthermore, it may be argued that, when 
the objective is to extend psychological research on the basis of variables that are not 
sample-specific, the continued use of this approach provides a useful foundation for 
comparison and dialogue between the two disciplines (as will be discussed in chapter 5, 
page 182). However, should robust evidence emerge that individual differences do 
indeed moderate the MEE, the study of different consumer groups may come to be seen 
as an important direction for future research in the marketing domain. 
 
4.3.2. Stimuli 
 
In addition to sample size it should be acknowledged that, although published in the 
marketing literature, many of the studies reviewed in this chapter do not necessarily 
extend mere exposure research in a way that is domain-specific. For example, 
Obermiller (1985) measures evaluations of invented sequences of tones, whilst Lee 
(1994) studies affective response to high versus low-density abstract patterns. Neither 
the stimuli nor the type of decision in these studies specifically relate to marketing or 
consumer behaviour, and thus it may be argued that they should perhaps be considered 
to be part of the experimental psychology literature (as reviewed in chapter 2). To a 
large extent, the same criticism might be made of Anand et al. (1988), in which the 
target stimuli consisted of 60-second textual and musical (piano) passages; although the 
prose in this study was drawn from a real-world product review. The potential for such 
criticism is recognised by Obermiller (1985: 20) who, in a pre-emptive defence, argues 
that, “my intention was to generalise to advertising response at the level of theory rather 
than stimulus operationalisation.” At the time of publication this may indeed have been 
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a perfectly reasonable basis on which to extend mere exposure research in the marketing 
domain; a decision that Obermiller (1985: 20) explains, quite justifiably, as follows: 
“when processes are subtle and effects are expected to be small, one must 
first isolate the processes under question, and then assess their robustness by 
examining their impact in more complex environments” 
 
However, subsequent demonstrations of effect size differences between simple and 
complex stimuli (for a review see Bornstein, 1989), and directional differences in the 
exposure effects of high versus low-density patterns (Lee, 1994) indicate that the MEE 
is to some extent stimulus-specific. With this in mind, it may be argued that the use of 
typical marketing stimuli (e.g. brand logos, Vanhuele, 1995; brand names, Baker, 1999) 
constitutes an important element of marketing-based research into the MEE. 
 
4.3.3. Procedure (stimulus exposure) 
 
Whilst the theoretical conceptualisation of mere exposure in the marketing literature is 
generally in line with the original definition of Zajonc (1968), the operationalisation of 
this is often questionable. This is particularly apparent in relation to the notion that mere 
exposure is characterised by presentations that are just perceptible, and therefore do not 
involve a high degree of attentive and elaborative processing (Zajonc, 1968). In this 
respect, it may be argued that techniques of divided attention (Obermiller, 1985; Anand 
et al., 1988) may not necessarily afford a high degree of exposure control and facilitates 
wide variations in attentive processing between individuals and stimuli. Similar 
criticism may be made with regard to the experimental use of the peripheral (or 
incidental) exposure techniques in Janiszewski (1993), Shapiro (1999) and Fang et al. 
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(2007). In these studies, it is possible that the results could be confounded by differences 
in attentive processing between both participants and stimuli. Although participants are 
requested to focus on a particular part of the visual stimulus in these studies, there is 
rarely (if ever) direct control or measurement of where and for how long focal attention 
is focussed. On this point, it should perhaps be noted that, although Janiszewski (1993) 
uses eye tracking-technology to provide a mean estimation of the direction and amount 
of attention, this does not necessarily address the issue of individual differences in the 
sample. In this respect, specific measurement of the interaction between attention and 
exposure (alongside subsequent recognition) would perhaps provide a more robust 
means of demonstrating incidental exposure, and exploring the effects of increasing 
attention within this paradigm. 
 
Whilst peripheral exposure could possibly give rise to the confounding effects of 
attention and elaboration in mere exposure research, however, the occurrence of these 
must be considered probable in those studies that specifically allow, or even require, 
this during the exposure phase. For example, the 25 stimuli in Lee (1994) are each 
exposed for 8 seconds, whilst the 24 slides in Baker (1999) – each containing 12 
exposures of the same brand name – are exposed for 2 seconds at a time. Given the very 
small effect sizes that are traditionally associated with exposures of this length (see 
Bornstein, 1989) and the extremely small sample of Lee (1994), it is thus questionable 
as to whether the findings constitute valid and reliable evidence of the MEE. Perhaps the 
most elaborative exposure phase in this body of work, however, is that of Vanhuele 
(1995), in which participants are required to consciously and actively evaluate 81 brand 
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logos in their own time. Whilst it is acknowledged that this study specifically considers 
the role of familiarity and recollection in the MEE, it is clearly not in keeping with 
Zajonc’s definition of mere exposure as that which is just perceptible. Furthermore, it 
could be expected that the extensive exposure phases of Lee (1994), Vanhuele (1995) 
and Baker (1999), coupled with the use of stimuli and tasks that are not particularly 
arousing, might be expected to result in boredom and fatigue; factors that have been 
found to hinder the MEE (Bornstein et al., 1990). At best, therefore, it might be 
expected that the influence of mere exposure is significantly underestimated in these 
studies. At worst, the validity of the results might be questionable on the grounds that 
the effects observed under these conditions are unlikely to reflect the influence of mere 
exposure alone (see Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004).  
 
Finally, and in addition to the possible confounding influence of attention and 
elaboration, the issue of exposure control is particularly problematic in those studies that 
utilise peripheral stimulus presentation as a means of creating incidental exposure (IE). 
In this respect, however, it is perhaps first important to acknowledge the ecological 
validity of this approach in the broader context of advertising research. Peripheral, 
incidental exposure to advertising is likely to occur frequently in the contemporary 
media environment; e.g. advertising that appears at the periphery of the visual field 
when audiences are engaged in a focal task (such as reading a print article, watching an 
embedded video on a web page or simply driving down a busy street). In such 
circumstances, the advertisement is often perceived fleetingly and with low levels of 
conscious attention, elaborative processing and subsequent explicit memory. The effects 
  165 
of incidental exposure (IE) are therefore of significant interest to advertising, marketing 
and consumer researchers; and, it would appear, very closely related to those of mere 
exposure. 
 
In the IE research paradigm, a typical study involves focussing the attention of 
participants on a focal task whilst the target stimuli are exposed at the periphery of their 
visual field (usually to the left or right). As Shapiro et al. (1997: 94) explains: 
“Because the secondary information [i.e. peripheral stimulus] does not 
receive direct foveal attention, and since attentional resources available for 
processing [are] limited, it is not surprising that the secondary information 
cannot be explicitly recognized.”  
 
Cognitive and affective response to the target stimuli are then measured in the absence 
of recognition. In this way, consumer researchers have provided robust evidence of the 
positive influence of IE on liking for brand advertising (Janiszewski, 1988) and the 
inclusion of products in a consideration set (Shapiro et al., 1997). Given the close 
similarities in both the nature and outcome of incidental and mere exposure, it is 
unsurprising that the two phenomena are often considered to be one and the same in the 
marketing literature. Indeed, the IE paradigm has been employed in a number of the 
studies reviewed earlier in this chapter (e.g. Janiszewski, 1993; Shapiro, 1999; Fang et 
al., 2007). With specific regard to the MEE, however, the IE paradigm gives rise to an 
important limitation; namely, that the effects observed could be due to the simultaneous 
processing of focally attended material and the peripheral target stimulus. Indeed, 
Janiszewski (1988: 205) originally draws attention to this in a study of hemispheric 
processing: 
  166 
“the finding of a placement effect on evaluation of a pictorial ad when a 
verbal attended task is used . . .and a placement effect on a verbal ad, but 
not a pictorial ad, when a visual attended task is used . . . suggests that 
attended stimuli may influence the processing of unattended stimuli.”  
 
Furthermore, an interaction between the attended and non-attended material, and indeed 
different peripheral stimuli, in the IE paradigm has since been empirically demonstrated 
by Janiszewski (1993). Given this, it is possible (and even probable) that the peripheral 
or incidental exposure effect reflects the outcome of implicit associative priming during 
exposure, and thus the phenomenon of classical conditioning. This is distinct from the 
simple, repetitive, unreinforced priming of the target stimulus alone that characterises 
the MEE (see Baker, 1999). On the same basis, the simultaneous peripheral processing 
of each aspect of complex advertisements (e.g. logos, pictures, verbal claims, etc.) might 
be expected to contribute to affective response towards the target brand name. In 
conclusion, therefore, whilst the findings of Janiszewski (1993), Shapiro (1999) and 
Fang (2007) clearly demonstrate the influence of incidental exposure (that may indeed 
incorporate the MEE) it is important to acknowledge the potential confounding 
influence of implicit associative priming in this paradigm. As such, an important 
contribution of future research into the marketing-based MEE may be to validate these 
findings within the specific confines of the mere exposure paradigm. 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion to the critical review in this chapter, therefore, it should be noted that the 
body of marketing research undertaken within the strict parameters of the mere exposure 
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paradigm is relatively small and subject to a number of theoretical and methodological 
limitations. In some cases, these limitations may be seen to undermine the original aims 
of the research; a problem that is particularly true of those studies that ostensibly seek to 
test competing theoretical explanations of the MEE. Nonetheless, the work reviewed in 
this chapter gives rise (albeit often inadvertently) to some potentially important findings 
regarding the effects of supraliminal mere exposure in the presence and absence of 
recognition. The majority of these findings, it has been observed, relate to the former; 
supporting evidence for which is provided by Anand et al. (1988), Baker (1999) and 
Vanhuele (1995). In addition, Baker (1999) identifies the conditions under which this 
specific form of the effect might be expected to be most influential in the consumption 
environment, whilst Vanhuele (1995) makes a contribution to explaining the potential 
role of familiarity (albeit questionable in the light of current theories of the MEE). 
Whilst evidence of the MEE in the absence of recognition is surprisingly not found by 
Anand et al. (1988), it is proffered by Lee (1994). Importantly, however, this later work 
is also one of the very few studies to demonstrate a reverse non-conscious MEE in 
adults, and to provide a clear indication that the direction of the non-conscious MEE 
may be stimulus-specific. Given the inadvertent nature of many of these findings, 
however, and significant methodological limitations (e.g. very small samples, the use of 
non-marketing stimuli, and long, attentive and elaborative exposure phases), and the 
rarity with which effect size data is reported, it may be premature to draw conclusions 
with regard to the marketing-based MEE on the basis of these studies alone.  
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In the absence of robust, unequivocal, domain-specific findings as to the occurrence, 
size, direction and nature of the MEE in the presence and absence of objective 
recognition and a subjective sense of recollection, therefore, it may be argued that clear 
evidence for the propositions identified in chapter 2 (see page 62) remains elusive in the 
marketing literature. As a result the role, relevance and efficacy of the MEE in 
marketing theory and practice remains unclear. In response, and with a view to 
establishing a strong foundation on which to facilitate the exploration, application, 
measurement and control of this phenomenon in marketing theory and practice, the 
primary purpose of the empirical work in this thesis is to provide a robust examination 
of the MEE in relation to typical marketing stimuli; and in particular to test each of the 
propositions stated in chapter 2 (see page 62). To this end, critical aspects of 
methodology and research design are discussed in detail during the next part of this 
thesis, prior to the presentation and discussion of results in part III. 
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Part II 
Research Objectives and Methodology 
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Chapter 5 
 
Research objectives, methodology and design 
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5.1. Introduction 
 
During the first part of this thesis a number of propositions were developed (page 62) 
that, it is argued, reflect the fundamental basis of current psychological understanding of 
the mere exposure effect (MEE). Following a broad discussion of how this phenomenon 
has been, could be and should be conceptualised in marketing theory (chapter 3), a 
detailed critical review of previous empirical research in this domain was then 
undertaken. In conclusion, it was argued that marketing-specific empirical evidence for 
the propositions identified in chapter 2 is currently compromised by significant 
theoretical and methodological limitations, and characterised by somewhat equivocal 
results across what remains a relatively small stream of the marketing literature. In light 
of this, it was explained that the overarching aim of this thesis is to test these 
propositions in a marketing context, and thus to provide a robust, first-principles 
extension of previous psychological research in this domain. Specifically, this involves 
the design and execution of a study of the MEE in relation to typical marketing stimuli 
and brand-related evaluation that is closely aligned (both theoretically and 
methodologically) to the extant psychology literature. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the research objectives, methodological 
approach and experimental design for the empirical work in this thesis. In this respect, 
the chapter begins with a brief overview of the research paradigm within which the 
study will be developed. This is then followed by a recap of the propositions distilled 
from the psychology literature that, if validated in a marketing context, would provide a 
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foundation for the theoretical conceptualisation, further exploration and practical 
application of the MEE in this domain. To this end, and in relation to the selected 
stimuli and measurement techniques, these are translated into a number of hypotheses; 
the testing of which constitutes the primary objective of the empirical work in this 
thesis. Having established the aims and objectives of the study, the remainder of the 
chapter is then given over to a comprehensive explanation of the experimental design - 
including sampling, stimuli and procedure (see figure 5.1); with critical issues regarding 
the latter considered further in chapter 6. 
 
Figure 5.1: Structure of chapter 5 
 
 
 
5.2. Research Paradigm 
1. Introduction 
2. Research paradigm 
 
4. Experimental design 
5. Conclusion 
3. Research aims & objectives 
 
• Sampling 
• Stimuli 
• Apparatus & materials 
• Procedure 
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During the course of this thesis, the MEE has been conceptualised as a non-conscious 
processing effect. Specifically, it was noted in chapter 2 (section 2.3.2.2, page 45) that, 
in the absence of a generic theory of mere exposure, the influential misattribution 
theories of mere exposure are underpinned by common assumptions as to the nature of 
the mental processes that underpin this phenomenon; namely, the creation and influence 
of implicit (i.e. subconscious) memory. In this sense, whilst the ultimate behavioural and 
attitudinal outcomes of the MEE are consciously experienced (e.g. affective response), 
the actual effects of mere exposure (i.e. the creation and misattribution of implicit 
processing fluency) occur subconsciously.  
 
On this basis, therefore, mere exposure research has evolved within the positivist 
tradition; assuming, as it does, that the MEE constitutes a lawful generalisation of 
human behaviour that is underpinned by the common processes of non-conscious 
processing (see Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004).  By definition, therefore, 
participants cannot be expected to reflect and report upon their experiences of this 
phenomenon, as may be required in qualitative research that is conducted within a 
phenomenological paradigm. That is not to say that such an approach does not have a 
place in mere exposure research; indeed, it might be particularly appropriate in studies 
that seek to challenge certain assumptions about the relevance of the MEE in a 
marketing context. For example, whilst it is assumed that the sheer volume and ubiquity 
of marketing communications means that most of it receives little or no attention and 
elaborative processing (see chapter 1, page 4), qualitative research might usefully be 
employed to explore the ways in which this might differ between consumers, products, 
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brands, media, etc. In this way, it may shed light on the particular circumstances in 
which the MEE might be expected to have the greatest impact on consumer decision-
making.  
 
However, given that this study specifically endeavours to test existing psychological 
theory (and thus extend previous psychological research) in a marketing context, and 
that participants may be expected to be unaware of the processes that are under 
investigation, the continued adoption of a positivist perspective remains appropriate. 
Furthermore, the extension of marketing-based mere exposure research within this 
tradition is important to facilitate direct comparison with previous work and meaningful 
dialogue with other researchers in the field. To this end, therefore, the thesis draws on 
existing psychological theory to develop a number of propositions regarding the 
existence, size, direction and nature of the marketing-based MEE. These are then 
translated into specific hypotheses for testing by way of experimentation; as will be 
explained below. 
 
5.3. Research Aims and Objectives 
 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the overarching aim of the empirical work in 
this thesis is to test the three fundamental propositions distilled from the literature 
review in chapter 2 and, in doing so, to provide a robust examination of the occurrence, 
nature, size and direction of the MEE in a marketing context.  To this end, the 
propositions are transformed into specific hypotheses that reflect the precise nature of 
the dependent variable, the conditions under which it will be studied and the means by 
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which it will be measured in this study; as illustrated in table 5.1 (below). The key 
aspects of experimental design that are inherent in these statements of hypothesis will be 
discussed in detail during both this and the following chapter.  
 
At this stage, however, it is important to reiterate that the marketing stimuli selected for 
use in this study are invented brand names (as previously noted in chapter 2, page 62, 
and indicated in the hypotheses below); the rationale for which will be discussed in 
section 5.4.2 (page 189). Furthermore, and in light of the possibility that the MEE may 
be influenced by the relative complexity of the stimuli in question (Bornstein, 1989), 
these are limited to simple, single-word brand names. However, it was previously 
acknowledged that marketing cues of this type may take the form of either real words 
(e.g. ‘Virgin’) or pseudo-words (i.e. pronounceable non-words, like ‘Persil’); and that 
this is a potentially important distinction in light of meta-analytic indications that 
meaningful words may produce larger experimental exposure effects than nonsense 
words (Bornstein, 1989; see chapter 2, page 25). In order to enhance both internal and 
ecological validity, therefore, an even number of each type of brand name was selected 
for use in this study. This not only facilitates the identification of word-type as a 
moderating influence in the testing of the three fundamental propositions, but effectively 
constitutes an additional contribution to the marketing literature in its own right; 
namely, the relative degree to which real-word and pseudo-word brand names might be 
expected to produce mere exposure effects. To this end, the relevance and necessity of a 
fourth additional proposition (P4) was acknowledged in chapter 2 (page 62); as 
illustrated in table 5.1., alongside the specific hypotheses by which it will be tested. 
Table 5.1: Primary propositions and related hypotheses for empirical testing 
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Propositions Related Hypotheses 
P1: Mere exposure* to a marketing 
stimulus will influence affective 
response to that stimulus when it  is 
subsequently encountered 
 
H1a. Following supraliminal mere exposure, the mean 
target preference rate for target brand names will be 
significantly higher than that which may be expected to 
occur by chance; or 
 
H1b. Following supraliminal mere exposure, the mean 
target preference rate for target brand names will be 
significantly lower than that which may be expected to 
occur by chance 
 
P2: The size of the marketing-based 
mere exposure effect will be 
hindered by the presence of accurate 
recognition memory for marketing 
stimulus exposure 
 
H2. Following supraliminal mere exposure, the degree to 
which the mean preference selection rate for target brand 
names differs from chance will be significantly lower in 
the presence of stimulus recognition than in the absence 
of this 
 
P3: The size of the marketing-based 
mere exposure effect will be 
hindered by a subjective sense of 
confident, contextualized 
recollection for prior exposure to the 
marketing stimulus; regardless of 
recognition accuracy 
 
H3a. Following supraliminal mere exposure, the degree 
to which the mean target preference rate differs from 
chance will be significantly lower when accurate 
recognition judgments are accompanied by high levels of 
confidence (i.e. certain/sure) than when they are not (i.e. 
unsure/guess); and 
 
H3b. Following supraliminal mere exposure, the degree 
to which the mean non-target preference rate differs 
from chance will be significantly lower when inaccurate 
recognition judgments are accompanied by high levels of 
false confidence (i.e. certain/sure) than when they are 
not (i.e. unsure/guess). 
 
P4: The marketing-based mere 
exposure effect will be significantly 
larger for real-word brand names 
than it will for pseudo-word brand 
names 
 
H4. Under conditions of supraliminal mere exposure, the 
degree to which the mean target preference rate differs 
from chance will be significantly larger for real-word 
brand names than pseudo-word brand names 
 
H5a. In the presence of stimulus recognition, the degree 
to which the mean target preference rate is higher than 
chance will be significantly larger for real-word brand 
names than pseudo-word brand names; and 
 
H5b. In the absence of stimulus recognition, the degree 
to which the mean target preference rate is lower than 
chance will be significantly larger for real-word brand 
names than pseudo-word brand names 
 
*The operational definition of mere exposure in this study is brief, repeated exposure to a 
stimulus in isolation at a level that is just perceptible (see chapter 2, page 66) 
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The development of each of the hypotheses in table 5.1 will be explained further during 
chapter 7, following a detailed discussion of the aspects of research design on which 
they are founded in this part of the thesis (i.e. the specific nature of the dependent and 
independent variables and the means by which the former will be measured). At this 
stage, however, it is perhaps useful to note that H1a/H1b constitute competing 
hypotheses to test the direction of the MEE in this study (should it be found to occur at 
all). By contrast H3a/H3b and H5a/H5b constitute complimentary hypotheses; reflecting 
the unfolding nature of the analytical process and, specifically, previous indications that 
the direction of MEE may differ in the presence and absence of recognition (as will be 
explained in chapter 7). 
 
Further to the testing of the above propositions (by way of the accompanying 
hypotheses), additional analysis will be undertaken to rule out alternative explanations 
on the basis of task order and, if sample size permits, the inherent characteristics of the 
stimuli at test (i.e. fluency effects that are not exposure-induced; see Whittlesea, 1993). 
As will be explained in chapter 6 (page 287), the former relates to the possible influence 
of affective modulation bias (Phaf and Rotteveel, 2005); i.e. an increase in the likelihood 
of perceived recognition as a result of previously stated preference for the stimulus. It 
may therefore be identified by a between-group comparison of recognition rates in the 
experimental and control conditions; whereby the only difference is that control 
participants are not required to make an intervening preference judgment in relation to 
the same stimuli that then appear in the recognition task (see chapter 6, page 289-290). 
With regard to the second alternative explanation, and whilst the experiment is carefully 
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designed to minimise both the influence of inherent fluency effects and subliminal 
perception in the exposure phase (as will be explained in chapter 6), it is accepted that 
the latter is likely to occur (to a small extent) as a result of individual differences in 
perceptual ability. As a by-product, however, it is also acknowledged that, should a 
sufficient number of participants experience the exposure phase subliminally, this may 
provide an additional opportunity to check that the observed effects are linked to the 
exposure phase. In this respect, and on the basis of the discussion in chapter 2 (page 29), 
it might be expected that a relevant change in the nature of the exposure phase (i.e. 
subliminal rather than supraliminal perception) will lead to a change (i.e. increase) in the 
size of the preference bias (Bornstein, 1989; Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992). The 
hypotheses for testing with regard to both of these alternative explanations are therefore 
summarised in table 5.2 below. 
 
Table 5.2: Additional propositions and related hypotheses for empirical testing 
 
Possible alternative explanation Further hypotheses 
Inherent fluency effects  
(i.e. false familiarity effect) 
H6. In the absence of stimulus recognition, the 
size of the non-target preference bias will be 
significantly larger under conditions of 
subliminal versus supraliminal perception 
during exposure 
 
Task order  
(i.e. affective modulation bias) 
 
H7. Recognition rates for the target and non-
target stimuli will differ significantly between 
the control and experimental groups. 
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In light of the stated research objectives of the study (i.e. testing the hypotheses stated in 
this section), therefore, the remainder of this chapter endeavours to provide a detailed 
explanation of the experimental design by which they will be addressed; structured 
around the three core elements of sampling, stimulus selection and experimental 
procedure.  
 
5.4. Experimental Design 
 
The key aspects of experimental design are discussed in detail during both this and the 
following chapter. At this point, however, and by way of an overview, it is perhaps 
important to highlight a number of steps that were taken to address some of the 
methodological issues associated with previous market research that relates to the MEE 
(see chapter 4, page 159). In this respect, the key areas in which methodological 
improvements were sought may be summarised as follows:  
• Sample size – a significant increase in sample size was designed to enhance the 
relative reliability of this study 
• Experimental procedure – close control and measurement of the nature and 
extent of exposure were employed to ensure the necessary conditions for the 
MEE in this study (i.e. supraliminal perception and the subsequent 
presence/absence of stimulus recognition and recollection).  
• Analytical approach – a far more detailed categorical approach than mean 
selection rates on forced-choice tests is employed; an approach that was adopted 
in original studies of the MEE but is subject to significant limitations (as will be 
discussed in chapter 6, page 238). 
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During this part of the thesis, each of these factors will be discussed as part of a 
comprehensive explanation of the methodological approach. To this end, an overview of 
the experimental design is first provided in this chapter; beginning with sampling and 
moving on to incorporate the stimuli, materials, apparatus, procedure and measurement 
techniques. The key issues and considerations that are relevant to each of these areas 
will then be discussed in more detail during chapter 6. 
 
5.4.1. Sampling 
 
It is evident from the discussion in previous chapters that prior studies of implicit 
priming and the MEE, whether in psychology or marketing research, exhibit two 
common traits; relatively small groups of participants in each experimental condition 
and the use of student samples (see chapter 4, page 159). During the course of this 
section both the nature of the sample and the process by which it was drawn will be 
explained in detail. Prior to this, however, the section begins with a discussion of sample 
size. 
 
5.4.1.1. The size of the sample 
 
Whilst small samples (n<30) are extremely common in experimental psychology, they 
are not necessarily the norm in the wider marketing literature. Indeed, research in this 
domain is often characterized by significantly larger sample sizes; a response perhaps to 
the demands of practitioners for extremely high levels of reliability (see Baker, 2002). 
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With this in mind, and specifically concerns regarding the reliability of indirect tests of 
implicit memory via performance changes (Buchner and Brandt, 2003), this study 
utilizes a relatively large sample (n=240) in comparison to previous marketing research 
in this field (see chapter 4, page 159). Furthermore, it is divided into just two conditions; 
giving rise to an n of 160 in the main experiment and 80 in the recognition control 
group. In the context of mere exposure research, the former therefore represents the 
largest sample in a single experimental condition to date. 
 
In determining the specific sample size, primary consideration was given to the nature 
and power of the planned statistical tests, the anticipated effect size and the degree of 
confidence required (95%). To this end, a software package called GPower 3.0 was used 
to provide an indication of the sample size necessary to reveal the presence of the MEE, 
given the average effect size indicated by Bornstein (1989; see chapter 2, page 23). In 
addition, however, practical considerations also contributed to the decision regarding 
sample size. In this respect, two computer suites were secured for the duration of the 
experiment that, taken together, held a capacity of 120 participants. During the data 
collection period it was possible to run the entire experiment twice and thus include a 
total of 240 participants within these resource constraints. As this number exceeded that 
indicated by the GPower 3.0 calculations, it was deemed to be both sufficient and 
practical in the context of this study. However, perhaps a more contentious issue with 
respect to sampling is the use of student participants in mere exposure research. The 
debate in this regard, and its implications for research design in the current study, are 
therefore discussed below. 
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5.4.1.2. The selection of a student sample 
 
The use of student participants potentially confers practical and methodological benefits 
in the form of accessibility, convenience, location, control, compliance and access to 
resources (Bello et al. 2009; Bergmann and Grahn, 1997; Dasgupta and Hunsinger, 
2008). As a result, it may facilitate the generation of relatively large samples, the 
efficient use of time and resources and lower rates of non-response or drop-out. 
Furthermore, the relative homogeneity of this group (Peterson, 2001) facilitates the 
identification (via pretesting) of research stimuli, contexts, questions and tasks that may 
be considered to be broadly relevant and meaningful by all participants. For all of these 
reasons student samples have traditionally been adopted in psychological 
experimentation and are increasingly used in consumer research (see Peterson, 2001; 
Fuchs et al., 2009).  
 
However, this trend has developed against a backdrop of theoretical concern and 
criticism regarding the external validity of student samples. Broadly, these revolve 
around the proposition that students represent a distinct, homogenous group that is not 
necessarily representative of the wider population (Dill, 1964; Lamb and Stern, 1979; 
Rubenstein, 1982; Schultz 1969). Specifically, it has been suggested that students are 
likely to be relatively young and thus possess a lesser degree of life experience (see 
Dasgupta and Hunsinger, 2008; Sears, 1986). As a result, it is claimed that students are 
likely to exhibit less-crystallized attitudes, a weaker sense of self and a greater 
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propensity for attitude and behaviour change (Hoge et al., 1993; Perry, 1999; Sears, 
1986). Furthermore, Henry (2008) proposes that, in addition to the potential for intrinsic 
differences in student and non-student samples, the university environment may also 
constitute a cultural constraint. On the assumption that such factors may distort the 
beliefs, attitudes and behaviour of students relative to those of the wider population, and 
that the former represents a distinct and homogenous group, the generalisability of the 
results they produce has therefore been theoretically challenged.  
 
Whilst it is important to acknowledge the arguments for and against the use of student 
samples in research, however, it is perhaps also important to stress that there is as yet 
little consistent evidence for either. In the realms of marketing resarch, for example, 
empirical evidence of differences in student versus non-student samples (e.g. Park and 
Lessig, 1977; Soley and Reid, 1983) is challenged by studies that have found these 
differences to be negligible (e.g. Bergmann and Grahn, 1997; Brown and Brown, 1993; 
Sheth, 1970). As Peterson (2001: 453) observes: 
“Despite the enduring and oftentimes vitriolic nature of the debate over the 
use of college students as research subjects, relatively little empirical 
evidence exists to inform or buttress the various positions proffered . . . the 
empirical evidence that does exist is typically ad hoc and inconsistent, does 
not lend itself to meaningful generalization, and is inconclusive at best.” 
 
Furthermore, the argument against the use of student samples in academic research has 
been subject to significant challenges on theoretical grounds. In this respect, the defence 
of student sampling may be distilled into three key themes: 
1. Non-student samples are not necessarily representative of the target population 
2. Student samples are not necessarily homogenous 
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3. Homogenous student samples are beneficial to theory testing and development 
 
With regard to the first of these, Sears (2008) highlights the fact that telephone surveys 
of the general US population tend to under-represent less-educated ‘Whites’ to illustrate 
his assertion that most samples are in fact unrepresentative (see also Basil, 1996). 
Secondly, James and Sonner (2001) draw attention to radical changes in the profile of 
undergraduate students in recent decades and present evidence against the assumption 
that this is, in fact, an homogenous group. Even if this assumption is maintained, 
however, a strong case has been made that such homogeneity is in fact beneficial to the 
testing of theoretical propositions.  In line with the claims of Calder et al. (1981), Brown 
and Stayman (1992) and Henry (2008), Malhotra and King (2003: 43) argue that: 
“Many researchers assume that having a random sample from the 
population of interest provides a stronger test of theory than having a 
student sample. In fact, the use of an homogenous sample often decreases 
error variance and provides a stronger test of theory. Selecting homogenous 
samples can better control random sources of error.” 
 
Moreover, it should be noted that the ‘wider population’ is, in fact, the product of 
myriad groupings, each of which is both important and homogenous in its own right (see 
Oakes, 1972). In the field of organizational psychology, for example, Greenberg (1987: 
158) argues that: 
“any research population is atypical. Just as the results of studies using 
student subjects may not be generalizable to the greater population of 
working people, so may the results of studies using narrowly defined 
groups of workers be similarly limited.” 
 
On this basis, therefore, it has been proposed that, whilst student samples may not 
necessarily be the most effective means of providing specific, immediately applicable 
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parameter estimates for the broader population, they may be highly appropriate in the 
testing, evolution and generation of theory (Bello et al., 2009; Calder et al., 1981; 
Greenberg, 1987). In such cases, representative samples may be sacrificed in pursuit of 
the high degree of internal validity that is critical to this process (Cook and Campbell, 
1979; Berkowitz and Donnerstein, 1982). Furthermore, it is argued that the testing and 
development of theory across a wide range of homogenous groups may provide a more 
effective means of assessing the breadth of its validity and applicability - and identifying 
specific boundary conditions - than the study of a single, heterogenous sample (Tunnell, 
1977; Bass and Firestone, 1980; Dasgupta and Hunsinger, 2008; Greenberg, 1987; 
Henry, 2008). Whilst the latter might be considered to be generally representative, the 
extent to which each of the important homogenous groupings that make-up the wider 
population are actually represented is often extremely limited and at the mercy of 
chance. With this in mind, Greenberg (1987: 157) concludes that: 
“it is not the purpose of any one study using college students to explain all 
that may be going on . . . Rather, such research may prove to be a valuable 
source of insight into some of the psychological processes operating 
therein.” 
 
This point is pertinent to the empirical work in this thesis, and in line with the earlier 
conclusion of Lamb and Stem (1979). Following a review of the somewhat equivocal 
empirical results regarding differences between student and non-student responses, these 
authors concluded that, whilst student samples might not necessarily provide a valid 
means of studying the beliefs, opinions and interests of a population, they may be 
considered appropriate to the investigation of widely shared psychological processes; 
such as memory, decision-making and information processing. On a broader note, and in 
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light of the discussion above, there appears to be a good degree of consensus that, whilst 
student samples should be used with caution and restraint, they may be considered 
useful, valid and appropriate whenever there are clear theoretical grounds to assume 
they will not significantly distort the outcome (Basil, 1996; Bello et al., 2009; Henry, 
2008).  
 
With regard to the current study, therefore, a student sample may be considered to be 
appropriate for four reasons. Firstly, it relates to the study of psychological processes 
(i.e. implicit memory and information processing); an endeavour for which student 
sampling has been deemed to be relatively appropriate (Lamb and Stem, 1979). 
Secondly, the non-conscious psychological processes that are under investigation are 
not, by definition, subject to conscious, elaborative thought, nor are they shaped by 
reflection and mindful reasoning. Furthermore, there is no evidence to indicate that the 
extent and nature of implicit processing is significantly different amongst individuals 
and groups in the general population (see Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004). Thirdly, 
this study is concerned with the testing of theoretical propositions and, as such, may be 
considered to benefit from the enhanced internal validity of a relatively homogenous 
sample (Greenberg, 1987; Malhotra and King, 2003; Henry, 2008). Finally, a student 
sample may even be considered necessary in light of the fact that the study endeavours 
to test the extent to which previous psychological findings are replicated in relation to 
typical marketing stimuli, and thus to clarify the somewhat limited and equivocal 
evidence in the extant marketing literature. Given that mere exposure research in both 
disciplines is almost universally characterised by the use of student samples, and on the 
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assumption that these participants constitute a distinct, homogenous group, changes to 
this aspect of experimental design may confound conclusions in this respect. 
Specifically, it may be impossible to determine whether differences in the existence, 
size, direction and nature of the effects observed in the current study are the product of 
changes to the stimulus type, context of evaluation or sample profile. That is not to say 
that the extension of mere exposure research to marketing should not include subsequent 
comparisons between different types of consumers (as will be discussed in chapter 9); 
rather that, in this particular investigation, the comparability of results with those of 
previous psychological studies requires the adoption of a similar (homogenous) sample. 
For these reasons, the use of students was considered to be not only appropriate and of 
practical (and potentially theoretical) benefit, but also necessary for the empirical work 
in this thesis.  
 
5.4.1.3. The sampling process 
 
The sample frame for this study was provided by a 2-hour lecture at Hull University 
Business School that was attended by 271 undergraduate students. The experiment ran 
twice during the period of the lecture, with the experimental and control groups 
represented equally on a pro rata basis in each session. As such, two groups of 80 
participants completed the main experiment, whilst two groups of 40 participants 
completed the control version of this. Each group was spread across two computer 
suites; these were used simultaneously and accommodated 80 and 40 participants 
respectively. During each session, therefore, the two conditions were represented 
  188 
equally (n=20) in the smaller of the two rooms, whilst the experimental condition 
accounted for 60 of the 80 participants in the larger room. The 31 students in the sample 
frame who were randomly omitted from the study were taken to an overspill room for a 
non-participative demonstration of the experiment. Whilst not engaged in the 
experiment, each group attended a short guest lecture by a visiting academic on an 
unrelated topic. On completion of both data collection sessions, a full debrief was 
provided with the opportunity for questions and further discussion. 
 
The number of students attending the lecture was calculated on entry. For the 
experimental condition 160 cards were produced, each containing the reference number 
of a specific computer and data collection session. Similarly, 80 cards were produced 
containing the same information for those in the control group. All of these cards were 
shuffled together with 31 blank cards (to reflect the fact that 31 of the 271 students 
present would not be included in either group), split between four research assistants and 
distributed randomly across the sample frame. In this way, participants were randomly 
selected for inclusion in the experiment and allocated to one of the two conditions. 
 
All of the participants were asked to sign a consent form prior to the start of the 
experiment, and were given the opportunity to refrain from participating if they wished. 
They were also informed that they could withdraw at any point by raising their hand and 
requesting to do so. Those who chose not to complete the experiment would join the 
overspill group and be given a non-participative demonstration. None of the participants 
chose to withdraw from the study although one was unable to take part on medical 
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grounds (it was explained at the beginning of each session that the experiment contains 
flashing images and is not suitable for those with epilepsy). This participant was taken 
to a different room where she was provided with a modified demonstration of the 
experiment. 
 
5.4.2. Stimuli 
 
It was acknowledged in chapter 2 (page 26) that one of the main reasons for replicating 
scientific studies in the consumer domain is that there is a need to extend psychological 
findings in relation to abstract stimuli to those that are typically used in marketing 
communication. In this respect, it is observed that previous marketing-based studies of 
fluency effects, and in particular those related to the MEE, have utilised products (e.g. 
Shapiro, 1999), brand names (e.g. Janiszewski, 1993; Chung and Szymanski (1997) and 
brand logos (e.g. Vanhuele, 1995). Of these, brand names not only constitute the central 
and most important brand asset (Kohli, 1997), but are also likely to produce a stronger 
MEE than abstract and animated logos under experimental conditions (Bornstein, 1989). 
For these reasons, brand names were selected for use in this study. In order to minimise 
the influence of previous exposure, experience and attitudes, and thus isolate the 
influence of the exposure phase in this experiment, these brand names were invented 
and pretested for prior associations with existing product categories; detailed discussion 
of which will be provided in section 5.4.2.2 (page 194).  
 
Prior this, however, it should be noted that it was also deemed important to define the 
product categories to which brand names would be related during this research. In order 
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to make the task of choosing preferred brand names meaningful to participants, it is 
necessary to place this in the context of specific products. For example, the question 
‘which brand name do you prefer?’ is not meaningful unless participants are provided 
with a product category in which to evaluate the stimuli. The question might therefore 
be phrased, ‘The following names have been proposed for a new brand of [PRODUCT]. 
Which of the two brand names do you like the most?’ Thus, whilst the product category 
does not in itself constitute the target stimulus type in this experiment, initial pretesting 
and selection of this was important to provide an appropriate context for preference 
judgments during the experiment. Prior to a discussion of the creation and selection of 
specific brand names for use in this study, therefore, a brief explanation of product 
category selection is provided below. 
 
5.4.2.1. Product categories: Pretesting and selection 
 
Prior experimental research into the effects of priming on consumer attitudes has 
stressed the importance of using brand and product stimuli in categories that are relevant 
and appropriate to the target population (e.g. Chung and Szymanski, 1997; Shapiro, 
1999). This is an important factor in enhancing the ecological validity of experimental 
results, and in developing tasks that are meaningful to participants. With this in mind, 
and in light of the fact that participants would be required to evaluate a number of 
different brand name pairs in the test phase (as will be explained in section 5.4.4, page 
211), initial consideration was given to the number of product categories that would be 
both necessary and appropriate. Three main alternatives were considered in this respect: 
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1. The use of a different product category for each trial1 (i.e. brand name choice) 
2. The use of the same product category for all of the trials 
3. A compromise between these approaches, whereby a small range of categories 
might be used with participants required to make multiple brand name choices in 
relation to each product type. 
 
As a context in which to consider these options it is important to acknowledge that 
maximising the number of trials provides a means by which to enhance the reliability of 
indirect tests of implicit memory effects (see Buchner and Brandt, 2003). With this in 
mind, the first consideration in this respect is that it is extremely difficult to generate 
numerous different product categories with a high degree of equivalence in relation to 
each of the selection criteria (see below). Similarly, in relation to the second option, it is 
also difficult to generate dozens of brand names that are considered to be equally 
appropriate for a single product category. Furthermore, this second scenario is more 
likely to lead to boredom, fatigue and a risk that the requirement to make the same 
decision in the same product category, over and over again, would be perceived as 
meaningless. The third option was therefore deemed to be the most appropriate for this 
study. Specifically, four product categories were used, with participants expected to 
make a small number of paired-choices in each context (as will be discussed in the 
following section, participants were ultimately required to make three brand name 
choices in relation to each of the four product types). The rationale for this was to 
facilitate comparability in appropriateness between each brand name, enable the 
                                                 
1
 It may be useful to clarify at this point that the brand names in this study are often referred to as ‘items’ 
from this point on, whilst the 12 paired-choices in each task of the test phase are referred to as ‘trials’ 
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selection of equivalent product categories on key criteria and minimise the influence of 
boredom and fatigue (Bornstein et al., 1990). Regarding this latter issue, the brand 
choice-pairs were presented in different, random orders during the two test phase tasks 
to further reduce the risk of boredom effects. Having identified the number of categories 
that would be required, specific product types were selected on the basis that they met 
three criteria; a) familiar to the target population, b) purchased frequently/regularly by 
the target population, and c) relatively inexpensive (the purpose of this criterion being to 
reduce perceptions of irrevocability and financial risk and thus the extent of actor 
involvement during the test phase; see chapter 6, page 291). 
 
In order to operationalise these criteria in the selection of the four product categories, 
the following steps were taken. Firstly, an audit was completed of the products available 
in the Student Union shop on the main campus of Hull University. As this store is 
specifically designed to serve the daily needs of students, it was deemed to provide an 
appropriate frame from which to develop a list of potential product categories. As a 
result, 20 categories were selected for further pretesting on the basis that they might 
reasonably be expected to be well-known, purchased regularly and not usually subject to 
high levels of actor involvement. Pretesting of these products was undertaken by way of 
a survey of 35 undergraduate students (who did not did not then take part in the main 
experiment) to evaluate the frequency of purchase. This survey was conducted at the 
beginning of two second-year undergraduate seminars and followed by an explanation 
of what the data would be used for and an invitation for feedback from participants in 
this respect. On this basis, eight products were identified as being purchased by over 
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90% of the sample with an average frequency of at least once per month; soft drinks, 
crisps, chocolate bars, biscuits (packets), breakfast cereal, yoghurt, toilet rolls, shampoo. 
 
At this point, however, it was noted that the first four products in the list above could all 
be regarded as similar in the sense that they are all types of confectionary. In order to 
provide clear distinction in the nature of the selected products, and thus to investigate 
the MEE in relation to a broader range of categories, only one of these was selected 
(randomly) for inclusion in the main experiment. Furthermore, participant feedback 
indicated that, whilst toilet rolls might be purchased frequently by second-year 
undergraduates (most of whom lived in rented houses) this might not be the case for 
first-year undergraduates (most of whom lived in serviced halls of residence). With this 
in mind, the category of toilet rolls was also excluded at this point and  four products 
were selected on the basis that they represented a broad range of relevant, familiar, 
inexpensive consumer goods that were likely to be purchased frequently by participants 
in the main experiment; these were chocolate bars, breakfast cereal, yoghurt and 
shampoo. 
 
Having established the product context in which brand stimuli would be positioned, 
therefore, the next phase of stimulus pretesting and selection concerned the specific 
nature of the brand names that participants would be exposed to (and required to 
evaluate) during the experiment. This is a critical element of experimental design in this 
study and is thus discussed fully in the following subsection. 
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5.4.2.2. Brand Names: Pretesting and Selection 
 
As discussed in chapter 2 (page 57) one of the current theoretical challenges to mere 
exposure research is that, whilst the observed affect-bias may indeed be due to relative 
ease of processing for the stimulus in question, this fluency may not necessarily be the 
outcome of previous exposure. It could arise, for example, simply as a result of the 
inherent characteristics of the stimuli between which participants are required to 
discriminate (see Whittlesea, 1993). In order to minimise this possibility in the current 
study, pretesting was undertaken to ensure each pair of stimuli in the forced-choice tests 
of preference and recognition (see section 5.4.4.3, page 216) consisted of brand names 
that were equivalent in terms of their inherent ‘likability’. Furthermore, in order to 
ensure a degree of ecological validity, whilst minimising the impact of influences 
outside the experiment, all brand names were pretested for appropriateness regarding 
the product category and the absence of common pre-existing associations with real-
world products.  
 
At this point, however, it is important to acknowledge that each target brand name 
selected for use in this experiment was not only paired with a ‘filler’ brand name during 
the forced choice tests of preference and recognition, but was also accompanied by a 
‘distractor’ brand name during the exposure phase; a mechanism that was used to reduce 
the extent to which target stimuli were actively processed, encoded and thus retrieved 
during the experiment (as will be explained in chapter 6, page 251). As such, rather than 
simply developing equivalent choice pairs (i.e. the exposed target and non-exposed filler 
brand name for each trial in the test phase), pretesting was undertaken with the aim of 
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creating triads of brand names that were considered equally likable and appropriate for 
the product category. This approach was selected as it facilitates a further means by 
which to minimise the possibility of systematic preference bias due to the inherent 
characteristics of a particular stimulus; namely, the counterbalancing of target and 
distractor stimuli across the sample. In this respect, of the two brand names in each triad 
that were presented during the exposure sequences, one was then presented as the target 
stimulus (alongside a ‘filler’ brand name) in the test phase for half the sample, whilst the 
other was presented as the target stimulus (alongside the same filler) for the other half. 
A comparative analysis of the results for targets A and B respectively was then 
undertaken; the results of which are not indicative of a systematic bias arising from the 
characteristics of a particular stimulus (see appendix III, page 483). To clarify, therefore, 
a series of brand triads were developed for inclusion in the main experiment via a 
process of extensive pretesting. Each triad consisted of a target stimulus, a distractor (for 
use in the exposure phase), and a filler (or non-target) stimulus that would provide an 
alternative to the target brand name in forced-choice tests of preference and recognition 
(see section 5.4.4, page 211). All three brand names in each triad were selected on the 
basis that they exhibited equivalent ratings on scales related to liking and 
appropriateness for the product category, prior to the experimental procedure. Finally, 
on the basis that brand names may constitute both real and pseudo-words, and that this 
factor might moderate the size of the MEE (see proposition 4 in table 5.1, page 176), 
half of the selected triads were composed of real-word brand names and the other half 
pseudo-word brand names; i.e. pronounceable non-words that could conceivably be real 
in the context of the language within which they are created, but are not part of the 
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lexicon. Whilst pseudo-word stimuli are commonly used in psychology research, it 
should perhaps be acknowledged at this point that the creation of global pseudo-words 
may be rendered extremely difficult, and perhaps even impossible, by the linguistic 
diversity of multinational samples. In this respect, it is possible that the ‘invented’ word 
inadvertently resembles one that is part of another language or dialect. However, the 
central issue is whether the word may be reasonably expected to be considered highly 
obscure and thus without a consistent or common meaning across the audience for 
which it is intended. In the context of this thesis, therefore, it is perhaps useful to 
operationally define the term ‘pseudo-word’ as; a pronounceable non-word that is not 
part of the English lexicon, may be reasonably expected to be considered highly obscure 
by the vast majority of the audience and is unlikely to convey a common meaning. 
 
The process of pretesting by which the final set of brand names was selected and 
grouped for use in the experiment will be outlined subsequently. Prior to this, however, 
it is perhaps important to discuss a key initial decision regarding the validity of 
experimental mere exposure research in a marketing context; namely, the trade-off 
between the use of real versus fictitious brands. In this respect, whilst the ecological 
validity of real brands is attractive, it is important to note that there is a high likelihood 
of previous experience and brand knowledge. As such, participants may harbour a 
preconceived set of brand associations that could significantly moderate exposure-
induced changes in affective response during the experiment. That is not to say that 
mere exposure effects cannot occur for established brands in the real-world 
environment. Rather it is to acknowledge that, for those stimuli to which participants 
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have a high degree of prior familiarity, a small number of additional exposures may be 
unlikely to have a significant influence on preference within the context of a single 
experiment (Shapiro, 1999). Furthermore, previous exposure may lead to attention 
switching, enhanced perception and thus greater ability to create explicit memory for the 
exposure phase (Greenwald and Leavitt, 1984); i.e. the outcomes of mere exposure 
outside of the experiment might confound the study of this phenomenon within it. Thus, 
whilst it is acknowledged that the use of real brand names would potentially confer 
higher levels of ecological validity, there is a significant likelihood that it would be 
gained at the expense of internal validity. In order to avoid the potentially confounding 
effects of previous exposure, therefore, real brand names would need to be wholly 
unfamiliar to participants. Given this, it could be argued that there is little point in using 
real brand names if they have to be so unfamiliar as to be altogether unrecognisable. As 
such, and in order to minimise the possibility of contamination by previous recognition 
and association, the proposed new brands referred to in this study are fictitious (although 
participants were led to believe otherwise; see chapter 6, page 291 for a discussion of 
the need for disguise in this respect). 
 
With this in mind, and as a first step in the selection of the brand stimuli in this study, 
two sets of 80 brand names were created. One of these lists contained only real-word 
brand names, whilst the other contained pseudo-word brand names. These lists were 
constructed using the real names (or fragments of these) adopted by small to medium-
sized US companies in different product categories to those selected for this experiment; 
and all were simple, single-word brand names. The latter criterion was applied in 
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recognition of the possibility that relative stimulus complexity may exert a mediating 
influence on the MEE in paired-choice judgments (Bornstein, 1989). Whilst the 
evidence for this is somewhat limited at present, it was considered prudent to control for 
it in the context of the current study. The frame from which these names were drawn 
was constructed by amalgamating the lexical aspects of published samples from three 
specialist logo-design companies in the USA. The rationale for this approach is that it 
provides a practical means by which to identify brand names that are: 
a) fictitious in the context of the product categories specified in this experiment; 
and 
b) unlikely to be recognised as existing brand names by participants; but 
c) ecologically valid in the sense that (although not recognised by participants) they 
have previously been selected as brand names by real-world companies. 
 
The two sets of brand names formed the basis for the first phase of pretesting with a 
focus group of 12 members of the target population (who did not subsequently take part 
in the main experiment). In this respect, each set of 80 brand names was divided into 
four equal subsets; relating to the four product categories selected for use in the 
experiment (see page 193). The subsets were formulated so that they all contained 20 
brand names that the researcher considered to be appropriate for the product category in 
question. During the first part of the focus group, participants were divided into four 
small groups of three. Each group was asked to select the 15 most appropriate real-word 
brand names for each product from the list of 20 provided (i.e. to exclude the 5 brand 
names they considered to be the least appropriate in each case). The process was then 
repeated with regard to pseudo-word brand names. The purpose of this reductive process 
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was to facilitate the removal of brand names that were considered entirely (or relatively) 
inappropriate by members of the group, without the need for redundant discussion as to 
which of these were the most inappropriate. For each product category, the lists of 15 
real-word brand names produced by each subgroup were then displayed and the group 
as a whole was asked to agree on a single list of 15 brand names for each product that, 
whilst they may not necessarily be regarded as the most appropriate, could nonetheless 
be considered to be appropriate for that category. The criteria for stimulus selection in 
this phase, therefore, was that each brand name could only be selected in the category in 
which it was initially presented and all selected brand names were not considered to be 
entirely inappropriate for the product category by any participant. This process was then 
repeated with regard to pseudo-word brand names. Via moderated discussion, 
advocation and negotiation, therefore, consensus was reached on a list of 15 real-word 
brand names and 15 pseudo-word brand names for each of the four product categories 
that were widely considered to be appropriate (or at least not inappropriate) for the 
product in question (see table 5.3).  
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Table 5.3: Brand names selected as appropriate for the product category during 
qualitative pretesting (in alphabetical order) 
 
 Chocolate Bars Breakfast Cereal Yoghurt Shampoo 
Real-word stimuli Affair 
Apollo 
Busker 
Esquire* 
Flame 
Hippo* 
Kiss* 
Legend 
Merlin* 
Power 
Rhino 
Rocky* 
Space 
Suave 
Wizard 
Advantage* 
Balance 
Connect 
Excel* 
Game* 
Harvest* 
Jump 
Mamas 
Munch 
Perform 
Physique  
Rapid 
Spark  
Team  
Wonder 
Angel* 
Barefoot 
Cube 
Faith* 
Fly 
Fresh  
Haven* 
Passion 
Perfect 
Polar 
Pure  
Sensation* 
Spirit 
Sun* 
Touch 
Clear 
Create 
Earth  
Elite 
Envy* 
Fusion* 
Gecko 
Guru 
Honey 
Inspire 
Liberty 
Synergy 
Tranquil 
Urban 
Vision 
Pseudo-word stimuli Carador 
Effero 
Ibia 
Jinny 
Kapnick 
Khoja 
Magia 
Orbis 
Palmetto 
Raha 
Shanti 
Shasta 
Slano 
Xypher 
Zeco 
Almega 
Almi 
Calix 
Chama 
Chanda 
Comtran 
Innotrans 
Jindz 
Kedrix 
Kolodge 
Movixo 
Stradix 
Wasatch 
Wizbit 
Xinonix 
Aduo 
Bajaroo 
Bayou 
Boga 
Danossia 
Diehl 
Imoo 
Jasta 
Joojoo 
Koodley 
Oculo 
Seo 
Shurtz 
Yolo* 
Zyda 
Aliana 
Axira 
Belanger 
Celianz 
Censola 
Denali 
Fidelis 
Imbarco 
Imperlum 
Lianza 
Lox 
Najila 
Solideon 
Tulsani 
Verizon 
 
* Brand names excluded on the basis of relatively common pre-existing associations with a single real-
world company or product (as discussed below).  
 
Note: The brand names in this table are listed in alphabetical order so as not to infer any ordering in the 
extent to which they were considered to be appropriate. Aside from this being arguably an impossible task 
in a group of 12 participants, the establishment of such a detailed shared ranking is not necessary in this 
pretesting phase. As such, respondents were not asked to rank each of the stimuli according to relative 
appropriateness but merely to decide whether which of the stimuli should be excluded on the grounds that 
they were relatively inappropriate as brand names in the given product category. 
 
 
Each of the brand names in the four product category lists was then further pretested for 
appropriateness in relation to the product category, inherent likability, and existing 
associations with particular products. This was undertaken by way of a quantitative 
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survey of 44 members of the target population, who did not then take part in the main 
experiment. The first two constructs were measured by way of a 5-point likert scale; 
running, for example, from strongly dislike (-2) to strongly like (+2) with a neutral point 
(0). The majority of this data collection took place at the beginning of two 
undergraduate seminars, and was followed by qualitative discussion with regard to how 
participants had understood and responded to concepts such as ‘liking’, 
‘appropriateness’ and ‘associations’. During these discussions, it became apparent that 
some participants had experienced difficulty in distinguishing between the first two of 
these concepts; considering brand names to be appropriate because they liked them, and 
likable because they were appropriate. As such, the data regarding appropriateness was 
excluded from the analysis during this phase on the basis that the earlier qualitative 
phase had perhaps provided a more robust basis on which to make judgments in this 
respect. However, 17 brand names were excluded at this stage as they were already 
associated with a particular real-world product by at least 10% of the sample (these are 
marked with an asterisk in table 5.3, above). The remaining brand names in each 
product category were then grouped into triads where possible on the basis of the 
following criteria: 
1. The mean liking ratings for each of the three brand names are very similar (to 
operationalise this, ‘similar’ mean ratings were considered to be those that did 
not differ by more then 0.1) 
2. The mean liking rating for each brand rating is neutral, or very close to neutral, 
on the 5-point likert scale (to operationalise this, a ‘neutral’ mean score was 
deemed to be between -0.25 and +0.25). 
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Whilst the first of these criteria is central to distinguishing the influence of the exposure 
phase in particular (see chapter 6, page 236), the second was deemed to be prudent in 
light of the fact that most psychological research has focussed on exposure-induced 
affective response to previously neutral stimuli. Whilst the question of whether the MEE 
is also comparable in relation to stimuli that are already subject to strong positive or 
negative feelings may represent an interesting and important direction for future 
marketing research (see chapter 9, page 426), it is beyond the scope of this study.  
 
Figure 5.2: Brand triad selection to maximise number of potential trials 
 
 
Furthermore, it should be noted that brand names in each product category were grouped 
to facilitate the maximum number of triads possible in light of the above criteria, rather 
than the single ‘best’ triad in this respect. This is perhaps best explained with reference 
to the hypothetical example illustrated in figure 5.2 (above). In this scenario, the three 
brand names that have a mean liking rating of 0 (i.e. precisely neutral and identical) 
would constitute the best possible triad in light of the criteria above. However, this triad 
BRAND A 
(Mean liking =0) 
 
BRAND B 
(Mean liking =0) 
 
BRAND E 
(Mean liking = -0.05) 
 
BRAND D 
(Mean liking = -0.05) 
 
BRAND C 
(Mean liking =0) 
 
BRAND F 
(Mean liking = 0.05) 
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(ABC) would not be selected if two other brand names exhibited a mean liking rating of 
-0.05 (DE) whilst one further brand name was rated at +0.05 (F). In this scenario, it 
would be possible to group the two brand names with the slightly negative mean score 
with one of the perfectly neutral stimuli (DEA), and the other two neutral brand names 
with the one that exhibited a slightly positive rating (BCF) to create two triads that both 
meet the criteria above. In this way, the maximum number of potential trials was created 
for use in the experiment; a factor that contributes to the enhancement of reliability in 
studies of this nature (as will be explained in section 6.6, page 266). Specifically, it was 
possible to create two equivalent (neutral) brand name triads for both real-word and 
pseudo-word stimuli in each product category with one exception; as illustrated in table 
5.4, below. 
 
Table 5.4: Equivalent (neutral) brand name triads in each product category 
 
  Chocolate Bars Breakfast Cereal Yoghurt Shampoo 
 
 
Brand 
name 
Mean 
liking 
rating 
Brand 
name 
Mean 
liking 
rating 
Brand 
name 
Mean 
liking 
rating 
Brand 
name 
Mean 
liking 
rating 
1st 
Choice 
Real-
words 
Affair 
Busker 
Suave 
-0.12 
-0.12 
-0.12 
Physique 
Mamas 
Jump 
0.00 
-0.02 
-0.05 
Fly 
Cube 
Polar 
-0.02 
-0.05 
-0.07 
Earth  
Gecko 
Liberty 
0.00 
0.05 
0.05 
 Pseudo-
words 
Kapnick 
Shanti 
Slano 
-0.05 
-0.05 
-0.10 
Kolodge 
Chanda 
Stradix 
0.00 
0.02 
0.05 
Aduo 
Zyda 
Oculo 
-0.12 
-0.12 
-0.14 
Solideon 
Tulsani 
Lianza 
0.00 
0.02 
0.02 
2nd 
Choice 
Real-
words 
Legend* 
Apollo* 
Space* 
0.12 
0.14 
0.16 
Team  
Connect 
Spark 
-0.14 
-0.09 
-0.07 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
Guru 
Create 
Synergy 
0.21 
0.12 
0.16 
 Pseudo-
words 
Effero 
Xypher 
Jinny 
0.05 
0.07 
0.10 
Chama* 
Movixo* 
Jindz* 
-0.14 
-0.12 
-0.07 
Jasta 
Shurtz 
Bajaroo 
0.02 
0.05 
0.07 
Belanger* 
Imbarco* 
Denali* 
-0.10 
-0.05 
-0.02 
* Brand names not selected for use in the main experiment, as explained below 
 
With reference to table 5.4, the first-choice brand name triads in each product category 
were initially selected with regard to both real-word and pseudo-word stimuli. This 
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facilitated an 8-trial experiment in which each product category and brand name type 
(i.e. real versus pseudo-word) was equally represented. As will be discussed in the 
following chapter (section 6.7.2, page 274), however, both the opportunity and need for 
the inclusion of additional items and trials was quickly identified during piloting and 
pretesting of the experimental procedure. As such, consideration was given to selecting 
the second-choice triad from each of the four product categories and in relation to each 
type of brand name. As illustrated in the table above, however, no second-choice option 
was available with regard to real-word brand names for Yoghurt. Whilst a total of seven 
more trials could have been added at this stage, therefore, it would have led to one 
product category and, perhaps more importantly, pseudo-word brand names in general 
being under-represented in the main experiment. Given that the comparison of the MEE 
on this latter variable constitutes a central objective of the current study (see in table 5.1, 
page 176), a balance in the number of real-word and pseudo-word trials was considered 
to be important to the comparability of results. Furthermore, careful consideration was 
also given to the length of the exposure sequences, the test phase and the experiment as 
a whole during piloting and pretesting; all of which were sensitive to the number of 
items/trials used and related to the potentially serious consequences of boredom and 
fatigue on the validity of the experiment (Bornstein et al., 1990; see chapter 2, page 28). 
In light of this, it was decided that four more trials should be added to create a 12-trial 
version of the experiment in which product categories and brand name types were 
equally represented (see table 5.4, above). To this end, the second-choice real-word pair 
was selected in the category of Breakfast Cereal and Shampoo, whilst the second-choice 
  205 
pseudo-word pair was selected with regard to Chocolate Bars and Yoghurt. The 
rationale for these selections was as follows: 
• One of the pseudo-word brand triads must relate to Yoghurt as no second-choice 
real-word triad is available 
• In the category of Chocolate Bars, the three brands in the second-choice pseudo-
word triad exhibit greater similarity in their mean liking ratings than those in the 
second-choice real-word triad for this category. 
• In the category of Shampoo, the three brands in the second-choice real-word 
triad exhibit greater similarity in their mean liking ratings than those in the 
second-choice real-word triad for this category. 
• In the category of Breakfast Cereal, the second choice real-word and pseudo-
word triads are almost identical in terms of the degree to which mean liking-
ratings vary within them.  As any could be selected for use in the experiment, 
therefore, the real-word triad was chosen to maintain an even balance of brand 
name types in the new 12-trial version of the experiment. 
 
Having established both the specific brand name stimuli and the product categories with 
which they would be associated, therefore, the final decision regarding the use of these 
stimuli relates to which of the three brand names in each triad would not be presented 
during the exposure phase, and would thus serve as a filler (or non-target) stimulus in 
the paired-choice tests of preference and recognition. As explained at the start of this 
section, the other two brands would both be presented in the exposure sequences, with 
one then used as a target stimulus for half of the sample (target A) and the other used as 
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a distractor. By contrast, the latter stimulus would be presented in the test phase as the 
target brand name (target B) for the other half of the sample, whilst the former would 
revert to the role of distractor in the exposure sequences for these participants. The 
allocation of the three brands in each triad to the roles of ‘Target A’, ‘Target B’ and 
‘Non-Target’ respectively was made via a random draw; the results of which are 
presented in table 5.5, below. 
 
Table 5.5: Selected target and non-target brand names 
 
 Target A Target B Filler 
Affair Busker Suave 
Connect Spark Team 
Physique Game Jump 
Fly Polar Cube 
Gecko Liberty Earth 
Real-word stimuli 
Guru Synergy Create 
Jinny Xypher Effero 
Slano Shanti Kapnick 
Stradix Kolodge Chanda 
Bajaroo Shurtz Jasta 
Oculo Aduo Zyda 
Pseudo-word stimuli 
Tulsani Solideon Lianza 
 
Finally, it should be noted that, for the control condition, a series of ‘dummy’ brand 
names were required to replace those used in the preference judgment task. As will be 
explained in section 5.4.4.6 (page 222), while these stimuli should be still be considered 
appropriate for the product category and not subject to common pre-existing 
associations, they were not required to be equivalent or neutral in terms of likability; the 
preference judgment test was no more than a filler task in the control condition. As such, 
these ‘dummy’ brand names were identified using a simple process of stratified random 
selection from those stimuli that remained on each category-appropriate list of real-word 
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and pseudo-word brand names; i.e. those that were not previously excluded on the basis 
pre-existing company/product associations or included in the triads selected for the 
experimental tasks. A summary of the replacement brand names used in the control 
condition is provided in table 5.6, below. 
 
Table 5.6: Replacement brand names for the preference judgment task in the 
control condition 
 
 Product 
category 
Experimental 
condition targets 
 
Control 
condition 
replacement 
targets 
Experimental 
condition 
fillers 
Control 
condition 
replacement 
fillers 
Chocolate Affair & Busker Wizard Suave Rhino 
Breakfast cereal Connect & Game Munch Team Rapid 
Breakfast cereal Physique & Spark Perform Jump Wonder 
Yoghurt Fly & Polar Fresh Cube Pure 
Shampoo Gecko & Liberty Vision Earth Honey 
 
Real-
word 
stimuli 
Shampoo Guru & Synergy Tranquil Create Clear 
Chocolate Jinny & Xypher Raha Effero Zeco 
Chocolate Slano & Shanti Khoja Kapnick Carador 
Breakfast cereal Stradix & Kolodge Wizbit Chanda Comtran 
Yoghurt Bajaroo & Shurtz Diehl Jasta Bayou 
Yoghurt Oculo & Aduo Danossia Zyda Boga 
 
Pseudo-
word 
stimuli 
Shampoo Tulsani & Solideon Fidelis Lianza Aliana 
 
Following the extensive process of stimulus pretesting and selection outlined in this 
section, therefore, the experiment was formulated as a stand-alone computer-based 
activity to facilitate simultaneous data collection in large groups (and thus a relatively 
large sample). The experimental procedure will be explained in detail during section 
5.4.4. (page 211). Prior to this, however, a brief outline of the apparatus and materials 
used in this respect is provided below. 
  208 
5.4.3. Apparatus and Materials 
 
The experiment was designed and executed using Microsoft Powerpoint, and was 
contained within a single file for each participant. This file was automatically timed to 
facilitate control over two key elements of the experimental procedure (each of which is 
discussed in section 5.4.4, page 211): 
• The 3 masked exposure sequences (each presented for a total of 30 seconds) 
• The filler tasks (timed so that participants were given one minute for each task, 
whether this required them to memorise or recall a list of stimuli)2 
 
All of the screens (i.e. slides) in the file were designed with a black background and 
white text/symbols. Brand names were consistently presented in size 44 arial font, and 
in block capital letters to distinguish these perceptually from other verbal elements of 
the experiment (e.g. instructions and labels). The presentation of each brand name was 
executed via a timed block of four screens (see figure 5.3), with the blocks for each 
brand stimulus following directly on from each other. Each block was constructed as 
follows: 
Screen 1 – Blank MS Powerpoint slide (black) presented for 1s 
Screen 2 – Centred pre-mask (@@@@@) presented for 100ms 
Screen 3 – Centred brand name presented for 50ms 
Screen 4 – Centred post-mask (########) presented for 100ms  
                                                 
2
 This is important for two reasons. Firstly, the compression of decision-time may be used to limit the 
opportunity for elaboration and therefore reduce levels of involvement. Secondly, and from a practical 
perspective, it ensures that all participants complete the experiment at around the same pace and in 
particular within the 30 minute data collection session. This, in turn, allows for the experiment to run 
twice in the 2-hours for which the participants and experimental resources were available. 
  209 
 
Figure 5.3: Example block of screens for the mere exposure of a brand name 
 
@@@@@
 
[BRAND]
 
########
 
         Screen 1               Screen 2       Screen 3      Screen 4 
 
At this point it should be noted that, whilst specific timings for the automatic transition 
between screens were set to 50ms within MS Powerpoint (the rationale for which will be 
explained in chapter 6, page 273), the actual exposure durations for each of these 
screens may have varied slightly depending on the speed of each machine and the 
refresh rate of each monitor. As such, it is not possible to set timings to the precise 
millisecond using this software (for this, specialist applications such as Eprime or 
Matlab are required). The selection of this exposure duration, therefore, is based on the 
results of pretesting, during which 50ms was found to be the point at which the great 
majority of participants reported supraliminal perception of the exposed stimuli (see 
chapter 6, page 273); a key condition under which the MEE is to be tested in this study 
(see table 5.1, page 176). However, the degree to which the exposed brand names are 
perceived is likely to vary quite significantly between participants as a result of 
individual differences in perceptual ability (see Miller, 1991). Furthermore, in 
endeavouring to set a masked exposure duration that ensures the stimuli are just 
perceptible (Zajonc, 1968) for the majority of participants, it is probable that individual 
differences will result in subliminal perception amongst a small number of participants. 
Given the size of the sample, however, this is not necessarily a limitation provided that 
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the cases in which this occurs can be identified. Indeed, should it occur in a sufficient 
number of cases (n>30; see Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch, 2000) it may in fact 
confer an additional benefit of facilitating confirmatory comparison of effect size in the 
presence and absence of conscious perception (with the latter expected to give rise to a 
larger MEE than the former; see Bornstein, 1989). However, it should be noted that this 
was not initially considered to be a primary objective of the empirical work in this study 
and that the original plan was to exclude the small number of subliminal perception 
cases that might be expected to occur. To this end, therefore, participants were required 
to report their subjective perceptual experience of the exposure phase at the end of the 
experiment (as will be discussed in chapter 6, page 246). 
 
All of the computer files used in the experiment were stored on, and opened from, the 
hard drive of each individual computer to facilitate a degree of control and consistency 
in the speed of the exposure sequences. Specifically, the alternative (and more 
convenient) approach of storing and opening all the files from a single networked drive 
would have meant that exposure duration could be significantly influenced by the speed 
of the network at a particular moment. As this can vary across computer suites and over 
time, there was a significant likelihood that it would constitute an additional 
uncontrolled influence on the nature of perception, and thus the extent of attentive 
processing, between brand stimuli and participants. All of the machines were of the 
same specification, make and model and preloaded with the same operating system and 
software. Preloading the files onto the hard drive of each of these machines therefore 
minimised variations in the speed of exposure across computers, rooms and sessions. In 
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addition, the use of a preloaded file meant that this was the only possible version of the 
experiment the participant could complete, and thus enhanced the degree of control in 
the data collection process. 
 
Finally, a task booklet was laid on the desk next to each computer prior to participants 
entering the room. This was labelled with a participant ID, the room number, date, desk 
number and the name of the MS Powerpoint file with which the computer on that desk 
had been preloaded. On each desk, an additional filler questionnaire was also laid out 
and clearly labelled. Participants were told to complete this only when the instructions 
on the screen requested them to do so. 
 
5.4.4. Experimental Procedure 
 
The procedure used in this experiment is summarised in figure 5.4, prior to a discussion 
of each of these phases below. 
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Figure 5.4: Overview of the experimental procedure 
 
Pre-experiment 
1. Random allocation of participants to conditions and computers 
2. Opening instructions 
 
Exposure Sequence 1 
Masked, randomised 50ms presentation of 12 target + 12 distractor brand names 
 
Filler Task 1 
Memorise 10 shapes in one minute 
 
Exposure Sequence 2 
Masked, randomised 50ms presentation of 12 target + 12 distractor brand names 
 
Filler Task 2 
Memorise 10 animals in one minute 
 
Exposure Sequence 3 
Masked, randomised 50ms presentation of 12 target + 12 distractor brand names 
 
Additional Questionnaire 
Short, unrelated questionnaire to add processing demands and time delay between exposure and test 
phases 
 
Filler Task 3 
Recall as many shapes as possible from filler task 1 in one minute 
 
Filler Task 4 
Recall as many animals as possible from filler task 2 in one minute 
 
Test Phase: Preference Judgment (task 1) 
12 target brand names + 12 new filler brand names presented in pairs on a two-factor forced choice test 
Choices relate to 4 different product categories, with 3 pairs presented for each category 
Participants indicate which brand name they like the most, in relation to the specified product type 
Dummy brand names used in this task for the control group (only change from experimental group) 
 
Test Phase: Recognition Judgment (task 2) 
Replication of test phase task 1 (with different ordering of brand name choice pairs), but this time: 
          a) Participants indicate which of the two brand names they think was presented previously in the 
              exposure phases of this experiment, and guess if not sure; and 
          b) Participants indicate the degree of confidence they have in this judgment on a scale of 1-4  
 
Profiling Questionnaire 
Level of perception, socio-demographic characteristics and visual/reading impairments 
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5.4.4.1. Pre-Experiment 
 
As outlined in section 5.4.1.3 (page 187), participants were randomly selected and 
allocated to a condition and computer. Once seated, and following a brief verbal 
introduction, they were then presented with an opening screen of instructions as 
illustrated below.  
 
Figure 5.5: Screenshot – Opening Instructions 
Instructions
• You will shortly be presented with a sequence of flashing images.
• The images will be presented automatically and rapidly on this screen
• You DO NOT have to press any keys once the sequence has begun.
• Please focus your attention on the screen in front of you and watch the full 
sequence unfold – it will last approximately 25 seconds.
• At the end of the sequence you will be provided with further instructions.
• Please  press the space bar when you are ready for the first sequence of 
flashing images to begin.
 
 
The two important elements to note regarding these instructions are that participants 
were asked to: 
a) Focus their attention on the screen – this is important as the main method of 
exposure control in this experiment is to physically limit the opportunity for 
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attentive, elaborative processing via the use of very short exposure durations and 
stimulus masking. In order to ensure that exposure occurs at all, however, it is 
critical that participants are looking directly at the screen during these very brief 
exposures. 
b) Watch the full sequence unfold – this phrase was selected on the basis that it does 
not specifically request participants to engage in active cognition during this 
phase, and instead encourages passive processing (i.e. participants were not 
instructed to memorise or think about what they were seeing in an active way).  
 
5.4.4.2. Exposure Phase and Filler Tasks 
 
Following the opening instructions, participants were required to press the space bar to 
begin the first of three exposure sequences. In each of these, the 24 brand names (12 
targets and 12 distractors) were automatically presented in a different, previously 
determined random order (as will be explained in chapter 6, page 283). Each brand 
name appeared individually and in isolation for 50ms, between 100ms pre and post-
masks (the rationale for which are further discussed in chapter 6, page 273).  
 
It should be noted that all of the stimuli were presented visually during the exposure 
phase. The primary reason for this is that the creation of mere exposure conditions for 
auditory stimuli is extremely difficult within experimental research (as noted in chapter 
4, page 149). The main limitation with such an approach is a lack of control over, or 
objective measurement of, the extent to which attention is paid to each auditory 
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stimulus, and thus the extent to which mere exposure occurs for each participant. 
Furthermore, visual presentation is in line with the approach used by the vast majority of 
marketing studies in this field, and the claim that this is “the most widely occurring 
[presentation modality] and the most relevant for consumer products” (Veryzer, 1999: 
503).  
 
In between each exposure sequence participants were requested to complete a filler task. 
The first of these (between exposure sequences 1 and 2) required them to memorise a 
list of 10 shapes during an automatically timed one-minute period. The second (between 
exposure sequences 2 and 3) was identical but for the fact that participants were asked to 
memorise a list of animals. These tasks (including the reading of pre- and post-
instructions) were designed and pretested to take approximately 2 minutes each. On 
conclusion of the third and final exposure sequence, participants were then asked to 
undertake a third filler task involving the completion of a short, simple and entirely 
unrelated questionnaire; taking approximately five minutes. Finally, to conclude this 
phase of the experiment, participants were requested to complete two more filler tasks in 
which they were asked to firstly write down all of the shapes they could recall from 
filler task 1, and then all of the animals they could remember from filler task 2. They 
were given one minute to perform each of these activities, and a countdown clock 
appeared in the bottom right hand corner of the screen. The combined duration of these 
two final tasks (including the reading of instructions) was approximately four minutes, 
meaning that the participants were actively engaged in filler tasks for approximately two 
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minutes between each exposure sequence, and approximately 9 minutes between the end 
of the third sequence and the beginning of the test phase. 
 
5.4.4.3. Test Phase 
 
Prior to commencing the first of the test phase tasks (i.e. the preference judgment task), 
participants were engaged for approximately one more minute in reading the 
instructions for this. A screenshot of these instructions is presented below. 
 
Figure 5.6: Screenshot – Instructions for preference judgment task 
Task 5
• Please open your task booklet at Task 5
• You will shortly be presented with a series of 12 pairs of proposed new brand names for 
4 types of products.
• For each choice, the first screen you will see will be a product category (e.g. Soft Drinks)
• You will then be presented with two proposed new brand names for this product.
• Please indicate which of the two brand names you LIKE the most.
• Please choose as quickly as possible – you will have just 5 seconds to make each choice 
before the next pair of brand names is presented.
• Please ensure that you make a choice for EACH of the 12 pairs.
• Mark your answer on the answer sheet provided in your task booklet, by ticking either 
option 1 or option 2 for each of the 12 pairs of brand names.
• If you have any questions, please raise your hand to call the researcher over now.
• Ok, before we begin let’s have a practice - press the space bar to begin the practice.
 
 
Following this, participants were required to complete two practice trials prior to 
undertaking the preference task itself. These lasted approximately one further minute, 
and ensured that participants were involved in around 11 minutes of intensive alternative 
activities between the end of the exposure phase and the first preference judgment. The 
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practice trials were identical to the 12 paired-choices participants would complete in the 
task itself but for the fact that they did not include any of the previously exposed brand 
names. Instead, they were constructed using brand names that had been discarded during 
pretesting.  
 
The key aspects of the preference judgment task in this experiment are as follows: 
a) Participants were presented with 12 choice pairs, each containing a target brand 
name (i.e. a brand name that had been presented in each of the three exposure 
sequences earlier in the experiment) and a non-target (i.e. a new, distractor brand 
name that had not been presented in any of the exposure sequences). 
b) Each of the 12 choices was made in the context of a product category, with three 
choice pairs randomly presented in relation to each of the four product 
categories. 
c) The 12 choice pairs were presented in one of 20 different, predetermined, 
random orders for each participant (as will be explained in chapter 6, page 285). 
d) Participants were instructed to make their choices as quickly as possible, and 
were asked the following question at the start of the sequence of choice pairs; 
which one of the two brand names do you like the most?  
e) Participants were given a maximum of 5 seconds to make their choice and mark 
this in the task booklet provided. A countdown clock appeared at the bottom of 
the screen to show the time ticking down, and the screens for the next choice 
trial appeared automatically after this period. The process for each test trial is 
illustrated in figure 5.7 (below). 
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Figure 5.7: Example of question, product context & brand name choice screenshots 
 
Which one of the two brand names 
do you like the most?
Choice 1
Yoghurt
Option 1
OCULO
Option 2
ZYDA
Seconds left to answer!!
5
Times up!
Here comes choice 2 . . .
 
             Screen 1              Screen 2            Screen 3          Screen 4 
 
Finally, on completion of the preference judgment task, participants were requested to 
undertake a recognition task (task 6) to investigate the extent to which they recalled 
and/or had a sense of familiarity with the brand names presented in the exposure phase. 
The instructions for this are illustrated in the screenshot below, and the important factors 
to note are as follows: 
• The choice pairs were identical to those in the previous preference task, although 
they were presented in a different random order. 
• Participants indicated their choice by ticking the box marked ‘Option 1’ or 
‘Option 2’ for the relevant choice pair in their task booklet. 
• Participants were instructed to guess if they did not remember which of the two 
brand names was presented in the exposure phase – this is important so that the 
chance value of guessing correctly can be used in the analysis of these results 
(see chapter 6, page 233). 
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• Participants were also asked to indicate the degree to which they were confident 
this choice was correct on a scale of 1 to 4 (whereby; 1= certain, 2 = quite sure, 3 
= quite unsure, 4 = guess). 
• No time limit was placed on participants during this task as it is important to 
identify all traces of recognition, and not just very clear memory that is ‘top of 
mind’. As such, participants moved from one choice pair to the next in their own 
time. 
 
Figure 5.8: Screenshot – Instructions for the recognition judgment task 
 
Task 6
• Please open your task booklet at Task 6.
• You will now be presented with the SAME 12 pairs of brand names as in the previous task (task 5).
• One of the brand names in EACH pair was presented during the rapid sequences of flashing 
images you saw before completing tasks 1,2 and 3.
• For EACH pair of brand names please indicate which one of the two names you think was 
presented during these rapid sequences of flashing images, by ticking option 1 or 2 on your 
answer sheet.
• For EACH decision please also indicate how sure you are of this by placing a number between 1 
and 4 in the right-hand box, as explained on your answer sheet.
• Please choose as quickly as possible – if you do not know which one was presented during the 
sequences of flashing images then please GUESS.
• Please note, this is NOT a test of your memory for the pairs of brands that appeared in the 
previous task (task 5). 
• We are interested in which one of the brands you think was presented in the rapid sequences of 
flashing images you saw before completing tasks 1,2 and 3.
• If you have any questions please raise your hand to call the researcher now
• OK, before we begin let’s have a practice - press the space bar to begin the practice
 
 
As in the preference judgment task (task 5), participants were first required to undertake 
two practice trials. These were identical to the 12 recognition judgments in the task itself 
but for the fact that they did not include any of the target or distractor brand names used 
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previously in the experiment. The brand choice pairs from the practice trials for task 5 
were replicated in task 6 (just as those for the actual tasks would be). 
 
5.4.4.4. Profiling questionnaire 
 
Finally, participants were required to complete a short ‘profiling’ questionnaire 
regarding the following factors: 
1. The extent to which they had consciously perceived the brand names presented 
during the exposure phase of the experiment  
2. The socio-demographic factors of age, gender, nationality, first language and 
bilingualism. 
3. Visual and/or reading impairment 
 
With regard to the first of these, the subjective experience of perception was measured 
by way of the 4-point scale illustrated in figure 5.9; a fuller discussion of which will be 
provided in chapter 6 (see section 6.3.1.1, page 246). Further to this, specific profiling in 
relation to some of the key personal characteristics of participants was undertaken for 
two reasons. Firstly, to facilitate a descriptive analysis of the sample (and thus more 
precise comparative discussion in relation to previous research) and, secondly, to 
facilitate exploration of the impact that participants’ first language and 
bilingual/multilingual capabilities might have on the observed effects (if necessary). 
Whilst there is no previous research to suggest this might be the case, it is important to 
acknowledge that this study seeks to test the influence of perceptual implicit memory for 
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real and pseudo-words constructed within the framework of the English language. With 
this in mind, it is perhaps reasonable to assume, for example, that the physical features 
of the selected words might be more easily processed by native English speaking 
participants than those whose first language, and particularly the alphabet on which it is 
based, is far removed from English. As such, whilst it is not the specific aim of this 
study to research this issue, it was considered important to acknowledge it as a possible 
mediating influence and collect data that would facilitate the identification of this if 
necessary. 
 
Figure 5.9: Scale used to measure level of perception during the exposure phase 
1 = I did not see any letters in the flashed images 
 
2 = I saw isolated letters in the flashed images but did not perceive these as 
words or brand names 
 
3 = I saw rows of letters in the flashed images but did not perceive these as 
words or brand names 
 
4 = I saw words or brand names in the flashed images 
 
Finally, given that the observed effects are expected to be influenced by the processes of 
visual and lexical processing, it was considered important to identify cases in which 
participants had reading difficulties and/or uncorrected visual impairment. The purpose 
of this was to facilitate either the removal of these cases prior to analysis, or (should a 
large number be identified) testing for significant differences with the rest of the sample. 
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5.4.4.5. Closing instructions 
 
On completion of the experiment, the on-screen instructions required participants to 
remain in their seat and under experimental conditions until every participant in the 
room had finished. In order to reduce the temptation to disturb others prior to this point, 
those who finished relatively quickly were handed an additional, unrelated questionnaire 
to fill-out. The completed materials (i.e. consent form, task booklet and additional 
questionnaires) were collected from each desk by the researcher once all participants 
had left the room. On conclusion of the experiment, the participants returned to the 
lecture theatre where they were provided with a full debrief and the opportunity to ask 
questions. 
 
5.4.4.6. Procedural changes in the control condition 
 
As will be explained in chapter 6 (section 6.8.3, page 287), the purpose of the control 
condition in this experiment is to identify the potential for systematic effects as a result 
of the order in which participants were required to make preference and recognition 
judgments respectively. Specifically, this relates to the possibility of affective 
modulation bias (Phaf and Rotteveel, 2005); a  phenomenon whereby stimuli that have 
previously been identified as preferred may then be more likely to be adjudged to have 
been presented previously on this basis alone (i.e. in the absence of genuine, objective 
recognition memory for prior exposure). In order to identify the influence of this 
phenomenon, should it occur, a comparative control group was undertaken in which 
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participants were not required to make any preference judgments in relation to the target 
brand names and the filler items that appeared alongside them in each choice-pair; only 
to engage in the recognition task for these stimuli. To this end, initial consideration was 
given to simply removing the preference judgment task from the control condition. 
However, this would have the effect of reducing the length of delay between exposure 
and test, the type and intensity of activities that participants were required to engage in 
during this period, and thus the comparability of stimulus recognition rates between the 
two groups. Instead, therefore, the control condition was identical to the experimental 
condition but for one important alteration; the brand names in the preference judgment 
task were replaced with ‘dummy’ stimuli that did not appear in either the exposure 
phase or the subsequent recognition task. These brand names were drawn randomly 
from those discarded during pretesting (see table 5.3, page 200) and ensured that, whilst 
all participants completed an identical experimental procedure, the recognition 
judgments made in the control group could not possibly be subject to affective 
modulation bias (Phaf and Rotteveel, 2005). As a result, a comparison between 
recognition rates in the experimental and control conditions of this experiment was 
planned to assess the degree to which these may have been influenced by the intervening 
preference task (the results of which are presented and discussed in chapter 7, page 343). 
 
5.5. Summary 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to identify the research questions at the heart of 
this study, outline the methodological approach and provide an overview of the key 
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aspects of experimental design. To this end, the key elements of sampling, stimulus 
selection, apparatus and experimental procedure have been discussed in some detail The 
last of these, however, is subject to a number of important and complex issues, 
including: 
• Definition and measurement of the dependent variable 
• Manipulation and measurement of the key independent variables (i.e. the nature 
of perception, the type of brand name and the degree of recognition memory) 
• The purpose and design of filler tasks 
• The length of delay between exposure and test 
• The interdependencies between task duration, the number of items/trials, length 
of delay and experiment length - and their combined impact on reliability and 
validity 
• Presentation and task order effects, and the use of counterbalancing and 
randomisation 
• Deception, disguise and the creation of low involvement, low attention 
conditions 
 
The key considerations and decisions in relation to all of these issues are central to the 
reliability and validity of the experimental design in this study. They are therefore 
discussed in detail during the following chapter, along with the importance, purpose and 
process of piloting and pretesting in this study. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Critical issues in the research design 
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6.1. Introduction  
 
During the latter part of the previous chapter, an overview of the experimental procedure 
was followed by the identification of several issues that are of great importance to the 
reliability and validity of this study. The purpose of this chapter is to explain and discuss 
these issues in detail, highlighting the key considerations and decisions in each case (as 
illustrated in figure 6.1). As a starting point for this, it is first necessary to understand 
the basis on which the MEE will be identified and thus the selection and measurement 
of the dependent variable in this study.  
 
Figure 6.1: Structure of chapter 6 
 
 
1. Introduction 
2. Selecting & measuring the dependent variable 
 
4. The purpose and design of filler tasks 
3.  Defining & manipulating the independent variables 
• Perception 
• Recognition 
• Recollection 
5. Piloting and pretesting 
6. Deception, disguise and involvement 
7. Minimising order of presentation effects 
5. Length of tasks, delay and experiment 
7. Summary & conclusion 
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6.2. Selection and measurement of the dependent variable 
 
In line with the vast majority of psychological and marketing research into the MEE (see 
chapters 2 and 3), the dependent variable in this study will be affective response to the 
target stimuli. As in the original empirical study into the non-conscious MEE by Kunst-
Wilson and Zajonc (1980), this will be measured by the degree to which preference 
frequency for the exposed stimulus differs from chance in a forced-choice test. The key 
considerations that underpin these, and indeed all decisions regarding the dependent 
variable in this study are illustrated in figure 6.2, and discussed in detail below.  
 
Figure 6.2: Defining and measuring the dependent variable 
 
Type of Response 
Affective Cognitive 
Brand Choice Inclusion in a 
consideration set 
Brand name liking 
Relative  
(i.e. preference) 
Absolute 
Forced Choice Tests Self-Report Scales 
Chance Baseline Control Group 
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6.2.1. Defining the dependent variable 
 
As discussed in chapter 2 (page 19), evidence for the MEE has been presented in 
relation to both affective and cognitive judgments (for a review see Bornstein, 1989). 
However, the focus of the original empirical studies of the MEE (Wilson, 1979; Kunst-
Wilson and Zajonc, 1980), the principle means by which it has been demonstrated since 
(see Bornstein, 1989), and arguably the most pertinent outcome of mere exposure in a 
marketing context is the enhancement of affect. Whilst it was noted in chapter 2 that 
such a response is likely to be mediated by cognition (see section 2.3.1, page 38), it is 
this ultimate outcome that has been of the greatest interest to psychologists and 
marketing researchers alike over recent decades (as illustrated by the literature reviewed 
in chapters 2 and 4); and will thus form the basis on which the MEE is examined in this 
study.  
 
In defining the specific nature of the affective response under investigation, however, a 
number of alternatives may be considered. In the extant marketing literature, for 
example, three forms of affective response are evident; brand choice (e.g. Lee, 2002), 
inclusion in a consideration set (e.g. Shapiro, 1999) and stimulus liking (e.g. 
Janiszewski, 1993). In this context, brand choice may be seen to provide a direct 
measure of changes in behavioural response as a result of mere exposure, and thus 
confer the greatest degree of ecological validity in a marketing context. Alternatively, 
inclusion of the brand in a consideration set would not only provide a potentially valid 
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measure of affective response, but may also serve to further reduce the level of 
involvement that participants have in the decision. In this respect, Cai et al. (2004) argue 
that consumer involvement increases as consumers move through four stages of 
decision-making; from developing awareness, to the formation of consideration and then 
choice sets prior to making a final purchase decision. From this perspective, the 
requirement to make a decision regarding consideration set membership may be 
assumed to occur with a lower level of involvement than that relating to ultimate brand 
choice. In the context of the current study, however, the validity of both these 
approaches may be seriously limited. For example, one might question the ecological 
validity of asking participants to decide how likely they are to choose one brand over 
another when they are fully aware that they will never be required, or given the 
opportunity, to make that choice and thus experience the consequences. Furthermore, 
the internal validity of these approaches may by limited by the nature of the stimuli in 
question; namely, simple and novel brand names. In this sense, the absence of any other 
information or imagery relating to the brand (e.g. the ingredients, size, shape, quality or 
price of the chocolate bars in question), and the lack of opportunity or requirement to 
actually consume the product, could result in such questions being perceived as 
meaningless by participants. More importantly perhaps, it may be argued that, whilst 
both the choice of brand and its inclusion in a consideration set may be based primarily 
on affect, this may be preceded, accompanied or succeeded by cognitive judgments (e.g. 
perceived quality and value-for-money in consumers seeking to maximise utility).  
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By contrast, it may be argued that stimulus ‘liking’ constitutes a simple passive feeling 
(without the need for further cognition), and thus represents a particularly valid measure 
of affective response. This might explain why it is the most commonly used dependent 
variable in the realms of psychological mere exposure research (see Bornstein, 1989; 
Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004). Furthermore, and in the context of affect-based 
theories of consumer decision-making (see chapter 2, page 38) it may be argued that 
relative liking for a brand asset might be seen as a precursor to inclusion in a 
consideration set and ultimately brand choice. With this in mind, and in line with the 
reasoning of Cai et al. (2004), one might argue that experiencing a general sense of 
‘liking’ for the brand stimuli requires even lower levels of involvement than inclusion in 
a consideration set. In the context of this experiment, therefore, brand name liking was 
considered to be a relatively passive affective response when compared to the more 
active decision of choosing whether or not to include the brand in a consideration set, 
and thus constitutes the core aspect of the dependent variable. 
 
As a consequence of this, however, a second important consideration arises with regard 
to the precise nature of the response that is to be investigated in this study; namely, 
whether it relates to relative or absolute liking for the brand name. In this respect, it is 
important to acknowledge that the MEE is most likely to play a role in rapid stimulus-
based discrimination under conditions of low attention and involvement (see chapter 3, 
page 118). On this basis, it was noted in chapter 1 that the increasing proliferation of 
brands, messages and media (MacInnis et al., 1991; Skinner and Stephens 2003), 
coupled with a convergence in the perceived quality of the brands themselves (Heath, 
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2004) has created a consumption context in which the MEE might be expected to 
flourish. Specifically, therefore, the marketing-based MEE is likely to be most 
significant in relation to the formation of preference amongst brands that are otherwise 
equally attractive; as (Baker, 1999: 32) observes: 
“[The mere exposure effect] may significantly impact brand choice 
decisions when brands tie on tangible criteria (e.g., prior evaluation, benefit 
possession, etc.), or when consumers do not have the motivation, ability or 
opportunity to search for more specific information at the time of brand 
choice.” 
 
With this in mind, the most ecologically valid measure of the MEE in this study was 
deemed to be relative, rather than absolute, liking for the brand stimulus. This was 
operationalised by pretesting brand names to produce triads of target and non-target 
stimuli that were equivalent in terms of perceived appropriateness for the product 
category and inherent likability (as discussed in chapter 5, page 194). For each trial, 
participants were then presented with a product category before being asked to select 
which of one of two proposed new brand names they liked the most. The precise nature 
of this task was determined on the basis that it grounds the study in a marketing context, 
provides a sound rationale for the use of novel (i.e. invented) stimuli and ensures that 
the experimental task is meaningful to participants; i.e. a valid response can be made 
without the need for further information about the brand. On reflection, however, it is 
acknowledged that the degree to which it reflects a typical consumer evaluation may be 
open to question. In this respect, it may be argued that participants might assume the 
perspective of marketer, rather than consumer; their judgments therefore reflecting the 
choices they would make if they were responsible for naming these brands. In response 
to this, however, it is important to stress that ea
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extremely rapidly, under significant time pressure (i.e. a few seconds). As such, careful 
deliberation of the type a marketing manager might be expected to engage in was not 
possible and participants were reliant on their immediate affective response to complete 
the task. Given the rapid and relatively passive nature of this response it may be 
expected to occur in the same way, and with the same result, regardless of the way in 
which the question is interpreted, and thus form the basis on which either low 
involvement decisions are made or further (high involvement) deliberation occurs. For 
this reason, it is not considered to be a significant limitation in the current study. 
 
In sum, therefore, the selection of stimulus ‘liking’ as the dependent variable confers the 
benefit of maximum passivity in the required response (and therefore the lowest level of 
required involvement), and is closely in line with the paradigm within which the vast 
majority of psychological mere exposure research has been undertaken. Furthermore, 
the study of relative, rather than absolute, liking for the brand name is deemed to most 
closely reflect the type of discriminatory judgments that consumers are typically 
required to make with regard to brand alternatives. On this basis, the dependent variable 
in this study is specifically defined as brand name preference; the typical MEE being 
revealed by a systematic enhancement of this for the exposed over the non-exposed 
stimuli. The precise means by which these preferences were measured is discussed 
below. 
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6.2.2. Measuring the dependent variable 
 
Having identified the specific nature of the effect that is under investigation in this study 
(i.e. relative preference for novel brand names), the next important question relates to 
how this should be measured. In this respect, two alternative approaches may be 
considered; ratings scales and forced-choice tests. As discussed in Grimes and Kitchen 
(2007), however, techniques that rely on the self-reporting of conscious perceptions may 
not necessarily be appropriate for the measurement of the non-conscious MEE. Rather, 
in the continued absence of reliable, valid and practical physiological techniques, the 
most effective means by which this can be achieved is via the indirect measurement of 
performance effects in a behavioural or judgment task. 
 
On this basis, forced-choice tests were used to measure the frequency with which target 
and non-target stimuli were preferred by participants. This technique was selected as it 
confers a number of important benefits in the context of this study. Firstly, forced-
choice tests facilitate the measurement of rapid, passive, low involvement preference 
judgments between two stimuli, without the need to self-report conscious perceptions. 
Indeed, these tests require participants to discriminate clearly between target and non-
target stimuli, even if they are not consciously aware of the basis or reason for this 
decision. As such, they might be seen to confer a significant degree of ecological 
validity as they closely reflect the rapid, passive, stimulus-based consumer decision-
making within which the MEE might be expected to be at its most influential (see 
chapter 3, page 116). Furthermore, as participants are required to make a choice on 
  234 
every trial, there is a known chance of the target stimuli being selected purely by chance 
in this task (e.g. p=0.5 in a 2AFC, p=0.25 in a 4AFC). This allows for measurement of 
enhanced preference following mere exposure in relation to a chance baseline, and thus 
negates the need for a control group (as discussed in more detail below). In turn, 
therefore, this approach facilitates the use of much larger sample sizes in each 
experimental condition; an important methodological consideration in this study (as 
noted in chapter 5, page 179). 
 
It should be noted, however, that forced choice tests are subject to a number of 
criticisms. Perhaps the most notable of these (in the context of this study at least) is that 
such tests might not provide the sensitivity necessary to measure the precise degree to 
which enhanced preference occurs as an experimental effect (i.e. whether mere exposure 
results in large or small shifts in preference). In response to this, the additional use of a 
scale was considered to clarify the extent of reported preference in the forced-choice 
task. In this respect, a scale such as the one illustrated in figure 6.3 might be expected to 
record the degree to which one brand name was preferred over the other in each choice 
pair: 
 
Figure 6.3: Example scale for the measurement of preference in each pair  
          
      1. Much prefer                2. Prefer           3. Marginally Prefer      4. Like both equally 
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In the context of stimulus-based consumer decision-making, however, it may be argued 
that the important question is whether the MEE induces a tendency to choose one brand 
over another, regardless of the degree to which preference is consciously perceived and 
in the absence of the need to verbalise this. As such, a scale that distinguishes between 
perceived degrees of preference is unnecessary and perhaps even invalid in the context 
of marketing-based mere exposure research. Furthermore, the use of a scale with a 
neutral point (see point 4 in figure 6.3) may result in the masking of implicit approach 
tendencies by allowing participants to ‘opt out’ of making a preference judgment in the 
absence of a clear, conscious reason for this. More broadly, the validity of any self-
report scales in the measurement of implicit memory effects (such as the MEE) might be 
questioned on the basis that they reflect only the participants’ conscious perceptions of 
the degree to which they prefer a particular stimulus. Furthermore, the use of these 
scales increases the level of cognitive engagement at test and thus reduces the ecological 
validity of the test phase in relation to low involvement consumer decision-making. 
Indeed, in the context of the misattribution theories of mere exposure (Mandler et al., 
1987; Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994; see chapter 2, page 45) it might be argued 
that the use of such scales may in fact eliminate the necessary conditions for the MEE, 
by replacing the opportunity for passive, instinctive decision-making – underpinned by 
implicit memory and misattribution - with a requirement for more deliberate, thoughtful 
reasoning. As such, the measurement of preference in this study was limited to the 
results of two-factor forced choice tests in relation to each item. Further to this, a 
relatively large sample was employed to enhance the power of the statistical tests in this 
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study and thus reduce the likelihood of type II error occurring as a result of a small 
effect size (the possibility of which was discussed in chapter 2, page 23).  
 
However, whilst the results of forced-choice tests provide an indicator of preference, the 
important measure in this study is the degree to which this is influenced by mere 
exposure. As such, a further consideration with regard to the dependent variable relates 
to the measurement of difference between observed preference frequency and that which 
might be expected in the absence of prior exposure. In the vast majority of previous 
mere exposure research one of two approaches has been used to measure the effect of 
the experimental manipulation; comparison with a control group or a chance baseline 
(see Bornstein, 1989; Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004). The use of a control group 
confers the benefit of providing a direct between-group comparison to identify 
significant differences in the primed versus non-primed conditions. However, this also 
requires a doubling of the sample size and thus the time and resources required to 
administer the additional data collection, preparation and analysis. The use of a chance 
baseline, however, does not require additional data collection but rather the existence of 
a known chance value that might be expected to occur in the absence of a priming 
effect. In the context of this experiment the chance value would be equal to the 
proportion of times the target brand name would be expected to be preferred if 
participants had chosen entirely randomly (i.e. in the absence of exposure-induced bias). 
As this study utilizes two-factor forced choice tests to measure brand name preference, 
random selection would result in the target being selected 50% of the time by chance 
alone. However, this assumes that the two stimuli in each choice pair are equivalent in 
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terms their ‘likability’, i.e. that there is nothing more inherently likable about one of the 
stimuli that would result in participants tending to consistently prefer it. As such, careful 
pretesting was necessary to ensure that this was the case; as discussed in chapter 5 (see 
page 194). 
 
In light of the importance of sample size in enhancing the reliability of research into 
implicit memory (Buchner and Brandt, 2003), a control group approach was deemed to 
be problematic for two reasons. Firstly, a further division of the sample frame would 
have considerably reduced the size of the sample in each condition. By contrast, the 
development of additional control groups for each condition would have required 
doubling the total sample to nearly 500 participants. Given the detailed nature of this 
experiment, the size of the sample frame, and time and resource limitations (e.g. 
research assistants, computer suites, computers, etc.), a sample of such magnitude would 
have been impractical. As such, comparison to a chance baseline was selected as a 
means by which to measure the systematic enhancement of preference frequency as a 
result of mere exposure in this study. A critical implication of this is that the two brand 
names from which participants are required to choose must be largely equivalent in 
terms of their inherent likeability. If this is not the case then it is possible that any 
systematic preference bias could be the result of extraneous factors. However, the 
difficulty in achieving this became evident during the pretesting of stimuli for use in this 
study. Whilst it was possible to identify 15 triads of equivalent brand names at this stage 
(see chapter 5, page 203), groups of four or more would have greatly reduced the 
possible number of trials (and thus the reliability of results). Given the necessity for the 
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target brand name to be accompanied by one equivalent stimulus in the exposure phase 
and another in the test phase, this prohibited the use of forced-choice tests containing 
more than two factors. 
 
In summary, therefore, the dependent variable in this study, and thus the means by 
which the MEE will be examined, is the degree to which the selection frequency of 
previously exposed brand names differs from chance in a series of 2-factor forced-
choice tests of preference. In order to test the propositions and hypotheses at the heart of 
this study (see table 5.1, page 176), however, this variable must be measured under 
conditions of supraliminal perception, the presence and absence of both objective 
recognition and subjective recollection, and in relation to real-word versus pseudo-word 
stimuli. Taken together, these factors thus constitute the independent variables in this 
study; the definition and manipulation of which will be discussed in section 6.3. Prior to 
this, however, an important final step in refining the dependent variable for analysis is 
explained in the section below. 
 
6.2.3. Refining the dependent variable for analysis 
 
In line with the original demonstration of the non-conscious MEE by Kunst-Wilson and 
Zajonc (1980), and numerous experiments subsequently (e.g. Seamon et al. 1983a; 
Bonanno and Stillings, 1986; Barchas and Perlaki, 1986; Mandler et al., 1987; Murphy 
and Zajonc, 1993), both affect and recognition are measured in the current study by way 
of target stimulus selection frequency on 2-factor forced-choice tests. On the basis of the 
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vast majority of mere exposure research to date, this may be expected to give rise to four 
possible outcomes, as illustrated in figure 6.4 below. 
 
Figure 6.4: Possible outcomes from 2-factor forced-choice tests of affect and 
recognition 
 
Recognition above chance  
No Yes 
 
No 
 
 
A 
 
B 
 
 
Preference 
above chance 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
C 
 
D 
 
With regard to figure 6.4, the absence of any effect at all is reflected in recognition and 
preference frequencies that do not differ significantly from the level of chance (A). The 
enhancement of explicit (but not implicit) memory is illustrated by above chance 
recognition in the absence of an effect on preference (B). The fully non-conscious MEE 
is typically characterised by enhanced preference under conditions of chance recognition 
(C), whilst the enhancement of both factors may be considered to reflect the MEE in the 
presence of recognition (D).  
 
However, whilst not acknowledged in the literature, the overall logic of this approach 
may be questioned on the grounds that it does not take into account the specific 
relationship between preference and memory for each participant and stimulus item. In 
order to explain this problem it is perhaps useful to work through a hypothetical 
replication of the original experiment of Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc (1980), in which 2-
  240 
factor forced choice tests of recognition and affect are administered following repeated 
exposure to the target stimuli. The statistical (t-test) results for this imaginary data set 
are presented in figure 6.5 below.  
 
Figure 6.5: Worked example to illustrate limitations of measuring the MEE by 
comparing mean target preference and recognition frequency  
 
 
 
 
 
In this extreme hypothetical example, Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc’s (1980) experiment is 
replicated with a sample of 100 participants and 12 trials (i.e. 12 target stimuli and thus 
12 choice pairs in each of the two tests), with the following results: 
1. Half of the participants (50) recognise all 12 of the target stimuli and the other 
half recognise none of them  
2. Half of the participants (50) prefer all 12 of the target stimuli and the other half 
prefer none of them 
3. All of the 50 participants who did not recognise the stimuli account for all of the 
60 who prefer them. 
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In the context of figure 6.5, these findings would lead to the conclusion that both 
recognition and preference are exactly equivalent to chance and, as such, exposure is 
found to have no effect whatsoever (figure 6.4: quadrant A). However, these results 
actually reflect the largest possible fully non-conscious MEE; i.e. that every single 
participant who did not recognise the target stimulus also preferred it (figure 6.4: 
quadrant C). The underlying criticism, therefore, is that comparing the mean frequency 
rates of preference and recognition in studies of this nature may lead to type II error. As 
such, the validity of the forced-choice approach in measuring the MEE may require 
within-subject analysis to reveal the nature and extent of the relationship between affect 
and recognition. For example, two new dependent variables might be created during 
data analysis to reflect the mean frequency with which the target stimulus is preferred in 
the presence and absence of recognition respectively. In the illustration above the mean 
preference rate under these two conditions would be 0% and 100% respectively; thus 
revealing the entirely non-conscious nature of the MEE in this hypothetical example.  
 
In order to ensure the validity of the forced-test approach in this study, therefore, and to 
facilitate the comparisons required to test proposition 2 (see table 5.1, page 176), reports 
of stimulus preference will be refined into four dependent variables; reflecting the rate at 
which this occurs for both the target and non-target brand names in the presence and 
absence of recognition respectively. To test proposition 3, these variables will then be 
further refined to reflect preference rates in the presence and absence of confident, 
contextualised recollection when this is associated with both accurate and inaccurate 
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recognition. Alongside supraliminal perception these two aspects of memory (i.e. 
objective recognition and subjective recollection) effectively constitute the conditions 
under which this study seeks to investigate the influence of mere exposure on affective 
response, and as such the independent variables. The means by which these are defined, 
manipulated and measured constitutes an important issue in itself, and is therefore 
discussed in the section below.  
 
6.3. Defining and manipulating the independent variables 
 
In order to test the hypotheses stated at the beginning of chapter 5 (see table 5.1, page 
176), it is necessary to manipulate four independent variables within this study: 
1. Perception during the exposure phase; i.e. supraliminal rather than subliminal 
(all hypotheses) 
2. Objective recognition memory; i.e. presence versus absence (H2) 
3. Subjective recollection during the test phase; i.e. presence versus absence of 
clear, confident recollection for prior stimulus exposure (H3a, and H3b) 
4. Stimulus type; i.e. real-word versus pseudo-word brand names (H4, H5a and 
H5b) 
 
The last of these is manipulated entirely by way of experimental design; specifically, the 
selection of target, filler and distractor brand names so that half are real words and half 
pronounceable non-words (see chapter 5, section 5.4.2, page 189). However, in light of 
individual differences in perception and memory ability (see Miller, 1991; Bors and 
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MacLeod, 1996), and small variations in the computer hardware used by each 
participant,  the precise manipulation of these variables is not possible by way of 
experimental design alone; requiring supplementary measurement to identify the nature 
of these factors in each case. The critical considerations and decisions regarding the 
manipulation and measurement of perception, objective recognition and subjective 
recollection are discussed in the subsections below. 
 
6.3.1. Manipulating and measuring perception during exposure  
 
In chapter 2 (pages 29-31) it was acknowledged that, whilst subliminal exposure 
techniques have been universally employed to eliminate the influence of explicit 
memory in mere exposure research, the effect itself is not necessarily considered to be 
subliminal in nature. Rather, the MEE may be expected to occur whenever explicit 
memory for prior exposure is not present at test, regardless of the nature of perception. 
In the absence of direct evidence for this, however, it remains no more than a 
proposition; the testing of which constitutes a primary of objective of this thesis (see 
chapter 5, page 174). To this end, it is therefore necessary to manipulate exposure so 
that the target and distractor stimuli are just perceptible to participants (in line with 
Zajonc’s original definition of the MEE; see chapter 2, page 18).  
 
The methods that have been used to manipulate perception and attention in previous 
marketing research constitute a key theme of the critical discussion of this literature in 
chapter 4. In particular, this review highlights the numerous and potentially serious 
limitations associated with peripheral presentation in what might be termed the 
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incidental (rather than mere) exposure paradigm (e.g. Janiszewski, 1993; Shapiro, 1999; 
Fang et al. 2007). Furthermore, the lack of availability of eye-tracking technology for 
use in this experiment eliminates the opportunity to measure the exact length of time a 
stimulus remains in the periphery of attention and the extent to which it receives focal 
attention. With this in mind, the most effective means by which to manipulate 
perception in this study, and the one that is most commonly used in psychological mere 
exposure research (see Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004), is to closely control the 
duration of exposure by combining focal attention with extremely fleeting, masked 
presentation.  
 
In the context of this study, the necessity for equivalent and minimal supraliminal 
perception across the sample ideally requires the identification of a precise exposure 
duration that represents the liminal threshold for all participants. This is impossible, 
however, in the light of individual differences in perceptual ability (see Miller, 1991). 
Furthermore, even if it were possible to identify a ‘golden exposure duration’ at which 
all stimuli are just perceptible to all participants, the precise execution of this would 
require the use of a single computer and specialist software (such as Eprime or Matlab). 
Given resource, sampling and licensing constraints, such an approach would only be 
possible with an extremely small sample; a common limitation amongst previous 
marketing research (see chapter 4, page 160) that this study seeks to address. The use of 
a larger sample in this study, however, is dependent on the use of standard software that 
can be run simultaneously on multiple computers during group data collection sessions. 
Furthermore, whilst it is of course possible to identify an exposure duration at which all 
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participants would perceive the stimuli supraliminally, this would be likely to be 
relatively long in the light of variations in perceptual ability and apparatus performance. 
To explain; the duration would need to facilitate supraliminal processing for those at the 
lowest extreme of perceptual ability, and to account for variations in computer speed 
and monitor refresh rates across the sample. As such, this approach may be expected to 
give rise to extensive supraliminal perception in a significant number of participants; a 
condition that is not necessarily in line with Zajonc’s (1968) original definition of mere 
exposure as that which is just perceptible. Furthermore, minimal supraliminal perception 
also plays an important role in restricting the degree to which memory is encoded during 
exposure, and thus retrieved at test. It is therefore a key method of reducing the extent to 
which preference judgments are made under conditions of stimulus recollection, without 
the need for extensive time delays (as will be discussed on page 251). 
 
In light of this, an approach was utilised that combines exposure duration control with 
measurement of the subjective perceptual experience of each participant. Crucially in 
this respect, an extensive pretesting phase was undertaken to establish an exposure 
duration at which the majority (approximately 80%) of the sample could be expected to 
experience the exposure phase supraliminally (as will be explained on page 273). The 
fact that a minority of participants might be expected to perceive the stimuli 
subliminally confers two potential benefits in the context of this study. Firstly, it 
indicates that where supraliminal exposure occurs, it is likely to be relatively close to the 
liminal threshold. Secondly, should the expected proportion of participants perceive the 
exposure phase subliminally (approximately 20%), it would provide the opportunity to 
validate previous psychological findings of a larger MEE under these conditions. Whilst 
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this does not constitute a primary objective of the study, it may nonetheless provide a 
useful additional dimension in which to contextualise the results in relation to previous 
evidence for the non-conscious MEE (see chapter 2, page 21). With this in mind, 
therefore, and on the basis of pretesting (see page 273), a presentation time of 50ms was 
set for each stimulus. Whilst it is acknowledged that the actual duration of exposure may 
differ slightly (as MS Powerpoint software is not designed to be accurate to the 
millisecond level), it is important to note that it is the outcome, and not the duration 
itself, that is important in this study. As such, participants were required to report their 
subjective experience of perception during the exposure phase; an aspect of 
measurement that is discussed in more detail below. 
 
6.3.1.1. Identifying supraliminal versus subliminal perception during exposure 
 
As noted in chapter 5 (page 171), the overarching aim of this study is to investigate the 
existence, size and nature of the MEE in a marketing context, and under conditions of 
supraliminal perception. Given the likely individual differences in perceptual ability 
(see Miller, 1991) and minor but potentially influential variations in the speed of the 
computers used in this study, it is not possible to identify a single exposure duration that 
ensures perception occurs just above the liminal threshold for all participants. Rather, it 
is necessary to supplement an exposure duration that maximises the extent to which this 
occurs in the sample with specific identification of the cases in which it does not. To this 
end, measurement of the subjective experience of perception was incorporated into the 
experimental design. The key considerations, decisions and assumptions in this respect 
are summarised in figure 6.6, and discussed in more detail below. 
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Figure 6.6: Identifying the subliminal versus supraliminal nature of perception during exposure 
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With reference to figure 6.6, consideration was first given to when and with what 
precision participants should be required to report their subjective experience of 
perception during the exposure phase. In this respect, it is acknowledged that the most 
precise identification of the nature and extent of perception would require measurement 
immediately following the presentation of each brand name in each of the three 
exposure sequences. Such an approach, however, would give rise to an extremely long 
and contrived exposure phase, significantly increasing the likelihood that the MEE will 
be eliminated by boredom and fatigue (Bornstein et al., 1990). Furthermore, the 
requirement to regularly and frequently engage in evaluation during exposure would 
severely undermine the passive nature of this phase, raising the level of attention, 
engagement and involvement and thus reducing the validity of the experiment as a 
means by which to study the effects of mere exposure to marketing stimuli. In response 
to this, an alternative option was selected whereby participants would be required to 
report their subjective experience of perception in relation to the exposure phase in 
general, and at the end of the experiment. It is acknowledged that the validity of this 
approach might be confounded to some extent by the fact that participants may perceive 
some stimuli but not others, and that their response is based on a memory-based 
judgment rather than current sensory experience. On balance, however, these potential 
limitations were adjudged to be outweighed by the problems described above in the 
context of this study (see appendix III for further technical discussion of this issue). 
 
The second key consideration in relation to this aspect of the experimental design 
relates to the measurement tool. In this respect, a dichotomous question was initially 
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considered to identify whether or not participants generally perceived the exposed 
stimuli subliminally or supraliminally. During qualitative discussions in the first phase 
of piloting and presting, however, differences were observed in the meaning that 
participants attached to this concept. For example, whilst some reported the perception 
of isolated letters within words as supraliminal, others regarded the fact that they were 
unable to consciously identify the words as a whole as an indication of subliminal 
perception. In order to address this, and on the basis of qualitative discussions during 
piloting, the scale was extended to incorporate the four points illustrated in figure 6.6 
(page 247). The purpose of this was to facilitate more precise reporting during data 
collection, and to minimise the need for participants to evaluate the degree to which 
their experience should be described as subliminal or supraliminal. 
 
At this point, however, it is important to stress that the critical underlying aspect of all 
hypotheses in this study is the absence of subliminal perception (see table 5.1, page 
176); a condition that is associated with points 2, 3 and 4 on the scale in figure 6.6 (page 
247).  For the purpose of testing these hypotheses, therefore, the scale may be collapsed 
into two categories during data analysis; subliminal (point 1) and supraliminal (points 2, 
3 and 4). Indeed, it might be argued that this is necessary if the approach is to 
effectively minimise the limitations it was designed to address. To explain; it may be 
tempting to interpret each point on the scale as directly relating to a level of perception; 
ranging from subliminal through varying degrees of strength in relation to supraliminal 
perception. However, to analyse the data at this level would defeat the objective of the 
scale and give rise to the same limitation as that initially associated with the 
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dichotomous question; namely a lack of equivalence in conceptual understanding of 
each category amongst participants. As a result it is important to stress that the purpose 
of the four-point scale was to reduce the need for participants to make a complex 
judgment on the meaning of perception, and thus ensure greater equivalence of meaning 
across the sample. This is only achieved if the scale is then collapsed into one which 
simply distinguishes subliminal from supraliminal perception, regardless of the degree 
to which the latter has been deemed to occur. 
 
As mentioned previously, however, whilst the manipulation of minimal supraliminal 
perception constitutes a necessary condition in its own right, it also provides one 
method by which another important condition is manipulated in this study; recognition 
memory. The critical aspects of definition, manipulation and measurement of this third 
and final independent variable are discussed in the subsection below. 
 
6.3.2. Manipulating and measuring stimulus recognition at test 
 
As illustrated in table 5.1 (page 176), the testing of hypotheses in relation to 
propositions 2 and 3 requires the creation of two memory conditions; the presence and 
absence of accurate stimulus recognition, and the presence and absence of subjective 
recollection (see figure 6.7, below). In a similar vein to the approach described above, 
all of these conditions were engineered by a combination of experimental design (to 
foster the likelihood of the condition occurring in the experiment) and measurement (to 
identify the specific cases in which it does appear to have occurred). The key aspects of 
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the approach in relation to each pair of conditions (i.e. the presence versus absence of 
objective recognition and subjective recollection respectively) are discussed below. 
 
Figure 6.7: Memory conditions under which exposure-induced affect change will 
be tested (propositions 2 and 3) 
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6.3.2.1. Manipulating the likelihood of memory for exposure to the target stimuli 
 
In section 6.3.1 (page 243) it was noted that the use of extremely fleeting stimulus 
presentation during the exposure phase may be expected to limit the extent to which 
explicit memory encoding occurs at the point of perception. In this respect, higher levels 
of conscious perception are likely to lead to greater encoding of explicit memory for the 
stimulus exposures. In other words, the degree to which explicit memory encoding 
occurs might be expected to weaken with the extent of supraliminal perception, and to 
be eliminated by subliminal perception. In order to ensure that a sufficient number of 
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preference judgments were made in the absence of accurate recognition, however, and 
in the light of both individual differences in memory ability (see Bors and MacLeod, 
1996) and the relatively short delay between exposure and test (11 mins), it was 
necessary to supplement efforts to ensure minimal supraliminal perception with 
measures to further limit the encoding and retrieval of explicit memory. 
 
Firstly, and with specific regard to encoding during exposure, each stimulus was 
accompanied by pre and post-masks designed to ‘cut-off’ processing as soon the 
stimulus disappeared from the visual field, and thus prevent continued elaboration. 
Secondly, each exposure sequence contained 12 distractor stimuli (non-target brand 
names) and 12 target brand names. The purpose of this was to restrict attempts to create 
and sustain explicit memory for the latter by doubling the number of items in each 
sequence.  Further to this, four filler tasks were used to increase processing demands 
with regard to encoding and retrieval in explicit memory. Two of these tasks were 
designed to engage participants in intensive encoding of extraneous stimuli, and were 
placed between the three exposure sequences. In addition to reducing the extent of 
encoding, these tasks also served to provide respite from the attentional demands of 
each exposure sequence (reducing the likelihood of fatigue). The other two tasks were 
located between the final exposure sequence and the preference judgment task and were 
designed to engage participants in intensive retrieval of these irrelevant stimuli. The 
purpose of this was to create a period of delay between exposure and test during which 
memory resources were actively engaged in an extraneous task; thus increasing the 
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likelihood of degradation in explicit memory for target stimulus exposure. This outcome 
was further facilitated by additional distractions and time delays associated with: 
a) the completion of an unrelated questionnaire between the exposure and test 
phases; 
b) the completion of two practice preference judgment trials prior to the task itself; 
and 
c) reading and comprehension of on-screen instructions for all filler and test phase 
tasks. 
 
As with perception, however, the capacity for encoding and retrieval varies between 
individuals (see Bors and MacLeod, 1996). As such, subsequent measurement was then 
necessary to identify the specific memory conditions under which each preference 
judgment was made by each participant. With regard to the hypotheses stated at the 
beginning of the previous chapter (see table 5.1, page 176), this required the 
identification of objective recognition memory (H2) and specifically the extent to which 
this was based on clear, contextualised recollection of the stimulus exposure (H3a and 
H3b). The key considerations, decisions and elements of the approach in this respect are 
illustrated in figure 6.8 and discussed in the subsections below. 
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Figure 6.8: Measuring the presence and absence of recognition and recollection 
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6.3.2.2 Measuring the presence and absence of stimulus recognition and 
recollection 
 
As an initial step in the measurement of recognition memory, participants were required 
to complete a task consisting of 12 two-factor forced choice tests, relating to each of the 
12 stimulus pairs. At the beginning of this task they were informed that, for each choice 
pair, one of the brand names had been presented in the exposure phase and asked to 
identify which one this was. Participants were instructed to always make a choice, and 
to guess if they could not remember. The main benefit of a 2-factor forced choice test as 
a measure of recognition in mere exposure research is that it enables (and indeed 
encourages) participants to demonstrate the full range of recognition memory for the 
target, from clear, explicit memory to a vague sense of having seen it before. It therefore 
avoids the need for self-reporting and eliminates potential inconsistency between 
participants as to their perceptions of what constitutes ‘memory’. For example, during a 
self-report memory task, two people may have a feeling that they have seen the target 
before, but are not entirely sure about this. One of these people may have a confident 
and assertive disposition that encourages them to trust their instincts, be bold and clearly 
state that they can remember it. The other one may have a nervous disposition that leads 
them to decide not to run the risk of ‘getting it wrong’ and to state that they don’t 
actually remember seeing either of the two stimuli presented at test. Self-report 
measures of memory, and particularly those that are based on dichotomous questions, 
may therefore be confounded by individual differences amongst participants. 
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Furthermore, the processes of implicit memory (on which the influential cognition-
based theories of mere exposure are founded; see chapter 2, page 46) may be reflected 
in a tendency to select the target as having been seen before (as a result of enhanced 
processing fluency) without conscious awareness of this (Mandler et al., 1987; 
Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994). The presence of this may only be revealed, 
therefore, when participants are forced to make an apparent guess between two or more 
stimuli.  
 
However, whilst the initial forced-choice tests indicate the objective accuracy of 
recognition memory, it is important to stress that these results do not necessarily reveal 
the extent to which the judgment is based on explicit recollection (Mandler 1980); a 
critical variable in the testing of P3 (see table 5.1, page 176). In order to distinguish 
recollection-based recognition from that which is based on a vague sense of familiarity 
or guessing it is perhaps useful to draw on Tulving’s (1985) distinction between 
retrieval-based and familiarity-based recognition as essentially akin to ‘remembering’ 
and ‘knowing’. On the basis that it facilitates the identification of “recollection on one 
hand, and the familiarity in the absence of recollection on the other,” Algarabel and 
Pitarque (2007: 478) note that the remember-know methodology has been extensively 
adopted in memory research. Furthermore, the authors draw attention to the two factors 
by which each type of recognition has been distinguished in this literature; context and 
confidence. The former refers to the extent to which contextual details of the exposure 
can be remembered, whilst the latter relates to the subjective experience of memory. 
The presence of either or both of these factors may be expected to indicate recognition 
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by way of explicit retrieval, rather than familiarity in the absence of recollection. With 
this in mind, therefore, recollection is operationally defined in the current study as the 
confident, context-specific, conscious experience of memory for having seen the target 
stimulus during the exposure phase of the experiment (in line with Lee, 2001b; Wang 
and Chang, 2004).  
 
On this basis, participants were first required to make a memory judgment as to which 
of the two brand names was presented during the exposure phase of the experiment. 
Following each choice, a measure of confidence in this judgment was applied. To this 
end, consideration was first given to the addition of a dichotomous (yes/no) question to 
identify whether or not participants believed each recognition judgment to be based on 
clear, contextualised recollection of the stimulus exposure. However, this was rejected 
on the basis that it relies heavily on subjective understanding of the concept of 
recollection amongst participants. In line with the measurement of perception 
(discussed in section 6.3.1.1, above), therefore, confidence scales were adopted to allow 
participants to report the nature of their memory with more precision, and express 
varying degrees of certainty/uncertainty with regard to each memory judgment (as 
recommended by Castelli and Zogmaister, 2000). In this respect, a five-point scale was 
initially considered (see figure 6.9a, page 259) but rejected on the basis that a neutral 
point (e.g. neither confident nor unconfident) is illogical in the context of this question 
(i.e. that a lack of confidence must, by definition, reflect a degree of uncertainty). 
Instead, the simple three point-scale illustrated in figure 6.9b (page 259) was originally 
developed to facilitate a distinction between judgments that were made under conditions 
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of certainty, some uncertainty and no degree of certainty at all (i.e. guessing). During 
the first phase of piloting, however, differences in participant understanding became 
apparent with regard to the notion of ‘certainty’. In this respect, group discussion 
revealed that participants who had a clear sense that they had seen one of the stimuli 
previously, but were not fully confident in their memory judgment, had expressed this 
in different ways.  Whilst some decided that this degree of assuredness constituted 
‘certainty’ others adjudged it to reflect ‘some uncertainty’. As such, an extended four-
point scale (figure 6.9c, page 259) was designed and applied in subsequent phases of the 
piloting process (see section 6.7, page 270) to facilitate more precise reporting during 
data collection. Over the course of these phases, qualitative feedback indicated that 
points 1 and 2 essentially reflect recollection-based recognition memory. In this respect, 
the degree of uncertainty that underpinned responses at point 2 was revealed to be 
extremely small in most cases. By contrast, whilst point 3 may reflect relatively weak, 
but nonetheless conscious, memory for having encountered the stimulus previously, 
pilot participants were usually unable to identify the exposure phase as the context in 
which this occurred with any degree of certainty; often referring instead to a general 
sense of familiarity that suggested to them that the stimulus they selected was probably 
the one that was presented previously. As such, whilst it is acknowledged that both a 
vague sense of familiarity and accurate ‘guesses’ that are unaccompanied by any sense 
of contextualised memory may or may not reflect implicit memory for prior stimulus 
exposure, neither appear to be the product of the subjective sense of recollection 
referred to in P3. By contrast, whilst points 1 and 2 provide a means by which 
participants may report their subjective experience of memory (to varying degrees), 
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both types of response may be considered to reflect relatively confident, contextualised 
recollection of prior exposure. In this respect, therefore, it is important to stress that 
points 1 and 2 are not necessarily designed to facilitate discrimination between different 
degrees of recollection but rather to remove the need for participants to make a 
judgment as to the degree of confidence necessary for them to report explicit memory. 
For the purposes of analysis, therefore, these may be collapsed to provide a measure of 
subjective recollection. 
 
Figure 6.9: Development of self-report scales for the identification of recollection 
 
a) Initial five-point semantic differential scale (rejected prior to piloting) 
 
        1                              2                           3                            4                            5 
Very certain       Quite certain       Neither certain       Quite uncertain      Very 
uncertain 
               nor uncertain 
 
 
b) Original three-point scale (rejected during piloting) 
 
     1                    2                       3        
Certain               Uncertain                  Guess        
 
 
c) Final four-point scale (successfully piloted and adopted in the main experiment) 
 
     1                       2                             3                            4                    
Certain               Quite sure             Quite unsure               Guess 
 
 
 
In summary, therefore, objective recognition and subjective recollection are measured 
by way of an approach that combines forced-choice judgments with confidence scale 
data to optimize the potential benefits of both performance effects on a memory task 
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and self-reporting of the qualitative nature of the memory. To explain; whenever 
participants choose the target stimulus in a two-factor forced-choice memory task, this 
may or may not be the result of a number of factors; including explicit recollection, a 
vague but conscious sense of familiarity alone, an implicit approach tendency on the 
basis of processing fluency or simply a lucky guess. As such, the additional confidence 
rating attached to each choice enables participants to indicate the degree to which this 
decision was based on a clear, contextualized sense of recollection for the prior 
exposures. Furthermore, whilst an absence of genuine explicit memory may be assumed 
when participants choose the non-target stimuli in a forced-choice test of recognition, it 
does not necessarily eliminate the possibility of a false sense of recollection. The 
subjective nature of this raises the possibility that it may still hinder the non-conscious 
misattribution of processing fluency to affect, and thus the MEE (see Mandler et al., 
1987, and Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994). As such, the inclusion of an 
additional confidence scale also provides the opportunity to explore the extent to which 
this occurs in the current study. 
 
6.4. The purpose and design of filler tasks 
 
As indicated in the previous section, five filler tasks were employed during the course 
of this experiment. A brief summary of these is provided in table 6.1 below. 
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Table 6.1: Summary of the 5 filler tasks used in this experiment 
 
Filler 
Task 
Participants required to . . . Approx duration 
(inc. instructions) 
Location in 
experiment 
1 Memorise a list of 10 shapes 
in one minute 
2 mins Between exposure 
sequences 1 & 2 
2 Memorise a list of 10 animals 
in one minute 
2 mins Between exposure 
sequences 2 & 3 
3 Complete an unrelated 
questionnaire 
5 mins Between exposure 
and test phases 
4 Recall the previous list of 10 
shapes in one minute 
2 mins Between exposure 
and test phases 
5 Recall the previous list of 10 
shapes in one minte 
2 mins Between exposure 
and test phases 
 
The purpose of the initial encoding tasks (1 and 2) was two-fold. Firstly, they were used 
to create a consistent time delay between each of the exposure sequences. In this 
respect, the tasks facilitated three exposure sequences, with a delay of approximately 2 
minutes between them.  To some extent, this delay replicates real world conditions in 
which there are often short gaps between stimulus exposures (e.g. repeated TV or online 
advertisements, billboards/posters displayed at intervals along a route, etc.). 
Furthermore, and from a practical perspective, division of the exposure sequences 
minimises the risk of fatigue, boredom, discomfort and divided attention. These factors 
would be much more likely to occur if participants were asked to view a single 
sequence in which each of the 24 brand names was presented 3 times. Such a sequence 
would require participants to focus and concentrate on flashing imagery for an unbroken 
period of 90 seconds. The filler tasks facilitated the division of this into three short 
sequences in which each brand name was presented once. Participants were therefore 
required to concentrate their attention on the flashing imagery for just 30 seconds at any 
one time, and were then provided with a two-minute ‘break’ in which they were actively 
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engaged in another task. Secondly, the requirement to actively and intensively engage in 
an explicit memory task immediately after each exposure sequence was designed to 
make it extremely difficult for participants to dwell on the target brand names (i.e. to 
prevent them from elaborating upon and reinforcing explicit memory for these stimuli). 
To further disrupt this process, participants were told they would be asked to recall the 
filler task items later in the experiment. As such, they were required to maintain their 
memory for the encoded shapes and animals whilst they viewed the remaining exposure 
sequences and then completed an unrelated questionnaire. Participants were then 
required to engage in active and intensive free recall of the shapes and animals they had 
previously encoded, prior to completing the test phase of the experiment.  
 
Taken together therefore, these filler tasks facilitated periods of delay in which 
conscious, explicit memory resources were intensively occupied in extraneous 
activities. The overall aim was to reduce the availability of these resources for the 
processing of target stimuli during the exposure and test phases of the experiment. 
Further to this, the tasks were also designed to introduce participants to the 
automatically-timed nature of the experiment, and the notion that they were required to 
complete each task within the time limit stated on the screen. Thus, they were intended 
to prepare participants for making rapid, timed decisions in the preference and 
recognition tasks that constitute the primary dependent measures in this experiment. 
Similarly, the filler tasks were designed to address the initial nervousness, apprehension 
and lack of confidence that was sometimes evident during the piloting of the experiment 
(and indeed prior to the actual experiment itself). In this respect it is important to 
recognise that experimental conditions can lead to a feeling amongst participants that 
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their knowledge or ability is being tested. The desire to ‘pass’ this test, and the 
apprehension and fear regarding the unknown nature of it, may in turn lead to a 
relatively high degree of involvement during the experiment. The natural tendency for 
this to occur in the early stages of the experiment is not necessarily problematic, as the 
exposure phase is designed to limit the opportunity, rather than the motivation, for 
conscious, elaborative processing. Indeed, a high level of involvement may actually be 
seen as beneficial at this point, as it is likely to ensure that participants follow the on-
screen instructions carefully and focus attention on the screen throughout the exposure 
sequences. However, in order to replicate the low involvement conditions under which 
the MEE may be most likely to influence real-world consumer decisions (see chapter 3, 
page 115) it is important that the subsequent test phase is completed under conditions of 
low involvement. In this respect, whilst the timed nature of the preference judgments 
restricted the opportunity to elaborate at this stage, it was also important to ensure that 
participants did not feel a heightened sense of risk, fear or apprehension during the test 
phase. With this in mind, the filler tasks were designed to be relatively short and easy to 
complete, with a view to minimising boredom and building confidence in participants 
prior to the test phase. This was especially important with regard to the first filler task. 
For this reason, the stimuli for this task were selected on the basis that they were simple, 
regular, familiar shapes that could be depicted both verbally and pictorially. This 
enabled participants to use a choice of strategies to memorise the equivalent pictorial 
and verbal stimuli in this task. Subsequently, the pictorial cues were removed from the 
second filler task to marginally increase the level of difficulty, and ensure that explicit 
memory processing was engaged in relation to the same type of (lexical) stimuli used in 
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the exposure and test phases of the experiment. The selection of shapes and animals for 
these tasks was made on the basis that they are commonly used in the branding and 
advertising of consumer products, and thus might be seen to be relevant by participants 
in the context of a study into perception, memory and preference for brand stimuli.  
 
In summary, therefore, the filler tasks in this experiment were designed to minimise the 
likelihood of participants explicitly recalling the presentation of target brand names; a 
possibility that was already restricted by extremely short presentation durations, the 
presence of 12 distractor stimuli and the masking of all 24 brand names in the exposure 
phase. The inclusion of these additional tasks was necessary due to the relatively short 
delay between exposure and test; an issue that is in itself subject to some complex 
considerations and, as such, is discussed in more detail below. 
 
6.5. Length of delay between study and test 
 
The length of the delay between exposure and test was not specifically measured, but 
piloting of the experiment indicated that it was approximately 11 minutes on average. In 
the context of implicit priming research this is a relatively short period, and may be seen 
to have some limitations. For example, it is argued by some researchers that a relatively 
long delay between exposure and test (e.g. weeks, Shapiro, 1999; and even years, 
Mitchell, 2006) may be expected to result in the deterioration (and ultimately 
elimination) of explicit but not implicit memory. As such, changes in the dependent 
variable may be more clearly linked to the latter after long delays as this is all that 
remains for the exposure phase. However, whilst higher levels of explicit memory might 
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be expected in relation to studies that utilize short delays (i.e. minutes), there are a 
number of compelling theoretical and practical reasons for selecting this approach; not 
least of which is the fact that there is still no broad consensus as to how long implicit 
memory effects may persist (see chapter 2, page 34). Given this, it is perhaps prudent to 
assume that implicit memory may be relatively short-lived under experimental 
conditions at least. Furthermore, it should be stressed that the rate of depreciation in 
explicit memory is subject to individual differences (see Bors and MacLeod, 1996), and 
that natural degradation is not the only means by which explicit memory for stimulus 
exposures might be diminished or even eliminated. Indeed, it may be argued that such 
an outcome might be more effectively achieved by a more proactive and controlled 
approach in this respect.  
 
With this in mind, a number of steps were taken to reduce the extent to which 
participants were able to consciously remember stimuli from the exposure sequences 
during the test phase, as discussed in the preceding sections. Additionally, and in 
relation to experimental control, administering the test phase within the same session as 
the exposure phase confers a number of other important methodological benefits. For 
example, it helps to ensure that the experimental conditions are largely identical 
between the two phases, and between participants. Secondly, it prevents contamination 
of the results by participants discussing the exposure phase, informally ‘testing’ each 
other, reminding or informing each other of which stimuli they had seen and speculating 
as to the purpose of the experiment. This was deemed to be particularly likely in this 
study, given that all participants are drawn from a close student body and thus have 
regular contact outside of the experiment. Finally, and from a practical perspective, 
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arranging for 240 participants to attend two phases of the experiment on two separate 
occasions (days, or even weeks, apart) would be likely to result in a large non-response 
rate and would thus require a much larger sample. In addition, co-ordinating resources 
such as research assistants, rooms and computer equipment on two separate occasions 
would have greatly increased the practical difficulties of completing the study.  
 
In summary, therefore, a relatively short delay was selected on the grounds of 
theoretical and empirical evidence, alongside the requirements of experimental control, 
the practical considerations of sampling and the availability of resources. However, the 
specific length of this delay was dependent on the nature and duration of the filler and 
experimental tasks, and limitations on the length of the experiment overall. The 
interdependencies between these factors, and their various impacts on the reliability and 
validity of the study, are numerous and complex; as will be discussed in the following 
section. 
  
6.6. Number of items/trials and length of tasks, delay & the experiment as a whole 
 
The number of items and trials in each task, the duration of these tasks, the length of 
delay between exposure and test, and the experiment duration as a whole are connected 
by a series of interdependent relationships. Not only do these factors influence each 
other, they ultimately impact upon the reliability and validity of the results in this 
experiment. These interdependencies and the ways in which they might influence the 
reliability and validity of results are illustrated in figure 6.10, and discussed in more 
detail below. 
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Figure 6.10: Interdependent influence of items, trials, task duration, delay and experiment length on reliability and validity  
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With regard to figure 6.10, increasing the number of trials in the experimental task has, 
in itself, been identified as a means by which to enhance the reliability of results in 
implicit memory research (Buchner and Brandt, 2003). Furthermore, expanding the 
number of items in the filler tasks increases the explicit memory resources required; 
thus reducing those available for encoding, maintaining and retrieving the target stimuli. 
In turn, this raises the number of preference judgments made in the absence of 
recollection, resulting in a larger data set for analysis and enhanced reliability of results.  
 
However, increasing the number of trials, by implication, extends the length of time for 
which participants are engaged in each task; a factor that may ultimately limit the 
reliability and, perhaps also, the validity of results. Firstly, given that both the stimuli 
and the tasks themselves are designed to be very simple (rather than complex, 
stimulating or challenging), longer tasks may enhance the likelihood of boredom and 
fatigue effects (Bornstein et al., 1990). In the context of this experiment these may 
become manifest in lower response rates and higher rates of incomplete response, 
limiting the size of the data set for analysis and thus the reliability of results. 
Furthermore, boredom and fatigue may also lead to a lack of attention and motivation 
for information processing throughout the experiment. In simple terms, this may lead to 
misunderstanding of the task instructions and thus limitations regarding the validity of 
these tasks. More importantly perhaps, such limitations may also arise if the degree of 
attention varies widely between participants in the exposure phase in particular. In this 
respect, increasing the number of trials in the experimental tasks would, by implication, 
inflate the number of stimuli (items) in the exposure sequences, and thus the length of 
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time for which continuous attention is required. However, the extremely rapid 
presentation of dozens of flashing white images on a black background is likely to place 
a significant degree of visual strain on participants, and so full attention cannot be 
expected to be maintained over long periods of time. The selection of too many trials for 
the experimental tasks could therefore result in overly long exposure sequences and 
variations in the degree to which mere exposure occurs between participants. 
 
Finally, increasing the length of the filler and experimental tasks (to accommodate more 
items/trials) may have important implications for the length of delay between the 
exposure and test phases, and/or the length of the experiment as a whole. In this respect, 
it is important to reiterate that maximising the delay between exposure and test is an 
important element of the strategy to minimise explicit memory during the test phase, 
and thus enhance the reliability of results. Given the need to limit the overall duration of 
the experiment (and thus prevent the boredom and fatigue effects discussed above), 
therefore, it is also important to recognise that extending the filler tasks (during the 
exposure phase) and the experimental tasks (during the test phase) would require the 
shortening of this delay. In this respect, increasing the number of items/trials may thus 
serve to reduce the reliability of results overall. With all of this in mind, it was 
acknowledged that both reliability and validity in this experiment will be maximized by 
the identification of an optimum balance between the number of items/trials in each 
task, the length of each task, the delay between exposure and test and the length of the 
experiment as a whole. To this end, these factors were all considered in during an 
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extensive period of piloting and pretesting; the process and results of which are 
discussed in the following section.  
 
6.7. Piloting, pretesting and refining the experimental procedure 
 
As indicated in previous sections, extensive piloting and pretesting of the experiment 
was undertaken for a number of important reasons. At a general level, and as the 
experiment was designed to run without the need for intervention by a researcher, this 
was necessary to ensure clarity and equivalence of meaning with regard to all 
instructions and the validity of self-report scales (regarding perception and recognition 
confidence). Further to this, however, careful piloting was also required in relation to 
task timings, the number of items/trials and the duration of each task. Taken together, 
these factors have implications for the length of the exposure and test phases, and thus 
the length of the experiment overall (see section 6.6, page 266); all of which were 
monitored to ensure the experiment did not become overly long. This was determined 
by pilot participant reports regarding their subjective experience of the experiment (and 
in particular feelings of boredom, fatigue or frustration) and the practical considerations 
of running two data collection sessions within a two-hour period. In addition, and as 
indicated previously in this chapter, two important elements of the experimental 
procedure were also pretested: 
1. The likely impact of stimulus presentation duration on the nature of perception 
in the exposure phase (see page 243) 
  271 
2. The likely impact of the entire experimental design on recognition for the 
stimulus exposures (see page 250) 
 
The purpose of this section, therefore, is to explain the process by which the 
experimental procedure was piloted, pretested and refined prior to the main experiment. 
As a starting point, it should be noted that this was undertaken in five phases to 
facilitate incremental changes to the experimental design where necessary. In each 
phase the full experiment was completed by 10 different participants prior to a 
qualitative discussion of their subjective experience during the experiment. As such, the 
piloting and pretesting phase was undertaken with a total of 50 participants, all of whom 
were members of the target population and none of whom subsequently participated in 
the main study. The key elements of the experimental design in each phase, and 
indicative results regarding the nature of perception and recognition, are illustrated in 
table 6.2 and discussed further in the subsections below. 
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Table 6.2: Summary of experimental designs during 5 phases of pretesting 
 
Design element Phase 
1 
Phase 
2 
Phase 
3 
Phase 
4 
Phase 
5 
No. of pretest participants (n) 10 10 10 10 10 
Timings for each stimulus exposure: 
     Blank screen 
     Pre-mask 
     Brand name 
     Post-mask 
     Total  
 
1s 
100ms 
20ms 
100ms 
1.22s 
 
1s 
100ms 
30ms 
100ms 
1.23s 
 
1s 
100ms 
40ms 
100ms 
1.24s 
 
1s 
100ms 
50ms 
100ms 
1.25s 
 
1s 
100ms 
60ms 
100ms 
1.26s 
No. of items in exposure sequence: 
Target brand names 
Non-target brand names (Distractors) 
Total 
 
8 
8 
16 
 
12 
12 
24 
 
12 
12 
24 
 
12 
12 
24 
 
12 
12 
24 
Length of each exposure sequence 19.52s 24.6s 29.76s 30s 30s 
Timings for encoding filler tasks 90s 90s 60s 60s 60s 
Timings for retrieval filler tasks 90s 90s 60s 60s 60s 
Items for each filler task 15 12 10 10 10 
Additional filler task included? No No No Yes Yes 
Timings for preference task: 
Question screen 
Product category screens 
Brand name choice screens 
Times-up, next choice screens 
 
3s 
3s 
3s 
3s 
 
5s 
3s 
3s 
3s 
 
5s 
3s 
5s 
3s 
 
5s 
3s 
5s 
3s 
 
5s 
3s 
5s 
3s 
Trials for preference practice  task 2 2 2 2 2 
Length of preference practice task 21s 23s 27s 27s 27s 
Trials for preference judgment task 8 10 12 12 12 
Length of preference judgment task 75s 95s 137s 137s 137s 
Quantitative Indicators      
Mean recognition frequency: 
      Filler task (shapes) 
      Filler task (animals) 
      Target brand names 
Mean recognition rate (%): 
      Filler task (shapes) 
      Filler task (animals) 
      Target brand names 
 
11.5 
10.6 
5.4 
 
77 
71 
68 
 
9.5 
9.1 
5.9 
 
79 
76 
59 
 
8.2 
7.6 
6.7 
 
82 
76 
56 
 
8.1 
8.3 
6.4 
 
81 
83 
53 
 
7.9 
7.7 
6.8 
 
79 
77 
57 
Supraliminal perception frequency 4/10* 6/10 8/10 7/10 8/10 
 
*Perception was measured using a dichotomous yes/no question in the first phase, during which 
qualitative group discussion indicated that this may result in an underestimation of supraliminal 
perception. In this respect, some participants assumed that they must recognise a complete word to be 
able to report supraliminal perception, whilst others deemed this to have occurred if they simply saw 
some of the letters within the word. Measurement of this variable was therefore undertaken by way of a 
four-point scale in all subsequent phases (as explained in section 6.3.1.1, page 246). 
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6.7.1. Exposure duration and the nature of perception 
 
As discussed previously in this chapter, stimulus masking and exposure duration are 
central factors in the manipulation of both perception and recognition memory in this 
experiment. With this in mind, careful pretesting was undertaken in relation to the 
automated presentation timings for each element of the exposure sequences. To this end, 
initial exposure to the brand names was set at 20ms on the basis of previous findings of 
frequent subliminal perception below this point (see Cheesman and Merikle, 1984; 
Greene and Oliva, 2009). This was then increased by 10ms in each subsequent phase of 
pretesting. Whilst these incremental increases were not expected to result in a linear 
reduction in the rate of subliminal perception, the intention was to identify a point at 
which the great majority (approximately 80%) of the main sample could be expected to 
perceive the exposure sequences supraliminally. This approximate rate was apparent in 
relation to three consecutive exposure durations (i.e. 40ms, 50ms and 60ms). The mid-
point of these exposure durations (i.e. 50ms) was therefore selected for use in this study 
on the basis that supraliminal processing might still be expected to occur at roughly the 
same rate should variations in computer hardware cause the actual exposure duration to 
fluctuate slightly in either direction. 
 
Additionally, it should be noted that other presentation factors (i.e. the blank screen, 
pre-mask and post-mask) were presented for longer durations to facilitate a situation 
where the brand names were perceived to be embedded in a dynamic background, rather 
than simply one of a series of flashing images. This makes for a more comfortable 
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visual experience and focuses attention on the brand name exposures as the central 
element of this. Furthermore, the presentation times for the masking and interim screens 
were maintained throughout the pretest phase to provide a stable ‘background’ against 
which to assess changes in perception as a result of brand name exposure duration 
alone. 
 
6.7.2. Length of exposure sequences, experimental tasks and filler tasks 
 
Variations in the exposure duration (as discussed above) do of course have some small 
effect on the length of each exposure sequence overall, and thus the amount of time for 
which participants are required to pay continuous attention to the screen. However, the 
fact that these differences are measured in milliseconds means their impact is negligible. 
Rather, the main influence on the length of each exposure sequence is the number of 
target and distractor items (i.e. brand names) included within it. With this in mind, it is 
important to recognise that, given the visual strain and relatively unstimulating nature of 
the task, participants can only be expected to pay full, continuous attention to the screen 
for a relatively short period of time. As such, too many brand name presentations might 
result in overly long exposure sequences and thus variations in attention between 
participants.  
 
As noted previously, however, maximising the number of brand names (and thus trials 
in the test phase) is potentially an important factor in enhancing the reliability of mere 
exposure research (Buchner and Brandt, 2003). With this in mind, one objective of the 
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piloting and pretesting stage was to identify the optimum number of items in the 
exposure sequences and, by implication, trials for the experimental tasks. To this end, 
the exposure phase initially contained 16 brand names (half of which were targets and 
half distractors) and thus 8 paired-choice trials in each task of the test phase. At this 
point it is perhaps useful to reiterate that an even number of target and distractor stimuli 
were included in the exposure phase to facilitate the counterbalancing of the target 
stimuli in the test phase, and thus identify and address relative fluency effects that were 
not linked to mere exposure. However, whilst the relatively high brand name 
recollection rates observed at this first stage of pretesting may or may not reflect an 
insufficient number of stimuli, subsequent qualitative feedback indicated the potential 
for more brand names to be added. In this respect, participants reported that each 
exposure sequence seemed to be over very quickly and that they experienced no feeling 
of discomfort, boredom or fatigue throughout the experiment. In response, initial 
consideration was given to doubling the number of items (and thus trials) by including a 
second triad of brand names in each product category; an option that was discounted on 
the basis that an insufficient number of appropriate brand name triads were available for 
selection. In this respect, the maximum number of brand name triads that could be 
included in the experiment without unbalancing the representation of product categories 
and, more importantly, stimulus type was 12 (as explained in chapter 5, pages 202-205). 
As such, all of these were included in the second phase of pretesting (facilitating 
exposure sequences of 24 brand names and paired-choice tasks containing 12 trials) and 
maintained throughout subsequent phases of pretesting. Overall, this seemed to cause 
few problems to pilot participants although it should be noted that during group 
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discussions across the four phases, two participants reported some minor discomfort 
during the exposure sequences. In phase 3, one of these participants also reported a 
degree of frustration during the third exposure sequence and boredom towards the end 
of the experiment, although this was not widely experienced in the group. 
 
The expansion of the experiment to 24 brand names in the exposure phase and, as a 
result, 12 choice trials in each task of the test phase was initially determined by the 
limited number of appropriate brand name triads identified during stimulus pretesting. 
During the process of piloting and pretesting, however, it was subsequently found to 
reflect the maximum number of items for another important reason. Specifically, this 
number of brand name stimuli (and thus paired-choice trials) resulted in some pretest 
participants taking up to 25 minutes to complete the experiment. In addition to the 
increased potential for boredom and fatigue beyond this point, it was acknowledged that 
extending the overall duration of the experiment could eliminate the opportunity for two 
data collection sessions within the allocated two-hour period (see chapter 5, page 181). 
Whilst further stimulus pretesting, and the identification of more potential brand name 
triads, could therefore have been undertaken to increase the number of items/trials in the 
study, it was deemed to be unnecessary and perhaps even counterproductive in light of 
the extent to which this would increase the length of the experiment. 
 
In line with the experimental tasks, however, it is also important to acknowledge that 
the length of the filler tasks are also influenced by two factors; the number of items and 
the length of time participants are given to complete the task. The second of these was 
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automated to enhance the intensity of the task (and thus the focus of attentive resources) 
and control the pace (and thus the overall length) of the experiment (as discussed in 
section 6.6, page 266). Settings in relation to both of these factors were therefore piloted 
to optimise the effectiveness of the tasks in reducing explicit memory for the target 
brand names, whilst preventing boredom and fatigue within the experiment as a whole. 
To this end, participants in the initial phase of pretesting were required to encode or 
retrieve 15 items during a period of 90s for each of the four memory-based filler tasks. 
Whilst this appeared to fully engage explicit memory (with no participants successfully 
recalling all 15 items on the two tests), two important limitations were revealed during 
the subsequent group discussion. Firstly, some participants were daunted by having to 
memorise 15 items early in the experiment, and then another 15 items before they had 
chance to complete the memory retrieval test for the first set. They found it quite taxing 
and frustrating. Indeed, in response to this, one participant reported that he had decided 
to focus on just 10 of the items, ignoring the other 5, and was thus able to “switch off 
for the last 20 seconds or so” (Anon). Secondly, and on a similar note, two participants 
expressed the opinion that 90 seconds might feel like a long time for these relatively 
unstimulating tasks and, although they themselves had not experienced this, other 
participants may become bored. As a result, the number of items for each of the 
memory-based filler tasks was reduced to 12 in the second pretest phase, although the 
90-second time limit was maintained. The rationale for this was to explore the 
possibility that a more realistic challenge would engage participants more effectively for 
this amount of time. However, the qualitative feedback at this point was very similar to 
that of the first phase, especially in relation to the 90-second time period. Using a more 
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inductive approach, therefore, the design for phase three was inspired by the participant 
in phase one who had sought to memorise 10 items in approximately one minute. 
Subsequently, both recognition rates and qualitative discussion indicated that this was 
an appropriate design, and it was therefore maintained throughout the following two 
phases (with no further problems identified by participants). 
 
However, as a by-product of reducing the number of filler items (and thus the length of 
these tasks), the periods of time between the three exposure sequences, and the length of 
delay between the last of these and the beginning of the test phase, were reduced. Whilst 
the former does not necessarily constitute a problem (as a sufficient ‘break’ from 
exposure was still apparent), the latter might be seen to reduce the time period during 
which explicit memory for the both the filler task items and, more importantly, the 
target brand names might degrade prior to the test phase. Although this was not 
apparent in the quantitative indicators action was taken to ensure that, rather than 
reducing the length of the experiment, the time savings made in the completion of filler 
tasks were used to extend this interim period of delay. To this end, an additional filler 
task was placed in between the final exposure sequence and the first retrieval filler task, 
in the form of a simple questionnaire about an unrelated topic. This required some 
reflection on personal experience, was limited to two sides of a single page of A4 paper 
and took approximately 5 minutes to complete. Participants in the final two phases of 
pretesting reported that it was neither taxing nor frustrating, and indeed provide a 
welcome “time out” from the intensity of the computer-based tasks. As such, it served 
to provide: 
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a) a further active period of delay between the encoding and retrieval of filler task 
items, enhancing the difficulty of these tasks whilst avoiding the need for longer 
lists of items and longer task durations; 
b) an extended period of delay between the exposure and test phase of the 
experiment, increasing the likelihood of explicit memory decay for the target 
brand names (if indeed this had been encoded during the exposure sequences); 
and 
c) a break from the intensive, automated nature of the experiment and, in 
particular, from staring at the computer screen.  
 
6.7.3. Automated timings for the preference judgment task 
 
All of the screens in the preference judgment task were automatically timed for a 
number of reasons. The first, and most important, of these was to limit the degree of 
involvement in each choice decision via the use of time pressure (as will be discussed 
on page 291). In line with Chung and Szymanski (1997), the time limit for each 
judgment was set at 3-seconds during the first two phases of pretesting. However, over 
the course of the group discussions it became apparent that participants had barely 
processed the on-screen information before it was gone and they were being introduced 
to the next trial. As such, some participants reported that they tended to make rapid 
choices based on recent memory of the brand names that had just disappeared from the 
screen; a situation that could give rise to two problems in the main experiment. Firstly, 
the intensity of such a task could lead to participants falling behind, experiencing 
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frustration and failing to complete it fully. Secondly, given that the mere exposure effect 
refers specifically to stimulus-based responses (Zajonc, 1968; see Butler and Berry, 
2004), the influence of memory-based judgments could potentially be seen to invalidate 
the results of this study. As such, the time limit was increased to 5-seconds for the final 
three phases of pretesting and no further problems of this nature were reported. 
 
In addition to those relating to brand choice, all of the other screens in this task were 
automatically presented for 3-seconds in the first phase of pretesting. The purpose of 
this was to ensure that the experiment progressed relatively quickly (to prevent 
boredom) and at a uniform pace for all participants (to enhance control over the length 
of the experiment). In addition, the standardisation of all screen timings was intended to 
acclimatise participants to short, automated screen exposures (and thus the need to make 
rapid judgments) as quickly and effectively as possible. However, whilst this duration 
was appropriate for the product category and interim screens (which stated that the time 
was up for the previous choice and the next set of product category/choice pair screens 
were imminent), it was found to be potentially too rapid for the initial question screen. 
In this respect, a small number of participants in the first phase of pretesting felt that the 
question in the practice preference task had disappeared from the screen too quickly. 
Although they confirmed that they had indeed read and understood the question by the 
time they made their first preference judgment in the main task, these participants (for 
whom English was not their first language) expressed some discomfort about this aspect 
of the experiment. As such, presentation of the question screen in both the practice and 
main task was extended to 4-seconds in subsequent phases of pretesting and no further 
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problems of this nature were reported. Finally, the use of a two-trial practice task was 
consistently reported to be both sufficient and effective in introducing and acclimatising 
participants to the nature and conditions of the task. 
 
6.7.4. Finalising the experimental procedure 
 
In light of the process of piloting and pretesting described in this section (and 
summarised in table 6.2, page 272), the experimental design adopted during phase 4 was 
selected for use in the main experiment. The main reasons for this are that, during this 
phase: 
• The mean recognition rate for brand names (0.53) was relatively close to chance 
(0.5), indicating that a significant number of preference judgments in the main 
experiment could be expected to occur in the presence and absence of accurate 
recognition. 
• Supraliminal perception was evident for the majority of the group in this (7/10) 
and the two neighbouring phases (both 8/10); providing a ‘buffer’ against 
significantly different rates of perception occurring as a result of slight 
differences in the speed at which each computer operated during the main 
experiment, and potentially facilitating the comparison of subliminal and 
supraliminal mere exposure effects. 
• Mean recognition rates for the filler tasks were considerably below 100%, 
indicating that they were not so easy as to be successfully completed without the 
intensive engagement of explicit memory.  
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• Each task and the experiment as a whole appeared to be of a duration that 
facilitated the use of all 12 triads of equivalent stimuli that were generated 
during pretesting, and the practical execution of two group data collection 
phases within the necessary time period. 
• Participants completed the experiment fully and generally without feelings of 
boredom, fatigue, confusion, frustration or discomfort. 
 
In addition to the specific elements of research design discussed so far in this chapter, 
however, it is important to note that two further procedural issues are critical to the 
effectiveness of the experiment. These relate to the identification and minimization of 
presentation order effects, and the use of deception/disguise; each of which will be 
discussed in the remainder of this chapter. 
 
6.8. Minimising order of presentation effects: Randomisation, counterbalancing 
and controls 
 
In this experiment, it was considered important to recognise (and minimise) the 
potential for ordering effects in both the exposure and test phases. The first of these 
relates to the presentation order of the 24 brand names (12 targets + 12 distractors) 
during each of the three exposure sequences. The second relates to the order in which 
the brand choice pairs are presented in the preference and recognition tasks, and in 
which the two tasks themselves are undertaken. The potential problems associated with 
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ordering effects in each of these aspects - and the rationale for decisions taken in this 
respect - are discussed in the subsections below. 
 
6.8.1. Order of brand name presentation in the exposure sequences 
 
Given that the exposure phase involved three presentation sequences of 24 brand names 
(12 targets + 12 distractors), it was important to minimise the risk of systematic bias as 
a result of the order in which the stimuli were presented. For example, a standardised 
presentation order may result in consistently clear explicit memory for certain brand 
names, but not others, as result of the primacy or recency of their appearance in the 
sequence (Wedel and Pieters, 2000). To minimise this, steps were taken to randomize 
the order in which the 24 brand names were presented in each exposure sequence. 
Ideally in this respect, specialist software (such as MatLab or Eprime) would be used to 
randomly generate new presentation orders for each participant in both the exposure and 
test phases. Unfortunately, as noted previously (on page 244), licensing and sampling 
limitations prevented the use of these applications in the current study. In the absence of 
this option, therefore, an alternative approach was adopted that combines a degree of 
randomization with subsequent measurement to identify evidence of systematic bias. 
Specifically, three sequences of the 24 brand names were randomly generated using 
web-based computer software. These were built into the exposure phase of the 
experiment in the same way for all participants. As such, whilst each participant was 
exposed to the same three exposure sequences, each of these displayed the brand names 
in a different, randomly selected order. 
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It is acknowledged that that this may constitute a methodological limitation regarding 
the within-subject analysis in this experiment. In this sense, it may be argued that the 
fact that each participant was initially exposed to the same three sequences of brand 
names could give rise to primacy or recency effects on recognition (see Bower, 2005). 
Whilst the implication of this may simply be to alter the frequency (and thus perhaps the 
reliability) with which the MEE might be tested in the presence and absence of memory 
in this study, it should nonetheless be acknowledged as a potentially extraneous 
influence. However, it should be noted that none of the 24 brand names was 
systematically presented towards the beginning or end of all three sequences, and 
presentation position tended to vary considerably for most items. Furthermore, a by-
item analysis provides no evidence to suggest that target recognition rates were 
influenced by early or late presentation in the exposure phase as a whole (see appendix 
III for results and further discussion). As such, it is argued that the use of the same three 
randomly selected exposure sequences should not be considered to be a significant 
methodological limitation in this study.  
 
Additionally, it should be noted that, in addition to the practical benefits afforded by this 
approach (e.g. the facilitation of large-scale simultaneous data collection using standard 
computer software, and thus a much larger sample size), it also adds greater validity to 
the between-group analyses in this study. In this respect, it may be argued that the fact 
participants in the experimental and control conditions have been exposed to exactly the 
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same stimuli, in exactly the same order, enhances the comparability of recognition rates 
between these two groups. 
 
6.8.2. Presentation order of brand choice pairs in preference and recognition tasks 
 
In addition to the exposure sequences, it is acknowledged that presentation order effects 
in the two test phase tasks (i.e. preference and recognition) may also give rise to 
systematic bias in the results of this experiment. Given the use of 2-factor forced-choice 
tasks (featuring a target and novel filler brand name), systematic bias could arise as a 
result of: 
a) the order in which the 12 trials (i.e. the 12 brand name choice pairs) were 
presented in each task (e.g. as a result of increasing task competence or 
boredom/fatigue); and/or 
b) the left/right visual presentation of the brand names in each choice pair (e.g. as a 
result of hemispheric processing specialisation, and thus enhanced processing 
fluency for verbal stimuli in the right visual field; see Hellige, 1990). 
 
To eliminate the influence of the latter, the left/right visual presentation of the brand 
names in each choice pair was fully counterbalanced across the sample. The nature of 
the former, however, and thus the action required to minimize its influence, is similar to 
that relating to presentation order effects in the exposure phase (see section 6.8.1, 
above). In this respect, and in the absence of specialist software (e.g. Eprime), fully 
randomized sequencing of the 12 choice pairs would have required the manual 
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production of 240 different versions of the experiment within MS Powerpoint (i.e. one 
file for each participant, each containing randomly generated choice-pair ordering in the 
test phase). Given the time and resource constraints around this study, however, a more 
practical solution was developed on the basis of partial randomization. Specifically, 20 
different versions of the experiment were manually constructed in MS Powerpoint for 
use in the experimental condition. In each, the choice pairs in the preference judgment 
and recognition task were presented in a different, randomly determined order 
(generated by web-based software). Furthermore, both of these presentation orders were 
unique to that particular version of the experiment. Each version was then loaded on to 
4 of the 80 computers that were used for data collection in this condition. As every 
computer was used twice in this condition, each version was therefore completed by 8 
of the 160 participants. Similarly, in the control condition, the 20 versions - modified 
only in the sense that the stimuli in the preference judgment task were replaced with 
entirely novel, ‘dummy’ brand names (see chapter 5, page 222-223) -  were preloaded 
onto 2 of the 40 machines that were used for data collection in this group. Again, as 
every computer was used twice in this condition each version was thus completed by 4 
of the 80 control participants. Whilst it is acknowledged that this approach does not 
entirely eliminate the possibility of systematic bias as a result of the order in which 
brand choice pairs are presented at test, it may confidently be expected to minimise this 
to the point at which it is extremely unlikely to exert a significant influence, if indeed it 
occurs at all. In this respect, the results of just 5% of the sample could be influenced by 
a single presentation order; the effect of which is likely to have a negligible impact on 
mean rates of preference and recognition across the sample as a whole.  
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6.8.3. Identifying and accounting for task order effects 
 
Although it is rarely acknowledged in empirical studies of the MEE, the potential for 
bias as a result of task order constitutes an important methodological issue. The vast 
majority of mere exposure research is characterized by a test phase in which participants 
report two judgments; one in relation to affect and the other to stimulus recognition. As 
such, there are three possible approaches to the ordering of tasks in the test phase, all of 
which confer benefits and limitations: 
1. Recognition task first for all participants 
2. Preference task first for all participants 
3. Counterbalancing (i.e. recognition task first for half the participants and 
preference task first for the other half) 
 
Firstly, it may be argued that consistently placing the recognition task before that of 
preference judgment provides a valid manipulation check of the memory conditions 
under which affective evaluations are then made (i.e. it ensures a valid measure of 
recognition immediately prior to the preference judgment task). However, it should be 
acknowledged that it may also invalidate the subsequent preference judgment as an 
indicator of the MEE; confounding the link between enhanced preference (or not) and 
mere exposure by adding an intervening exposure in which participants are required to 
process the target stimuli attentively, actively and elaborately. In general terms, it may 
therefore be argued that this approach makes it impossible to distinguish between the 
effects of mere exposure and those of the processing that takes place during the 
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recognition task. More specifically, however, it may not be possible to identify the 
nature and direction of the task order effect in this scenario. For example, if the MEE is 
explained by the misattribution of perceptual fluency to whatever is suggested as “the 
most parsimonious and reasonable explanation of the experience” (Bornstein and 
D’Agostino, 1994: 106-107), then it might be expected to result in a familiarity-bias on 
the initial test of recognition memory. There are no theoretical grounds to assume that 
once fluency has been attributed to the familiarity of the stimulus, it might then be re-
attributed to another factor (e.g. preference). By contrast, however, the theory of 
hedonic fluency (Winkielman and Cacioppo, 2001) incorporates the notion that the 
experience of recognition is inherently positive (see chapter 2, page 39). As such, it is 
not inconceivable that the act of making a recognition judgment (whether this is correct 
or not) may in itself enhance the likelihood of affect-bias for the same stimulus in a 
subsequent preference judgment task. 
 
This limitation could be eliminated by placing the preference task first for all 
participants. Such an approach would confer the important benefit of ensuring a valid 
dependent measure; i.e. a valid indication of preference immediately after mere 
exposure to the target stimuli. However, in studies whereby the objective is to measure 
affect in the absence and/or presence of recognition, this approach is subject to a similar 
limitation as that detailed above. In short, consistently placing the recognition task 
second may invalidate this as a manipulation check of the memory conditions under 
which affective response occurs. The basis for this concern is the recent finding that 
subjective recognition may be artificially enhanced by a prior statement of preference 
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for the stimulus (affective modulation bias; Phaf and Rotteveel, 2005). As a result, the 
requirement for participants to consistently make preference judgments prior to those of 
recognition could result in a false memory effect; raising the possibility of type II error 
in relation to the non-conscious nature of the MEE. 
 
In summary, therefore, only the results of whichever task is placed first may be 
confidently considered to reflect the influence of mere exposure. The essence of the 
problem is that an observed effect in the second task may reflect either the influence of 
exposure, task order or a combination of the two. In light of this, a case might be made 
for counterbalancing the order of the two tasks within the sample. Whilst this would not 
necessarily eliminate the limitations identified above, comparative analysis may at least 
facilitate the identification of task order effects. However, the validity of this approach 
may be challenged on the basis that the requirement to first make a recognition 
judgment might be expected to either limit or enhance the likelihood of a subsequent 
affect-bias for the selected stimulus (as explained above). Furthermore, it is conceivable 
that these two effects might occur simultaneously within the sample, thus masking the 
true extent of each.  
 
In developing a more effective solution to this conundrum, therefore, it is important to 
begin from a clear, basic understanding of how experimental evidence for the mere 
exposure effect may be elicited. In this respect, support for the MEE would be provided 
by enhanced preference for the target stimuli in either the presence or absence of 
recognition memory for previous mere exposure, at the point at which the preference 
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judgment is made. The final part of this statement is particularly important and 
highlights the fact that affect is the dependent variable, whilst the extent and nature of 
recognition constitutes a manipulation check to indicate the memory conditions under 
which this occurs. With this in mind, it may be argued that the key factor in the 
selection of task order should be the maintenance of a valid measure of affect following 
the exposure phase, and the absence of intervening attentive processing of the target or 
distractor stimuli. Furthermore, whilst the possible effects of previously stated 
recognition on preference are potentially complex and bi-directional (as explained 
above), that of previously stated preference on recognition is uni-directional (i.e. 
positive; Phaf and Rotteveel, 2005). Critically, however, this enhanced memory is not 
present at the time the preference judgment is made, occurring only subsequently on the 
basis of responses to the previous task. Given this, it should be possible to assess the 
likelihood of an effect arising from an initial preference judgment on the results of a 
subsequent recognition task by way of a control group in which the former is effectively 
removed; i.e. both the target and non-target stimuli that appear in the recognition task 
are replaced by ‘dummy’ stimuli in the intervening preference judgment task that do not 
appear anywhere else in the experiment. Specifically, this would be indicated by a 
significant difference in target recognition rates between the control and experimental 
conditions. Whilst neither this approach, nor that of counterbalancing, can eliminate the 
influence of task order effects, it is nonetheless important to identify and account for 
these should they occur. The consistent elicitation of affective response prior to 
recognition judgments, coupled with the use of a recognition-only control group would 
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appear to provide the most effective means by which to do this, and will thus be adopted 
during the empirical phase of this thesis. 
 
6.9. Deception, disguise & the creation of low involvement, low attention conditions 
 
As discussed in chapter 3 (section 3.5, page 115) the influence of the MEE in a 
marketing context might be expected to be maximized by (and may even be dependent 
upon) conditions of low audience and actor involvement (Greenwald and Leavitt, 
1984); the first of which relates specifically to low attention during exposure to brand 
stimuli, whilst the second refers to the degree of elaborative cognition and behaviour 
during brand choice. To the extent that these are necessary conditions for the marketing-
based MEE, their creation in the context of experimental research may therefore be 
extremely important. However, it is notoriously difficult to engineer experimental 
conditions of low involvement in an experimental setting; the contrived nature of which 
may be expected to lead to interest, intrigue, anxiety and/or fear, and thus artificially 
high levels of involvement. Nonetheless, efforts to minimise this should constitute an 
important aspect of marketing-based mere exposure research.  
 
In order to understand the specific means by which this might be achieved, it is perhaps 
useful to acknowledge that involvement is mediated by the opportunity, ability and/or 
motivation to elaborate (see MacInnis and Jaworski, 1989). In a media and consumption 
environment that is characterised by fragmentation, clutter, noise and a proliferation of 
similar brands (MacInnis et al., 1991; Ha and Litman, 1997; Skinner and Stephens, 
2003), the absence of high involvement consumer behaviour may be the result of any or 
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all of these factors. In experimental research, therefore, measures may be taken with a 
view to artificially controlling these factors, limiting the extent of conscious, elaborative 
processing and thus replicating conditions of low attention, engagement and 
involvement in the real world environment (see MacInnis and Jaworski, 1989). For 
example, a relatively common technique to minimise audience involvement (i.e. 
attention and elaboration during exposure) is to position a ‘decoy task’ as the main 
purpose of the study, and therefore the main focus for attentive processing (e.g. 
Janiszewski, 1993; Shapiro, 1999; Fang et al., 2007). The target stimuli are then 
presented outside of this task and, it is presumed, perceived to be irrelevant and thus not 
worthy of attention and elaboration (Janiszewski, 1988). Specifically, the use of 
deception and disguise in this peripheral (or incidental) exposure paradigm is designed 
to reduce the motivation of respondents to engage in conscious, elaborative processing 
and thus reduce the level of audience involvement. In turn, it is expected that this will 
limit the extent to which participants seek to memorise the target stimuli and thus their 
ability to use explicit retrieval during the test phase.  
 
In the context of this thesis, however, the incidental exposure paradigm may be subject 
to an important limitation in that it does not necessarily distinguish between the effects 
of mere exposure and classical conditioning (as discussed in chapter 2, page 56). 
Alternatively, therefore, the use of a highly controlled exposure phase may be used to 
physically limit the opportunity for attentive processing, and thus the extent to which 
target stimuli are elaborated upon and encoded in explicit memory. As such, it provides 
a controlled means by which to create low audience involvement without the need for 
additional stimuli. Furthermore, whilst restricting the motivation to engage in attentive, 
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elaborative processing necessarily requires the use of deception (i.e. a ‘decoy’ task), the 
same is not true of methods that limit the opportunity or ability to elaborate. This is an 
important point in the context of ethical concerns regarding the use of deception and 
disguise in psychology and consumer research; a situation that has led to calls for this to 
be limited where possible, and only used when there is no alternative way of obtaining 
the same data in a non-deceptive way (see Smith, Kimmel and Klein, 2009). 
 
With all of this in mind, the condition of low audience involvement was engineered by 
the requirement for participants to passively observe sequences of extremely fleeting, 
masked exposures of the target stimuli amidst a ‘clutter’ of distractors. In this way the 
opportunity for attentive, elaborative processing was limited, and the need for deception 
minimized. Instead, a brief, but rather vague, explanation was given at the outset, 
indicating that the purpose of this study was to investigate “issues of perception, 
memory and affective response in relation to brand stimuli.” However, in order to 
ensure the questions were meaningful in the context of the study, a small element of 
disguise was necessary in the question related to preference judgment. Specifically, this 
stated that the two stimuli in each choice pair were proposed new brand names for a 
new product to be launched in a particular category. This is not true, but was necessary 
to place the preference task in a meaningful context and thus help participants to 
imagine choosing, buying or consuming each brand of the specified product.  
 
Further to this, a number of other steps were taken to restrict the level of actor 
involvement in the test phase of this study. Firstly, relatively inexpensive products were 
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selected to provide a context for the brand name preference decision (see chapter 5, 
page 192). The purpose of this was to reduce perceptions of irrevocability and perceived 
financial risk in an imagined brand choice situation; two of the major drivers of high 
involvement behaviour (see Laurent and Kapferer, 1985). Secondly, steps were taken to 
further reduce the opportunity for elaboration during the preference judgment task in 
particular (in line with the recommendations of Andrews, 1988). To this end, 
participants were instructed to make their choices as quickly as possible and a 
maximum time limit of 5 seconds per choice was built into the MS powerpoint 
presentation. This is a similar approach to that used in the study by Chung and 
Szymanski (1997), in which participants were limited to 3 seconds in the choice task. 
The slightly longer duration in the current experiment was deemed necessary as the 
choice pairs were automatically presented in quick succession and, as explained in 
section 6.7.3 (page 279), some pilot participants experienced difficulties in making 
stimulus-based decisions within the 3-second time limit. Finally, dependent measures 
were selected that would negate the need for verbal, introspective responses from 
participants in relation to the target stimuli. Specifically, these were limited to 
performance effects in the first instance; namely the frequency with which the target 
brand name was preferred over a novel filler brand name. The only time introspection 
was required on the part of respondents was in relation to the confidence scale for each 
choice in the final recognition task. At this stage, however, greater opportunity for 
elaboration is necessary, and indeed desirable, to establish the presence of varying 
degrees of recognition memory for the target stimuli (not just that which is top-of-
mind). As such, no time limits were placed on the choices made in this respect, and 
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introspection was encouraged to establish how confident the participants were of their 
memory judgments. 
 
 
6.10. Summary and conclusion 
 
In conclusion, therefore, this chapter has sought to provide a comprehensive and 
detailed discussion of the wide range of issues, considerations and decisions that are 
central to the reliability and validity of the experimental procedure in this study. 
Primarily these relate to two critical elements of the research design; measuring the 
MEE and the manipulation of key independent variables. The depth of the discussion in 
this respect reflects the complexity of the mere exposure phenomenon and the 
challenges associated with its empirical examination. As such, the careful identification 
and consideration of each of the issues raised in this chapter is of critical importance to 
the overall aims of the thesis; namely, the provision of a theoretically and 
methodologically robust examination of the MEE in a marketing context. In this respect, 
it is hoped that the chapter provides a clear and detailed explanation of the research 
design outlined previously (in chapter 5), and a strong foundation on which to accept 
the validity and reliability of empirical results. These results are presented and analysed 
in the following chapter, prior to a detailed discussion of the conclusions, implications, 
limitations and contributions of the thesis in chapters 8 and 9. 
  296 
 
Part III 
Results, Conclusions and Discussion  
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Chapter 7 
 
Data analysis and results 
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7.1. Introduction 
 
As stated at the beginning of chapter 5, the primary objective of the empirical work in 
this thesis is to test four propositions by way of a series of related hypotheses; as 
illustrated in table 7.1 (page 300). In light of the experimental design (explained in part 
II), and in particular the measurement approach adopted, the initial purpose of this 
chapter is to explain the development of these hypotheses and present the results of 
statistical testing in each case. However, in light of the theoretical and methodological 
challenges highlighted previously in this thesis, a further process of hypothesis 
development and testing will then be undertaken to assess the possibility of two 
alternative explanations of the observed effects: 
1. The influence of a false familiarity effect (Whittlesea, 1993; see chapter 2, page 
57) 
2. The influence of a task order effect (Phaf and Rotteveel, 2005; see chapter 6, 
page 287) 
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Figure 7.1: Structure of chapter 7 
 
 
 
The structure of this chapter is summarised in figure 7.1, above. On this basis, the 
analysis contained within is intended to provide a clear indication of the extent to which 
each of the four propositions in table 7.1 is supported (or not), and thus constitute a 
robust examination of the existence, size and nature of the marketing-based MEE. The 
primary purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to present and interpret the results of 
statistical testing and thus provide a foundation for reflection, discussion and conclusion 
in the following chapter. Prior to this, however, a series of descriptive analyses and 
manipulation checks are undertaken to clarify the context for hypothesis testing in this 
study. 
2. Describing the sample 
3. Manipulation checks 
5. Addressing alternative explanations 
6. Conclusion 
4. Hypothesis testing 
• Occurrence, size & direction (P1) 
• Influence of recognition (P2) 
• Influence of recollection (P3) 
• Influence of stimulus type (P4) 
• False familiarity effect 
• Affective modulation bias 
1. Introduction 
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Table 7.1: Primary propositions and related hypotheses for empirical testing 
 
Propositions Related Hypotheses 
P1: Mere exposure* to a 
marketing stimulus will 
influence affective 
response to that stimulus 
when it  is subsequently 
encountered 
 
H1a. Following supraliminal mere exposure, the mean target 
preference rate for target brand names will be significantly higher 
than that which may be expected to occur by chance; or 
 
H1b. Following supraliminal mere exposure, the mean target 
preference rate for target brand names will be significantly lower 
than that which may be expected to occur by chance 
 
P2: The size of the 
marketing-based mere 
exposure effect will be 
hindered by the presence 
of accurate recognition 
memory for marketing 
stimulus exposure 
 
H2. Following supraliminal mere exposure, the degree to which 
the mean preference selection rate for target brand names differs 
from chance will be significantly lower in the presence of stimulus 
recognition than in the absence of this 
P3: The size of the 
marketing-based mere 
exposure effect will be 
hindered by a subjective 
sense of confident, 
contextualized 
recollection for prior 
exposure to the marketing 
stimulus; regardless of 
recognition accuracy 
 
H3a. Following supraliminal mere exposure, the degree to which 
the mean target preference rate differs from chance will be 
significantly lower when accurate recognition judgments are 
accompanied by high levels of confidence (i.e. certain/sure) than 
when they are not (i.e. unsure/guess);  and 
 
H3b. Following supraliminal mere exposure, the degree to which 
the mean non-target preference rate differs from chance will be 
significantly lower when inaccurate recognition judgments are 
accompanied by high levels of false confidence (i.e. certain/sure) 
than when they are not (i.e. unsure/guess). 
 
P4: The marketing-based 
mere exposure effect will 
be significantly larger for 
real-word brand names 
than it will for pseudo-
word brand names 
 
H4. Under conditions of supraliminal mere exposure, the degree to 
which the mean target preference rate differs from chance will be 
significantly larger for real-word brand names than pseudo-word 
brand names 
 
H5a. In the presence of stimulus recognition, the degree to which 
the mean target preference rate is higher than chance will be 
significantly larger for real-word brand names than pseudo-word 
brand names; and 
 
H5b. In the absence of stimulus recognition, the degree to which 
the mean target preference rate is lower than chance will be 
significantly larger for real-word brand names than pseudo-word 
brand names 
 
 
*The operational definition of mere exposure in this study is brief, repeated exposure to a 
stimulus in isolation at a level that is just perceptible (see chapter 2, page 66) 
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7.2. Describing the Sample 
 
As a context in which to interpret the results of subsequent analyses in this chapter, it is 
perhaps useful to begin by describing the sample. In this respect, profile data was 
collected with regard to the age and gender of participants, along with their nationality, 
first language and whether or not they were bilingual. Whilst there is no evidence in the 
literature that the MEE is influenced by personal differences (Bornstein and Craver-
Lemley, 2004), it is not inconceivable that varying degrees of prior experience with 
word and letter forms might confound the effects of exposure-induced processing 
fluency within the experiment; a central factor in the influential misattribution theories 
of this phenomenon (see chapter 2, page 45).  As such, an exploration of the degree to 
which the results are comparable across different nationalities and languages may be 
required in the context of this study. In order to assess the need (and indeed the 
potential) for such analysis, however, it is first necessary to profile the sample in these 
terms. The results of descriptive analysis in this respect are presented in appendix I. 
However, the key findings in this respect may be concisely summarised as follows: 
• The vast majority of participants (approx. 90%) are aged between 18 and 24 
• There are slightly more female participants than male, with approximately a 55-
45% split in the experimental group and a 60-40% split in the control group 
• The majority of participants in the experimental group are from the UK and 
Ireland (69%), with other European countries (9%) and those of the Far East 
(14%) accounting for most of the remaining participants. 
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• The nationality profile is similar in the control group, but for an increase in the 
proportion of European participants (18%) at the expense of those who are 
specifically from the UK and Ireland (61%) 
• English is the first language of the majority of participants (70% in the 
experimental group and 61% in the control), and the basis of the alphabet used 
by around 80% of the sample. 
 
In summary, therefore, it is apparent that the majority of the participants in this study 
speak English as their first language (usually on the basis of them being native to the 
UK and Ireland), and that the first language of an even larger majority (approximately 
80%) is based on the English alphabet. Whilst it may be possible to compare the results 
of native and non-native English speakers, therefore, the frequency of participants 
whose first language is not based on the English alphabet (n=17) is too small for 
statistical testing (i.e. n>30; see Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch, 2000). Similarly, 
the vast majority of respondents are of a similar age (18-24); negating the need (and 
indeed the potential) for statistical comparison on this basis. Furthermore, it is perhaps 
useful to note at this point that all of the results presented subsequently in this chapter 
were analysed by both gender and English as a first language, with no significant 
between-group differences apparent at any point. As such, the value of the descriptive 
data discussed in this section is limited to providing background context in which to 
interpret the findings from this study. 
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7.3. Manipulation checks: Perception, recognition and recollection 
 
As explained in chapter 6 (section 6.3, page 242), the conditions under which this study 
aims to investigate preference bias as a result of mere exposure are characterised by 
supraliminal perception during exposure and the presence and/or absence of memory for 
this at test. As such, the experiment was designed to facilitate the manipulation and 
measurement of perception, objective recognition and subjective recollection (see 
chapter 6). Prior to an analysis of the mere exposure effect, therefore, it is perhaps 
useful to identify the extent to which preference judgments were made under conditions 
of supraliminal (versus subliminal) perception, and the absence/presence of both 
accurate recognition and a subjective sense of recollection for the stimulus exposures. 
To this end, the results of descriptive analysis are presented in figures 7.2 to 7.7, below. 
At this point it is perhaps useful to note that throughout the analysis and discussion in 
this chapter previously exposed stimuli are referred to as ‘target’ brand names, whilst 
the filler stimuli that appear during the test phase only are referred to as ‘non-target’ 
brand names. As such, the rates at which previously exposed stimuli are preferred and 
recognised are consistently referred to as the ‘target preference rate’ and ‘target 
recognition rate’ respectively. 
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Figure 7.2: Frequency of subliminal and supraliminal perception in the sample 
  
 
Figure 7.3: Distribution of target recognition rates 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Distribution of target recognition rates under conditions of recollection 
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Figure 7.5: Distribution of target recognition rates under conditions of non-
recollection 
 
 
Figure 7.6: Comparing mean target recognition rates to chance baseline (50%) 
Mean target recognition rates
0.54 0.54
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Experimental Control
Group
%
 
Group  N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Experimental Target recognition rate 154 0.544 0.178 0.014
Control Target recognition rate 72 0.541 0.175 0.021
One-Sample Statistics
 
 
Group t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Lower Upper
Experimental Target recognition rate 3.064 153 0.003 0.044 0.016 0.072
Control Target recognition rate 1.968 71 0.053 0.041 -0.001 0.082
One-Sample Test
95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
Test Value = 0.5
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Figure 7.7: Comparing mean target recognition rates to chance baseline (50%) 
under conditions of ‘recollection’ and ‘non-recollection’ 
 
Mean target recognition rates by recollection
0.49
0.65
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Mean target recognition rates by recollection
0.61
0.48
0.0
0.1
0.2
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0.8
0.9
1.0
Target recognition rate (recollection) Target recognition rate (non-recollection)
Control Group
%
 
Group  N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Experimental Target recognition rate (recollection) 131 0.648 0.272 0.024
Target recognition rate (non-recollection) 145 0.495 0.218 0.018
Control Target recognition rate (recollection) 59 0.609 0.285 0.037
Target recognition rate (non-recollection) 69 0.484 0.227 0.027
One-Sample Statistics
 
 
Group t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Lower Upper
Experimental Target recognition rate (recollection) 6.239 130 0.000 0.148 0.101 0.195
Target recognition rate (non-recollection)
-0.286 144 0.775 -0.005 -0.041 0.031
Control Target recognition rate (recollection) 2.935 58 0.005 0.109 0.035 0.183
Target recognition rate (non-recollection)
-0.600 68 0.550 -0.016 -0.071 0.038
One-Sample Test
Test Value = 0.5
95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
 
 
With reference to the figures above, the majority of participants reported that they 
experienced the exposure phase under conditions of supraliminal perception (77% in the 
experimental group and 82% in the control). As a result, 36 participants (23%) in the 
experimental group reported subliminal perception during the exposure phase; 
facilitating a statistical comparison between preference bias in the presence and absence 
of conscious perception, and thus the validation of previous psychological research into 
the non-conscious MEE (see chapter 2, page 21). As noted in chapter 5 (page 178), this 
comparison also provides a useful means by which to link the observed effects directly 
to the exposure phase and thus distinguish the MEE from the false familiarity effect 
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(Whittlesea, 1993). Secondly, accurate recognition of the target stimuli is marginally, 
though significantly, above the level of chance in both the experimental (M=0.544, 
t=3.064, p<0.01) and control group (M=0.541, t=1.968, p=0.05; see figure 7.6). As 
illustrated in figure 7.7, however, this appears to be mediated by confidence in the 
memory judgment; i.e. the degree to which the judgment is based on certain or sure 
recollection of stimulus exposures. In this respect, the key findings may be summarised 
as follows: 
• Under conditions of recollection (i.e. when participants are certain or at least 
quite sure of their memory judgment), accurate recognition of the target stimuli 
is significantly above chance. 
• Under conditions of non-recollection (i.e. when participants are quite unsure or 
simply guessing) accurate recognition of the target stimuli is at chance. 
 
Given that a significant recognition bias for the target stimuli is only apparent under 
conditions of confident recollection, it may be fair to assume that explicit memory (and 
thus the moderation of the MEE) is limited to this condition; i.e. that accurate 
recognition judgments in the absence of confident recollection are the result of 
guessing. Whilst this may be true in some cases, however, it is not necessarily so for all. 
Indeed it should be acknowledged that correct recognition judgments may be based on a 
genuine sense of familiarity with the stimulus as a result of prior exposure; the 
implications of which for the MEE are as yet unclear (see chapter 2, page 29). As such, 
it is considered prudent in this study to examine the outcome of preference judgments 
that are specifically made in the presence and absence of accurate recognition (P2) and a 
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subjective sense of recollection (P3) respectively. To this end, hypotheses are developed 
and tested in the next section, following those that are related to the occurrence, size and 
direction of the MEE regardless of memory for prior exposure (P1). 
 
7.4. Hypothesis testing: Analysing the occurrence, size, direction and nature of the 
marketing-based MEE 
 
As previously stated in chapter 5 (page 174), the primary objective of the empirical 
research in this thesis is to examine the four propositions in table 7.1 (page 300) as a 
means by which to investigate the existence, size, direction and nature of the MEE in a 
marketing context. In the following four subsections, therefore, and in light of the 
experimental design outlined in part II, a series of hypotheses will be formulated and 
tested with a view to assessing each of these propositions. This analysis begins with an 
examination of the first proposition and thus the occurrence, size and direction of the 
MEE regardless of memory for prior exposure. 
 
7.4.1. Testing the occurrence, size and direction of the MEE (P1) 
 
The primary purpose of this section is to examine the extent to which the results of this 
study provide support for the first of the four propositions for testing in this thesis, as 
stated below: 
 
P1: Mere exposure to a marketing stimulus will significantly influence affective 
response to that stimulus when it is subsequently encountered 
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It is important to acknowledge that this proposition does not draw a distinction between 
the MEE in the presence and absence of recognition, nor does it incorporate any 
assumptions regarding the direction of the response-bias. In this respect, it should be 
recalled that, whilst the vast majority of mere exposure research supports the positive 
enhancement of affect in adults (see Bornstein, 1989), there are a small number of 
exceptions; one of which is published in the marketing literature (Lee 1994; see chapter 
4, page 142). As such, it is considered prudent to test this proposition by way of two 
alternative hypotheses, as stated below: 
 
H1a. Following supraliminal mere exposure, the mean target preference rate for 
target brand names will be significantly higher than that which may be expected 
to occur by chance; or 
 
H1b. Following supraliminal mere exposure, the mean target preference rate for 
target brand names will be significantly lower than that which may be expected 
to occur by chance 
 
P1 may be deemed to be validated by evidence in support of either of these hypotheses, 
while the direction of the MEE may be clearly distinguished by support for one over the 
other. The results of analysis in this respect are presented in figure 7.8, and discussed 
below. 
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Figure 7.8: Mean target preference rate compared to chance baseline (50%) 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Target preference rate 154 0.475 0.148 0.012
One-Sample Statistics
 
 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Lower Upper
Target preference rate -2.128 153 0.035 -0.025 -0.049 -0.002
Test Value = 0.5
95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
One-Sample Test
 
 
As illustrated in figure 7.8, under conditions of supraliminal perception during the 
exposure phase, the mean rate of preference is significantly lower than chance 
(M=0.475, t=-2.128, p<0.05); providing support for H1b, and thus P1. Furthermore, this 
validation of H1b (rather than H1a) indicates the presence of a reverse MEE in this 
study; a finding that is somewhat rare in previous mere exposure research (see chapter 
2, page 20). Although the size of this effect is small (r= 0.2), it should be acknowledged 
that it may be moderated by the presence of memory for the exposed stimuli (see 
chapter 2, page 29). Given that accurate target recognition occurs above the rate of 
chance in the sample (M=0.544, t=3.064, p<0.01), it might therefore be expected to 
have a limiting influence on the size of the observed effect. In order to test this, 
however, and specifically to validate the assumptions of P2, it is necessary to examine 
target preference in the presence and absence of recognition respectively; as will be 
outlined in the following section. 
 
7.4.2. Testing the moderating influence of objective recognition on the MEE (P2) 
 
The degree to which the MEE is moderated by recognition memory is an important 
issue in its own right as it has implications for how, when and to what extent the MEE is 
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likely to occur in a marketing context. As acknowledged above, however, it may also be 
of importance in explaining the relatively limited size of the effect observed in support 
of H1b. In order to fully test P1, therefore, it is necessary to consider this alongside the 
second proposition stated in the introduction to this chapter: 
 
P2: The size of the marketing-based mere exposure effect will be hindered by 
the presence of recognition memory for marketing stimulus exposure 
 
Within the extant psychology literature, it is proposed that recognition of a stimulus as 
having been previously exposed gives rise to an MEE that is approximately half the size 
of that found in the absence of stimulus recognition (see Bornstein, 1989; Bornstein and 
Craver-Lemley, 2004). However, it is important to reiterate that empirical evidence for 
this is generally provided by studies that eliminate the possibility of stimulus 
recognition via subliminal stimulus exposures (see chapter 2, page 29). One of the 
primary aims of this study is to validate the proposition that an absence of recognition 
memory alone will moderate the size of the MEE, by examining this phenomenon under 
conditions of supraliminal exposure. In the context of the experimental research in this 
thesis, therefore, support for P2 may be provided by evidence that preference frequency 
for the target stimuli differs from chance to a significantly greater degree in the absence, 
rather than the presence, of stimulus recognition. With this in mind, the second 
hypothesis for testing in this study is stated as follows: 
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H2. Following supraliminal mere exposure, the degree to which the mean 
preference selection rate for target brand names differs from chance will be 
significantly lower in the presence of stimulus recognition than in the absence of 
this 
 
In order to test this hypothesis, the rate of preference for target brand names in both the 
absence and presence of accurate recognition was calculated for each participant. To the 
extent that the mean target preference rate is above or below chance in each memory 
condition, one of two possible effects may emerge, as illustrated in figure 7.9.  
 
Figure 7.9: Four possible preference effects as a result of mere exposure 
 
Target Stimulus Recognition  
No Yes 
 
 
>chance 
 
 
Effect 1a 
 
Classic MEE 
 
 
Effect 2a 
 
Classic MEE 
 
 
 
 
Target 
Stimulus 
Preference 
 
 
<chance 
 
 
Effect 1b 
 
Reverse MEE 
 
 
Effect 2b 
 
Reverse MEE 
 
With regard to figure 7.9, the MEE is referred to as ‘classic’ when it relates to the 
enhancement of preference for the exposed (target) stimuli (effect 1), and ‘reverse’ 
when it relates to a novelty-bias for the unexposed (non-target) stimuli (effect 2). In this 
study, the classic (positive) MEE that is commonly observed in adults would therefore 
be revealed by a mean rate of preference for the target stimuli that is above the level of 
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chance (50%) in the presence and/or absence of recognition. Similarly, a reverse MEE 
(i.e. an exposure-induced novelty bias as commonly observed in children; see chapter 2, 
page 20) would be evidenced by a mean rate of target preference that is significantly 
below this chance baseline. As such, it may be argued that the analytical approach in 
this section not only facilitates testing of the existence of the MEE in the presence and 
absence of recognition (H2), but also provides a means by which to identify the 
direction of observed effects in each memory condition. As such, it perhaps provides a 
more appropriate means by which to test H1a and H1b (see page 309). The results of 
data analysis in this respect are thus presented in figure 7.10, and discussed below. 
 
Figure 7.10: Mean preference rates in the absence and presence of recognition 
compared to chance baseline (50%) 
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N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
1a. Target preference rate in the absence of recognition 153 0.386 0.267 0.022
1b. Non-target preference rate in the absence of recognition 153 0.614 0.267 0.022
2a. Target preference rate in the presence of recognition 154 0.553 0.224 0.018
2b. Non-target preference rate in the presence of recognition 154 0.447 0.224 0.018
One-Sample Statistics
 
 
Group t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Lower Upper
Experimental 1a. Target preference rate in the absence of recognition -5.272 152 0.000 -0.114 -0.156 -0.071
Experimental 1b. Non-target preference rate in the absence of recognition 5.296 152 0.000 0.114 0.072 0.157
Experimental 2a. Target preference rate in the presence of recognition 2.953 153 0.004 0.053 0.018 0.089
Experimental 2b. Non-target preference rate in the presence of recognition
-2.914 153 0.004 -0.053 -0.088 -0.017
One-Sample Test
Test Value = 0.5
95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
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95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean Lower Upper t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Pair 1 1a. Target preference rate in the absence of recognition - -0.167 0.376 0.030 -0.228 -0.107 -5.504 152 0.000
2a. Target preference rate in the presence of recognition
Pair 2 1b. Non-target preference rate in the absence of recognition - 0.167 0.376 0.030 0.107 0.227 5.496 152 0.000
2b. Non-target preference rate in the presence of recognition
Paired Samples Test
Paired Differences
 
 
With respect to figure 7.10, it might firstly be observed that the t-statistics for effects 2a 
and 2b are not an exact mirror image of those for effects 1a and 1b respectively. This 
may appear to be contrary to expectations, given that each selection of a stimulus as 
preferred is made at the expense of the alternative stimulus in the choice pair. The slight 
differences, however, are simply the result of rounding error in the calculation of the 
mean preference rate for each participant to two decimal places. They are extremely 
slight and have a negligible impact on the significance of test results throughout the 
analysis in this chapter. With regard to the above results, therefore, the mean target 
preference rate is above chance in the presence of accurate recognition (M=0.553, 
t=2.953, p<0.01), and below chance in the absence of this (M=0.386, t=-5.296, p<0.01); 
resulting in a significant difference in the target preference bias observed under 
conditions of recognition and non-recognition (M=-0.167, t=-5.504, p<0.01). 
Furthermore, and in line with previous studies of the MEE (see Bornstein, 1989), the 
observed preference bias is twice as large in the absence of recognition (r=0.4) than in 
the presence of such memory (r=0.2) 
 
These findings are of both interest and importance on two counts. Firstly, they may be 
seen to provide support for P2 in this study; indicating that, under conditions of 
supraliminal mere exposure, recognition memory does indeed moderate the size of the 
subsequent affect bias. With reference to the discussion in chapter 2 (section 2.2.3.3.1, 
page 29), therefore, it may be implied that the results presented above suggest that 
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findings of a larger non-conscious MEE in the psychology literature are not necessarily 
a function of the universal use of subliminal exposure, and validate previous 
assumptions that recognition moderates the size of the MEE. In which case, they may be 
more appropriately explained by implicit misattribution, unencumbered by conscious 
memory (Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994), rather than a reduction in boredom 
and fatigue during the experiment (Bornstein et al., 1990; see chapter 2, page 31). 
Secondly, somewhat surprisingly and perhaps more importantly, the results indicate 
that, whilst stimulus recognition may moderate the size of the MEE, it might also 
mediate the direction in which it occurs. Furthermore, the simultaneous occurrence of a 
preference bias in two opposing directions provides support for both H1a and H1b; 
rather than simply the latter, as implied by the data presented in the previous section. 
Indeed, this result may be important from a methodological perspective as it 
demonstrates the potential invalidity of mere exposure research that does not 
specifically account for the relationship between recognition and affect in the creation 
of the MEE. 
 
It is acknowledged that the validity of the statistical results above may be undermined to 
some extent by the fact that the frequency distributions are somewhat removed from 
normal; particularly with regard to effects 1a and 1b (see appendix II). In the interests of 
consistency, however, and given that the one-sample t-test is considered to be relatively 
robust in such circumstances (Field, 2005), this approach may still be considered to be 
an important means by which to test the hypotheses relating to P1 and P2. Nevertheless, 
it is perhaps prudent to supplement the above results with those of non-parametric 
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testing to assess the degree to which confident conclusions may be drawn in this 
respect. To this end, and following the removal of cases in which target preference is at 
exactly the level of chance, one-sample chi-square analysis may be undertaken to assess 
the frequency with which target preference differs from this baseline in each direction 
(supplementing the one-sample t-test results above). Secondly, a Wilcoxon Signed 
Ranks test might be used as a non-parametric alternative to the paired-sample t-test 
applied previously. The results of these analyses are presented in figure 7.11 and 
discussed below. 
 
Figure 7.11: Comparing the distribution of preference rates for target and non-
target stimuli to a chance baseline in the absence and presence of recognition (One 
Sample Chi-Square) 
 
 
Observed N Expected N Residual
Above chance (>50%) 38 67.5 -29.5
Below chance (<50%) 97 67.5 29.5
Total 135
 Observed N Expected N Residual
Above chance (>50%) 98 67.5 30.5
Below chance (<50%) 37 67.5 -30.5
Total 135
 
Observed N Expected N Residual
Above chance (>50%) 80 67.5 12.5
Below chance (<50%) 55 67.5 -12.5
Total 135
 
Observed N Expected N Residual
Above chance (>50%) 55 67.5 -12.5
Below chance (<50%) 80 67.5 12.5
Total 135
1a. Distribution of target preference in the absence of recognition (=chance removed)
1b. Distribution of non-target preference in the absence of recognition (=chance removed)
2a. Distribution of target preference in the presence of recognition (=chance removed)
2b. Distribution of non-target preference in the presence of recognition (=chance removed)
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 1a. Distribution of target   1b. Distribution of non-target  2a. Distribution of target  2b. Distribution of non-target 
preference in the absence of preference in the absence of preference in the presence of preference in the presence of 
recognition (=chance removed) recognition (=chance removed) recognition (=chance removed) recognition (=chance removed)
Chi-Square 25.785 27.563 4.630 4.630
df 1 1 1 1
Asymp. Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.031
Test Statistics
 
 
With reference to figure 7.11, the results indicate a significant target preference bias in 
the presence of recognition (2a; Chi-square=4.630, p<0.05) and a significant non-target 
preference bias in the absence of recognition (1b; Chi-square=27.563, p<0.01). Given 
that the pattern and extent of these results is almost identical to those of the one-sample 
t-tests in figure 7.10, it may be argued that the weight of evidence supports the 
conclusion that the direction of the MEE is mediated by recognition memory. However, 
in light of the possibility that accurate, objective recognition in this study may be 
underpinned by the presence of subjective recollection (see page 307), it is conceivable 
that it is this latter variable that exerts the critical mediating influence on the direction of 
the MEE. If this were the case, the same pattern of results may be expected to occur in 
the presence and absence of the subjective experience of memory, even when this is 
inaccurate; i.e. when incorrect recognition judgements are made on the basis of 
confident, false recollection. Indeed, this is encapsulated in the third proposition to be 
tested in this study, the results of which are presented and discussed in the following 
section. 
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7.4.3. Testing the moderating influence of subjective recollection on the MEE (P3) 
 
At this point, it is important to reiterate that the enhanced rate of target recognition in 
this study may in itself be mediated by the extent to which participants are sure of their 
memory judgment. As illustrated in figure 7.7 (page 306), accurate recognition occurs at 
a frequency that is above the level of chance only under conditions of clear, confident 
recollection for the stimulus exposures (M=0.648, t=6.239, p<0.01). In cases where 
participants report a lack of confident recollection, objective recognition rates for the 
target stimuli do not differ from chance (M=0.495, t=-0.286, p=0.775). With this in 
mind, this part of the analysis is designed to explore the possibility that exposure-
induced preference bias will in fact be hindered by subjective recollection (regardless of 
accuracy), rather than objective recognition of the target stimuli (Vanhuele, 1995; see 
chapter 4, page 157). This is encapsulated in the third proposition to be tested in this 
study, as stated below: 
 
P3: The size of the marketing-based mere exposure effect will be hindered by a 
subjective sense of confident, contextualized recollection for prior exposure; 
regardless of recognition accuracy 
 
In line with Lee (2001b) and Wang and Chang (2004), recollection is operationally 
defined in this study as clear, confident, contextualised memory for the stimulus 
exposures and measured by the degree to which participants are sure of their selection 
during each paired-choice test of recognition (chapter 6, page 257). Importantly, it is the 
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subjective experience of memory that is identified as the inhibitory factor in this 
proposition, rather than the accuracy of the recognition judgment. As such, it may be 
validated by evidence that the experience of recollection (be it genuine or false) 
moderates the preference biases that were previously observed in the presence and 
absence of accurate recognition (see section 7.4.2, page 310). This is encapsulated in the 
two-part hypothesis below: 
 
H3a. Following supraliminal mere exposure, the degree to which the mean 
target preference rate differs from chance will be significantly smaller when 
accurate recognition judgments are accompanied by high levels of confidence 
(i.e. certain/sure) than when they are not (i.e. unsure/guess); and 
 
H3b. Following supraliminal mere exposure, the degree to which the mean non-
target preference rate differs from chance will be significantly smaller when 
inaccurate recognition judgments are accompanied by high levels of false 
confidence (i.e. certain/sure) than when they are not (i.e. unsure/guess). 
 
Evidence for the moderating role of subjective recollection, regardless of objective 
recognition, would be provided in the event that both of the above hypotheses are 
supported in this study. In this respect, the results of statistical testing are presented in 
figures 7.12 to 7.14, and discussed below. 
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Figure 7.12: Comparing mean preference rates to chance baseline (50%) in the 
absence and presence of recognition under conditions of ‘recollection’ 
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 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
1a. Target preference rate in the absence of recognition 100 0.368 0.372 0.037
1b. Non-target preference rate in the absence of recognition 100 0.632 0.372 0.037
2a. Target preference rate in the presence of recognition 126 0.582 0.332 0.030
2b. Non-target preference rate in the presence of recognition 126 0.418 0.332 0.030
One-Sample Statistics
 
 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Lower Upper
1a. Target preference rate in the absence of recognition -3.542 99 0.001 -0.132 -0.205 -0.058
1b. Non-target preference rate in the absence of recognition 3.542 99 0.001 0.132 0.058 0.205
2a. Target preference rate in the presence of recognition 2.776 125 0.006 0.082 0.024 0.141
2b. Non-target preference rate in the presence of recognition -2.767 125 0.007 -0.082 -0.140 -0.023
Test Value = 0.5
95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
One-Sample Test
 
 
Figure 7.13: Comparing mean preference rates to chance baseline (50%) in the 
absence and presence of recognition under conditions of ‘non-recollection’ 
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 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
1a. Target preference rate in the absence of recognition 139 0.381 0.297 0.025
1b. Non-target preference rate in the absence of recognition 139 0.619 0.297 0.025
2a. Target preference rate in the presence of recognition 138 0.548 0.298 0.025
2b. Non-target preference rate in the presence of recognition 138 0.452 0.298 0.025
One-Sample Statistics
 
 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Lower Upper
1a. Target preference rate in the absence of recognition -4.726 138 0.000 -0.119 -0.169 -0.069
1b. Non-target preference rate in the absence of recognition 4.726 138 0.000 0.119 0.069 0.169
2a. Target preference rate in the presence of recognition 1.889 137 0.061 0.048 -0.002 0.098
2b. Non-target preference rate in the presence of recognition -1.880 137 0.062 -0.048 -0.098 0.002
95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
One-Sample Test
Test Value = 0.5
 
 
Figure 7.14: Comparing mean preference rates in the absence and presence of 
recognition under conditions of recollection versus non-recollection 
 
  
95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean Lower Upper t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Pair 1 1a. Target stimuli preference rate in the absence of recognition (recollection) - 0.002 0.487 0.052 -0.102 0.107 0.047 85 0.963
1a. Target stimuli preference rate in the absence of recognition (non-recollection)
Pair 2 1b. Non-target stimuli preference rate in the absence of recognition (recollection) - -0.002 0.487 0.052 -0.107 0.102 -0.047 85 0.963
1b. Non-target stimuli preference rate in the absence of recognition (non-recollection)
Pair 3 2a. Target stimuli preference rate in the presence of recognition (recollection) - 0.030 0.435 0.041 -0.052 0.112 0.730 109 0.467
2a. Target stimuli preference rate in the presence of recognition (non-recollection)
Pair 4 2b. Non-target stimuli preference rate in the presence of recognition (recollection) - 
2b. Non-target stimuli preference rate in the presence of recognition (non-recollection) -0.030 0.435 0.041 -0.112 0.052 -0.728 109 0.468
Paired Differences
Paired Samples Test
 
 
As illustrated in figure 7.14 (above), the absence or presence of recollection does not 
appear to give rise to significant differences in either the classic MEE that occurs in the 
presence of accurate recognition (2a: M=0.03, t=0.730, p=0.467), nor the reverse MEE 
that is apparent in the absence of this (1b: M=-0.002, t=-0.047, p=0.963). However, it is 
perhaps important to note that, whilst the latter is a statistically significant effect in both 
the presence and absence of (false) recollection, the former is only so when participants 
experience a confident sense of (accurate) recollection (see figures 7.12 and 7.13, 
above). To clarify; whilst evidence of a significant target preference bias (2a) is clearly 
evident in the presence of recollection it is less evident (and not statistically significant) 
in the absence of this. Although the mean target preference rates are not dramatically 
different in this respect, recollection-based differences in the MEE in the presence of 
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accurate recognition (2a) but not the absence of this (1b), coupled with the previously 
observed directional difference in these two effects (see page 313-314), may indicate 
that the two effects are qualitatively different; a possibility that will be discussed further 
in the following section and subsequent chapters. 
 
Once again, however, the fact that the frequencies for the observed effects are not 
normally distributed (see appendix II) may require that the t-test results above are 
supplemented by those of non-parametric analysis. In line with the approach adopted in 
section 7.4.2, therefore, cases in which target preference is at exactly the level of chance 
were removed prior to one-sample chi-square analysis in each condition. Finally, the 
paired sample t-test (figure 7.14), was replaced by a Wilcoxon Signed Rank test to 
examine the extent to which significant differences are apparent under conditions of 
‘certain/sure recollection’ and ‘unsure/guessing’ respectively. The results of these non-
parametric analyses are presented in figures 7.15 and 7.16, and discussed below. 
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Figure 7.15: Comparing the distribution of preference rates for target and non-
target stimuli to a chance baseline in the absence and presence of recognition 
 
a) Under conditions of recollection 
 
Observed N Expected N Residual
Above chance (>50%) 26 41.5 -15.5
Below chance (<50%) 57 41.5 15.5
Total 83
 Observed N Expected N Residual
Above chance (>50%) 57 41.5 15.5
Below chance (<50%) 26 41.5 -15.5
Total 83
 
Observed N Expected N Residual
Above chance (>50%) 66 51.5 14.5
Below chance (<50%) 37 51.5 -14.5
Total 103
 
Observed N Expected N Residual
Above chance (>50%) 37 51.5 -14.5
Below chance (<50%) 66 51.5 14.5
Total 103
1a. Distribution of target preference in the absence of recognition (=chance removed)
1b. Distribution of non-target preference in the absence of recognition (=chance removed)
2a. Distribution of target preference in the presence of recognition (=chance removed)
2b. Distribution of non-target preference in the presence of recognition (=chance removed)
 
 
 1a. Distribution of target   1b. Distribution of non-target  2a. Distribution of target  2b. Distribution of non-target 
preference in the absence of preference in the absence of preference in the presence of preference in the presence of 
recognition (=chance removed) recognition (=chance removed) recognition (=chance removed) recognition (=chance removed)
Chi-Square 11.578 11.578 8.165 8.165
df 1 1 1 1
Asymp. Sig. 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004
Test Statistics
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b) Under conditions of non-recollection 
 
Observed N Expected N Residual
Above chance (>50%) 31 53.5 -22.5
Below chance (<50%) 76 53.5 22.5
Total 107
 
Observed N Expected N Residual
Above chance (>50%) 76 53.5 22.5
Below chance (<50%) 31 53.5 -22.5
Total 107
 
Observed N Expected N Residual
Above chance (>50%) 66 58.5 7.5
Below chance (<50%) 51 58.5 -7.5
Total 117
 
Observed N Expected N Residual
Above chance (>50%) 51 58.5 -7.5
Below chance (<50%) 66 58.5 7.5
Total 117
1a. Distribution of target preference in the absence of recognition (=chance removed)
1b. Distribution of non-target preference in the absence of recognition (=chance removed)
2a. Distribution of target preference in the presence of recognition (=chance removed)
2b. Distribution of non-target preference in the presence of recognition (=chance removed)
 
 
 1a. Distribution of target   1b. Distribution of non-target  2a. Distribution of target  2b. Distribution of non-target 
preference in the absence of preference in the absence of preference in the presence of preference in the presence of 
recognition (=chance removed) recognition (=chance removed) recognition (=chance removed) recognition (=chance removed)
Chi-Square 18.925 18.925 1.923 1.923
df 1 1 1 1
Asymp. Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.166 0.166
Test Statistics
 
 
Figure 7.16: Comparing target and non-target preference rates in the absence and 
presence of recognition under conditions of recollection versus unsure recollection 
 
 1a. Distribution of target   1b. Distribution of non-target  2a. Distribution of target  2b. Distribution of non-target 
preference in the absence of preference in the absence of preference in the presence of preference in the presence of 
recognition (=chance removed) recognition (=chance removed) recognition (=chance removed) recognition (=chance removed)
Z -1.342 -1.342 -1.414 -1.414
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.180 0.180 0.157 0.157
Test Statistics
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In short, the results presented above are directly in line with those of parametric testing. 
In this respect, they provide confirmation that the non-target preference bias in the 
absence of recognition (1b) does not differ under conditions of recollection and non-
recollection (Z=-1.342, p=0.180). This effect is significant when the memory illusion is 
based on a false sense of recollection (Chi-square=11.578, p<0.01) and when it is not 
(Chi-square=18.925, p<0.01). On the assumption that the observed preference bias 
reflects a reverse MEE in the absence of recognition, therefore, it may be concluded that 
this particular effect is not moderated by a sense of subjective recollection; i.e. that H3b 
is not supported in this study. However, whilst the preference-bias for target stimuli (2a) 
is statistically significant when accurate recognition is based on confident recollection 
(Chi-square=8.165, p<0.01), this is not the case when it is not (Chi-square=1.923, 
p=0.166). Not only do the results fail to support H3a, therefore, but it might be argued 
that the classic, positive MEE that is observed in the presence of recognition may in fact 
be enhanced by subjective recollection. Whilst this interpretation should perhaps be 
treated with caution, particularly in the absence of statistically significant paired-sample 
differences (Z=-0.784, p=0.433), it could be seen to raise the possibility that the 
preference effects observed in the absence and presence of objective recognition reflect 
two different phenomena; a reverse implicit MEE that is not moderated by false 
recollection, and a classic, explicit MEE that is, in fact, enhanced by this subjective 
experience.  
 
As a final caveat, however, it should be noted that the substantive size of each effect 
does not appear to be significantly moderated by the subjective experience of memory. 
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In this respect, the size of the classic MEE in the presence of accurate recognition is 
identical (r=0.2) under conditions of both recollection and non-recollection, whilst that 
of the reverse MEE in the absence of recognition is only marginally reduced by a 
confident, though false, sense of contextualised memory (from r=0.4 to r=0.3). On this 
basis, therefore, it is perhaps prudent to conclude that neither H3a nor H3b are 
unequivocally supported by the results presented in this section, and thus P3 is not 
validated. However, the proposition that the effects observed in the absence and 
presence of recognition reflect two qualitatively different forms of the MEE is revived 
in the following section; and on the basis of much clearer empirical evidence. 
 
7.4.4. Examining the mediating influence of brand name type on the MEE (P4) 
 
The results presented to this point would appear to provide support for the existence of 
the MEE in a marketing context (P1), and the moderating influence of recognition 
memory (P2) but with one important (and surprising) qualification; that this factor may 
also mediate the direction of the effect. Specifically, the classic, positive enhancement 
of affective response that is commonly found in adults is only evident in the presence of 
accurate recognition, whilst a larger, reverse MEE is apparent in the absence of such 
memory. Furthermore, whilst robust statistical evidence for the influence of subjective 
recollection remains elusive in this study, it has been tentatively suggested that, far from 
having a moderating influence, it may in fact enhance the classic, positive MEE when it 
is associated with accurate recognition (and have a neutral impact on the reverse 
implicit MEE when it reflects false memory). 
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As noted in part II, however, it should be acknowledged that the nature of the selected 
stimuli (i.e. brand names) may also exert a mediating influence on the results of this 
study. In this respect, whilst the use of both real-word and pseudo-word brand names 
contributes to the ecological validity and generalisability of the findings it also gives 
rise to potential variations in the size of the MEE. Specifically, this relates to the fact 
that real-word stimuli have previously tended to produce larger experimental MEEs 
than nonsense words and ideograms (Bornstein, 1989; see page 25). Given that brand 
names are often composed of either commonly occurring real words or invented 
pseudo-words (i.e. pronounceable non-words), it may therefore be proposed that:  
 
P4: The marketing-based mere exposure effect will be significantly larger for 
real-word brand names than it will for pseudo-word brand names 
 
In the context of this study, it might be expected that this proposition would be 
supported if the degree to which the mean target preference rate differs from chance is 
significantly larger for real-word brand names than pseudo-word brand names. In this 
respect the following hypothesis might be formulated: 
 
H4. Under conditions of supraliminal mere exposure, the degree to which the 
mean target preference rate differs from chance will be significantly larger for 
real-word brand names than pseudo-word brand names 
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Figure 7.17: Comparing mean target preference rates to the chance baseline (50%) 
for real-word and pseudo-word brand names 
 
Target preference by stimulus type
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 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Target preference rate (real-word stimuli) 154 0.510 0.207 0.017
Target preference rate (pseudo-word stimuli) 154 0.439 0.201 0.016
One-Sample Statistics
 
 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Lower Upper
Target preference rate (real-word stimuli) 0.583 153 0.561 0.010 -0.023 0.043
Target preference rate (pseudo-word stimuli) -3.749 153 0.000 -0.061 -0.093 -0.029
Test Value = 0.5
95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
One-Sample Test
 
 
As illustrated in figure 7.17 (above), the non-target preference bias that was previously 
found in the sample as a whole (M=0.475, t=-2.128, p<0.05: see page 310), is only in 
fact evident in relation to those choice-pairs containing pseudo-word brand names 
(M=0.439, t=-3.749, p<0.01). By contrast, the results pertaining to real-word brand 
names do not differ significantly from chance (M=0.510, t=0.583, p=0.561). The 
absence of any preference bias in relation to real-word stimuli (r=0.0), alongside a 
moderate reverse MEE for pseudo-word stimuli (r=0.3) may thus be seen to contradict 
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the predictions made in H4. However, at this point it is important to reiterate that the 
direction of the MEE has previously been found to be diametrically opposed in the 
presence and absence of recognition in this study (see page 313-314); a factor that may 
confound the results of the simple analysis above. In order to account for this, it is 
therefore necessary to examine the influence of stimulus type in each of these memory 
conditions in turn, and thus to divide the hypothesis above into two parts: 
 
H5a. In the presence of stimulus recognition, the degree to which the mean 
target preference rate is higher than chance will be significantly larger for real-
word brand names than pseudo-word brand names; and 
 
H5b. In the absence of stimulus recognition, the degree to which the mean target 
preference rate is lower than chance will be significantly larger for real-word 
brand names than pseudo-word brand names 
 
On this basis, it may be argued that that P4 would be fully validated by evidence in 
support of both elements of the above hypothesis. To this end, the data set was split by 
stimulus type prior to a replication of the analysis undertaken in section 7.4.2; the 
results of which are presented in figures 7.18 to 7.20, and discussed below. 
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Figure 7.18: Comparing mean preference rates for real-word brand names to the 
chance baseline (50%) in the absence and presence of recognition 
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 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
1a. Target preference rate in the absence of recognition 141 0.380 0.340 0.029
1b. Non-target preference rate in the absence of recognition 141 0.620 0.340 0.029
2a. Target preference rate in the presence of recognition 151 0.612 0.300 0.024
2b. Non-target preference rate in the presence of recognition 151 0.388 0.300 0.024
One-Sample Statistics
 
 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Lower Upper
1a. Target preference rate in the absence of recognition -4.185 140 0.000 -0.120 -0.177 -0.063
1b. Non-target preference rate in the absence of recognition 4.185 140 0.000 0.120 0.063 0.177
2a. Target preference rate in the presence of recognition 4.569 150 0.000 0.112 0.063 0.160
2b. Non-target preference rate in the presence of recognition -4.569 150 0.000 -0.112 -0.160 -0.063
Test Value = 0.5
95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
One-Sample Test
 
 
Figure 7.19: Comparing mean preference rates for pseudo-word brand names to 
the chance baseline (50%) in the absence and presence of recognition 
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 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
1a. Target preference rate in the absence of recognition 150 0.371 0.318 0.026
1b. Non-target preference rate in the absence of recognition 150 0.629 0.318 0.026
2a. Target preference rate in the presence of recognition 153 0.508 0.312 0.025
2b. Non-target preference rate in the presence of recognition 153 0.492 0.312 0.025
One-Sample Statistics
 
 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Lower Upper
1a. Target preference rate in the absence of recognition -4.979 149 0.000 -0.129 -0.181 -0.078
1b. Non-target preference rate in the absence of recognition 4.979 149 0.000 0.129 0.078 0.181
2a. Target preference rate in the presence of recognition 0.301 152 0.764 0.008 -0.042 0.057
2b. Non-target preference rate in the presence of recognition -0.301 152 0.764 -0.008 -0.057 0.042
One-Sample Test
Test Value = 0.5
95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
 
 
Figure 7.20: Comparing mean preference rates for real-word and pseudo-word 
brand names in the absence and presence of recognition 
 
  
95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean Lower Upper t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Pair 1 1a. Target stimuli preference rate in the absence of recognition (real-word stimuli) - 0.031 0.420 0.036 -0.040 0.101 0.854 137 0.395
1a. Target stimuli preference rate in the absence of recognition (pseudo-word stimuli)
Pair 2 1b. Non-target stimuli preference rate in the absence of recognition (real-word stimuli) - -0.031 0.420 0.036 -0.101 0.040 -0.854 137 0.395
1b. Non-target stimuli preference rate in the absence of recognition (pseudo-word stimuli)
Pair 3 2a. Target stimuli preference rate in the presence of recognition (real-word stimuli) - 0.105 0.405 0.033 0.039 0.170 3.160 149 0.002
2a. Target stimuli preference rate in the presence of recognition (pseudo-word stimuli)
Pair 4 2b. Non-target stimuli preference rate in the presence of recognition (real-word stimuli) - -0.105 0.405 0.033 -0.170 -0.039 -3.160 149 0.002
2b. Non-target stimuli preference rate in the presence of recognition (pseudo-word stimuli)
Paired Samples Test
Paired Differences
 
 
As illustrated in the figures above, an almost identical non-target preference bias is 
evident in the absence of recognition (1b) for both real-word (M=0.620, t=4.185, 
p<0.01) and pseudo-word brand names (M=0.629, t=4.979, p<0.01), with no significant 
differences apparent between the two types of stimuli (M=-0.031, t=-0.854, p=0.395). In 
this respect both real-word (r=0.3) and pseudo-word (r=0.4) brand names appear to give 
rise to a moderate reverse MEE. By contrast, however, the target preference bias that 
was previously observed in the presence of recognition (2a) is only in fact apparent for 
real-word brand names (M=0.612, t=4.569, p<0.01), with a mean target preference rate 
that is very close to chance for pseudo-word stimuli (M=0.508, t=0.301, p=0.764). In 
the presence of memory, therefore, a similarly moderate classic MEE (r=0.3) is evident 
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with respect to real-word brand names, but not those that constitute pseudo-words 
(r=0.0)  
 
Taken together, therefore, the results may be seen to provide support for H5a but not 
H5b. While this is not sufficient to validate P4, perhaps, it revives the possibility that 
the two effects may be influenced differently, and thus reflect two qualitatively different 
forms of the MEE. In contrast to the somewhat weak indications of this that were 
acknowledged in the previous section, however, the results above provide a much 
stronger empirical foundation for this claim. Specifically, they provide a more robust 
indication that the classic, positive MEE that is observed in the presence of recognition 
is mediated by stimulus type, whilst the reverse MEE that occurs in the absence of 
objective memory is not. Before this conclusion can be confidently drawn, however, 
and in light of the fact that the frequencies for each effect are not normally distributed 
(see appendix II), it is once again prudent to conduct further non-parametric analysis. 
To this end, and in line with the approach adopted throughout this chapter, one-sample 
chi-square and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are utilised; the results of which are 
presented in figures 7.21 and 7.22, and discussed below.  
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Figure 7.21: Comparing the distribution of target and non-target preference rates 
for to a chance baseline in the absence and presence of recognition 
 
a) Real-word brand names only 
 
Observed N Expected N Residual
Above chance (>50%) 41 59 -18
Below chance (<50%) 77 59 18
Total 118
 Observed N Expected N Residual
Above chance (>50%) 77 59 18
Below chance (<50%) 41 59 -18
Total 118
 
Observed N Expected N Residual
Above chance (>50%) 86 61.5 24.5
Below chance (<50%) 37 61.5 -24.5
Total 123
 
Observed N Expected N Residual
Above chance (>50%) 37 61.5 -24.5
Below chance (<50%) 86 61.5 24.5
Total 123
1a. Distribution of target preference in the absence of recognition (=chance removed)
1b. Distribution of non-target preference in the absence of recognition (=chance removed)
2a. Distribution of target preference in the presence of recognition (=chance removed)
2b. Distribution of non-target preference in the presence of recognition (=chance removed)
 
 
 1a. Distribution of target   1b. Distribution of non-target  2a. Distribution of target  2b. Distribution of non-target 
preference in the absence of preference in the absence of preference in the presence of preference in the presence of 
recognition (=chance removed) recognition (=chance removed) recognition (=chance removed) recognition (=chance removed)
Chi-Square 10.983 10.983 19.520 19.520
df 1 1 1 1
Asymp. Sig. 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Test Statistics
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b) Pseudo-word brand names only 
 
 
Observed N Expected N Residual
Above chance (>50%) 30 58.5 -28.5
Below chance (<50%) 87 58.5 28.5
Total 117
 Observed N Expected N Residual
Above chance (>50%) 87 58.5 28.5
Below chance (<50%) 30 58.5 -28.5
Total 117
 
Observed N Expected N Residual
Above chance (>50%) 66 63 3
Below chance (<50%) 60 63 -3
Total 126
 
Observed N Expected N Residual
Above chance (>50%) 60 63 -3
Below chance (<50%) 66 63 3
Total 126
1a. Distribution of target  preference in the absence of recognition (=chance removed)
1b. Distribution of non-target  preference in the absence of recognition (=chance removed)
2a. Distribution of target  preference in the presence of recognition (=chance removed)
2b. Distribution of non-target  preference in the presence of recognition (=chance removed)
 
 
 1a. Distribution of target   1b. Distribution of non-target  2a. Distribution of target  2b. Distribution of non-target 
preference in the absence of preference in the absence of preference in the presence of preference in the presence of 
recognition (=chance removed) recognition (=chance removed) recognition (=chance removed) recognition (=chance removed)
Chi-Square 27.769 27.769 0.286 0.286
df 1 1 1 1
Asymp. Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.593 0.593
Test Statistics
 
 
Figure 7.22: Comparing preference rates for real-word versus pseudo-word brand 
names in the absence and presence of recognition (Wilcoxon) 
 
 1a. Distribution of target   1b. Distribution of non-target  2a. Distribution of target  2b. Distribution of non-target 
preference in the absence of preference in the absence of preference in the presence of preference in the presence of 
recognition (=chance removed) recognition (=chance removed) recognition (=chance removed) recognition (=chance removed)
Z -1.300 -1.300 -2.160 -2.160
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.194 0.194 0.031 0.031
Test Statistics
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In line with those of parametric testing (see figures 7.18 to 7.20), the above results 
confirm that the significant non-target preference bias observed in the absence of 
recognition (1b) is robust across stimulus type, whilst the target preference bias in the 
presence of recognition (2a) is not. Specifically, this latter effect (2a) is once again 
apparent only in relation to real-word stimuli (Chi-square=19.520, p<0.01), occurring 
close to the level of chance for pseudo-word brand names (Chi-square=0.286, p=0.593). 
As a result, significant differences are apparent in the target preference bias (2a) that is 
evident in relation to each type of stimulus (Z=-2.160, p<0.05). 
 
Given the consistent pattern of the results in this phase of the analysis, the weight of 
evidence would seem to clearly indicate that, whilst target preference in the presence of 
recognition (2a) is likely to be mediated by stimulus type, the reverse MEE that is 
apparent in the absence of recognition (1b) is not. In simple terms, therefore, it might be 
concluded that whilst P4 is only partially validated in this study, support for H5a but not 
H5b may provide evidence that the preference biases observed in the presence and 
absence of recognition respectively reflect two qualitatively different forms of the mere 
exposure phenomenon; a classic, positive MEE that is underpinned by explicit memory, 
and a reverse MEE that is the product of implicit processing alone. At this point, 
however, it is important to acknowledge the potential for two alternative interpretations 
of the results presented to this point in the chapter. The first of these stems from the 
theoretical challenge presented by the false familiarity effect (Whittlesea, 1993), as 
discussed in chapter 2 (section 2.4.2, page 57). The second relates to the methodological 
issue of task order effects and, in particular, the possibility of affective modulation bias 
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(Phaf and Rotteveel, 2005; see chapter 6, 286). Both of these alternative explanations 
are discussed and tested in section 7.5.  
 
7.5. Acknowledging and addressing alternative interpretations 
 
Throughout this chapter, evidence for the MEE has been determined on the basis of the 
degree to which a systematic and significant preference bias for either the target or non-
target stimuli is apparent in the absence and presence of recognition. In each condition, 
two possible effects were identified; a classic, positive MEE and a reverse MEE (as 
illustrated in figure 7.23a). However, it is important to acknowledge that, in light of the 
fact that 2-factor forced choice tests were used to record recognition judgments in this 
study, an inaccurate selection in this respect may indicate either a simple absence of 
memory for the target stimulus exposure, or the presence of false memory for the non-
target stimulus. Throughout, the former interpretation has been adopted; leading to the 
conclusion that a non-target preference bias - and thus a reverse MEE - is apparent in 
the absence of accurate recognition of the target stimuli (see section 7.4.2., page 310). If 
inaccurate recognition judgments are assumed to reflect false memory, however, it may 
be argued that the results essentially reflect a preference bias for stimuli that are 
subjectively ‘recognised’, regardless of the accuracy of this memory judgment; i.e. that 
the preference-bias is a by-product of the false familiarity effect (Whittlesea, 1993; see 
chapter 2, page 57) rather than the MEE (see figure 7.23b). Additionally, it is 
acknowledged that the correlation between stimulus preference and recognition - and 
the fact that preference judgments were always made first – also gives rise to the 
  337 
possibility that the latter is simply a function of the former; i.e. that the results reflect 
affective modulation bias (Phaf and Rotteveel, 2005; see chapter 6, page 287) rather 
than mere exposure. Both of these alternative explanations must be examined before the 
results of this study can be confidently accepted as evidence of a classic and reverse 
MEE that is mediated by stimulus recognition. The purpose of the following two 
sections, therefore, is to present and discuss the results of additional analysis in relation 
to each of these challenges in turn.  
 
Figure 7.23a: Possible preference effects in the presence and absence of target 
stimulus recognition (original assumption) 
 
Target Stimulus Recognition  
No Yes 
 
>Chance 
 
1a 
Classic MEE 
 
2a 
Classic MEE 
 
Target 
Stimulus 
Preference 
 
<Chance 
 
1b 
Reverse MEE 
 
2b 
Reverse MEE 
 
Figure 7.23b: Possible preference effects in the presence of target and non-target 
recognition (alternative assumptions) 
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7.5.1. Non-target preference in the absence of accurate stimulus recognition: A 
product of mere exposure or false familiarity? 
 
As noted in the introduction above, the first challenge to the validity of the results as 
evidence for the MEE stems from the fact that an inaccurate selection on paired-choice 
tests of recognition may reflect either an absence of memory, or the presence of false 
memory for the non-target stimulus. Furthermore, the latter may constitute a cognitive 
illusion as a result of one stimulus being easier to process than the other; a phenomenon 
that is termed the false familiarity effect (Whittlesea, 1993; see chapter 2, page 57). 
However, this misattribution of processing fluency to another quality of the stimulus is 
the very same mechanism that is identified in arguably the most prominent theory of 
mere exposure (Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994; see chapter 2, page 45). Whilst 
the notion that processing fluency may be misattributed to either familiarity, preference 
or a whole host of other cognitive and affective responses is not in dispute (see chapter 
2,. page 45), the key point of difference between the false familiarity effect (FFE) and 
the MEE is the source of the processing fluency advantage; in the former it is the 
inherent characteristics of the stimulus (in the present) whilst in the latter it is mere 
exposure (in the past). With this in mind, it may be argued that the finding of a non-
target preference bias in the presence of false recognition for these same, non-target 
stimuli indicates that it is a by-product of the FFE; i.e. that the relative processing 
fluency that underpins false recognition, and is entirely unrelated to prior exposure, also 
gives rise to a preference bias via the mechanism of misattribution. Indeed, this claim 
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may be extended to the preference-bias that is observed for target stimuli in the presence 
of accurate recognition. Specifically, in the absence of direct evidence that mere 
exposure is the source of the processing fluency that leads to accurate recognition (and 
the accompanying preference bias), it is possible that both responses are based on the 
relative perceptual characteristics of the stimuli at test; i.e. that all familiarity is, in fact, 
false familiarity in this study. As such, the first important issue to address is whether the 
results of this study do indeed reflect the MEE rather than the FFE. 
 
The scope for this particular criticism may to some extent be traced to a limitation 
regarding the pretesting of stimuli in this study. Whilst the two stimuli in each choice 
pair were carefully pretested and selected to ensure equivalence in likability, the issue of 
relative processing fluency was not addressed at this point. It is acknowledged, 
therefore, that further pretesting of each pair of (affectively equivalent and neutral) 
stimuli could have been undertaken to identify the degree to which systematic 
preference-bias may be expected to occur in each pair without the influence of a prior 
exposure phase. In the absence of this, it is also recognised that a further phase of data 
collection might have been employed to assess the degree to which each choice-pair 
may have given rise to non-exposure induced preference bias in the main experiment. 
Should this have been found to be the case in relation to a particular choice-pair, the 
analysis detailed in this chapter could then be repeated with this trial removed (see 
appendix II for further technical discussion in this respect). In the context of this 
specific study, however, it is important to stress that this issue may be addressed 
analytically, without the need for further data collection. In this respect, the key 
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question is whether or not the observed preference-bias can be shown to be sensitive to 
relevant changes in the nature of the exposure phase; an avenue of analysis that is 
facilitated by individual differences in perceptual ability and experience within the 
sample. 
 
In explanation of the analytical approach taken to distinguish the MEE from the FEE in 
this study, it is first important to reiterate that evidence for the moderating influence of 
stimulus recognition on the size of the MEE is inferred from experiments in which 
subliminal exposure has been used to eliminate the possibility of this (see chapter 2, 
page 29). In particular, these previous investigations demonstrate a consistently larger 
MEE under conditions of subliminal perception; an outcome that was initially explained 
with reference to a possible reduction in the experience of boredom and fatigue (see 
Bornstein, 1989). More recently, it has been suggested that the larger effect sizes 
observed in these studies reflect the extremely effective elimination of recognition 
memory in studies that utilise subliminal mere exposure (e.g. Bornstein and 
D’Agostino, 1992, 1994; see chapter 2, page 30); a proposition that receives support 
from the current findings (see section 7.4.2, page 310). Whichever mechanism is 
responsible for findings of the consistently larger MEE under conditions of subliminal 
exposure, however, the fact remains that it is a characteristic that is not, by definition, 
shared by the FFE (for which no previous exposure is required); and thus presents a 
means by which to distinguish between the two effects in the current study. Specifically, 
the non-target preference bias that is evident in the absence of recognition might be 
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confidently adjudged to reflect the MEE if it is significantly larger under conditions of 
subliminal perception, as encapsulated in the following hypothesis: 
 
H6. In the absence of stimulus recognition, the size of the non-target preference 
bias will be significantly larger under conditions of subliminal versus 
supraliminal perception during exposure 
 
As a caveat to this approach, however, it should perhaps be acknowledged that, in light 
of the absence of conscious perception (and thus explicit memory encoding) in the 
subliminal condition, a similar comparison of the preference-bias that occurs in the 
presence of accurate, objective memory is illogical. Indeed, the finding that the 
moderate target preference bias in this latter condition (r=0.3) is not, as might be 
expected, entirely eliminated under conditions of subliminal perception (r=0.1) is most 
likely due to the fact perception was measured at the phase rather than item-level. As 
such, it is conceivable that some cases of ‘subliminal perception’ might be contaminated 
by a small number of items that were in fact perceived supraliminally; a potential 
limitation that was acknowledged in chapter 6 (page 247) and is discussed in more 
detail in appendix III. However, it must be considered extremely unlikely that the FFE 
would explain this particular form of preference bias but not that which occurs in the 
absence of accurate recognition memory. Should H4 be supported, therefore, it may be 
confidently assumed that the findings reflect the MEE rather than the FFE in both 
memory conditions. To this end, the results of statistical testing are presented in figures 
7.24 and 7.25, and discussed below. 
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Figure 7.24: Comparing preference bias in the absence of recognition under 
conditions of subliminal and supraliminal perception 
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Perception Type  N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Subliminal perception 1a. Target preference rate in the absence of recognition 36 0.342 0.230 0.038
1b. Non-target preference rate in the absence of recognition 36 0.658 0.230 0.038
Supraliminal perception 1a. Target preference rate in the absence of recognition 117 0.400 0.277 0.026
1b. Non-target preference rate in the absence of recognition 117 0.601 0.277 0.026
One-Sample Statistics
 
 
Perception Type t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Lower Upper
Subliminal perception 1a. Target preference rate in the absence of recognition -4.121 35 0.000 -0.158 -0.236 -0.080
1b. Non-target preference rate in the absence of recognition 4.121 35 0.000 0.158 0.080 0.236
Supraliminal perception 1a. Target preference rate in the absence of recognition -3.916 116 0.000 -0.100 -0.151 -0.050
1b. Non-target preference rate in the absence of recognition 3.942 116 0.000 0.101 0.050 0.152
One-Sample Test
Test Value = 0.5
95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
 
 
Figure 7.25: Comparing mean preference rates in the absence/presence of 
recognition under conditions of subliminal versus supraliminal perception 
 
 
Perception Type N Mean Std. DeviationStd. Error Mean
1a. Target stimuli preference rate in the absence of recognition Subliminal perception 36 0.342 0.230 0.038
Supraliminal perception 117 0.400 0.277 0.026
1b. Non-target stimuli preference rate in the absence of recognition Subliminal perception 36 0.658 0.230 0.038
Supraliminal perception 117 0.601 0.277 0.026
Group Statistics
 
  
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Std. Error Difference Lower Upper
1a. Target stimuli preference rate in the absence of recognition Equal variances assumed 1.824 0.179 -1.132 151 0.260 -0.058 0.051 -0.158 0.043
Equal variances not assumed -1.249 69 0.216 -0.058 0.046 -0.149 0.034
1b. Non-target stimuli preference rate in the absence of recognition Equal variances assumed 1.858 0.175 1.118 151 0.265 0.057 0.051 -0.044 0.157
Equal variances not assumed 1.234 69 0.221 0.057 0.046 -0.035 0.149
95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means
 
 
As illustrated in the figures above, a significant non-target preference bias (1b) is 
observed in both the subliminal (M=0.658,t=4.121, p<0.01) and supraliminal group 
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(M=0.601, t=3.942, p<0.01), with no significant differences apparent in a simple 
between-group comparison (M=0.057, t=1.118, p=0.265). However, the relevant 
statistic that is specifically referred to in H4 is the substantive size of this effect. In this 
respect, and in line with Bornstein’s (1989) seminal meta-analysis of mere exposure 
research, the effect is twice as large under conditions of subliminal (r=0.6) rather than 
supraliminal perception (r=0.3). On this basis, H4 would appear to be supported; 
providing a clear indication that the results presented in previous sections of this chapter 
reflect the MEE (rather than the FFE). Before this conclusion can be drawn, however, 
one further alternative explanation must also be ruled out; namely, the possibility that 
the results reflect affective modulation bias (Phaf and Rotteveel, 2005) as a result of 
task order. 
 
7.5.2. Non-target preference bias in the absence of accurate stimulus recognition: 
A product of task order rather than mere exposure? 
 
In light of the correlation between preference and recognition bias for both the target 
and non-target stimuli in this study, the possibility of affective modulation bias (Phaf 
and Rotteveel, 2005) cannot be ignored. To recap, this phenomenon refers to the 
enhanced likelihood of subjective recognition for a stimulus that has previously been 
identified as preferred (see chapter 6, page 288).With this in mind, it may be argued that 
the sensitivity of the observed effects to changes in the nature of exposure (see section 
7.5.1.) provides evidence of a direct link in this respect; diminishing the validity of an 
alternative explanation based on task order in the test phase alone. In order to confirm 
  344 
this, however, a planned comparison between recognition rates in the experimental and 
control conditions may be used to assess the moderating influence of the intervening 
preference task. Indeed, the control group was established specifically to identify the 
likelihood of task order effects, and in particular the possibility of affective modulation 
bias (see chapter 6, page 288). To this end, control participants were required to 
complete the full experiment, with both the target and non-target brand names replaced 
by equivalent ‘dummy’ stimuli in the preference judgment task. As a result, the 
recognition rates observed in each condition may be compared to isolate the influence 
of an intervening requirement to make preference judgments regarding these same 
stimuli in the main experiment. In this respect, a task order effect would be indicated by 
support for the following hypothesis: 
 
H7. Recognition rates for the target and non-target stimuli will differ 
significantly between the control and experimental groups. 
 
As previously indicated (see figure 7.6, page 305), however, the mean recognition rate 
(M=0.54) was found to be almost identical in both the experimental and control 
condition; confirmation of which is provided by the finding of no significant between 
group differences in this respect (M=0.003, t=0.132, p=0.895). Given that H7 is not 
supported, therefore, and in light of the evidence for a direct link between the size of the 
observed effects and the nature of the exposure phase (see section 7.5.1, page 338), it 
may be confidently assumed that neither task order nor the FFE is responsible for the 
preference effects observed in this study; and that they do in fact reflect the MEE. In the 
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final section of this chapter a summary of the findings is thus provided, prior to a 
detailed discussion of conclusions and implications (in chapter 8), and an overview of 
the main contributions and limitations of the work in this thesis (chapter 9). 
 
7.6. Conclusion 
 
In summary, the findings of this study indicate that mere exposure to novel brand names 
results in: 
1. A classic, positive preference-bias for previously exposed stimuli that is: 
a) dependent on the presence of recognition memory; 
b) severely restricted, and most likely eliminated, by subliminal perception during 
exposure; 
c) potentially enhanced by confident, contextualised recollection of previous 
exposure; and 
d) evident only in relation to real-word (as opposed to pseudo-word) brand names. 
2. A  novelty preference-bias for unexposed stimuli that is: 
a) dependent on the absence of recognition memory; 
b) enhanced by subliminal perception during exposure; 
c) not influenced by the degree to which false recollection occurs; and 
d) not mediated by the real-word versus pseudo-word nature of brand names. 
 
Whilst it is acknowledged that both of these effects may, on the face of it, appear to 
reflect an identical preference-bias on the basis of subjective recognition (i.e. that 
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participants tend to prefer stimuli they deem to be recognised (regardless of the 
accuracy of this judgment), the fact that they are influenced differently by factors such 
as perception, brand name type and perhaps recollection indicate that they are, in fact, 
two qualitatively different types of effect. These may be defined as the explicit and 
implicit MEE respectively; the second of which occurs in reverse during this study, 
whilst the first reflects the classic, positive influence of mere exposure on affective 
response (see chapter 2, page 20). This conclusion and its implications for theory and 
practice will be discussed in detail during the following chapter. In drawing this chapter 
to a close, however, it is perhaps important to specifically summarise the extent to 
which the above findings support the four propositions that provide the impetus for this 
study. To recap, these are stated as follows: 
P1: Mere exposure to a marketing stimulus will significantly influence affective 
response to that stimulus when it is subsequently encountered 
P2: The size of the marketing-based mere exposure effect will be hindered by 
the presence of recognition memory for marketing stimulus exposure 
P3: The size of the marketing-based mere exposure effect will be hindered by a 
subjective sense of confident, contextualized recollection for prior exposure to 
the marketing stimulus; regardless of recognition accuracy 
P4: The marketing-based mere exposure effect will be significantly larger for 
real-word brand names than it will for pseudo-word brand names 
 
On the basis of the results presented in this chapter it may be argued that both 
propositions 1 and 2 are supported; although a more interesting, important and 
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unexpected finding with regard to the latter is that recognition also appears to mediate 
the direction of the MEE. In this respect, the classic, positive MEE that has been 
commonly observed in adults (see chapter 2, page 20) is only found to occur in the 
presence of accurate stimulus recognition in this study, whilst a larger reverse MEE is 
evident under conditions of inaccurate stimulus recognition. By contrast, proposition 3 
is not validated by the results of this study. Indeed, whilst little clear evidence is found 
for the influence of subjective recollection, there are some (relatively weak) indications 
that this factor may, if anything, enhance the MEE when it is associated with accurate 
objective recognition. Finally, proposition 4 receives only partial support in this study. 
In this respect, the reverse MEE that is apparent in the absence of recognition does not 
appear to be influenced by brand name type, whilst the classic form of this effect (that is 
evident in the presence of recognition) is significant only in relation to real-word brand 
names. This finding is potentially of great interest as it raises the possibility that, not 
only does the direction of the exposure-induced preference bias differ in the absence 
and presence of recognition, but that this reflects two qualitatively different forms of the 
MEE; arising on the basis of explicit and implicit memory respectively. This conclusion 
may have significant implications for theory and practice in the domains of both 
psychology and marketing, and will thus be discussed in detail during the following 
chapter. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusions, discussion and implications 
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8.1. Introduction 
 
As stated at the outset, the overall aim of this thesis is to provide a robust investigation 
of the existence, size, direction and nature of the MEE in a marketing context. To this 
end, a comprehensive theoretical foundation was provided by a critique of the extant 
literature in the disciplines of both psychology and marketing (Part I). On this basis, a 
series of propositions were developed and tested by way of experimentation (as outlined 
in part II); the results of which are presented in the previous chapter. In order to begin to 
bring the thesis to a conclusion, therefore, the purpose of this penultimate chapter is to 
summarise the conclusions that may be drawn and distil the implications of these for 
theory and practice. In this respect, theoretical implications are considered in relation to 
both the psychology and marketing literature, prior to a detailed discussion of the 
practical implications for marketers, advertisers and consumers. As a foundation for 
this, however, and as illustrated in figure 8.1, the chapter begins with a discussion of the 
overarching conclusions of the current study in relation to the empirical findings of 
previous marketing research. 
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Figure 8.1: Structure of chapter 8 
 
 
 
8.1.  Conclusions 
 
In contrast to Obermiller’s (1985) original attempt to extend psychological mere 
exposure research in the marketing domain, and in line with the majority of marketing 
studies since, this thesis proffers evidence for the MEE in a marketing context. 
However, the overarching finding of the current study is that the effect appears to be 
qualitatively different in the presence and absence of recognition memory. Specifically, 
the results indicate that the classic, positive influence of mere exposure on affective 
judgments is facilitated by objective recognition, whilst the absence of this memory 
condition gives rise to a preference bias for novel stimuli (i.e. a reverse MEE). 
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Furthermore, the former is enhanced by the use of common, real-word brand names 
(and perhaps clear, confident, contextualized recollection of prior exposure). By 
contrast, the latter is enhanced by subliminal perception but remains unaffected by both 
the subjective sense of (false) memory and the (real versus pseudo-word) nature of the 
stimulus. Taken together, the observed differences in the direction of the effect and the 
extent to which it is mediated by stimulus type (and perhaps subjective recollection) 
imply that the MEE occurs on the basis of different mental processes in the presence 
and absence of recognition. As such, the findings of this study give rise to the 
conclusion that the marketing-based MEE may occur in one of two forms; and thus to 
the proposal of a dual-processing model (as illustrated figure 8.2). 
 
Figure 8.2: Dual-processing model of the marketing-based mere exposure effect 
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On the face of it, the two forms of the MEE represented in the model above may be 
referred to as the conscious and non-conscious MEE respectively. However, in light of 
the earlier discussion of the non-conscious nature of this phenomenon (Chapter 2, page 
21), this would not be entirely appropriate. To recap; it was acknowledged in chapter 2 
that, whilst the MEE has previously been found to be magnified in the absence of 
recognition (or more specifically conscious perception) of prior stimulus exposure, it 
remains apparent to a lesser degree in the presence of such memory (and may even be 
enhanced by it; Lee, 2001b; Wang and Chang, 2004). However, Bornstein and Craver-
Lemley (2004: 230) stress that the MEE should nonetheless be considered a non-
conscious phenomenon on the basis that: 
“even in situations where participants are aware of having been exposed to 
stimuli, they rarely attribute their liking for a stimulus to repeated exposure, 
instead believing that some property of the stimulus is particularly attractive or 
interesting.” 
 
With this in mind, it is perhaps more accurate to label the two forms of effect as the 
explicit and implicit MEE respectively. These terms reflect the distinct mental processes 
by which each occurs whilst accommodating the notion that both might be considered to 
be ‘non-conscious’ to some degree. In this respect, whilst the implicit MEE occurs 
entirely below the threshold of consciousness, the explicit MEE may also be considered 
non-conscious by virtue of the fact that, while consumers are aware of having been 
exposed to the relevant marketing stimuli, they are not necessarily aware of the impact 
that exposure alone exerts in the formation of subsequent affective response (Bornstein 
and Craver-Lemley, 2004). With this in mind, the conclusions outlined above, and in 
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particular the proposed dual-processing model (figure 8.2, page 351), are discussed in 
the context of previous marketing-related research into MEE in the following section. 
 
8.3. Discussion in the context of previous marketing research 
 
As noted in chapter 4 (page 138-139), the possibility of dual forms of the MEE that are 
underpinned by separate memory processes is implied in the work of Shapiro and 
Krishnan (2001). Whilst the notion of a dual-processing model of mere exposure (as 
illustrated in figure 8.2, page 351) is not raised by Shapiro and Krishnan (2001), nor 
indeed by any other authors in the mere exposure literature, it may be argued that is not 
inconceivable on the basis of their results; particularly in light of the findings in the 
current study. Specifically, these indicate that the explicit MEE constitutes a familiarity-
bias on the basis of explicit memory for having encountered the stimuli previously, 
whilst the implicit MEE reflects a subconscious novelty-bias that arises when memory 
for the stimulus exposure is entirely implicit.  
 
In part, therefore, the current findings may be seen to be in line with those that (albeit 
often inadvertently) provide evidence of a classic, positive marketing-based MEE in the 
presence of recognition (e.g. Vanhuele, 1995; Chung and Szymanski, 1997; Baker, 
1999; Olson and Thjomoe, 2003; Lee, 2002; Tom et al., 2007: see chapter 4, page 130). 
Specifically, however, the empirical results in this thesis imply that those of earlier 
studies reflect the explicit MEE, rather than its implicit equivalent. However, the 
proposition of Vanhuele (1995) that such results are an indication that the MEE is not 
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moderated by recognition memory per se, but by that which is based on recollection in 
particular, is not supported in this study. Indeed, if anything, the current results suggest 
that the explicit MEE may in fact be enhanced by clear, contextualized memory of prior 
stimulus exposure. Whilst this finding might be seen to contradict that of Matthes et al. 
(2007; see page 158), it is line with a small body of emerging work in the psychology 
literature (e.g. Lee, 2001b; Wang and Chang, 2004), and lends support to Anand et al.’s 
(1988: 390) conclusion that “the [MEE] increases with the accuracy of recognition”; 
although it should be stressed that a further implication of the current study is that this 
assertion may be accurate only in relation to the explicit form of the MEE. Furthermore, 
and as a caveat to this qualification, it should perhaps be noted that, whilst the 
enhancement of the exposure-induced preference bias in Tom et al., (2007) may not 
necessarily be the result of subliminal perception (during 100ms as opposed to 250ms 
exposures), the fact that this occurs following the restriction of perception and attention 
may be problematic for the conclusion of Anand et al. (1988) and, indeed, the current 
thesis. However, given the questions raised in relation to the ecological and internal 
validity of Tom et al.’s (2007) work (see chapter 4, page 140), and the absence of 
replication at this point, the degree to which it poses a challenge to the conclusions of 
this study are as yet unclear. In this respect, further research may be necessary to 
investigate the impact of small increments in the opportunity for attentive processing 
during stimulus presentations that are nonetheless just perceptible; i.e. within the mere 
exposure paradigm (Zajonc, 1968). 
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In addition to validating previous indications of a marketing-based MEE in the presence 
of recognition, the empirical results in this thesis provide further evidence for the 
somewhat remarkable finding of a reverse non-conscious MEE in adults (Lee, 1994); 
extending this from abstract, high-density matrices to more typical marketing stimuli 
(i.e. brand names). However, the positive implicit MEE for low-density matrices that 
was also found by Lee (1994) is not replicated in relation to brand names in the current 
study. With this in mind, a caveat might be added to the conclusions of this thesis to the 
effect that the reverse implicit MEE may be limited to the type of stimuli employed (i.e. 
brand names in this study and high-density matrices in Lee, 1994). Further research may 
thus be important to ascertain the degree to which this finding is robust across different 
types of marketing stimuli (e.g. brand logos, photographs, advertising imagery, cartoon 
drawings, etc.); as will be highlighted in the following chapter (page 426). 
 
Finally, it is important to consider the fact that the findings regarding the implicit MEE 
in this study are not necessarily in line with possible evidence for this in previous 
marketing research. For example, Janiszewski’s (1993) finding of an equivalent, 
positive MEE in both the absence and presence of recognition is only partially 
supported in the current study. Specifically, the preference-bias that was previously 
evident for exposed stimuli in the absence of recognition is contradicted by current 
findings of a reverse implicit MEE (i.e. an exposure-induced novelty bias). In a sense, 
this discrepancy may be seen to undermine the argument that the direction of the 
implicit MEE is stimulus specific, with both studies employing brand names as the 
target stimuli. However, it should be stressed that Janiszewski’s (1993) work is not 
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specifically developed within the confines of the mere exposure paradigm; employing, 
as it does, techniques of incidental (or peripheral) exposure, and contextualizing the 
target stimulus within a meaningful scene (i.e. a complete advertisement). As discussed 
in chapter 4 (page 164), such conditions facilitate implicit associative priming and give 
rise to the possibility (and, it may be argued, even the likelihood) that the previously 
observed preference-bias is the product of classical conditioning rather than mere 
exposure alone.  
 
Similarly, the observation of an implicit novelty-bias in this thesis would appear to be 
contrary to the findings of Shapiro (1999); in which a positive, non-conscious 
familiarity-bias towards previously exposed stimuli is evident. However, it should be 
reiterated that this earlier study specifically measures the effects of incidental (or 
peripheral) exposure on the inclusion of products in a consideration set. Whilst the 
robustness of Shapiro’s work is not in question, therefore, a number of proposals might 
be made to explain the differences between the findings of this and the current study. 
Firstly, and in line with the observation made in relation to Janiszewski (1993) above, 
the discrepancy in results may highlight an important distinction between the effects of 
mere and incidental/peripheral exposure. This issue was discussed at some length in 
chapter 4 (page 162-166) and relates specifically to the possibility that the latter may 
give rise to either the MEE or classical conditioning. Alternatively, for example, it may 
be argued that the difference in the findings of the two studies may be due to either the 
nature of the response (i.e. affective ‘liking’ versus the relatively cognitive task of 
consideration set formation), the decision (i.e. discriminatory choice between two 
alternatives versus the construction of a set of alternatives) or the stimuli in question 
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(i.e. brand names versus product categories). Resolution of all of these possibilities may 
constitute an interesting and important direction for future marketing research in this 
field; as will be discussed in the following chapter (section 9.4.3, page 432). Prior to 
this, however, the remainder of this chapter is given over to a review of key aspects of 
psychological and marketing theory (discussed in part I) in light of the empirical 
findings presented in this thesis. 
 
8.4. Theoretical implications 
 
In drawing conclusions from the findings outlined in the previous chapter, the focus of 
this section is to discuss how the literature reviewed in part I may be re-interpreted and 
understood as a result of the subsequent empirical work. Specifically, the main 
conceptual implications of this thesis are related to the relevance, nature and importance 
of the MEE in the context of marketing theory; a detailed discussion of which will be 
provided in the second part of this section. However, given that the experimental 
approach adopted in this study is closely aligned to that which universally characterises 
psychological research in this field (see chapters 5 and 6), it is important to 
acknowledge that the findings may also have implications for purely scientific 
understanding and explanation of the MEE. As such, the section begins with a broad 
discussion of the conclusions that may be drawn in relation to the psychology literature 
reviewed in chapter 2. 
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8.4.1. Implications for psychological theory 
 
In simple terms, the empirical work in this thesis adds weight to the burgeoning 
evidence for the occurrence of a systematic affective response bias on the basis of mere 
exposure alone; i.e. exposure that “just makes the given stimulus accessible to the 
individual’s perception” (Zajonc, 1968:1). Regardless of the direction of this effect, it is 
nonetheless observed in both the presence and absence of recognition; lending further 
support to the conclusion that “the exposure-affect relationship is a robust, reliable 
phenomenon” (Bornstein, 1989: 278). Furthermore, the relatively moderate size of the 
exposure-induced preference bias in this study, and the fact that it doubles in size in the 
absence of accurate recognition, is generally in line with the meta-analytical findings of 
Bornstein (1989; see chapter 2, page 29). In addition to this, however, the current 
findings make an important distinction between the MEE and the false familiarity effect 
(Whittlesea, 1993; see chapter 2, page 57). In this respect, the implicit MEE is found to 
be unaffected by confident (mistaken) recollection but magnified by changes in the 
nature of exposure; increasing considerably under conditions of subliminal versus 
supraliminal perception. These findings thus provide support for the non-conscious 
MEE in the face of questions as to whether the fluency-based affective response by 
which this has been traditionally evidenced could in fact be due to the inherent 
characteristics of the stimulus (see chapter 2, page 57). 
 
Perhaps a more important outcome of the empirical research in this study, however, is 
the contribution it makes to the debate over whether previous observations of an 
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enhanced MEE in the absence of recognition (see Bornstein, 1989) is specifically due to 
subliminal perception during exposure or the wider notion of explicit memory failure at 
test (see chapter 2, page 29). To recap; it was previously acknowledged that, whilst the 
latter is assumed in the influential misattribution theories of mere exposure (see 
Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994; Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004), the 
empirical work on which it is based is characterised by the ubiquitous use of subliminal 
exposure to eliminate the possibility of subsequent recognition (see Bornstein, 1989). 
As such, the possibility that the implicit MEE is dependent on subliminal perception 
could not be ruled out and, by implication, nor could the proposition that the relative 
size of this effect is explained by the fact that such exposure greatly reduces the 
likelihood of boredom and fatigue; two factors that have since been found to limit the 
MEE (Bornstein et al., 1990). With regard to this issue, however, the current findings 
indicate that, whilst subliminal perception is a particularly effective means by which to 
eliminate the possibility of subsequent explicit memory, it is indeed the absence of such 
memory that underpins the implicit MEE. In this respect, the positive preference-bias 
observed in the presence of stimulus recognition was found to be reversed in the 
absence of this, even under conditions of supraliminal perception during exposure. In 
line with previous psychological findings, however, the size of this implicit preference-
bias (r=0.4) is twice as large as its explicit counterpart (r=0.2), and doubles in size under 
conditions of subliminal (r=0.6) versus supraliminal exposure (r=0.3). 
 
Inherent in this explanation, however, is the fact that one of the major findings of the 
current study is the opposing direction of exposure-induced affective bias in the 
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presence and absence of objective recognition memory. In this respect, the positive 
enhancement of affect under conditions of stimulus recognition is in line with previous 
psychological findings. To recap;  it was acknowledged in chapter 2 (page 29) that not 
only is stimulus recognition possible under conditions of fleeting yet perceptible 
exposure, but the vast majority of psychological research has demonstrated exposure-
induced changes in affective response under just such conditions. Within this literature, 
however, the same (positive) effect would appear to be even greater in the relatively 
small number of studies that have successfully eliminated the moderating influence of 
conscious memory (see Bornstein, 1989; Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004); a finding 
that is not supported in the current study. Rather, the empirical work in this thesis 
indicates that, whilst the observed preference bias is indeed twice as large in the absence 
of recognition (r=0.4) than in the presence of this (r=0.2), the classic, positive MEE that 
is evident in the latter condition is reversed in the former.  
 
This finding is surprising in the sense that it is one of the few times that a reverse non-
conscious MEE has been found in adults (alongside Crandall et al., 1973; Heyduk, 
1975; Lee, 1994). In the context of these earlier studies, however, it may give rise to the 
conclusion that, with regard to marketing communication at least, the MEE can take one 
of two forms; each underpinned by the processes of explicit and implicit memory 
respectively. This is evidenced by the fact that they are moderated and mediated by 
different variables. In line with Bornstein (1989), for example, the size of the explicit 
MEE is found to be enhanced by the use of commonly-occurring, real-word stimuli in 
the current study (with some indication that the same may be true in relation to clear, 
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confident recollection). By contrast, and contrary to the suggestions of Vanhuele (1995) 
and Shapiro (1999) respectively, the (reverse) implicit MEE was not found to be 
influenced by either false recollection or prior familiarity with the (real-word) stimuli. 
With regard to the first of these factors in particular, it would appear that it is the lack of 
objective recognition in all forms that facilitates the implicit MEE; i.e. the complete 
absence of recognition, even if this constitutes nothing more than a vague sense of 
familiarity. When it reflects accurate objective memory, even the weakest sense of 
familiarity may give rise to the conscious, positive MEE, although there is some 
suggestion that this may be further enhanced by clear, confident recollection; a finding 
that is line with those of Lee (2001b) and Wang and Chang (2004). 
 
A potentially important implication of this conclusion, therefore, is that it provides a 
basis on which to reconcile the seemingly contradictory findings of an enhanced MEE 
under conditions of subliminal perception (Bornstein, 1989; Bornstein and D’Agostino, 
1992) and, latterly, a positive correlation between exposure-induced affect and the 
subjective experience of recollection (Lee, 2001b; Wang and Chang, 2004). In this 
respect, it may be argued that, whilst the former reflects the current finding that the 
implicit MEE is larger that its explicit counterpart, the latter illustrates how the explicit 
MEE can in itself be enhanced; i.e. by confidence in recognition memory or the clarity 
and strength with which subjective recollection is experienced. 
 
On a broader note, therefore, the conclusions of this thesis are potentially of great 
significance in the continuing quest for a generic theory of mere exposure. In chapter 2 
(page 36) it was acknowledged that, after nearly four decades of research, a unified 
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theory of this phenomenon remains elusive and, in its absence, the field is characterised 
by a number of conflicting accounts. In light of the current findings it might be argued 
that a resolution to this debate may be found not in a single theory of mere exposure, but 
in a dual-processing model that acknowledges the two routes by which the effects of 
mere exposure may occur (see figure 8.2, page 351). In this respect, the explicit MEE 
might be explained by theories such as arousal (Berlyne, 1970), uncertainty reduction 
(Sawyer, 1981) and even hedonic fluency (Winkielman and Cacioppo, 2001). As 
explained in chapter 2 (section 2.3, page 36), all of these accounts are founded on the 
notion that mere exposure gives rise to a conscious sense of recognition for having 
encountered the stimulus previously; a state that may then result in positive affect on the 
basis of reduced physiological arousal (Berlyne, 1970), greater certainty (Sawyer, 1981) 
or the inherently positive feeling of accurate recognition (Winkielman and Cacioppo, 
2001). By definition, however, the assumption of familiarity as a process factor 
undermines the value of these theories in explaining the implicit MEE (i.e. that which 
arises in the absence of conscious recognition memory). However, whilst this second 
form of the effect occurs in reverse in the current study, it may nonetheless be 
adequately explained by the theories of non-specific activation (Mandler et al., 1987) 
and perceptual fluency/attribution (Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994: see chapter 
2, page 45). In this respect, the processes of feature analysis and implicit memory may 
be seen to give rise to a novelty-bias by way of misattribution; i.e. negative affective 
responses (such as feelings that the exposed stimuli are relatively boring, simplistic or 
common) are mistakenly adopted as “the most parsimonious and reasonable explanation 
of the experience [of processing fluency]” (Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1994: 106-107). 
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Whilst the direction of the implicit MEE is therefore different to that which has been 
found in the majority of previous research, it may nonetheless be explained as a 
‘cognitive illusion’ in the absence of explicit memory for the source of processing 
fluency (Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004).  
 
Figure 8.3: Dual-processing model of the mere exposure effect 
 
 
 
In summary, therefore, it is proposed that the marketing-based model (illustrated in 
figure 8.2, page 351) may be broadened to represent a generic dual-processing model of 
mere exposure that incorporates both an explicit and implicit form of this phenomenon 
(see figure 8.3). The former is enhanced by supraliminal perception, the encoding (and 
subsequent retrieval) of prior stimulus exposure, and thus by a degree of attention, 
elaboration and ease of processing (e.g. by the use of stimuli that are already 
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perceptually familiar or inherently more fluent). It may therefore be explained by the 
theories of arousal (Berlyne, 1970), uncertainty reduction (Sawyer, 1981) or hedonic 
fluency (Cacioppo and Winkielman, 2001). The latter is underpinned by the processes of 
implicit memory and is thus enhanced by conditions such as subliminal perception, 
preattention (i.e. an absence of conscious attention), weak explicit encoding and 
retrieval (i.e. forgetting) and the use of entirely novel (i.e. perceptually unfamiliar) 
stimuli. This form of the MEE is compatible with the theories of non-specific activation 
(Mandler et al., 1987) and perceptual fluency/attribution (Bornstein and D’Agostino, 
1992, 1994). With regard to figure 8.3, however, it should be acknowledged that the 
question of whether cognitive judgments (beyond those of familiarity) are influenced by 
the explicit MEE was not addressed during this study, and thus may be an interesting 
direction for future research. However, it is perhaps important to note that such 
outcomes may not be accommodated by the theories of arousal (Berlyne, 1970), 
uncertainty reduction (Sawyer, 1981) and hedonic fluency (Cacioppo and Winkielman, 
2001). In each case, the focus is on the processes that give rise to affective response 
following mere exposure, and there would appear to be no reason to assume that any of 
these are necessarily associated with changes in cognitive judgments (e.g. of brightness 
or darkness; Mandler et al., 1987). 
 
Given the gravity of the conclusions outlined in this chapter, however, the necessity of 
further research to replicate the current findings and validate the proposed models (i.e 
figure 8.2, page 351; figure 8.3, page 363) must be acknowledged. In this respect, the 
limitations of the work contained within this thesis, and recommendations regarding the 
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objectives, scope and nature of further research, will be discussed in the following 
chapter. Prior to this, however, the remainder of this chapter is given over to a 
discussion of the implications of the current conclusions for marketing theory and 
practice. 
 
8.4.2. Implications for conceptualising the MEE in marketing theory 
 
In the first part of this thesis it was acknowledged that, in the context of a contemporary 
marketing environment that is characterised by the proliferation of brands, media and 
messages, and thus low levels of attention and consumer involvement (Ha and Litman, 
1997; MacInnis et al., 1991; Skinner and Stephens, 2003), most marketing messages 
receive little or no active processing (Shapiro et al., 1997). As a result, it was noted that 
traditional stepwise models of consumer decision-making and advertising effects would 
appear to be of little relevance in the absence of attention, elaboration and logical 
reasoning (see chapter 3, page 70). By contrast, and on the assumption that the MEE is 
underpinned by rapid, automatic, non-conscious processing, it was argued that this 
phenomenon provides a relevant paradigm within which to understand the influence of 
marketing communication under just such conditions (Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 
2004). 
 
In the broadest of senses, therefore, it may be concluded that this basic proposition is 
supported by the current findings. In simple terms, mere exposure to novel brand stimuli 
alone appears to result in a systematic preference bias when these stimuli are 
subsequently encountered. Furthermore, such effects can occur (and are in fact more 
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pronounced) in the absence of explicit memory for previous stimulus exposure. Indeed, 
even when such memory is apparent, it may be expected that consumers will not be 
consciously aware of the influence that exposure alone exerts on the formation of 
subsequent response (Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004); although it might be noted 
that, in the absence of specific empirical evidence, this remains an assumption and a 
potentially interesting avenue for further research. Given the expected prevalence of 
mere exposure to marketing communication in the contemporary consumption 
environment, therefore, it may be argued that an understanding of the MEE may thus be 
important to developing a genuine understanding of “how advertising affects 
consumers, how it works, in order to formulate more effective advertising strategies” 
(Vakratsas and Ambler, 1999: 26). 
 
In the extant marketing literature, however, and largely on the basis of abstract 
psychological experimentation, there would appear to be an almost universal 
assumption that the relationship between mere exposure and affect is always positive. 
The current findings run contrary to this assumption and thus, whilst providing support 
for the notion that mere exposure to marketing stimuli may influence subsequent 
consumer attitudes and choice behaviour, they may have significant implications for the 
way in which the MEE should be conceptualized in marketing theory; as will be 
discussed in detail during this section.  
 
To this end, it is perhaps useful to re-iterate that, in the context of marketing theory, the 
MEE is most relevant to the specific field of consumer information processing; a 
boundary-spanning discipline at the interface between consumer behaviour and 
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marketing communication (see chapter 3, page 71). Indeed, it was from this perspective 
that the perceived role and nature of the MEE was critically discussed in chapter 3. 
Specifically, this review incorporated three important streams of the extant literature; 
involvement theory, non-cognitive and non-conscious consumer processing. On this 
basis, it was argued that the MEE should be conceptualised by marketers as a product of 
non-conscious cognitive processing under conditions of very low attention and 
involvement, and a model was developed to illustrate the creation and influence of this 
phenomenon in a marketing context (see figure 3.13, page 116). During the course of 
this section, however, it will be argued that the current findings have significant 
implications for how the MEE might be conceptualised in the context of marketing 
theory; and in particular that which relates to involvement, elaboration and non-
conscious consumer processing. To this end, the theoretical basis for the MEE from 
each of these theoretical perspectives is revisited in the following subsections; 
culminating in the proposal of a revised model that, it is argued, more accurately 
illustrates the creation and influence of this phenomenon in a marketing context. 
 
8.4.2.1. Revisiting the MEE in the context of involvement theory 
 
During chapter 3 (section 3.2, page 73), it was argued that the MEE provides a 
paradigm within which to explore, understand and influence communication effects at 
the very lowest levels of involvement; as defined in three ‘integrative models’ (Petty 
and Cacioppo, 1981; Greeewald and Leavitt, 1984; MacInnis and Jaworski, 1989). With 
regard to the first of these – the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty and Cacioppo, 
1981; see figure 8.4, below) - it was noted that the potential influence of entirely non-
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conscious processes in consumer information processing is not necessarily 
acknowledged. Rather the concepts of low involvement and the peripheral route to 
attitude change imply a degree of conscious, attentive processing and thus a likelihood 
of explicit memory for the stimulus exposure. As a result, it was acknowledged that it is 
perhaps unsurprising that the MEE is not directly referred to in Petty and Cacioppo’s 
(1981) work. However, the results of the current study indicate that, whilst it is true to 
say that the ELM does not accommodate the implicit MEE, the explicit form of this 
effect would appear to sit comfortably within the low involvement, peripheral route to 
attitude change in this model. In this respect, it might be considered to be akin to a 
familiarity-heuristic by which low involvement consumers might move rapidly and 
passively towards preference formation. 
 
Figure 8.4: Routes to attitude formation and consumer decision-making: The ELM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (Source: Shimp, 1997) 
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exposure into an integrative model of (specifically audience) involvement, processing 
and attitude change is that of Greenwald and Leavitt (1984; see figure 8.5, below). 
During the discussion of this model, however, it was claimed that the authors’ 
categorization of the MEE as the result of focal attentive processing alone, may not 
necessarily be accurate. Rather, it was argued that the non-conscious nature of the 
processes that are presumed to underpin the MEE (see Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 
2004) require that this phenomenon also be characterized as a function of the first 
(preattentive) level of processing. Indeed, it was noted that Greenwald and Leavitt 
(1984) did in fact acknowledge this possibility but cited a lack of empirical evidence for 
such a conclusion at the time of publication.  
 
In light of the empirical work in this thesis, this broader conceptualisation of the MEE 
in the context of Greenwald and Leavitt’s (1984) model would appear to be supported. 
Specifically, the findings indicate that the implicit and explicit forms of the MEE may 
exert an influence at the first and second levels of audience involvement respectively. 
Importantly, however, it should be recognised that the direction of the MEE might be 
different in each case; with the positive affect-bias apparent under conditions of focal 
attention (as proposed by Geeenwald and Leavitt, 1984) accompanied by a negative 
affect-bias at the level of preattention. As such, it may be concluded that the results of 
the current study suggest that the open questions with regard to the effects of 
preattentive processing in the model above may be replaced with reference to sensory 
trace formation (as a cognitive effect) and a tendency towards negative affective 
response (i.e. mere exposure – disliking). However, it should perhaps be acknowledged 
  370 
that further research may be necessary to validate the current findings, and in particular 
to determine whether the implicit form of the marketing-based MEE consistently results 
in negative affective bias (as will be discussed in chapter 9, page 424). 
 
Figure 8.5: Immediate & enduring effects associated with the 4 levels of 
involvement 
 
Source: Greenwald and Leavitt (1984) 
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broad sense, the findings of the current study would appear to support this proposition, 
whilst at the same time giving rise to an important qualification. Specifically, it should 
be stressed that, whilst mere exposure may indeed bias affective response to advertising 
stimuli at the first two levels of processing, the direction of this may in fact be negative 
at the very lowest of these (depending on the degree to which feature analysis results in 
encoding and subsequent stimulus recognition).  
 
Figure 8.6: The six levels of consumer processing (MacInnis and Jaworski, 1989) 
 
Antecedents Processing 
Motivation to 
process 
Attention Capacity Level of 
processing 
Representative 
operations 
Very low Secondary task only Very low 1 Feature analysis 
Low Divided Low 2 Basic categorization 
Low -moderate Ad only Low -moderate 3 Meaning analysis 
Moderate Ad only Moderate 4 Information integration 
High Ad only High 5 Role-taking 
Highest Ad only Highest 6 Constructive processes 
(Source: Extracted from MacInnis and Jaworski, 1989; Table 1) 
 
Finally, it was previously noted that the notion of preattentive audience involvement 
(Greenwald and Leavitt, 1984; MacInnis and Jaworski, 1989) appears to provide the 
foundation for the ‘low involvement processing theory’ of Heath (2001, 2004). Inherent 
in this, however, is the assumption that the automatic, implicit processing of advertising 
stimuli will systematically result in positive affective response. As such, it was proposed 
(on page 85) that the author’s work essentially constitutes a domain-specific 
conceptualisation of the non-conscious MEE. With this in mind, it may be argued that, 
of all the involvement-based theories discussed in chapter 3 (section 3.2.1, page 76), the 
conclusions of this thesis are perhaps most problematic for that of Heath (2001, 2004). 
Specifically, the current findings challenge the assumption that implicit processing 
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systematically produces a classic, positive, non-conscious MEE in the context of 
marketing communication. Indeed, the results of this study indicate that whilst a 
positive preference-bias may indeed arise under conditions of mere exposure, it is 
dependent on a degree of conscious attention and memory. Furthermore, this effect is 
not only eliminated in the absence of objective stimulus recognition, but replaced by an 
implicit novelty-bias for previously unseen stimuli. As such, the attitudinal outcome of 
‘low attention advertising’ may therefore be diametrically opposed to that proposed by 
Heath (2004); i.e. preattentive processing of marketing stimuli alone may in fact result 
in a relatively higher degree of liking for alternative stimuli.  
 
However, while the current findings re-assert the relevance of the MEE as a paradigm 
within which to understand the effects of advertising at low levels of audience 
involvement, they do not necessarily support the notion that low actor involvement will 
be consistently conducive to this phenomenon (e.g. Chung and Szymanski, 1997; Baker, 
1999; Fang et al., 2007). Whilst this may be true in relation to the implicit MEE, 
particularly if it is assumed to occur on the basis of the passive, automatic misattribution 
of implicit memory for prior exposure at the point of decision-making (Mandler et al., 
1987; Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994), it need not necessarily be the case with 
regard to the explicit MEE. Although in the majority of situations it is perhaps fair to 
assume that simply recognising the stimulus will not be sufficient to reduce the 
perceptions of risk that are associated with high involvement decisions, there are certain 
conditions in which this might not be the case. For example, if the explicit MEE can be 
explained by theories of arousal (Berlyne, 1970) and uncertainty reduction (Sawyer, 
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1981) it may be argued that it is, in fact, relevant to those situations in which highly 
involved consumers perceive a degree of risk that they cannot reduce with recourse to 
meaningful information. In such cases, consumers may be expected to attach greater 
meaning to peripheral cues in the formation of attitudes (Bitner and Obermiller, 1985); 
such as the simple fact that they remember having seen it before. Indeed, it was 
previously noted that Baker (1999) proffered evidence to suggest that the MEE might 
act as a ‘tie-breaker’ in highly involved choices between equally attractive brands (see 
chapter 4, page 131).  Furthermore, given that highly involved consumers may be 
expected to exhibit greater motivation and/or ability to engage in active retrieval, there 
is an enhanced likelihood of clear, contextualised memory for prior exposure and thus 
positive preference bias via the explicit form of the MEE.  
 
Figure 8.7: Illustrating the proposed influence of actor involvement on the likely 
occurrence of the explicit and implicit MEE, in the absence of central cues  
 
NB: This diagram is a figurative illustration of the relationship in question rather than a precise (linear) 
model. Indeed, the extent and nature of this proposed relationship remains to be tested and may constitute 
a relevant and important direction for future research (as will be discussed in chapter 9, page 425).  
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In light of this, one of the key implications for marketers may be that the decision-
making situations in which each form of the effect is most relevant are quite different. 
Specifically, whilst the explicit MEE might reduce the sense of risk and uncertainty that 
is experienced at relatively high levels of actor involvement (particularly in the absence 
of central message cues; Petty and Cacioppo, 1981), the implicit MEE may serve to 
trigger a novelty-bias under conditions of extremely low actor involvement (as 
illustrated in figure 8.7, above). Furthermore, it may be proposed that, whilst high levels 
of actor involvement are unlikely to be conducive to both the implicit and explicit MEE 
in the majority of cases, the notion that it may be expected to enhance the latter (but not 
the former) in the absence of other meaningful information may further reflect 
qualitative differences between the two forms of the effect. In the absence of empirical 
evidence for this, however, it is important to acknowledge that it remains a proposition 
at this stage, and a potentially interesting avenue for further marketing research (as will 
be discussed in chapter 9, page 425). 
 
The practical marketing implications of the discussion in this section, and indeed all of 
conclusions in this thesis, will be discussed in section 8.5 (page 386). Prior to this, 
however, it is important to consider the impact of these conclusions on theoretical 
conceptualizations of the MEE in the context of a second important stream of the 
marketing literature; that of non-conscious consumer processing. 
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8.4.2.2. Revisiting the MEE in the context of non-conscious consumer processing 
theory 
 
During chapter 2 (page 21) it was noted that, within the psychology literature, the MEE 
may be conceptualized as a non-conscious phenomenon on the basis that the implicit 
processes by which it occurs are hindered by the presence of explicit memory for 
previous exposures (see Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994; Bornstein and Craver-
Lemey, 2004). In the context of non-conscious consumer processing theory, and 
specifically the model of Chartrand (2005; see figure 8.8), it was therefore argued that 
the marketing-based MEE might be most accurately conceptualized as a product of 
automatic (intermediate) processing (B); alongside phenomena such as behavioural 
mimicry (Dijksterhuis et al., 2005) and the marketing placebo effect (Shiv et al., 2005).  
 
Figure 8.8: The three elements of non-conscious consumer processing  
 
 
Source: Chartrand (2005) 
 
The main implication of this is to reject the notion that subliminal perception of 
marketing stimuli is a necessary condition for the MEE (see chapter 3, page 114). 
However, it was also noted that, whilst this conclusion is in line with received wisdom 
in the psychology literature (see Lee, 1994; Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004), 
subliminal exposure has usually been adopted by psychologists as a means of 
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demonstrating the MEE in the absence of recognition memory (see chapter 2, page 29). 
As such, it was acknowledged that it has thus far been impossible to discount the 
proposition that the size of the marketing-based MEE is primarily enhanced by 
subliminal perception (Bornstein, 1989); and is therefore closely associated with the 
controversial concept of subliminal advertising in non-conscious consumer processing 
theory (i.e. with part A of figure 8.8). As noted in chapter 3 (page 114), resolution of 
this issue may be seen to be particularly important to the acceptance and application of 
the MEE as a means by which to understand, explain and influence the effects of 
marketing communication in the absence of conscious awareness. In this respect, whilst 
the investigation of those phenomena that are seen to occur naturally on the basis of 
non-conscious intermediate processing is considered to be a valuable and important 
stream of research in the contemporary consumer processing literature (Chartrand, 
2005), the concept of subliminal advertising remains subject to both skepticism and 
ethical concerns (Broyles, 2006; see chapter 3, page 104).  
 
The findings in this thesis may thus be seen to shed new and important light on the 
question of whether the marketing-based MEE should be conceptualized as a form of 
subliminal advertising (A) or the product of implicit intermediate processing (B). Firstly 
in this respect, it is important to stress that the current findings indicate that neither 
subliminal perception nor entirely implicit processing are necessary for the occurrence 
of the classic, explicit MEE; i.e. the enhancement of affective response following 
supraliminal exposure and in the presence of objective stimulus recognition. As such, it 
should be acknowledged that the controversy regarding the subliminal versus non-
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conscious nature of the MEE is only relevant to the implicit form of the MEE; a 
phenomenon that is characterized in this study by a novelty-bias for brand names that 
were not previously presented. In this respect, the current findings indicate that, whilst 
subliminal perception enhances the size of the experimental effect, it is not a necessary 
condition. With this in mind, it may be concluded that the implicit MEE is dependent 
upon the absence of conscious recognition of previous exposure rather than stimulus 
perception. As such, this form of the effect should not be regarded as being akin to the 
concept of subliminal advertising; although the use of subliminal exposure appears to be 
a particularly effective means by which to eliminate the moderating influence of 
recognition memory under experimental conditions. Rather, the implicit MEE should be 
contextualized in the rapidly growing stream of literature regarding the attitudinal and 
behavioural effects of non-conscious intermediate processing (see Chartrand, 2005; 
Dijksterhuis et al., 2005). More specifically perhaps, and with reference to the 
discussion in chapter 3 (page 107-111; see also figure 8.9 below), the implicit MEE 
might be considered to be a fully non-conscious intermediate processing effect (1), 
whilst its explicit counterpart may be more accurately conceptualized as a non-
conscious influence effect (2); on the basis that consumers may be aware of the previous 
exposure but not of the extent to which it impacts upon their subsequent attitudes, 
preferences and choice behaviour (see Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004).  
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Figure 8.9: The non-conscious nature of the MEE 
 
 
In light of the discussion to this point in the section, therefore, it is perhaps useful to 
draw it to a close by revisiting the conclusions of the literature review in chapter 3; and 
in particular the models that were proposed to encapsulate the basis on which the MEE 
might be expected to occur in a marketing context. 
 
8.4.2.3. Summarising the theoretical basis for the MEE in a marketing context 
 
On the basis of the review in chapter 3, a simple model was proposed to summarise the 
creation and influence of the MEE in a marketing context (see figure 8.10, below). In 
essence, this model was based on the assumption that an extremely low level of 
audience involvement provides the primary context in which the marketing-based MEE 
might be expected to occur (Greenwald and Leavitt, 1984). This is reflected in little or 
no conscious attention to marketing stimuli (Greenwald and Leavitt, 1984; MacInnis 
and Jaworski, 1989; Heath, 2004) and may occur naturally whenever consumers lack 
the motivation, ability and/or opportunity to elaborate on marketing communication 
(MacInnis and Jaworski, 1989). However, such communication may be designed and 
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executed in ways that intentionally limit the opportunity for elaboration and thus the 
level of audience involvement (e.g. Chaiken and Eagly 1983; Edell and Staelin, 1983; 
Moore, Hausknecht, and Thamodaran 1986). As such, the MEE should also be regarded 
as a phenomenon that might be manipulated by marketers to enhance affective response 
to products, brands and advertisements in the absence of significant focal attention. In 
light of the empirical findings in this thesis, however, this model - and the proposed 
conditions under which it might be applied with the greatest positive effect by marketers 
(see figure 8.11) - would appear to require important qualification and revision; as will 
be explained below. 
 
Figure 8.10: The creation and influence of the MEE in a marketing context 
(originally proposed model; see page 116) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Media & 
consumption 
environment 
Marketing 
communication: 
design, organisation & 
implementation 
Low attention & engagement 
 
Extremely low level of audience 
involvement and elaboration 
 
Naturally occurring 
non-conscious MEE 
 
Manipulated 
non-conscious MEE 
 
  380 
Figure 8.11: The basic conditions for maximising the influence of mere exposure in 
a marketing context (originally proposed model; see page 118) 
 
 
 
Whilst mere exposure has indeed been found to systematically bias affective response to 
marketing stimuli at low levels of attention and involvement, the nature and direction of 
this effect may be mediated by the degree to which perceptual encoding and subsequent 
stimulus recognition occurs. As outlined previously, positive preference-bias for 
previously encountered stimuli is dependent on objective recognition in this study; 
leading to the conclusion that the explicit MEE may enhance affective response by way 
of a familiarity-heuristic under conditions of low involvement processing. By contrast, 
mere exposure that does not result in objective stimulus recognition at the point of 
choice may in fact give rise to an implicit novelty-bias; i.e. a systematic preference-bias 
for alternative stimuli that have not been encountered previously. As such, whilst the 
model presented in figure 8.10 (above) is not necessarily inaccurate, the nature and 
direction of the outcomes to which it refers requires qualification. In this respect, the 
full range of affective response that might be expected under conditions of mere 
exposure may be more accurately summarised by the revised model in figure 8.12. 
Furthermore, it is also important to note that the mediating influence of objective 
recognition memory on the direction of the marketing-based MEE constitutes an 
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important addition to the basic conditions for maximising the positive influence of mere 
exposure in this domain (as illustrated in figure 8.13). 
 
Figure 8.12: The creation and influence of the MEE in a marketing context 
(revised model) 
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Figure 8.13: The basic conditions for maximising the positive influence of mere 
exposure in a marketing context (revised model) 
 
 
 
Finally, it should be recalled that three additional factors were identified in chapter 3 
(page 118) as potential mediators of the extent to which the MEE might be expected to 
occur in a marketing context: 
• Propensity for brand-switching  
• Low versus high levels of actor involvement  
• Absence of experience with the target brand, and perhaps even with competitor 
brands 
 
Whilst the current study does not necessarily address the first of these factors, the 
findings may to some extent challenge previous assumptions regarding the potential 
influence of the other two. In this respect, the possibility that high levels of actor 
involvement might in fact be conducive to the creation of the positive, explicit MEE in 
some circumstances was discussed in section 8.4.2.1 (page 367). Further to this, 
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however, the current findings may also cast doubt on the notion that prior brand 
familiarity is likely to hinder the substantive impact of the MEE.  
 
To recap; it was noted in chapter 3 (page 120) that the degree to which the marketing-
based MEE may alter previously ingrained attitudes towards well-known brands is yet 
to be adequately tested in the marketing literature. In light of the relatively modest size 
of the experimental effect, however, it was suggested that it is perhaps prudent to 
assume that mere exposure will be more likely to substantively increase consumer 
preference in the absence of well-established routines, habits, experience or beliefs with 
regard to target and competitor brands (see Baker, 1999). However, the finding that 
recognition memory is a necessary condition for the positive enhancement of affective 
response by way of mere exposure may pose a challenge to this assumption. This relates 
specifically to the fact that, under conditions of mere exposure, stimuli that are already 
familiar and salient to consumers are likely to be subject to a greater number of brief 
switches in attention, easier perceptual processing and subsequent recognition (see 
Moray, 1959; Nielson and Sarason, 1981; Kurilla and Westerman, 2008). As such, it 
may be proposed that the explicit MEE is in fact of greatest relevance to marketers as a 
tool for the continuous, passive reinforcement of established preferences for well-
known brands, and thus a means by which to reduce the propensity for brand switching.  
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Figure 8.14: Illustrating the proposed influence of brand familiarity/salience on the 
likely occurrence of the explicit and implicit MEE  
 
NB: Like figure 8.7, this diagram is a figurative illustration of the relationship in question rather than a 
precise (linear) model. Once again, the extent and nature of this proposed relationship remains to be 
tested and may constitute a relevant and important direction for future research (as will be discussed in 
chapter 9, page 426).  
 
From a broader theoretical perspective, therefore, it might be proposed that the extent to 
which marketing practitioners might expect to benefit from the explicit MEE - and, by 
the same token, the degree to which they should be concerned about the negative impact 
of the implicit MEE - may be mediated by the current familiarity and popularity of the 
brand. In this respect, brand stimuli that are already familiar, relevant and salient to 
consumers may be subject to greater recognition memory following mere exposure; a 
condition that not only negates the influence of the (reverse) implicit MEE but enhances 
the frequency and size of the positive, explicit form of this phenomenon (as illustrated 
in figure 8.14, above). Contrary to previous indications, therefore, the explicit MEE 
might be most effectively applied as a means by which to sustain and reinforce 
favourable attitudes to established brands in large consumer markets, rather than 
generating initial preference for new, unfamiliar brands in niche segments. In this 
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respect, the potential advantages that the MEE might be expected to confer on popular, 
well-known brands may be considered alongside the double jeopardy phenomenon 
(McPhee, 1963); whereby small brands are doubly disadvantaged by the fact that their 
relatively small number of customers are also prone to be less loyal (or inert) than those 
of larger brands (see Ehrenberg et al.1990; Ehrenberg and Goodhart, 2002). 
 
In summary, therefore, this thesis highlights the potential relevance and importance of 
the MEE in understanding, explaining and influencing the effects of marketing 
communication under conditions of low attention and audience involvement. In this 
respect, however, the current findings indicate that the direction and nature of this effect 
may depend on the extent to which consumers recognise marketing stimuli as having 
been previously encountered. Specifically, the explicit MEE appears to arise on the 
basis of conscious memory for prior exposure and has been found to create a positive 
preference-bias for marketing stimuli, whilst the implicit MEE appears to constitute a 
negative preference-bias on the basis of implicit memory alone.  With this in mind, it 
may be proposed that the likelihood of each type of MEE occurring in the real-world 
consumption environment might be mediated by the level of actor involvement and the 
existing familiarity with the brand. Whilst the implicit MEE may, by definition, be 
expected to be facilitated by passive, automatic processing, and therefore extremely low 
levels of actor involvement at the point of decision-making, the opposite may be true of 
the explicit MEE. In this respect, cognitive engagement at the point of decision-making 
may be reasonably expected to increase the likelihood of stimulus retrieval and thus the 
positive influence of this form of the effect (in the absence of other meaningful 
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information). Furthermore, given that popular, established brands in large consumer 
markets are likely to be considered familiar and salient on a broad scale, it may be 
argued that the stimuli with which they are associated are more likely to attract brief 
switches attention, be easier to process during mere exposure, and thus give rise to 
subsequent recognition judgments and the positive impact of the explicit MEE (see 
Moray, 1959; Nielson and Sarason, 1981; Kurilla and Westerman, 2008). By contrast, 
largely unfamiliar brands in small, niche markets are likely to be subject to less frequent 
attention switching, less perceptual fluency during exposure, and thus lower levels of 
explicit recognition. As such, brand preference in these markets may be more 
susceptible to the negative influence of the implicit MEE. On this basis, the level of 
actor involvement and prior brand familiarity/popularity may constitute important 
considerations in the effective application of the MEE by marketing practitioners; an 
area that is discussed in the following section. 
 
8.5. Implications for marketing practice 
 
From a practitioner perspective, arguably the most relevant marketing application of the 
MEE is in improving the communication effectiveness of brief, repeated exposures to 
simple brand stimuli (e.g. names, logos and other imagery). In this respect, marketing 
research into the MEE - and the findings of this study in particular - may have 
implications for the selection of stimuli, the design, organisation and placement of 
advertising, and the integration of marketing imagery in multiple channels, across 
multiple media and between external and point-of-purchase environments. During the 
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course of this section, the practical implications of the current findings in each of these 
areas will be discussed. As an overview, however, it is important to acknowledge that 
these are related to a single prominent theme; namely, that the positive influence of the 
explicit MEE (and the negative impact of the implicit MEE) may be determined by the 
degree to which marketers create accurate (and perhaps confident and contextualised) 
recognition memory for previous exposure to the relevant stimuli.  
 
Importantly in this respect, and with regard to the issue of subliminal advertising, the 
results indicate that whilst the reverse implicit MEE is indeed magnified under 
conditions of subliminal perception, the effect remains (albeit to a lesser extent) under 
conditions of supraliminal exposure (see chapter 7, page 342). This finding suggests 
that, whilst subliminal presentation may be a particularly effective way to eliminate 
recognition in an experimental setting, it is not a necessary condition for the implicit 
MEE. More significantly, perhaps, the negative impact of this form of the effect 
provides further reason for marketers and advertisers to reject the notion of subliminal 
advertising as an effective means of promoting positive attitudes towards products and 
brands. In this respect, the conclusions of this study go further than previous claims that 
the positive effect of subliminal advertising is negligible (e.g. Theus, 1994; Trappey, 
1996) by demonstrating that it can in fact result in a reduced tendency to prefer the 
stimulus in question.  
 
As such, marketers might be advised that, even under conditions of mere exposure, they 
should strive to ensure conscious attention, perception and elaboration to the extent that, 
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at the point of decision-making, the stimulus is recognised as having been encountered 
previously. The means by which this might be achieved are many and varied, and a full 
review of the vast literature regarding the enhancement of explicit memory is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. However, in order to more fully explain the implication that 
marketers can, and indeed should, seek to enhance recognition memory - even under 
conditions of fleeting and impoverished attention - it is perhaps useful to briefly review 
some of the most relevant aspects of this literature. These are therefore discussed in the 
subsection below, prior to a summary of the implications of this thesis for specific 
aspects of campaign planning. 
 
8.5.1. Enhancing recognition memory under conditions of mere exposure 
 
The means by which the encoding and retrieval of explicit memory might be enhanced 
has been the subject of a very large body of multidisciplinary literature. Whilst a full 
review of this work is beyond the scope of this thesis, one implication of the current 
findings is to highlight its relevance to marketers wishing to apply mere exposure 
principles to elicit positive affective response. By way of example, therefore, it is 
perhaps useful to discuss a number of key aspects of the memory literature in the 
context of this thesis; from overarching theories of memory to specific factors that may 
be expected to influence the encoding and retrieval of memory, even under conditions 
of mere exposure. 
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Firstly in this respect, it is important to acknowledge that there are a number of theories 
that seek to explain and predict how explicit memory occurs and may thus be enhanced 
(see Tulving and Craik, 2000 for a collection of relevant conceptual papers). Within the 
marketing literature reviewed in chapters 3 and 4, it would appear that by far the most 
commonly adopted theory of memory is that which is defined as ‘levels of processing’ 
(Craik and Lockhart, 1972). This is built around the proposition that memory for new 
external information will be more detailed and durable when it is subject to the “deep” 
processes of elaboration than when it is processed in a passive, superficial and shallow 
manner; an assumption that is pervasive in theories of consumer involvement and 
elaboration (see chapter 3, section 3.2.1, page 76). From this perspective, therefore, it 
would appear that mere exposure, by its very nature, prevents the kind of deep level 
processing that is necessary for ensuring and enhancing recognition memory. The 
implication of this for the application of mere exposure principles is that whilst some 
degree of explicit memory may occur, it is not possible to actively foster it without 
moving beyond the realms of the MEE; i.e. without extending the duration and nature of 
exposure to facilitate higher levels of attention, ‘deeper’ stimulus processing and greater 
elaboration. However, it should be acknowledged that the levels of processing 
perspective is far from being the only one that is relevant to marketing communication. 
In particular, two further theoretical constructs may be considered to be particularly 
germane in the context of the marketing-based MEE, as they accommodate the notion 
that explicit memory can be enhanced without the need for extended exposure duration 
and deep-level processing; these are the principles of encoding specificity (Tulving and 
Thomson, 1973) and transfer appropriate processing (Roediger and Blaxton, 1987). 
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The encoding specificity principle (ESP) has its origins in the proposition that, "specific 
encoding operations performed on what is perceived determine what is stored, and what is 
stored determines what retrieval cues are effective in providing access to what is stored” 
(Tulving and Thomson, 1973: 36). In line with this, Hill et al. (1997) observe that 
memory for advertising has been found to be enhanced when the cues presented in 
recognition tests are identical, or at least very similar, to those that were encoded during 
previous advertising exposures. In the context of this thesis, therefore, the implication for 
marketers is that recognition memory may be enhanced under conditions of mere exposure 
by replicating the perceptual features of the brand stimuli across all aspects of the marketing 
campaign, and in particular at the point of decision-making (e.g. via packaging and point-
of-sale promotion). 
 
However, whilst Hill et al. (1997) acknowledge that the replication of cues provides one 
explanation of their findings (i.e. enhanced memory for advertising), the fact that these 
accommodate a degree of variation in the features of the stimuli at encoding and retrieval 
prompts them to claim that it is not the nature of the cue that is important but the type of 
processing that is employed. Indeed, this notion is central to the principle of Transfer 
Appropriate Processing (TAP: Roediger and Blaxton, 1987); a construct that extends the 
level of processing perspective by proposing that it is the congruency, rather than depth, 
of processing during encoding and retrieval that mediates the robustness of recognition 
memory. In the context of mere exposure, this theory implies that, in light of the fact 
that brief, fleeting, passive exposures are unlikely to give rise to extended semantic 
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processing, it is important to provide the opportunity for recognition on the basis of 
perceptual fluency for the stimulus features alone. In essence, therefore, where ESP 
indicates the importance of stimulus congruency, the principle of TAP more clearly 
emphasizes the need for exact replication of the stimulus form throughout the marketing 
campaign; up to and including that which is encountered at the point of decision-
making. On a broader note, however, it stresses the general principle of maximising the 
opportunity for perceptual processing each time the brand stimulus is encountered. In 
this respect, it highlights the relevance of four additional factors that may be expected to 
mediate the enhancement of recognition memory under conditions of mere exposure 
alone; repetition, interference, decay and stimulus characteristics. 
 
With regard to the first of these, repetition is a central tenet of Zajonc’s (1968) initial 
conceptualisation of the MEE. However, subsequent experimental research indicates 
that there may be an upper limit to the number of repetitions that positively enhance the 
size of this effect (see Bornstein, 1989). In light of this, it may be argued that whilst 
maximising the number of repeated exposures may enhance subsequent recognition 
memory for the brand stimulus, it may not necessarily enhance affective response in line 
with this. However, it should be stressed that evidence for ‘wear-out’ of the MEE at 
high levels of repetition is thus far limited to laboratory-based psychological studies 
using simple, abstract stimuli (see Bornstein, 1989). As such, it is possible that it is due 
to boredom and fatigue under experimental conditions that are somewhat removed from 
the typical marketing environment (see Bornstein et al., 1990). As will be discussed in 
the following chapter, further research may thus be necessary to determine the 
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limitations of stimulus repetition as a means by which to enhance the explicit MEE in a 
marketing context. 
 
Whilst repetition is primarily associated with memory encoding, however, two other 
factors should be considered that essentially constitute the processes of forgetting. The 
first of these is interference; “the process by which our ability to recollect some 
information is hindered by our exposure to some other information” (Kumar, 2000: 
155). Within the marketing literature, the moderating influence of interference on 
memory for advertising stimuli has been found in relation to additional advertisements 
for competing brands (e.g. Burke and Srull, 1988; Keller 1987; Keller, 1991) and 
advertisements that utilize similar contextual imagery (e.g. colours, pictures, background 
designs, ad layout; see Kumar 2000). With regard to the first of these findings, it may be 
argued that the rapid growth in interference from competitive advertising in fact 
provides conditions that are conducive to the occurrence of the MEE in a marketing 
context. As such, whilst steps to reduce this form of interference may facilitate greater 
attention, elaboration and memory, they may also move marketers beyond the realms of 
the mere exposure paradigm. However, the study by Kumar (2000) may carry particular 
resonance within the framework of the MEE as it stresses the need to avoid the use of 
contexts and backgrounds that could conflict with those used in other marketing 
communications; highlighting the potential for reduced brand name memory under such 
conditions. In light of the additional need to limit the extent to which stimulus features 
(e.g. letters of the brand name) are cluttered by other information – and thus enhance the 
ease and speed with which they can be perceptually processed – these findings thus add 
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further weight to the importance of presenting the brand stimulus in isolation wherever 
possible. Within the context of this thesis, therefore, the relevance of interference 
research is that marketers might seek to enhance memory within the constraints of the 
mere exposure paradigm, not by reducing the occurrence of interference but by limiting 
the impact it has on the encoding and retrieval of recognition memory. A key 
implication of this is the need to avoid background and contextual overlap with 
competing marketing communication by presenting the brand stimulus in isolation 
where possible. Furthermore, it should be noted that the effects of interference have 
been found to lessen as familiarity with the brand stimulus increases (Alba and 
Hutchinson, 1987). In line with this, there is evidence to suggest that memory for the 
advertising of established, familiar brands is relatively invulnerable to interference 
effects (Kent and Allen, 1994; Unnava and Sirdeshmukh, 1994; Kent and Kellaris, 
2001). In the context of this thesis, therefore, these latter findings may be seen to add 
further weight to the conclusion that the explicit MEE is more likely to occur, and thus 
be more relevant, in relation to established, well-known brands in large consumer 
markets 
 
In addition to interference, however, recognition memory may be significantly reduced 
by natural decay in the strength (and thus the retrievability) of encoded memory over 
time (Spear, 1978). From the levels of processing perspective, mere exposure may be 
assumed to give rise to shallow processing and thus relatively weak memory traces that 
degrade quickly. As such, it would seem logical to conclude that reducing the delay 
between the final exposure and actual brand choice would maximize the possibility of 
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recognition memory at the point of purchase. The implication of this is that repeated 
exposures should stretch continuously from the external environment (e.g. via mass media 
and ambient advertising) into the purchase environment (via, for example, in-store, on-pack 
and online promotion); minimising the period of delay between the final exposure and the 
point of decision-making. 
 
Finally, and in addition to repetition, the processes of forgetting (i.e. interference and 
decay) and perceptual matching, the specific characteristics of the stimulus may mediate 
the extent to which it is subsequently recognised following mere exposure. In this 
respect, brand stimuli that are already familiar and salient are more likely to be the 
subject of brief switches in attention (and thus more repeated focal exposures), 
enhanced processing fluency and subsequent recognition (see Moray, 1959; Nielson and 
Sarason, 1981; Kurilla and Westerman, 2008). On this basis, and with regard to lexical 
stimuli such as brand names, it may therefore be argued that high frequency words 
might be subject to similar processing advantages over low frequency words. At this 
point, however, it should perhaps be acknowledged that there is also some evidence to 
suggest that, whilst high frequency words are better recalled, they are less well recog-
nized (Gregg 1976); a phenomenon that has been termed the frequency paradox 
between recognition and recall (Mandler, Goodman and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1982). 
However, the current findings do not support this paradox, with the mean rate of recognition 
for real-word brand names significantly higher than that for pseudo-word stimuli (M=4.55, 
t=2.108, p<0.05). As such, these results may further strengthen the conclusion that the explicit 
MEE is likely to be more relevant to established, well-known brands; or at least those that 
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make use of commonly occurring, familiar stimuli. Further to this, and in line with the 
interference research discussed previously, Alba et al. (1992: 414) suggest that, “a poorly 
processed peripheral cue may be highly memorable because of its inherent simplicity 
or a lack of interference from similar competing information."  
 
In summary, therefore, whilst the enhancement of recognition memory under conditions 
of mere exposure appears to be somewhat paradoxical from the widely adopted levels of 
processing perspective (Craik and Lockhart, 1972), it is accommodated by the 
principles of encoding specificity (Tulving and Thompson, 1973) and transfer 
appropriate processing (Roediger and Blaxton, 1987). With this in mind, the specific 
implications of the current study for marketing campaign planning are summarized 
below. 
 
8.5.2. Summary of implications for marketing campaign planning 
 
In light of the discussion above, the conclusions of this thesis may be seen to have 
significant implications for the planning and execution of marketing communication 
campaigns; specifically in relation to the selection and presentation of brand stimuli for 
positive MEEs, media planning and integration, and the measurement of low attention 
advertising effects in a cluttered, complex and dynamic environment.  The purpose of 
this section, therefore, is to outline the practical implications of the current study in each 
of these areas. 
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8.5.2.1. Brand stimulus selection, design and presentation 
 
As previously stressed, the findings of this study imply that the key to maximising the 
positive (and minimising the negative) influence of mere exposure to marketing 
communications is to establish accurate recognition memory at the point of decision-
making. The means by which this might be achieved were discussed in section 8.5.1 
(page 388), and highlight the potential implications for the selection and presentation of 
brand stimuli in marketing communications. For example, recognition memory may be 
enhanced under conditions of mere exposure by the use of stimuli with perceptual 
features that are familiar to the target audience (rather than those that are novel and 
unique). Such familiarity may be expected to enhance attention switching, perceptual 
processing and the experience of recognition memory at the point of decision-making 
(see Moray, 1959; Nielson and Sarason, 1981; Kurilla and Westerman, 2008). However, 
familiarity is not the only factor that might enhance processing fluency and thus 
recognition memory under conditions of mere exposure. For example, visually clear, 
isolated and coherent stimuli may also be relatively easy to process (Whittlesea, 1993), 
and thus may be considered more likely to give rise to encoding, subsequent recognition 
and the positive explicit MEE. 
 
Further to the selection and design of brand stimuli, however, the findings of this study 
also have implications for their presentation during the execution of marketing 
campaigns. Firstly, recognition memory might reasonably be expected to be enhanced 
by maximising the number of repeated mere exposures to the brand stimulus; although 
it should be acknowledged that applied marketing research may be necessary to 
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establish the point at which ‘wear-out’ might occur in relation to the positive influence 
of repetition in natural media environments. Secondly, and in line with the principles of 
both encoding specificity (Tulving and Thompson, 1973) and transfer appropriate 
processing (Roediger and Blaxton, 1987), the perceptual features of these stimuli should 
be replicated as closely as possible across all aspects of the marketing campaign. 
Thirdly, and with specific regard to the TAP principle and the elimination of 
interference effects (see section 8.5.1, page 388), each exposure should, where possible, 
feature the brand stimulus in isolation, i.e. uncluttered by contextual, background and 
associated imagery.  
 
8.5.2.2. Media planning and integration 
 
With regard to media strategy it is perhaps important to stress that the current findings 
re-assert the relevance of the MEE under conditions of low audience involvement. 
Indeed, by definition, the nature of mere exposure is such that it severely restricts the 
opportunity for elaborative processing and, in many cases, may be the product of a lack 
of motivation to attend to, and engage with, the marketing stimulus. An obvious 
implication of this for media planning is that mere exposure in the broader social 
environment is most likely to be facilitated by the use of a range of media that are 
associated with the rapid, repeated presentation of simple brand stimuli; for example, 
TV, outdoor, ambient and online advertising. In this respect, a campaign that harnesses 
the principles of mere exposure is thus likely to benefit from media-neutral planning 
(see Jenkinson, 2006). 
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However, perhaps the most important implication of the current findings for media 
planning is that, whilst the use of multiple media is essential for maximum coverage and 
stimulus repetition, the campaign as a whole must be closely integrated to ensure that 
the perceptual features of the stimulus, and the context in which it is presented, are 
closely replicated each time it is encountered. As such, it may be implied that the most 
effective application of mere exposure principles in marketing campaigns will be 
achieved in the context of Integrated Marketing Communication (IMC); a concept that 
stresses the need for consistency and cohesion in message content, design and style 
across multiple media channels (see Kitchen and Schultz, 2000);. Similarly, it may thus 
be proposed that an understanding of the principles of mere exposure – and the findings 
of this study in particular - may have significant practical implications with regard to the 
planning, execution and measurement of IMC campaigns under conditions of extremely 
low audience involvement. Furthermore, it is important to stress that such integration 
should extend from the general media environment to the purchase environment (e.g. a 
physical store or the relevant web pages of an online retailer), to minimise the delay 
between exposure and choice, and thus limit the extent of decay in explicit memory. In 
this respect, the effective application of mere exposure principles is thus likely to 
benefit from recency planning (see Ephron, 1997);  an activity that is founded on the 
notion that “an ad exposure has more sales potency when it occurs close to the purchase 
occasion” (Reichel and Wood, 1997: 66). 
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8.5.2.3. Measurement 
Finally, the findings of this study have implications for the measurement of 
communication effects in the context of marketing campaign planning. Firstly in this 
respect, the fact that both the explicit and implicit form of the MEE may occur naturally 
as a result of clutter and complexity in the consumption environment, and that the latter 
may in fact have a negative impact on affective response, may imply that marketers 
should seek to identify and measure the influence of the MEE (in both its forms), 
regardless of whether there is an active attempt to manipulate it. However, it is 
acknowledged that measurement is most likely to be undertaken to establish the 
effectiveness of an intended mere exposure strategy. To this end, one of the main 
implications of the current findings is to highlight the importance of measuring 
recognition and recall for prior exposure to the relevant brand stimuli, as this provides 
the necessary context for the (positive) explicit MEE. Further to this, however, 
marketers should then seek to establish the relationship between exposure, memory and 
affective response to identify the extent to which the explicit (and indeed, implicit) 
MEE exerts an influence on the formation of consumer attitudes. Finally, these 
measures might then be correlated with those regarding brand choice and purchase to 
examine the extent to which attitudes that are formed on the basis of mere exposure 
subsequently influence purchase behaviour. This is an issue that is not addressed in the 
current study but is one of a number of potential directions for further marketing 
research in this field; all of which will be discussed in chapter 9 (page 423). Prior to 
this, however, it is important to acknowledge that whilst the primary implications of the 
current study are for marketing practice, it also gives rise to some issues that may be of 
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direct relevance to consumers and the organisations that are tasked with representing 
their interests. These are therefore discussed in the following section. 
 
8.6. Implications for consumers 
 
From a consumer perspective, this study highlights the fact that attitudes to brand 
stimuli may (to some extent) be a function of mere exposure. For the most part, 
however, it might be argued that the MEE serves as a useful heuristic under conditions 
of extremely low actor involvement; facilitating more rapid and less effortful decisions 
where these are required. By definition, such decisions are likely to be characterised by 
a low level of risk and personal relevance and so the perceived impact of an ‘incorrect’ 
decision is likely to be relatively low. Furthermore, it may be reassuring for consumers 
to note that this study provides no support for the use of subliminal presentation 
techniques in marketing communications. In fact, the findings imply that the entirely 
non-conscious processing that underpins the implicit MEE is likely to result in a 
negative, rather than positive, affect-bias toward the brand stimulus in question. 
 
However, it may be important for consumers to acknowledge that recognisable 
occurrences of mere exposure to their preferred brands may contribute to brand inertia. 
Whilst this may not be perceived to be problematic, it may nonetheless be important for 
consumers to be aware that, whilst it may be experienced as genuine and continuous 
brand preference – and interpreted by marketers as brand ‘loyalty’ – the tendency to 
routinely prefer one brand over another may in fact be due to an irrational, non-
conscious reduction in the propensity for brand swi
  401 
miss out on the benefits of this simply as a result of exposure-induced inertia that they 
are not necessarily aware of. Furthermore, it was previously noted that the familiarity-
heuristic that characterises the explicit MEE may also be utilised in relatively high-
involvement decisions when there is an absence of other meaningful information (see 
chapter 8, 372-373). A sub-optimal decision in these circumstances may lead to more 
significant financial, physical, psychological and social consequences. Under such 
conditions, therefore, consumers may benefit from a conscious awareness of the 
irrational influence of familiarity that is based on nothing more than mere exposure. As 
Chartrand (2005: 2009) explains; “awareness is important to aid consumers in 
controlling and improving their decisions. Awareness must precede control.” 
 
However, perhaps the most significant implication of this thesis for consumers is not 
that marketers might be discouraged from adopting subliminal means of persuasion, but 
rather that they might be more motivated than ever to ensure attention, memory and thus 
the positive impact of the explicit MEE. In this respect, the current findings may have 
negative consequences regarding the ubiquity and intrusiveness of marketing 
communication. For example, the recent trend for online advertising ‘pop-ups’ to 
interrupt the activities of internet users by appearing in the centre of focally attended 
material (e.g. a news article) might represent a particularly effective means by which to 
engender the explicit MEE. In this respect, whilst audiences may immediately search for 
the ‘button’ by which they can end this uninvited intrusion – all the while distracted 
from focussing and elaborating on the message claims – the brief periods for which 
simple stimuli (such as brand names) remain in focal attention, the surprising manner of 
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their appearance and the repeated nature of these intrusions are likely to be sufficient 
conditions for the explicit MEE in a marketing context. From a public policy 
perspective, therefore, fears that the MEE constitutes a revival of the art of ‘hidden 
persuasion’ are not only unfounded but may actually divert attention away from the real 
threat to consumers’ rights of privacy and respect from increasingly aggressive attempts 
to ‘grab’ attention, if only for the briefest of moments. Marketing campaigns that seek 
to harness the power of the explicit MEE are likely to exacerbate this problem. 
 
Given all of this, however, it should be stressed that the MEE is not an invention of 
marketers and advertisers. Rather, it is a naturally occurring phenomenon that, together 
with a raft of other influences, may be expected to contribute to the continuous and 
largely unconscious shaping of preferences and attitudes in all aspects of life. As such, 
whilst greater awareness of the mere exposure phenomenon may be important in 
empowering consumers to make more effective decisions, and regulation may be 
implemented to enhance the degree to which consumers might reasonably control how 
and when they are exposed to marketing communication, the influence of mere 
exposure should not be considered to be necessarily dangerous or malign. Indeed, it 
may even be considered beneficial to the extent that it facilitates the formation of rapid, 
low involvement preferences and thus allows consumers to deal with the vast array of 
other information they are required to process every day.  
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8.7. Summary and Conclusion 
 
In summary, therefore, the empirical results in this thesis indicate that the MEE can 
occur when consumers are repeatedly and fleetingly exposed to marketing stimuli under 
conditions of extremely low audience involvement. More importantly, however, they 
also imply that this effect may take one of two forms; termed explicit and implicit to 
reflect the distinct processes of memory by which they occur. The explicit MEE occurs 
when audiences exhibit objective recognition memory for having been previously 
exposed to marketing stimuli, and can lead to a positive affect-bias when these stimuli 
are subsequently encountered. The implicit MEE occurs when consumers do not exhibit 
conscious, objective familiarity with marketing stimuli to which they have been 
repeatedly and fleetingly exposed (e.g. brand names), and can lead to a negative affect-
bias when these stimuli are subsequently encountered. The former is enhanced by 
factors that facilitate stimulus encoding and retrieval, even under conditions of low 
audience involvement (e.g. focal attention, ease of stimulus processing and short delays 
between exposure and decision-making), whilst the latter is facilitated by subliminal 
perception, preattentive analysis and other factors that prevent the encoding and 
retrieval of explicit memory for the stimulus exposure.  
 
Taken together, these conclusions underpin the overarching outcome of the empirical 
work in this thesis; a dual-processing model of mere exposure effects in the context of 
marketing communication (as illustrated in figure 8.2, page 351). On this basis, it is 
argued that the originally proposed model of the creation and influence of the MEE in a 
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marketing context (see figure 8.10, page 379) requires revision to incorporate the 
potential for both positive and negative affect-bias; whether this occurs as a natural 
result of environmental conditions or is manipulated via the design, organisation and 
placement of marketing communication (see figure 8.12, page 381).  
 
With regard to psychological theory, the broad implication of the proposed dual-
processing model is that it may be seen to accommodate what would appear to be 
conflicting theories of mere exposure. In this respect, those theories that are founded on 
the assumption that affect arises on the basis of stimulus recognition (e.g. Berlyne, 
1970; Sawyer, 1981; Winkielman and Cacioppo, 2001) may be considered to be 
potentially valid in the context of the explicit MEE. By contrast, the theories of non-
specific activation (Mandler et al., 1987) and perceptual fluency/attribution (Bornstein 
and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994) would appear to provide a possible explanation of the 
implicit MEE. Furthermore, the proposed model may also serve to reconcile seemingly 
conflicting evidence that the MEE might be enhanced by both subliminal perception 
(Bornstein, 1989; Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992) and the experience of clear, 
confident recollection (Lee, 2001b; Wang and Chang, 2004). In this respect, it may be 
argued that the former is explained by the current finding that the (reverse) implicit 
MEE is larger than its explicit counterpart and magnified by subliminal perception, 
whilst the latter reflects the possibility that the (positive) explicit MEE may be enhanced 
by the conscious experience of recollection. 
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From a marketing perspective, the key aspect of the proposed dual-processing model is 
that the two forms of mere exposure it expounds are qualitatively different. As such, 
both the size and direction of affect-bias may be different in each case. Specifically, on 
the basis of this study, it would appear that the positive influence of mere exposure in 
the presence of recognition memory may be reversed in the absence of this condition. 
Furthermore, the degree to which this negative effect occurs is magnified by the extent 
to which the influence of recognition memory is restricted. In a practical sense, 
therefore, the overarching implication for marketers and advertisers is that mere 
exposure should not be considered to be akin to subliminal advertising; a conclusion 
that may be reassuring to both practitioners and consumers alike. Indeed, in order to 
harness the positive (and negate the potentially negative) effects of mere exposure, it 
may be necessary to maximize the extent to which brand stimuli are recognised as 
having been previously encountered. In turn, this has implications for the selection, 
design, presentation and integration of marketing stimuli as a means of ensuring 
attention, ease of processing and recognition memory for extremely fleeting exposures. 
Given the inherent advantages that are associated with familiar and salient stimuli in 
this respect, it may also imply that the positive effects of mere exposure are most 
relevant to the maintenance of favourable attitudes towards well-known brands in large 
consumer markets. 
 
From the consumer’s perspective, however, one negative consequence of this may be 
that the commercial application of mere exposure principles could result in an 
increasingly intrusive and inexorable barrage of marketing communication. Should this 
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be the case, the primary challenge for regulators and public policy-makers may be to 
protect consumer privacy rather than prevent subliminal manipulation. However, in 
considering the potential implications for marketers and consumers alike it is necessary 
to identify and acknowledge the limitations of the current study and the necessity for 
further research into the marketing-based MEE. Both of these areas are therefore 
discussed in the final chapter, following a summary of the main contributions of the 
thesis. 
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Chapter 9 
 
Contributions, limitations and 
directions for further research 
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9.1. Introduction 
 
During the previous chapter it was noted that the overarching outcome of the empirical 
work in this thesis is a dual-processing model (see figure 8.2, page 351) that is 
underpinned by a number of specific findings regarding the existence, size, direction 
and nature of the marketing-based MEE (see chapter 7, page 345). The implications of 
this for theoretical understanding of the MEE, in the realms of both psychology and 
marketing, were discussed at length, prior to the distillation of the potential practical 
implications for marketers and consumers. With all of this in mind, the purpose of this 
final chapter is three-fold; a) to provide a summary of the main contributions of the 
thesis, b) to acknowledge the limitations of the current study and, c) to identify 
directions for further research into the marketing-specific effects of mere exposure (see 
figure 9.1). The chapter begins, therefore, with an outline of the theoretical, practical 
and methodological contributions of the thesis. 
 
Figure 9.1: Structure of Chapter 9 
 
5. Conclusion 
3. Limitations  
4. Directions for further research  
2. Main contributions 
• Methodological 
• Empirical 
• Theoretical 
• Practical 
1. Introduction 
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9.2. Main contributions of the thesis 
 
In the interests of clarity, the primary contributions may be divided into three 
categories; empirical, theoretical and managerial/practical. However, it is should be 
noted that the thesis may also be considered to make significant methodological 
contributions to mere exposure research, and in particular the measurement of the MEE. 
As such, the section begins with a review of these contributions, prior to summarising 
those that may be considered to be empirical, theoretical and managerial/practical 
respectively. 
 
9.2.1. Methodological contributions 
 
From a general perspective, an overarching methodological contribution of this thesis is 
the development of an approach that harnesses the extremely high degree of control and 
complexity of previous psychological experimentation to identify and explore the 
marketing-based MEE under conditions of low involvement. More importantly, 
perhaps, this is done in such a way as to minimise the need for specialist software and 
maximise the use of simultaneous data collection. As such, it constitutes a robust yet 
practical approach by which to identify and measure the potential effects of mere 
exposure in relation to marketing stimuli and brand-related judgments.  
 
However, arguably the most important methodological contributions are associated with 
the measurement of the MEE. Firstly in this respect, the thesis challenges the validity of 
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simply measuring affective response when recognition rates in the sample are at the 
level of chance as a means by which to identify the effects of mere exposure. The key 
problem with this approach is that it does not reveal the relationship between 
recognition and affect for each participant and with regard to each of the target stimuli. 
As such, it is not possible to draw conclusions as to the mediating or moderating 
influence of recognition on affective response (as explained in chapter 6, page 238-241). 
In response, an alternative approach was developed that specifically measures rates of 
preference in the presence and absence of recognition for each participant (see chapter 
7, page 312). In this way, two distinct forms of the MEE were identified and explored 
during the course of the thesis; an outcome that would not have been possible if the 
overall rate of preference had simply been compared against the overall rate of 
recognition. Secondly, this thesis highlights an important factor that is, as yet, largely 
unrecognised in the mere exposure literature; namely, the possibility that the observed 
effect is the product of stimulus characteristics that render it relatively easier to process, 
rather than exposure-induced fluency per se (see chapter 2, page 57). This is derived 
from research into the false familiarity effect (Whittlesea, 1993), and potentially 
provides an alternative explanation for experimental evidence of the MEE. In response, 
the current thesis develops two potential methods by which to distinguish between the 
FFE and MEE. The first consists of specifically linking the observed effect to changes 
in the exposure phase; an end that was achieved by demonstrating that subliminal 
perception during exposure gave rise to a significantly larger implicit MEE than 
supraliminal perception (a finding that is in line with studies of the ‘non-conscious 
MEE’ in the extant psychology literature; see chapter 2, page 29). On reflection, 
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however, a more straightforward approach might be to simply undertake an extended 
pretesting phase (with a larger sample) in which the preference rate for each stimulus 
pair is measured in the absence of prior exposure. By whichever means it is achieved, 
however, this thesis highlights the importance of incorporating a method by which to 
distinguish the effects of exposure from those of other sources of processing fluency, 
and offers potential solutions in this respect.  
 
9.2.2. Empirical contributions 
 
In addition to providing a robust validation of the existence and size of the MEE in a 
marketing context, perhaps the most important empirical contribution of the thesis is 
that it demonstrates: 
a) the mediating influence of recognition memory on the direction of the MEE; and 
b) the differing nature of the processes that underpin this phenomenon in the 
presence and absence of recognition memory.  
 
As noted in the previous chapter, both of these findings are somewhat surprising and 
represent significant contributions to knowledge and understanding of the MEE in the 
realms of both psychology and marketing. For example, inherent in the former is the 
discovery of a reverse MEE in the absence of stimulus recognition; one of only a few 
occasions that this result has been observed in four decades of mere exposure research, 
but the second time it has occurred in the very small subset of this research that is 
published in the marketing domain (alongside Lee, 1994). Even more surprising, 
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however, is the discovery that the direction of the MEE is mediated by recognition 
memory and, on the basis that it is influenced differently by stimulus type (and perhaps 
subjective recollection) in the presence and absence of this, appears to arise on the basis 
of two different processes of memory (i.e. implicit and explicit). As discussed in chapter 
8 (section 8.4.2, page 365) this may have significant implications for how the MEE is 
conceptualised in both psychology and marketing theory; as summarised in the 
following section. 
 
9.2.3. Theoretical contributions 
 
On the basis that both the direction and nature of exposure-induced preference is found 
to be mediated by recognition memory, the main theoretical contribution of this thesis is 
the proposal of a dual-processing model of mere exposure in a marketing context (see 
figure 9.2, page 413). This extends current conceptual understanding of the MEE to 
incorporate the possibility that there are two forms of the effect, arising on the basis of 
implicit and explicit memory processes respectively. With regard to typical marketing 
stimuli, therefore, it would appear that exposure-induced preference bias may only be 
positive when it is accompanied by recognition memory (i.e. the explicit MEE). 
Furthermore, this would appear to be enhanced by prior perceptual familiarity (i.e. the 
real-word nature) of the stimulus. In addition, and more fundamentally perhaps, there is 
some indication (and logical reason to assume) that this form of the MEE is further 
augmented by clear, contextual, explicit recollection of previous stimulus exposure. By 
contrast, mere exposure to marketing communication that does not give rise to 
subsequent recognition memory at the point of decision-making may result in a 
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preference-bias for alternative stimuli (i.e. a reverse implicit MEE). This effect does not 
appear to be mediated by brand name type or the (false) subjective experience of 
memory. 
 
Figure 9.2: Dual-processing model of the marketing-based mere exposure effect 
 
 
On the one hand, therefore, it may be argued that the major contribution of this thesis 
has been to distil a marketing-based model of the MEE (see figure 9.2); one in which 
the nature of the phenomenon in this particular domain is seen to differ from that which 
is evident in more abstract psychological studies. However, in the continued absence of 
a generic theory of mere exposure (see chapter 2, page 36), it may be reasonably 
proposed that the model above may have important implications for theoretical 
explanation of the MEE in a broader sense. Specifically, it could provide a means by 
which to reconcile a number of competing accounts of the MEE in the psychology 
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literature, and the seemingly contradictory findings that the size of the effect is 
enhanced by both subliminal perception (re. implicit MEE) and confidence in memory 
judgments (re. explicit MEE); as discussed in chapter 8 (page 361). In this respect, 
therefore, the thesis might be considered to provide an important contribution to the 
continuing search for a generic theory of mere exposure in the psychology literature; a 
search that is now entering its fifth decade.  
 
Figure 9.3: The non-conscious nature of the MEE 
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to a deeper understanding of the MEE by specifying that the implicit form of this effect 
is the product of entirely non-conscious processing, whilst its explicit counterpart should 
be considered to be non-conscious on the basis that consumers are unaware of the link 
between exposure and preference (despite experiencing both conscious perception and 
memory of the exposed stimuli; see figure 9.3). As illustrated in chapter 8 (section 8.5, 
page 386), the conceptual conclusions of this thesis have potentially important 
implications for marketing practitioners, whether or not they are actively involved in the 
application of the MEE as a means of persuasive communication. In this respect, the 
main managerial contributions of the thesis are summarised below. 
 
9.2.4. Managerial/practical contributions 
 
From a managerial perspective, the work contained in this thesis is most relevant to the 
field of marketing communication. In this respect, perhaps the most general implication 
is that mere exposure may influence attitudes towards marketing stimuli that are 
perceived fleetingly, repeatedly and at low levels of audience attention and 
involvement. Given that the conditions for such exposure occur naturally in a wide 
range of consumer markets, it may be important to recognise (and perhaps identify) the 
extent to which the MEE occurs; regardless of whether it is an intentional part of the 
communication strategy. However, the most important managerial contributions relate 
to the application of the MEE as a means by which to enhance the effectiveness of 
marketing communication. In this respect, and in direct contrast to the principles of 
subliminal advertising, the thesis highlights the importance of ensuring conscious 
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attention and memory for marketing stimuli that are encountered under conditions of 
mere exposure. This may be critical for the creation of the positive, explicit form of the 
MEE. Furthermore, mere exposure to brand stimuli that does not give rise to subsequent 
stimulus recognition might be expected to have a negative influence on consumer 
attitudes.  
 
A brief discussion of some of the means by which attention and memory may be 
enhanced under conditions of mere exposure was provided in the previous chapter 
(section, 8.5.1, page 388); during which the potential importance of familiarity-induced 
fluency was noted. With this in mind, it should be acknowledged that a further 
managerial implication of this thesis is to highlight the relevance of the MEE to well-
established, popular brands in large consumer markets. To explain; it was previously 
acknowledged that this phenomenon may be most relevant in situations where 
consumers have little experience of the product category, no established routines or 
habits and no preconceived attitudes towards the brands between which they must 
choose (see chapter 3, page 120). Whilst the current study does not dispute this with 
regard to the negative influence of the implicit MEE, it highlights the fact that these 
conditions are not necessary for the explicit MEE, nor perhaps even conducive to it. In 
this respect, it is argued that the degree of attention and memory that is required to 
ensure the MEE has a positive impact on brand perceptions may be facilitated by the 
familiarity-induced processing fluency of well-known brands. Furthermore, the high 
frequency with which consumers might be expected to encounter communications for 
‘mass market’ consumer brands, and the extent of the revenues involved (often on a 
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multinational scale), mean that even the moderate influence of mere exposure may 
conceivably result in substantive changes in sales and revenue. As such, an important 
managerial contribution of the current thesis is to highlight the fact that the most 
effective application of the MEE in marketing may be to continuously and passively 
reinforce existing positive attitudes to well-known brands and thus prevent (rather than 
stimulate) brand switching. 
 
In drawing this thesis to a close, however, it should be acknowledged that it constitutes 
an independent investigation of the potential influence of mere exposure to marketing 
communications. As such, its implications are not restricted to managers in the fields of 
marketing and advertising, but also to those tasked with the protection of consumer 
interests. In this respect, the main contribution of the thesis is to highlight the fact that 
the marketing-based application of the MEE does not necessarily constitute a form of 
subliminal advertising. Indeed, a deeper understanding of the principles of mere 
exposure amongst marketers, advertisers and consumers may serve to eliminate any 
remaining misconceptions of subliminal presentation as an effective means of 
persuasion in this domain. Rather, this thesis raises the possibility that the biggest threat 
to consumers from the application of the MEE in marketing communication may come 
from associated attempts to ensure attention and recognition, even under conditions of 
fleeting exposure. In this respect, the implications of increasingly frequent, intrusive and 
aggressive attempts to capture the attention of consumers, even for the briefest of 
moments, could be considered at best undesirable, and perhaps even dangerous (for 
example, where the attention of drivers is continuously distracted by such 
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communication). As such, the main contribution of this thesis from a public policy 
perspective is perhaps to flag the potential for increasingly ubiquitous and intrusive 
attempts to manipulate the attention of consumers as a means of harnessing the explicit 
MEE. 
 
Finally, and with regard to the empowerment of consumers, both Chartrand (2005) and 
Cialdini (2007) argue that the key factor in avoiding the unwanted effects of non-
conscious processing is awareness of the source, nature and outcomes of these 
responses. This thesis makes an important contribution in this respect by identifying the 
specific nature of the non-conscious processing that occurs in relation to two different 
forms of the MEE. Whilst it may, by definition, be impractical for consumers to identify 
the influence of the implicit MEE in the formation of attitudes, the same may not be true 
with regard to the explicit form of this effect. In this respect, the possibility that 
affective response might simply be a function of mere exposure alone may be 
acknowledged by consumers who cannot readily explain their brand preferences; 
affording them the opportunity to negate its influence on choice behaviour if required.  
 
In drawing this thesis to a close, however, it is of course important to consider its 
conclusions and contributions in the light of a number of potential limitations; both in 
terms of the design and scope of the experimental research around which it is built. 
These factors are therefore discussed in remainder of this chapter, along with their 
implications for future marketing research into the effects of mere exposure. 
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9.3. Limitations 
 
As noted at the outset (section 1.4, page 7), one of the primary aims of this thesis has 
been to address the limitations of previous marketing research and thus provide a robust 
experimental investigation of the MEE in a marketing context. To this end, a number of 
important methodological advancements are incorporated in this study; including a 
relatively large sample, use of the optimum number of items/trials, relatively precise 
exposure control, the measurement of perception, and a within-subject comparison of 
affective response in the presence and absence of recognition. Details of these, and 
indeed all, aspects of the research design were provided in part II of the thesis. At the 
same time, however, a number of potential methodological limitations were identified 
and discussed at length during chapter 6. To recap, these may be summarised as 
follows: 
a) Partial, rather than, full randomisation of stimulus presentation in the exposure 
and task phases of the experiment (see section 6.8, page 282) 
b) The limited reliability of quantitative indicators relating to likely perception, 
recognition and recollection rates in the main experiment; a consequence of 
small sample sizes in each of the 5 phases of pretesting (see section 6.7, page 
270) 
c) The possibility of contamination in the ‘subliminal’ and ‘supraliminal’ groups; a 
consequence of measuring perceptual experience of the exposure phase in 
general rather than for each item in particular (see section 6.3.1.1, page 246) 
d) The required preference judgment (i.e. to select a preferred brand name for a 
proposed new product) may not necessarily be considered to be a ‘typical’ 
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consumer evaluation in the natural environment (see section 6.2.1, page 228) 
e) Whilst forced choice tests provide a robust indication of the pattern of 
discriminatory preference (and exposure-induced changes to this), they do not 
necessarily indicate the extent of attitudinal shifts; i.e. the question of whether 
participants marginally or greatly prefer one stimulus over another is not 
addressed (see section 6.2.2, page 233) 
 
Detailed explanation of the necessity of these potential limitations and, perhaps more 
importantly, the steps taken to minimise their impact in this study was provided in 
chapter 6 (as indicated by the section/page references for each of the above points). 
Additionally, however, it should be noted that manipulation checks have subsequently 
illustrated that perception and recognition rates in the main experiment were generally 
in line with those indicated during pretesting (see page 303, and appendix III), whilst 
the relative size of the preference biases observed in the subliminal and supraliminal 
groups are consistent with those observed in Bornstein’s (1989) seminal meta-analysis; 
indicating that the impact of any group contamination in this respect is negligible (see 
appendix III for more detailed discussion).  
 
At this point, however, it is perhaps important to acknowledge the potential for one 
further limitation regarding the measurement of the MEE in this study; and in particular, 
the refinement of reported preference judgements into four dependent variables. These 
essentially reflect, for each participant, the mean rate of preference for the target and 
non-target stimuli when these judgments were made in the presence and absence of 
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recognition memory respectively (see chapter 6, page 239). As such, they are calculated 
on a denominator that varies from participant to participant. In this respect, some may 
have a relatively balanced profile in terms of their recognition rates across the 12 
choices; indeed a total absence of recognition memory would be expected to result in a 
chance rate of 6 stimuli correctly identified and 6 incorrectly so. Others, however, may 
exhibit an uneven ratio of correct and incorrect recognition judgments (either by chance 
or otherwise); e.g. they may correctly identify 9 of the target brand names as 
recognised, whilst incorrectly ‘recognising’ 3 of the non-targets. In principle, therefore, 
it is acknowledged that this situation could give rise to differences in reliability of the 
effects observed between the two types of profile. However, in this study the same 
overall pattern of effects is evident in the results of within-group analyses of ‘balanced’ 
and ‘unbalanced’ participants, and no significant between-group differences are 
observed in the dependent variables (as illustrated in figure 9.4). 
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Figure 9.4: Comparison of dependent variable results for cases in which 
recognition memory is ‘balanced’ (i.e. close to chance) and ‘unbalanced’ (i.e. 
significantly higher or lower than chance) 
 
 
 
 
Whilst it is thus acknowledged that certain aspects of the experimental design may be 
subject to potential limitations, it is argued that these are largely unavoidable in the 
broad context of the study and do not appear to have significantly influenced the results. 
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Nevertheless, the fact that they could have done so perhaps requires that they are 
acknowledged as technical limitations in this thesis; not least because of their potential 
implications for future mere exposure research. With this in mind, a detailed summary 
of these issues is provided in appendix III; the intention of which is to provide a useful 
resource for experimental researchers in the field, and further explanation and 
clarification for all readers where required. However, the limitations of this thesis are 
not confined to procedural aspects of experimentation and analysis. Indeed, perhaps the 
most significant of these are not related to what has been studied (and how), but rather 
to what has not been empirically addressed. The parameters within which this study 
should be considered are therefore discussed in the following section, alongside their 
implications for further marketing research into the MEE. 
 
9.4. Empirical parameters and directions for further research 
 
In addition to the technical limitations summarised above (and discussed at length in 
chapter 6 and appendix III), it is important to clearly identify the parameters of the 
empirical work in this thesis, and their implications for further research. In this respect, 
the limits of the current study may be most effectively explained in the context of the 
three major research directions to which they give rise; a) replication and validation, b) 
extension via experimentation, and c) extension via applied research. In this penultimate 
section, therefore, each of these areas is discussed with a view to providing a detailed 
understanding of the boundaries of the current thesis, and a clear trajectory for the 
continuation of mere exposure research in the marketing domain.  
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9.4.1. Replication and validation 
 
Given the somewhat surprising nature of the findings, and the relative scarcity of 
marketing research that is conducted specifically within the mere exposure paradigm, it 
is perhaps first important to stress the need for replication of the current findings; and, 
more broadly, validation of the proposed dual processing model (see figure 8.2, page 
351). In particular, further marketing research may be necessary to validate the notion 
that the two forms of the MEE to which it refers (implicit and explicit) are indeed 
qualitatively different. Furthermore, this stream of research might also seek to address 
the question of whether the observed directional differences (and in particular the 
reverse implicit MEE) may be expected to occur consistently in the marketing domain. 
To this end, it may be useful to highlight two particular ways in which future marketing 
research might be developed to test and validate the conclusions of this thesis. 
 
Firstly, it was acknowledged in chapter 2 (page 29) that, whilst the MEE is assumed to 
be enhanced by the absence of recognition, experimental evidence for this is drawn 
from studies that use subliminal exposure to eliminate the possibility of explicit 
memory. In light of the widespread scepticism that has come to characterise attitudes 
towards subliminal advertising, it was therefore proposed that a pressing challenge for 
marketing research is to validate the assumption that it is conscious memory and not 
perception that moderates the MEE (see chapter 3, page 114-115). As such, a primary 
objective of the current study was to examine the influence of recognition memory on 
the effects of mere exposure (i.e. that which is just perceptible; Zajonc, 1968). To this 
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end, numerous exposure durations were pretested with the intention of identifying the 
point at which most participants reported supraliminal perception of the target stimuli. 
The fact that a minority did not was considered an important indicator that the majority 
were in fact experiencing stimuli that were ‘just’ perceptible (see chapter 6, page 245). 
Whilst the potential opportunity for comparison between the naturally occurring 
conditions of subliminal and supraliminal perception was acknowledged, therefore, so 
too was the fact that this did not at the outset constitute a primary objective of the study. 
However, given the emergence of this factor as an effective means by which to 
distinguish between the influence of mere exposure and other fluency effects (e.g. false 
familiarity; Whittlesea, 1993) in the results of forced-choice preference tests (see 
chapter 7, page 340), such a comparison could be utilised as a central element of further 
research and a means by which to validate the proposed dual-processing model (see 
figure 8.2, page 351). 
 
Secondly, a potentially interesting implication of the current findings is that, whilst they 
validate the notion that low actor involvement is conducive to the implicit MEE (Chung 
and Szymanski, 1997; Baker, 1999; Fang et al., 2007), they indicate that the opposite 
might in fact be the case with regard to the explicit MEE; although perhaps only in the 
absence of other meaningful information on which consumer attitudes and decisions can 
be based (see chapter 8, page 372-373). As such, this factor may constitute another 
useful means by which to validate the notion that the two forms of the MEE identified 
in this thesis are qualitatively different. In this respect, it may be proposed that, in the 
absence of other meaningful information, the explicit MEE will occur more frequently 
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under conditions of high versus low actor involvement whilst the opposite will be 
evident in relation to the implicit form of this phenomenon. Furthermore, should it be 
assumed that involvement increases with proximity to the purchase decision (Cai et al., 
2004), further research might seek to test the proposition that so too will the occurrence 
of the explicit MEE (at the expense of its implicit counterpart).  
 
Finally, it is perhaps also important to draw attention to the technical issues identified in 
section 9.3; and thus the potential improvements that might be made in future 
experimental study of the marketing-based MEE. With this in mind, a full and detailed 
review of these issues is provided in appendix III for researchers wishing to replicate the 
current findings, validate the model to which they give rise and/or extend experimental 
research into the marketing-based MEE. This latter endeavour constitutes a second 
important direction for further research in this field, and is therefore discussed at length 
in the following section. 
 
9.4.2. Experimental extension 
 
Beyond the specific replication and validation of the work contained within this thesis, 
it is important to stress that the robust application of current experimental 
methodologies (such as that which is adopted in this thesis) provides a useful and 
important means by which to continue the incremental extension of mere exposure 
research in the marketing domain. Specifically, the study reported in this thesis could be 
usefully extended in relation to each aspect of the research design; from sampling and 
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stimuli to procedure and measurement. The key issues in each of these areas are 
therefore discussed in turn during this section. 
 
9.4.2.1. Target population and sampling 
 
Whilst it was previously argued that student samples are justifiable, and indeed 
ubiquitous, in experimental mere exposure research (see section 5.4.1.2, page 182), the 
fact that the vast majority of participants are therefore aged between 18 and 21 may 
ultimately be seen as a constraint in the current study. Whilst it has been acknowledged 
that the implicit processes that underpin most theoretical explanations of the MEE are 
largely deemed to be generic across individuals (see chapter 2, page 27), the extent to 
which explicit memory endures – and thus mediates the nature and direction of the MEE 
– is not (see Balota, Dolan and Duchek, 2000; Craik and Jennings, 1992). Given this, 
the finding that the MEE may occur on the basis of either implicit or explicit memory 
processes may enhance the need for demographic comparisons. In particular, the fact 
that age has been found to moderate explicit memory (Balota, Dolan and Duchek, 2000; 
Craik and Jennings, 1992), gives rise to the proposition that the frequency with which 
the explicit MEE occurs will be relatively lower (and that of the implicit MEE higher) 
amongst older participants, and highlights the importance of further comparative studies 
in this respect. Similarly, whilst gender differences have not been documented in 
relation to the MEE specifically (see Bornstein, 1989; Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 
2004), recent evidence indicates that these may exist in relation to visual recognition 
memory. In this respect, female participants have been found to exhibit an advantage 
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over their male counterparts in tests of visual recognition for objects (McGivern et al., 
1997, 1998) and pictures (Anooshian and Seibert, 1996). As a result, it may be proposed 
that enhanced memory ability in women (just as in younger participants) will lead to a 
greater prevalence of the explicit MEE (at the expense of the implicit MEE) amongst 
this group. 
 
Additionally, whilst the limited number of international participants in the current 
sample negated the need (or opportunity) for comparative analysis on the basis of 
language experience, it should be acknowledged that this may be an important 
consideration in future samples. Given the earlier discussion of memory enhancement 
under conditions of mere exposure (chapter 8, page 388-395), it may be proposed that 
variations in perceptual fluency as a result of language differences could mediate 
attention and stimulus processing, and thus the extent to which each form of the MEE 
occurs. Whilst no significant differences were apparent with regard to whether English 
was spoken as a first language or not, it should not necessarily be concluded that 
language does not mediate the extent to which each form the MEE occurs. In this 
respect, those who have relatively extensive experience of the letter forms that 
constitute lexical stimuli may be expected to experience greater fluency during exposure 
and thus a higher recognition rate at test (e.g. British participants might exhibit an 
advantage over Chinese participants when lexical stimuli are developed using the Latin-
based alphabet). In this respect, the low number of participants who did not fall into this 
group (n=17) prevented meaningful statistical analysis in this study, but it may 
constitute an interesting direction for further marketing research. Specifically, it might 
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be of relevance from an international marketing perspective as it highlights the potential 
mediating influence of culture in the type (and therefore direction) of the MEE that a 
single stimulus might be expected to create. Regardless of its importance from a 
methodological perspective (e.g. when conducting research with diverse participants), 
therefore, it perhaps provides a means by which to begin the cross-cultural study of an 
effect that has, until now, been assumed to be largely immune to individual differences 
(see chapter 2, page 27).  
 
9.4.2.2. Stimuli  
 
Whilst this study extends findings regarding abstract stimuli to those that are typically 
associated with marketing, it does so only in respect to real-word and pseudo-word 
brand names. As such, the experimentation described in this thesis could be usefully 
extended to other forms of marketing stimuli; such as logos, images, cartoons, faces and 
indeed any common facet of marketing communication that consumers may be expected 
to encounter frequently, fleetingly and at the point of decision-making. In addition, it 
should be noted that the current study is particularly concerned with brand names that 
are neutrally-liked. Another interesting and important direction for further research, 
therefore, may be to examine the impact of mere exposure on marketing stimuli that are 
currently associated with varying degrees of positive or negative feelings (as noted in 
chapter 5, page 202). Furthermore, the potential for greater perceptual fluency and 
memory in relation to familiar stimuli (see chapter 8, page 383) may give rise to an 
important question as to the extent of the explicit and implicit MEE for real-world 
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brands that are both familiar and unfamiliar. In particular, future research may focus 
upon testing the proposition that the explicit MEE will be more prevalent amongst the 
former rather than the latter, whilst the opposite is true with respect to the implicit MEE 
(see chapter 8, page 384). 
 
9.4.2.3. Procedure and measurement 
 
Beyond the nature of the stimulus in question, future marketing research may focus on 
other boundary conditions of the model proposed in this thesis. For example, the results 
of the current study are produced on the basis of a relatively brief, though intensive, 
period of delay between exposure and test. Although the intensity of the filler tasks is 
designed to replicate the effects of memory decay over a longer period of (relatively 
passive) time, it may be argued that these findings relate directly to the short-term 
effects of mere exposure. In light of this, an important direction for further research may 
be to extend this period of delay to hours, days and weeks to examine the applicability 
of the MEE to different types of consumption behaviours and environments in which 
these conditions are naturally apparent. 
 
In addition, a number of other procedural issues may be seen to limit the scope of the 
current research, and indicate important directions for future mere exposure research in 
the marketing domain. Firstly, it should be noted that a relatively small number of 
repeated exposures (3) was used in this study. However, previous experimental research 
indicates that ‘wear-out’ in the MEE may begin to occur after a certain number of 
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exposures (with plateau and ultimate decline potentially beginning at around 10 
repetitions; Bornstein and Craver-Lemley, 2004). It should be acknowledged that this 
may be the result of boredom and fatigue in the experimental setting (see chapter 2, 
page 27-28), and does not necessarily occur in the real-world marketing environment. 
However, it may be important to test the degree to which the MEE not only occurs in a 
natural consumption environment but also the extent to which it persists at high levels 
of repetition. Whilst the validity of such applied research may be dependent on the 
development of a means to distinguish the MEE from classical (affective) conditioning 
(as will be discussed below), relatively robust indications of wear-out might be provided 
by laboratory-based research if the potential influence of boredom and fatigue can be 
eliminated.  
 
Secondly, and with regard to measurement, it may be important to acknowledge that the 
use of forced-choice tests necessarily confines the current study to an investigation of 
whether a preference bias exists rather than the extent to which it occurs; an issue that 
may be further investigated via the use of scales in future experimental research (see 
appendix III for further discussion and guidance). Finally, whilst the current study 
focuses on affective response (for reasons explained in section 6.2.1, page 228), it 
should be acknowledged that the MEE is not necessarily limited to this type of outcome. 
As noted in chapter 2 (page 19), mere exposure alone may be expected to influence 
cognitive evaluations of marketing stimuli (e.g. the quality of products and brands) and, 
perhaps more importantly, consumer choice behaviour; an outcome that is presumed to 
follow the creation of preference in this study. In this respect, therefore, future research 
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might focus on examining a broader range of outcomes, and in particular the extent to 
which this effect impacts upon actual consumer choice. 
 
Inherent in this final point, however, is perhaps the most important limitation of the 
current study (and indeed marketing-based mere exposure research in general); namely, 
that it is conducted under highly controlled, and therefore highly contrived, 
experimental conditions. As such, the question as to whether the observed effects do 
indeed occur in the natural marketing environment, and to what extent, remains to be 
fully addressed. The importance of further research in this respect thus constitutes the 
main focus of the following section.  
 
9.4.3. Applied marketing research into the MEE 
 
With regard to the current experimental study it is important to note that, whilst it 
cannot claim to directly reflect the actual behaviour of consumers in a natural marketing 
environment, it is designed to provide a strong initial bridge between the psychology 
laboratory and the realms of marketing; the likes of which, it is argued (in chapter 4), 
has not yet been sufficiently established. In this respect, it constitutes a controlled, 
robust and detailed examination of the MEE in a marketing context. Furthermore, the 
thesis as a whole serves to provide a degree of clarity in the conceptualisation of this 
phenomenon in marketing theory, and the scope of its potential influence. In the 
continued absence of robust empirical data regarding the extent and nature of the MEE 
in the natural marketing environment, and arguably an effective methodology for 
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obtaining this, the current work thus constitutes an important first-principles study; 
utilising the techniques of psychological experimentation to extend abstract findings to 
those relating to typical marketing stimuli. Nevertheless, it may be argued that the most 
important task for future marketing research will be to build on this foundation in order 
to identify the extent to which this phenomenon occurs in real-world marketing 
environments, and the ultimate impact it has on actual consumption behaviour.  
 
In this respect, and with reference to the literature review in chapter 4, it may be 
proposed that the most important methodological challenge for applied marketing 
research into the MEE is to identify an effective means by which to distinguish the 
MEE from the effects of associative priming (e.g. classical conditioning) in consumer 
processing of complex marketing stimuli. This is critical to the examination, 
quantification and explanation of the influence that the MEE in particular may exert on 
consumer processing of real-world marketing communication (e.g. multi-faceted 
advertisements) in cluttered media environments. In the absence of this, it may be 
argued that marketing-based mere exposure research cannot be extended in a way that 
maximises ecological validity; a development that is likely to be of great importance to 
the widespread acceptance, understanding and application of this phenomenon in 
marketing and public policy. 
 
The current findings provide a foundation for this endeavour by providing confirmation 
that the MEE may be expected to influence consumer evaluations of marketing stimuli 
and, more importantly, an indication of the distinguishing characteristics of this 
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phenomenon (e.g. size, direction and the mediating influence of recognition). On this 
basis, future research may be developed to identify the extent to which this particular 
effect is apparent in the natural environment. An important (and practical) first step in 
this respect may be to identify the frequency with which the conditions for the MEE 
arise in various consumption environments (i.e. repeated, brief stimulus perception 
followed by either memory failure, accurate recognition and/or a strong sense of 
subjective recollection). On this basis, it may be possible to estimate the extent to which 
the MEE could, hypothetically, influence real-world consumer choice behaviour. 
Further to this, however, it may be important to test the degree to which the expected 
preference bias that is associated with the MEE actually occurs when these conditions 
are present. In this respect, it should be noted that mere exposure is only one of a 
number of possible influences that may impact simultaneously on consumer attitudes 
and behaviour under such conditions. For example, it has been acknowledged 
throughout this thesis that associative priming and false familiarity effects may result in 
a complimentary or competing affect-bias during the decision-making process, whilst 
previous brand knowledge, experience and attitudes may mediate the extent to which 
both these and the MEE impact upon ultimate choice behaviour.  
 
Should marketing researchers develop a means by which to reliably identify the specific 
influence of mere exposure in the natural consumption environment, they would be in a 
position to test the ecological validity of all aspects of the experimental MEE; including 
its size, direction and nature. For example, it was previously noted (on page 431) that 
whilst the MEE has been found to be subject to ‘wear-out’ at high levels of exposure in 
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a laboratory setting, it is unclear as to whether this is a product of the experimental 
conditions (that may quickly lead to boredom and fatigue) or a characteristic of the 
phenomenon itself. Whilst the importance of mere exposure research in the natural 
marketing environment cannot be overstated, however, nor can the difficulty and 
complexity of this endeavour; particularly in the continued absence of a robust means 
by which to distinguish the MEE from other types of fluency effect in complex, real-
word environments. As such, it may necessarily constitute a longer-term aim for 
marketing-based mere exposure research.  
 
In light of the discussion in this section, therefore, it would appear that there is still 
considerable ground to be made in the journey towards a theoretical and applied 
understanding of the influence that marketing-related mere exposure exerts on consumer 
behaviour. However, it is hoped that this thesis provides a robust foundation on which 
to develop an effective programme of research in this respect.  
 
9.5. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, therefore, this thesis has sought to provide a detailed theoretical and 
empirical examination of the mere exposure effect in a marketing context. Specifically, 
it has been guided by the following aims (as stated in chapter 1, page 7): 
1. To provide a detailed review of current knowledge and understanding of the 
MEE in the discipline of psychology 
2. To clarify how the MEE should be conceptualised in marketing theory 
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3. To critically review current evidence for the MEE in the marketing literature 
4. To provide a robust empirical examination of the existence, size and nature of 
the MEE in a marketing context 
5. To extend theoretical understanding of the MEE in a marketing context 
6. To identify the potential implications of the MEE for marketing practitioners 
and consumers  
 
To this end, a comprehensive review of current psychological understanding of the 
MEE  (aim 1) was followed by critical discussion of the extent to which it has been 
robustly applied in the development of marketing theory (aim 2) and empirically tested 
in this specific domain (aim 3). Whilst it was acknowledged that an emerging body of 
marketing research has sought to investigate the mere exposure effect of marketing 
communication, it was argued that direct, domain-specific empirical evidence for this 
phenomenon is relatively scarce, somewhat equivocal and subject to a number of 
theoretical and methodological limitations. In response, this thesis incorporates a 
detailed and robust examination of the existence, size, direction and nature of the MEE 
in the context of marketing communication (aim 4). Arguably the most interesting, 
surprising and important finding from this study is that the marketing-based MEE 
appears to occur in opposing directions, and on the basis of different mental processes, 
in the absence and presence of recognition memory. As a result, the main conclusions 
and implications of the thesis revolve around the proposal of a dual-processing model of 
the MEE (as illustrated in figure 8.2, page 351). This model, it is argued, extends 
theoretical understanding of the mere exposure effect in the realms of both marketing 
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and psychology (aim 5), highlights the potential relevance of this phenomenon for large, 
established brands and gives rise to specific implications for campaign planning and, 
perhaps, consumer protection (aim 6). 
 
However, it should be acknowledged that, whilst this thesis provides a strong theoretical 
and empirical foundation on which to develop an understanding of the influence of the 
MEE in a marketing context, its contribution is limited to restructuring and 
strengthening the emerging experimental foundations on which a comprehensive and 
applied understanding of the marketing-specific effects of mere exposure might 
ultimately be realized. Given the ever-increasing pace and complexity of the 
contemporary media, marketing and consumption environments, the importance of mere 
exposure research to an understanding of communication effects at hyper-low levels of 
attention and involvement should not be underestimated. As Cialdini (2007: 280) 
observes; “the blitz of modern daily life demands that we have faithful shortcuts, sound 
rules of thumb to handle it all. These are not luxuries any longer; they are out-and-out 
necessities that figure to become increasingly vital as the pulse of daily life quickens.” 
The MEE should be considered to be one such shortcut, and thus of increasing 
importance to marketers, advertisers and consumers alike. With this in mind, the work 
contained within this thesis is offered as a platform on which to build an accurate, 
detailed, comprehensive and applied understanding of the mere exposure effect in 
marketing communication. 
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Glossary 
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Active processing Processing with a high degree of involvement and elaboration 
(see below for definition of these terms) 
 
Affect Generic concept encapsulating emotions, feelings and/or moods 
associated with a stimulus, idea or action 
 
Affective Related to emotions, feelings or moods; may relate to 
associations in semantic memory, response to a stimulus, etc. 
 
Associative priming A change in response to, evaluation of, or attitude towards a 
stimulus as a result of its repeated association with another 
(commonly referred to as classical conditioning in the field of 
learning theory). As this is generally assumed to occur outside 
of conscious awareness it is sometimes referred to as implicit 
associative priming. 
 
Associative 
processing 
Mental processing relating to the association of ideas, 
experiences, events or stimuli in semantic memory 
 
Attention Conscious mental focus, serious consideration, and/or 
concentration in relation to a particular stimulus (also referred 
to as attentive processing at points in the thesis) 
 
Attentive exposure Stimulus exposure that is subject to conscious mental focus, 
serious consideration and/or concentration 
 
Attitude An opinion or general feeling about something; the outcome of 
evaluation of beliefs and characterised by the three dimensions 
of cognition (i.e. thoughts), affect (i.e. feelings) and connation 
(i.e. intention to act) 
 
Attribution/ 
Misattribution 
 
The accurate/inaccurate ascribing of a perceived outcome to a 
specific cause 
Automatic processes Intermediate mental processes between stimulus perception and 
outcome that remain outstide of the individual's conscious 
awareness 
 
Cognition Generic concept encapsulating thoughts, beliefs, perceptions 
and opinions associated with a stimulus, idea or action 
 
Cognitive Related to thoughts, beliefs, perceptions and opinions; may 
relate to associations in semantic memory, response to a 
stimulus, etc. 
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Conceptual 
processing  
Semantic mental processing related to the meaning of the 
stimulus in question. To the extent that semantic activation may 
occur automatically and preconsciously this may be more 
specifically termed implicit conceptual processing 
 
Conscious 
 
Relating to or concerned with a part of the mind that is capable 
of thinking, choosing, or perceiving and is aware of thoughts, 
feelings and surroundings. May be used to describe a range of 
mental processes such as attention, elaboration, memory 
encoding and recall. For example, the term conscious attention 
refers to attention that is accompanied by conscious awareness 
of both the act itself and the stimulus towards which it is 
directed 
 
Emotion A strong feeling about somebody or something 
 
Encoding Commit something to memory or establish a memory 'trace' for 
a stimulus, idea, experience, etc. 
 
Evaluative 
processing 
Processing that involves an evaluation of stimulus meaning, 
alternative responses, implications and possible outcomes 
 
Explicit memory Memory that is characterised by conscious awareness; may be 
related to related to events, experiences and stimulus exposure 
(episodic), personal history and experiences (autobiographical) 
and ideas, concepts and meanings (semantic) 
 
Fluency Ease of mental processing, relating to either stimulus features 
(perceptual fluency) or stimulus meaning (conceptual fluency) 
 
Focal (or foveal) 
attention 
 
Attention that occurs at or near the centre of the visual field  
Hemispheric 
processing 
Relating to the distribution of mental processing across the 
cerebral hemispheres 
 
High/low 
elaboration  
The degree to which consumers engage in detailed information 
search, purposeful processing and proactive dissemination in a 
decision context 
 
High/low 
involvement  
The extent to which consumers seek, pay attention to and 
cognitively process detailed, issue relevant information during 
communication exposure (audience involvement) or decision-
making (actor involvement) 
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Implicit memory Memory  that is characterised by a lack of conscious 
awareness; most often associated with habitual procedures and 
processes (e.g. breathing, driving, playing a musical 
instrument) but may also be associated with prior experiences 
and stimulus exposure 
 
Incidental exposure Stimulus presented in way that renders them incidental that 
which is the subject of focal attention (e.g. a decoy task that 
commands focal attention) 
 
Non-conscious Relating to environmental perception, mental processing and 
attitudinal/behavioural outcomes of which human beings are 
not consciously aware. May be used to describe a range of 
mental processes such as perception, memory and attitude 
formation (e.g. prejudice) and is specifically used to describe 
such things as advertising effects, misattribution, fluency, 
priming and consumer behaviour in this thesis 
 
Perception The process and outcome of using the senses to acquire 
information about the surrounding environment or situation 
 
Perceptual matching Identification of the fact that the stimulus form (i.e. the 
phsysical features and their arrangement) have been 
encountered previously  
 
Perceptual 
processing 
Mental processing of the stimulus form or physical features. 
Where this occurs subconsciously it may be more specifically 
termed implicit perceptual processing 
 
Peripheral exposure Stimulus presented at the periphery of the visual field 
 
Peripheral 
processing (ELM) 
Relatively passive processing of simple stimuli and the 
adoption of heuristics as a means of facilitating attitude change 
 
Preattention Brief, subconscious attention (towards a stimulus) usually 
associated with environmental screening prior to conscious 
engagement with selected environmental stimuli 
 
Priming A change in thoughts, feelings or behaviour (e.g. performance) 
towards as a result of a prior or related experience. This may be 
referred to as direct when the experience relates to prior 
exposure to the same stimulus, or indirect when the experience 
relates to prior or simultaneous experience with a related 
stimulus. It is generally considered to be occur outside of 
concious awareness and may therefore be more specifically 
termed implicit priming 
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Pseudo-word A pronounceable non-word that is not part of the English 
lexicon, may be reasonably expected to be considered highly 
obscure by the vast majority of the audience and is unlikely to 
convey a common meaning 
 
Recognition 
memory 
Accurate identification of a stimulus as having been previously 
encountered when the same stimulus is presented as a cue at 
test (sometimes referred to as 'objective recognition memory') 
 
Recollection Clear, contextualised memory for prior exposure to a stimulus 
 
Reinforcement In learning theory the term refers primarily to influencing 
behavior by reward and punishment. In the broader field of 
consumer processing (and thus this thesis), however, it may be 
defined more literally as giving strength, force, or conviction to 
a response to a stimulus (e.g. a thought, opinion, idea or 
feeling) by providing additional stimuli, information or 
evidence to support it 
 
Semantic Relating to the conceptual meaning of words, symbols, 
experiences and other stimuli. In the context of this thesis it is 
used to describe mental processing that endeavours to 
formulate meaning around the stimuli in question (e.g. semantic 
processing or semantic analysis). It is also used to describe the 
processes of memory that are associated with the creation of 
meaning (e.g. semantic memory, semantic activation and 
semantic networks) 
 
Stimulus exposure  Presentation of the stimulus within the perceptual field of 
participants (either above or below the liminal threshold) 
 
Stimulus perception Identification of the stimulus as being present in the perceptual 
field by participants (either subliminally or supraliminally) 
 
Subconscious See non-conscious; whilst the term subconscious may refer to 
mental processing that is partially conscious, it is specifically 
used in this thesis to describe that which occurs entirely outside 
of conscious awareness (as such it is used interchangeably with 
the term non-conscious) 
 
Subliminal  Existing or operating below the threshold of consciousness. 
Used in this thesis to describe stimulus perception that occurs 
below the threshold of consciousness (subliminal perception), 
stimulus exposure that is intended to prevent conscious 
identification by participants (subliminal exposure), 
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advertising that is intended to be processed below the threshold 
of conscious perception (subliminal advertising), persuasion 
that is intended to occur on the basis of stimuli that are 
perceived subconsciously (subliminal persuasion), and 
priming by way of stimuli that are presented below the liminal 
thresholds of participants and are therefore perceived 
subconsciously (subliminal priming)  
 
Supraliminal  Existing or operating above the threshold of consciousness. 
Primarily used in this thesis to describe stimulus perception that 
occurs above the threshold of consciousness (supraliminal 
perception) 
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Experimental group by age
137
13 4
18-24 years
25-34 years
34+ years
Control group by age
67
2 3
18-24 years
25-34 years
34+ years
 
Experimental group by gender
71
83
Male
Female
Control group by gender
29
43
Male
Female
 
Experimental group
by region
106
5
1
14
2
2
21
3
UK & Ireland
North America
South America
Europe - EU
Europe - Non-EU
Africa (excl. S.
Africa)
Far East
South East Asia
Control group
by region
4413
2
1
10
1
1
UK & Ireland
Europe - EU
Africa (exc. S.
Africa)
South Africa
Far East
South East Asia
M iddle East
 
Experimental group by 
first language
108
17
29
English
Non-English -
Same Alphabet
Non-English -
Different
Alphabet
Control group by 
first language
4413
15
English
Non-English -
Same Alphabet
Non-English -
Different
Alphabet
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Appendix II 
 
Distribution Frequencies 
for Hypothesis Testing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The purpose of this appendix is to present the distribution frequency charts associated 
with statistical testing of the hypotheses in chapter 7 (section 7.4.). To this end, the data 
is organised according the subsection section and figure (in chapter 7) to which it 
relates. 
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7.4.1. Testing the occurrence, size and direction of the MEE (P1) 
 
 
Figure 7.8: Mean target preference rate compared to chance baseline (50%) 
 
 
 
7.4.2. Testing the moderating influence of objective recognition on the MEE (P2) 
 
 
Figure 7.10: Mean preference rates in the absence and presence of recognition 
compared to chance baseline (50%) 
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7.4.3. Testing the moderating influence of subjective recollection on the MEE (P3) 
 
Figure 7.12: Comparing mean preference rates to chance baseline (50%) in the 
absence and presence of recognition under conditions of ‘recollection’ 
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Figure 7.13: Comparing mean preference rates to chance baseline (50%) in the 
absence and presence of recognition under conditions of ‘non-recollection’ 
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7.4.4. Examining the mediating influence of brand name type on the MEE (P4) 
 
Figure 7.17: Comparing mean target preference rates to the chance baseline (50%) 
for real-word and pseudo-word brand names 
 
 
 
Figure 7.18: Comparing mean preference rates for real-word brand names to the 
chance baseline (50%) in the absence and presence of recognition 
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Figure 7.19: Comparing mean preference rates for pseudo-word brand names to 
the chance baseline (50%) in the absence and presence of recognition 
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7.5.1. Non-target preference in the absence of accurate stimulus recognition: A 
product of false familiarity rather than mere exposure? 
 
 
Figure 7.24: Comparing preference bias in the absence of recognition under 
conditions of subliminal and supraliminal perception 
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Appendix III 
 
Further Discussion of Technical Limitations 
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Introduction 
 
This appendix provides a summary of technical limitations that may be associated with 
the experimental design in this thesis. In essence, these relate to the following factors: 
1. Randomisation of stimulus presentation during exposure and test 
2. Pretesting the manipulation of independent variables 
3. Measuring the independent variables: Perception 
4. The comparison of subliminal and supraliminal exposure effects 
5. Measuring the dependent variable: Brand name preference 
6. Refining the dependent variable: Affective response in the presence and absence 
of recognition memory 
7. Brand name pretesting and selection 
 
As explained in detail during chapters 6 and 9, extensive steps were taken to minimise 
the impact of these factors on the results of this study; and there is no evidence to 
suggest that this occurred to any significant degree. Nevertheless, it is perhaps important 
that the potential for these factors to exert a confounding influence be acknowledged in 
the development of future experimental research of this nature. With this in mind, the 
primary purpose of this appendix is to provide a detailed account of these factors, with a 
view to informing the effective development of future experimentation.
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1. Randomisation of stimulus presentation during exposure and test 
 
In order to fully minimize the possibility of presentation order effects, it is 
acknowledged that complete randomization of the order in which stimuli are presented 
to each participant in the exposure and test phase is required. As explained in chapter 6 
(page 283), however, this was impractical in the current study due to the lack of 
availability of large-group licences for the specialist software required (e.g. Eprime, 
Matlab). As such, an approach was adopted whereby 20 different versions of the 
experiment were developed in each condition (i.e. experimental and control). Whilst 
each version contained the same three randomly determined exposure sequences, the 
order in which the choice pairs were presented in the test phase was fully randomized. 
With this in mind, the essential aspects of presentation ordering to note are that: 
a. all participants were initially exposed to the same three, randomly generated 
exposure sequences  
b. each of the randomly generated sequences of choice-pairs was used 8 (out of 
160) times in the experimental condition and 4 (out of 80) times in the control 
condition. 
 
With regard to the first of these points, it is acknowledged that the order in which brand 
names were presented could potentially influence the extent to which they were 
perceived, remembered and preferred (e.g. primacy and recency effects; see Bower, 
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2005) and thus that full randomization of the exposure phase is a preferable approach. 
However, given that each of the three exposure sequences were randomly generated 
during experimental design, and that the juxtaposition of stimulus presentation between 
the exposure and test phases was shared by groups of just 8 respondents in each 
condition, it was considered highly unlikely that the adopted approach would give rise 
to significant ordering effects. Furthermore, it was noted in Chapter 6 (page 284) that 
none of the 24 brand names was systematically presented towards the beginning or end 
of all three sequences, with presentation position tending to vary considerably for most 
items (as illustrated in figure 1, below). 
 
Figure 1: Position of target brand names in each of the three exposure sequences  
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However, it is acknowledged that the enhancement of target recognition rates via 
primacy and/or recency effects may also occur as a result of the early/late presentation 
of a stimulus in the exposure phase as a whole. With this in mind, an analysis of 
recognition accuracy was conducted to ascertain the extent to which it might be the 
case. To this end, the 12 target stimuli were divided into four categories: 
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1. Those that appeared during the first five exposures of sequence one; and may 
therefore be subject to primacy effects on recognition (items 7,10 and 12) 
2. Those that appeared during the last five exposures of sequence two; and may 
therefore be subject to recency effects on recognition (items 3, 5 and 6) 
3. Those that appeared during the first five exposures of sequence one and the last 
five exposures of sequence three; and may therefore be subject to both primacy 
and recency effects on recognition (items 1 and 2) 
4. Those that appeared in neither the first five exposures of sequence one nor the 
last five exposures of sequence three; and would not therefore be subject to 
primacy or recency effects on recognition (items 4, 8, 9 and 11) 
 
The target recognition rates and mean recollection confidence scores for all stimuli are 
presented in figure 2, with the details and implications of the analysis in each category 
discussed below 
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Figure 2: Target recognition rates & mean recollection confidence by stimulus 
item  
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b) Control Group 
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With regard to the data above, there are a number of compelling reasons to reject the 
notion that target recognition is to some extent a function of recency and/or primacy 
effects in the current study. Firstly, of those items that may be subject to the effects of 
primacy (7, 10 and 12), only one (10) exhibits an above-chance rate of target 
recognition in the experimental group, whilst all are at or below chance levels in the 
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control group. Furthermore, all are associated with relatively low levels of subjective 
recollection, with participants appearing less confident in their memory for items 10 and 
12 than all of the other items. On this basis, it seems fair to conclude that primacy 
effects are not apparent in the current study.  
 
By contrast, there is perhaps some indication of recency effects on the recognition rates 
of those items that appeared in the last five exposures of sequence 3. In this respect, 
marginally above-chance recognition rates for item 5 are apparent in both the 
experimental and control groups, whilst the same is true for items 3 and 6 in one of the 
groups (but not the other). However, the evidence in support of recency effects in this 
category of items is significantly weakened by findings in the two remaining categories.  
 
Firstly, and with the exception of item 11 (which is at or below chance in both groups), 
a very similar pattern of recognition rates is evident amongst those items that do not 
appear early in sequence 1 or late in sequence 3 (and therefore cannot be subject to the 
effects or primacy or recency). In this respect, items 4 and 9 exhibit above-chance rates 
of target recognition in both groups (and are, in fact, subject to two of the four highest 
rates of recognition across all 12 items), whilst the same is true of item 8 in the 
experimental group. Furthermore, item 4 provides a potentially important case in point 
within the context of this discussion. Given that the target stimulus to which this relates 
does not appear either early or late in the exposure phase, and therefore cannot (by 
definition) be subject to recency or primacy effects, it is perhaps interesting to note that 
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it is the most frequently recognised and that which participants are the most certain they 
have seen. 
 
Finally, the target recognition rates for the two items that appear at both the beginning 
and end of the exposure phase do not provide clear evidence in support of either 
primacy or recency effects (as they might be expected to). In this respect, whilst target 
recognition for item 2 is significantly above chance, this is not the case for item 1. 
Moreover, neither have a particularly high prevalence of subjective recollection, with 
participants reporting mid-range levels of memory confidence relative to the other 
items. Taking all of the above analysis into consideration, therefore, there is little (if 
any) indication that primacy or recency of presentation exerts a significant effect on 
recognition memory in this study. 
 
In addition to order of presentation in the exposure phase, however, the issue of 
randomization is of course also pertinent to the order in which participants were 
presented with choice pairs in the test phase. In this respect, whilst full randomization 
would have been preferable to eliminate the possibility of systematic bias as a result of 
choice-pair order, it is argued that the use of 20 randomly generated orders confers a 
practical means by which to greatly reduce the effect of any such bias on the results of 
the study. Specifically, the fact that just 8 participants completed each of the 20 versions 
of the experiment should not be sufficient to significantly bias the results. As such, 
whilst the benefits of a fully randomized approach are not disputed (and are 
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recommended for future research), it is proposed that the approach adopted in this study 
constitutes a pragmatic and effective solution for studies in which this is not possible. 
 
2.  Pretesting the manipulation of independent variables 
 
In addition to the above discussion regarding stimulus selection, it is important to 
acknowledge that the successful manipulation of independent variables in this study (i.e. 
perception, recognition and recollection) was largely dependent on the effectiveness of 
pretesting. In this respect, whilst piloting and pretesting of the experimental procedure 
was undertaken with 50 participants in all, it was conducted in five phases to facilitate 
incremental refinements as necessary (see chapter 6, section 6.7, page 283). Whilst 
mean rates of perception and recognition were identified in each phase, therefore, their 
reliability is of course undermined by the limited size of the sample in each phase 
(n=10). As such, these results were simply considered to provide a general indication of 
the extent to which the required conditions (i.e. supraliminal perception and both 
recognition and non-recognition) could be expected to occur in the main experiment; an 
assumption that was then discussed with pretest participants in each of the five phases. 
However, the usefulness of this indicator was not deemed to extend to a further 
breakdown of recognition judgments on the basis of different degrees of confidence. In 
this respect, the degree to which participants experienced and reported a subjective 
experience of recollection was simply raised in group discussions at each stage of 
pretesting; resulting in a qualitative indication that this was likely to occur to varying 
degrees in the main experiment. In the event that the required rates of perception, 
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recognition and recollection did not materialise as expected, a contingency plan was 
developed to increase the size of the sample in the main experiment to the point at 
which the number of cases in each condition was sufficient for statistical analysis. In the 
unlikely event that a negligible number of cases occurred in any of the required 
conditions, it was accepted that changes to the experimental design and a return to 
pretesting would be required, prior to a second execution of the main experiment. As it 
was, the quantitative and qualitative pre-test findings regarding perception, recognition 
and recollection rates proved to be a remarkably accurate indication of those that 
ultimately occurred in the main experiment. However, it should nonetheless be 
acknowledged that, whilst the extent of piloting and pretesting in this study was 
necessarily limited by time, resource and sampling constraints, the reliability of 
quantitative indicators could be further enhanced by a larger pretest sample in future 
research. 
 
3.  Measuring the independent variables: Perception 
 
For the reasons detailed in chapter 6 (section 6.3.1.1, page 246), the measurement of 
perception in this study was made in relation to the exposure phase in its entirety, as 
opposed to each target stimulus. As such, whilst the majority of the affective responses 
that are deemed to have occurred under subliminal perception are likely to be valid in 
this respect, it should be acknowledged that a small number may in fact have taken 
place under conditions of supraliminal perception. Similarly, a small minority of those 
preference judgments that are deemed to have occurred following supraliminal exposure 
  493 
may in fact have been made on the basis of subliminal perception. In light of consistent 
evidence that the MEE is significantly larger under conditions of subliminal perception 
(see Bornstein, 1989), the consequence of this may be to underestimate the difference in 
the size of the implicit MEE in each perceptual condition. In this respect, the size of the 
(larger) subliminal implicit MEE may be underestimated, whilst that of the (smaller) 
supraliminal implicit MEE might be magnified slightly as a result of this small amount 
of contamination; leading to type II error with respect to the following hypothesis 
(discussed and tested in chapter 7, page 341): 
 
H6. In the absence of stimulus recognition, the size of the non-target preference 
bias will be significantly larger under conditions of subliminal versus 
supraliminal perception during exposure 
 
Given that the implicit MEE in the subliminal group was still found to be significantly 
larger than that exhibited in the supraliminal group (supporting H6a), this factor does 
not appear to have significantly influenced the results or conclusions of this study. 
However, it may be speculated that, should the size of the ‘supraliminal’ implicit MEE 
have been artificially magnified in this way, it may not in fact have occurred to a degree 
that is statistically significant in this study. Whilst this would not necessarily invalidate 
the proposed dual-processing model of mere exposure (in light of the fact that evidence 
for the implicit MEE is still observed under conditions of subliminal perception) it 
raises the possibility that the distractor stimuli and filler tasks were not sufficient to 
eliminate the influence of memory, even when this was not sufficient to facilitate 
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accurate identification in a discriminatory choice situation (i.e.  a genuine but weak 
memory was over-ridden by a false sense of recognition for the alternative stimulus). In 
this case, further research may be necessary to assess whether the effects of memory can 
be sufficiently eliminated by means other than subliminal perception (e.g. extended 
periods of delay between exposure and test) to produce the implicit MEE. Should this 
not be the case it may be more accurate to define the two forms of the effect observed in 
this study as subliminal and supraliminal. Alternatively, the degree to which the 
significance of the current results is indeed influenced by this factor may be assessed by 
replication with the addition of a by-item measure of perception. This might be achieved 
for example, by the requirement for participants to press a button during the blank slide 
between each exposure to indicate whether or not they had perceived a lexical stimulus 
in-between the pre- and post-mask. It should be noted, however, that such an approach 
would require a longer, more intensive, highly involved exposure phase with reduced 
ecological validity, fewer stimulus items and a higher risk of boredom and fatigue. As 
such, it is perhaps more suited to the domain of experimental psychology than applied 
marketing research. 
 
4. The comparison of subliminal and supraliminal exposure effects 
 
In addition to the above discussion, one further limitation should also be acknowledged 
with regard to the comparison of effects under conditions of subliminal and supraliminal 
perception. As previously noted, the observation of a significant difference in the size of 
the implicit MEE between those participants who perceived the target supraliminally 
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and those who did not constitutes a key piece of evidence; linking the observed 
preference bias directly to mere exposure and thus ruling out alternative explanations 
(such as the false familiarity effect, Whittlesea, 1993, and task order effects, Pham and 
Rotteveel, 2005). However, it should be noted that, whilst the potential for this 
comparison was acknowledged during the formulation of the experiment (see chapter 
5), its importance was not initially recognised and it was not originally stated as a 
primary objective of the empirical work in this thesis. Indeed, this analysis was 
facilitated (somewhat fortuitously it may be argued) by the fact that a sufficient number 
of participants exhibited a particularly low level of perceptual ability during the 
exposure phase (n=36).  
 
In response, however, it may be argued that this to some extent constitutes a ‘planned 
outcome’ of the research design, given the size of the selected sample and indications 
during pretesting that approximately one-fifth of the participants would experience the 
exposure phase subliminally. Nonetheless, it is perhaps important to acknowledge that, 
whilst theoretically sufficient for statistical analysis (see Diamantopoulos and 
Schlegelmilch, 2000) and in line with the vast majority of marketing-based mere 
exposure research (see chapter 4, page 160), the size of the sample in the subliminal 
group is relatively small. Given the potentially important role that this analysis may play 
in distinguishing the MEE from other priming effects, greater efforts to ensure the 
occurrence of both subliminal and supraliminal perception may be advisable in future 
mere exposure research. In this respect, should a similar approach be taken to the 
manipulation of perception (i.e. setting the exposure duration to a level at which the 
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stimuli are just perceptible to most, but not all, participants), it is recommended that an 
even larger sample be adopted to increase the expected size of the subliminal group, and 
thus the reliability of results. 
 
5.  Measuring the dependent variable: Brand name preference 
 
As discussed in chapter 5 (page 190), it was considered important to ensure that the 
specific nature of the preference judgment that participants were required to make was 
both relevant (in a marketing context) and meaningful in the context of the experiment. 
As a result, the two stimuli in each choice pair were positioned as potential brand names 
for a new product in a particular category, and participants were asked which of the two 
they liked the most. Whilst this question does require a discriminatory affective 
judgment (i.e. the formulation of preference based on liking), it should be 
acknowledged that it may not entirely reflect a typical consumer decision. Whilst 
participants may indeed have responded as they might in a consumption situation, it is 
possible that they assumed the position of marketer in making this judgment; i.e. that 
they made the selection on the basis of which name they would select for the new brand, 
if they were responsible for this decision. However, it is important to stress that each 
preference judgment was made rapidly and under significant time pressure (i.e. a few 
seconds). As such, careful deliberation of the type a marketing manager might be 
expected to engage in was not possible and participants were reliant on their immediate 
affective response to complete the task. Given the rapid and relatively passive nature of 
this response it may be expected to occur in the same way, and with the same result, 
  497 
regardless of the way in which the question is interpreted, and thus form the basis on 
which either low involvement decisions are made or further (high involvement) 
deliberation occurs. For this reason, it is not considered to be a significant limitation in 
the current study. 
 
However, whilst the basis on which preference was expressed is not necessarily 
considered to be problematic, a more significant issue may be identified with regard to 
the means by which preference was expressed. In this respect, whilst forced choice tests 
provide a good test of both memory and discriminatory preference (reflecting 
comparative brand evaluations, judgments and choice in a real-world situation), they 
may nonetheless be associated with certain limitations. With regard to recognition, for 
example, it may be reasonably claimed that it is impossible to know whether the 
inaccurate selection of the non-target stimulus on a forced choice test of memory 
reflects ‘no memory’ or ‘false memory’. To address this, a confidence scale was added 
to each recognition judgment in the current study, on the assumption that greater 
confidence in the inaccurate judgment would indicate the latter. This combination of 
forced-choice and confidence scale measures therefore contributes to the identification 
of both objective recognition memory and the subjective experience of this. With regard 
to preference, however, an inherent limitation of forced-choice tests is that they do not 
necessarily reveal the extent to which one stimulus is preferred over another; merely 
that it is. Whilst this may be sufficient to demonstrate the MEE, and as a basis on which 
to make brand choices in low involvement situations, it may be that the difference is so 
minimal as to not be consistently significant. 
  498 
 
Whilst the potential problem of using conscious self-report scales to measure the 
nonconscious effects of mere exposure research (Grimes and Kitchen, 2007) was 
acknowledged in chapter 6 (page 233), it may nonetheless be useful for future research 
to incorporate a means by which to measure not only the direction of relative 
preference, but the extent to which absolute liking is influenced. This may be achieved, 
for example, by the addition of a scale by which participants indicate their liking for 
each of the stimuli in a previous paired-choice task. The inherent limitation of such an 
approach, however, is that it may require a cognitive evaluation of the affective 
response and will be difficult to administer under conditions of low involvement. In this 
respect, the use of time pressure was used to limit the extent of involvement and 
elaboration in the preference judgment. By necessity, however, the additional 
administration of a liking scale for each stimulus would require additional exposure to – 
and consideration of – the target stimuli and thus greater levels of actor involvement. 
For this reason, a choice may be required as to which type of affective response will be 
used in a single experiment. In this study, preference was selected for reasons outlined 
in chapter 6 (section 6.2.1, page 228). Future research may seek to address the limitation 
discussed in this paragraph by replicating the experiment using liking-scale ratings 
instead. 
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6. Refining the dependent variable: Affective response in the presence and 
absence of recognition memory 
 
In addition to those identified so far, a further technical limitation may be associated 
with the refinement of preference judgements per se into the final set of four dependent 
variables that were measured during data analysis. These essentially reflect, for each 
participant, the mean rate of preference for the target and non-target stimuli when these 
judgments were made in the presence and absence of recognition memory respectively 
(see chapter 6, page 241). As such, they are calculated on a denominator that varies 
from participant to participant. In this respect, some may have a relatively balanced 
profile in terms of their recognition rates across the 12 choices; indeed a total absence of 
recognition memory would be expected to result in a chance rate of 6 stimuli correctly 
identified and 6 incorrectly so. Others, however, may exhibit an uneven ratio of correct 
and incorrect recognition judgments (either by chance or otherwise); e.g. they may 
correctly identify 9 of the target brand names as recognised and incorrectly identify just 
3 of the non-targets as recognised. In principle, therefore, it is acknowledged that this 
situation could give rise to differences in reliability of the effects observed between the 
two types of profile. However, in this study the same overall pattern of effects is evident 
in the results of within-group analyses of ‘balanced’ and ‘unbalanced’ participants, and 
no significant between-group differences are observed in the dependent variables (as 
illustrated in figure 1) 
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Figure 2: Comparison of dependent variable results for cases in which recognition 
memory is ‘balanced’ (i.e. close to chance) and ‘unbalanced’ (i.e. significantly 
higher or lower than chance) 
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7.  Brand name pretesting and selection 
 
Finally, one further technical issue that was not elucidated in this thesis is nonetheless 
worthy of discussion here. As explained in chapter 5 (page 202), the identification of 
brand name triads was undertaken in a way that ensured that, whilst each met the 
criteria of equivalence and neutrality, the maximum number of items/trials was 
available for inclusion in the experiment. Using this approach, therefore, the triad 
containing the three brand names that exhibited (marginally) the most similar mean 
liking ratings was not necessarily selected if it could be broken up to create two 
(marginally) less appropriate triads that nonetheless met the set criteria. Whilst this 
facilitated the identification of 15 possible trials for inclusion in the experiment, only 12 
were actually used (as explained in chapter 5, page 204). In light of this, it is 
acknowledged that the selected triads could have been re-examined (in light of the 
decisions to exclude 3 of the triads) to identify whether liking equivalence could be 
even further enhanced by the replacement of existing stimuli with those from the unused 
triads. Whilst this was not undertaken prior to experimentation, a subsequent 
examination of the pretest data reveals that the equivalence of the triads selected could 
not have been improved in this way. However, the potential for this should perhaps be 
noted and explored during the pretest phase of future research that adopts a similar 
methodological approach to this study. 
 
On reflection, however, a more important limitation of stimulus pretesting may be 
evident in relation to the way in which equivalence was identified. In this respect, it 
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may be recalled that the degree to which participants liked or disliked each potential 
brand name was measured by way of a 5-point likert scale. Brand name triads were then 
identified on the basis that each of the three stimuli exhibited an extremely similar mean 
liking rating that was also very close to neutral (see chapter 5, page 201). However, 
whilst this might be expected to result in choice pairs that are equally likable, based on a 
consideration of the merits of each stimulus in isolation, it does not necessarily reveal 
the extent to which systematic bias might arise as a result of the inherent characteristics 
of the stimuli. To explain; when participants in the main experiment are required to 
express a time-pressured preference between two equally likable stimuli they may use 
inherent processing fluency as an heuristic by which to make decisions with regard to 
the relative qualities of each stimulus (Whittlesea, 1993). In cases whereby one stimulus 
in the pair is easier to process than the other a systematic preference bias might 
therefore emerge on this basis alone. Given this, it is acknowledged that the equivalence 
of stimuli in each triad could have been more effectively pretested by requiring a further 
sample of pretest participants to indicate their preferences for every potential pairing, in 
each proposed triad, under similar time-pressure to that imposed during the main 
experiment. 
 
In the absence of pretesting to identify the possibility of inherent affective bias, 
consideration was given to the development of an additional control phase of 
experimentation whereby participants would be required to complete only the 
preference judgment task from the main experiment; i.e. they would not engage in the 
exposure phase, filler tasks and recognition memory test. This may facilitate between-
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group comparison with the main experimental condition in order to identify the extent 
to which the observed preference bias is specifically linked to prior exposure. However, 
this was considered to be unnecessary for two reasons. Firstly, the selection of equally 
liked stimuli was not the only means by which the experiment was designed to 
minimise systematic bias on the basis of inherent stimulus characteristics. For example, 
exposed brand names were counterbalanced so that half the sample was presented with 
choice pairs containing one set of target brand names (A) whilst the other half was 
presented with another set (B) during the test phase. In both halves, the choice pairs 
were completed by the same filler stimuli. As illustrated in figure 9.2, no significant 
between-group differences are apparent in the overall rate of preference, or those that 
occur in the presence and absence of recognition. The only potential difference that may 
be of worthy of note is that the mean recognition rate is higher amongst those that were 
presented with target set B during the test phase. Not only does this difference fail to 
reach the level of statistical significant (M=4.89, t=1.797, p=0.75), however, but it does 
not appear have a substantive influence on the four dependent variables in the current 
study (i.e. target and non-target preference in the presence and absence of recognition). 
The subsequent absence of significant differences in each half of the sample may 
therefore be taken as an indication that the observed effects are not due to the relative 
characteristics of the two brand names presented in each choice pair (as when all of the 
choice pairs were changed, no significant changes to the results were observed).  
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Figure 3: Comparison of dependent variable results for target sets A and B 
 
 
 
It is acknowledged, however, that it remains theoretically possible that both targets A 
and B were systematically preferred/not-preferred as a result of almost identical 
inherent processing advantages over the filler stimuli with which they were paired. In 
order to supplement the above evidence, therefore, an attempt was made to directly link 
the observed effects to the exposure phase. In this respect, it should be recalled that the 
MEE has been consistently demonstrated to be significantly larger under conditions of 
  505 
subliminal versus supraliminal perception during exposure (see Bornstein, 1989). With 
this in mind, it may be argued that a similar finding in this study would clearly link 
changes in the observed affect-bias to a relevant change in the exposure phase. As 
illustrated in chapter 7 (page 342-343), this result was indeed apparent; providing 
further evidence that the observed effects are causally linked to the exposure phase of 
the experiment. In light of these two additional factors, therefore, it would seem 
unnecessary to continue with additional data collection in the present study. However, 
the pretesting of stimulus choice-pairs under the same conditions as in the main 
experiment should be considered as a means by which to improve the reliability of 
pretesting in future mere exposure research that utilises stimulus-based forced-choice 
tests. 
 
In light of the discussion in this section, therefore, it is proposed that the basis on which 
stimuli were selected for inclusion in this study should not necessarily be considered a 
limitation. However, it may be useful for researchers in this field to acknowledge that it 
could have been further improved by a second review of the selected brand triads prior 
to experimentation and, more importantly, the inclusion of an additional phase of 
pretesting for inherent fluency-bias in which the requirements of the planned preference 
judgment task were more closely replicated. 
 
 
